Recognising Top-Down Causation by George F. R. Ellis

Coincidentally, James, I just looked up on Amazon the book that George referred to that started this thread (Rosen, *Life Itself.*) Biology isn't a subject that normally interests me, so I haven't gotten around to it until now -- however, the publisher's blurb is highly relevant to our discussion; it ends: "Ultimately, Rosen proposes an answer to the original question about the causal basis of life in organisms ... Rosen offers an alternate paradigm for science that takes into account the relational impacts of organization in natural systems and is based on organized matter rather than on particulate matter alone."

Tom

" ... a logical consequence of my clear distinction between past and future ..."

Your "clear distinction" is an assumption made solely of personal belief. Do you also believe that false premises lead to true conclusions?

Tom

Dear Eckard,

I am now sure they are not the same lectures as the Auckland ones. The Auckland lectures were presented for a lay audience as a less technical overview rather than the ones presented to the Caltec students. Trying to find the diagrams in question, I came upon this site which may be of interest to you. The material was produced by some of the students attending Feynman's physics course, as there wasn't a course text book. The notes serve as a historical record of what he taught to his students. Original Course Notes 1961-63

Also there are notes taken from Feynman's lectures Cornell 1947-49 available ...... .. Class notes of James C. Keck 1947-49

Dear Georgina,

You pointed me to handouts including summaries. Unfortunately I found a remark: "Missing Summaries to Lectures 1-17. Do they exist?" I referred in particular to the explanation of Einstein's relativity in Lectures 10, 15, and 17. I do not expect something of interest in the older (1947-1949) lectures.

The most important flaw is to be seen in Fig. 15-2 and the belonging text reiterating the wrong interpretation of the MMX.

Eckard

Dearest Tom :)

""Being bounded is not the same as being discrete.""

"Well, at least, not necessarily the same."

I think they are necessarily the same. I see no lapse, quantum theory included, where continuity between bounds exists. That continuity eliminates discreteness. However, in the approximations fed to us by the delivery of information performed by quanta, we very often receive information in discrete amounts. This limitation is corrected by our intelligences. We fill in for missing gaps of information. We can do this because we know what is coming before it comes. I don't mean that we know what information is about to arrive. I mean that we know already how to interpret it in a continuous manner by adding its 'maybe' missing parts.

The purpose of my message is to emphasize that: Understanding exists before it is needed for interpretation. I say this because it cannot be generated after the creation of the universe.

What say you?

Your Humble Servant,

James Putnam

Hi Rick and Tom,

You remember, I am sure, that I am the person who made the statement that: There is no such thing as electric charge. Considering the probable negative impact that satement must have made, I am very happy to hear from you again.

This 'Algebra' of new advanced mathematics, as it is being applied to theoretical physics is something that I have not said much about. I would not want to open my mou,th so that I give Tom Ray such a wonderful opportunity to bury me :). This is what I think without knowing what I am talking about:

Concerning Octonian Algebra:

" I have shown a different mapping for electrodynamics to particular math using octonion algebraic analysis, outlined in my essay. The nice thing about this approach beyond its ability to provide a potential function cover for gravitation in harmony with electrodynamics is that you are not permitted "added-on guesses". The structure of the algebra provides in no uncertain terms the mathematical structure of a complete set of forces, with no room for any more without going beyond requirements for algebraic invariance. I think everything to be found is present."

I think that what is happening is that similarities or symmetries are sought for after the fact. What I mean by 'after-the-fact' is that first there are the guesses about the nature or natures of cause by theoretical physicists and, then, there are the attempts to impose an arrangment of the combined theoretical guesses with the patterns observed in empirical evidence to form a picture of possible unity. My essay, after one pases by the obviously incorrect beginning, shows the very first choice made by theoretical physics that also firstly introduced unempirically supported disunity into our understanding of the meaning of empirical evidence.

The likenesses or symmetries belong to empirical evidence or they have only the value of guesses. If they belong to empirical evidence, i.e. patterns in changes of velocity, then they are born with their full worth. If they include previous guesses by theoretical physicists before their allegiance is solidified to empirical evidence, then I find them to be highly probable of being in error. That does not mean that I know they are in error. It means that I see their path toward their adoption to be traveled over good empirical stones and highly risky theoretical stones.

I will think more about your message. My problem is that I do not see 'umbrella fixes' as being of greater value than the level of understanding that they are formed to cover over. I am open to considering more input. As things stand right now, I do not understand how more than one cause could be responsible for all that followed during the evolution of the universe. And, mathematical cover, if that is what octonion algebra represents, has not yet shown me a way to make multiple causes logical. This opinion represents only my own level of understanding.

James Putnam

Tom,

You are bending too far over backwards:

"James, you spend a lot more time thinking about cause and effect than I do, so I defer to your opinion that we have no ultimate knowledge of what causes what, in a strict one to one relationship.

On the other hand, we don't know what "what" is, either. Somewhere here in George's rich and informative forum, we touched on artificial intelligence. I offered the metaphor (borrowed from Philip K. Dick's iconic novel) that even if it's possible for androids to dream of electric sheep, only a human brain-mind can dream of androids dreaming of electric sheep. The property of infinite regress that allows one-to-one causes to be replaced by multi-scale causality is inextricably bound to local arrows of time and network feedback. In other words, all the information that makes sense to us, is bounded -- not infinite -- which I expect is the basis of George's statement that continuous is an approximation to discrete. We speak of continuous functions and discrete results; i.e., continuous input, discrete output. From which, we get a general "finite and unbounded" dynamic picture of how the world is put together.

If "what" is information alone, though, your concerns about cause -- and the knowledge thereof -- is not an issue. It isn't knowledge, of what causes what, that adds anything to the meaning of (objective, physical) reality; it is knowledge of information order and relation. Or as Jacob Bronowski put it: "All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses.""

Information consists of empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is representative of patterns in changes of velocity delivered to us in a wildly mixed storm of photonic activity. There is no sense in such a voluminous quantity of wildly varied information until an observer interprets it. That interpetration process has no grounding in science. So far asa physicists are concerned, they think they get it for free. Theoretical physics attempts to pretend that it accounts for the existence of the interpretive process. That pretense ends with me. The categorization of empirical evidence in any form, no matter how well it is presently organized, does not explain what cause is.

The human mind, or even an insect's ability to interpret information for the purpose of finding purpose in it, remains to this day by anyone, including the popularization of 'Complexity experts', completely inexplicable. For anyone who considers responding to this rmark, I point out aganin that the practice of categorizing data is not a substitute for explaining the meaning obtained from the data.

"Or as Jacob Bronowski put it: "All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses."

Or, as I would put it: Unity in empirical likenesses. Empirical likenesses either stand on their own, without the crutch of theoretical physics, or, they remain too incomplete for conclusive results.

James Putnam

Tom,

I should have emphasized that: If one does not explain cause then one only has effects that are explained by nothing scientifically.

James Putnam

Tom,

I didn't mean what is the next step after Newton. I mean that in this process of punctuated equilibrium, as it applies to physical theories of the universe, what initiates the point of punctuation, when the dominant paradigm has stabilized to the point of spinning its wheels, as many recognize the current state of affairs has reached?

" What you say about about science, John, is simply not the way that science actually works in the real world. Scientists are generally a lot more patient and a lot less ambitious than you apparently think they should be."

I'm not doubting you, but sometimes, playing it safe is not the key to success.

"Yes, I would."

And five hundred years ago, the safe assumption would have been that giant cosmic gearwheels powered the motion of the stars, with the earth as the center of the universe.

" with the potential of the future continually becoming the certainty of the past;"

It would seem that only in a classic world is the past certain. Relativistically, since every event is entirely contextual and dependant on the point of observation for its definition, past events are constantly receding ever further into the past and thus from any perspective in the present, are constantly in a state of flux. Any description of events, as they occurred, are subjectively dependent, why wouldn't this effect be compounded as the event recedes into the past?

"Spacetime is well grounded, however, in both theory and experiment."

And we still use Newton to get men to the moon.

John,

You wrote, "I didn't mean what is the next step after Newton. I mean that in this process of punctuated equilibrium, as it applies to physical theories of the universe, what initiates the point of punctuation, when the dominant paradigm has stabilized to the point of spinning its wheels, as many recognize the current state of affairs has reached?"

If what you say is true then the many, unfortunately, don't know how the mathematical model of self organized criticality -- the model that supports punctuated equilibria -- actually works. The normal global state of a system is stasis; periods of rapid change can't be recognized locally as system-changing episodes -- they are only out of equilibrium punctuations of a system state whose path is always toward equilibrium, and which remains metastable over its life in spite of the recurrence of what has been nicknamed the "avalanche effect."

This effect has been shown empirically even in self organized communication networks (Braha--Bar-Yam; Complexity, 2006) where shorter intervals of observation may demonstrate dramatic shifts in the hub of communication. Over the long term, however, the system shows hardly any change at all.

So where you are sitting, at this moment -- fretting over the sorry state of science as you see it and wishing for an avalanche of ideas that may or may not happen -- is but a tiny spot in the landscape of science and not even necessarily where the action really is.

Me: "What you say about about science, John, is simply not the way that science actually works in the real world. Scientists are generally a lot more patient and a lot less ambitious than you apparently think they should be."

You: "I'm not doubting you, but sometimes, playing it safe is not the key to success."

Neither is being reckless, even intellectually so. You seem to think that system-changing ideas come in flashes of insight unrelated to anything that came before. This is demonstrably untrue -- the projection of scientific explanations into unexplored territory begins where unexplained data end. For example, Hoyle's steady state cosmology was as much state-of-the-art as big bang theory, until the discovery (1965) of cosmic background radiation, which steady state cannot explain, and big bang can.

You: " ... five hundred years ago, the safe assumption would have been that giant cosmic gearwheels powered the motion of the stars, with the earth as the center of the universe."

And 3000 years ago, the movement of the sun would be described as Apollo driving his fiery chariot across the heavens. The evolution of our ideas, about how the cosmos works, does not happen all at once. It's rather arrogant to disparage the ancients and elevate our own knowledge to some special status.

(Quoted from Ellis:) " ... with the potential of the future continually becoming the certainty of the past;"

You: "It would seem that only in a classic world is the past certain. Relativistically, since every event is entirely contextual and dependant on the point of observation for its definition, past events are constantly receding ever further into the past and thus from any perspective in the present, are constantly in a state of flux. Any description of events, as they occurred, are subjectively dependent, why wouldn't this effect be compounded as the event recedes into the past?"

Your naive idea of past events receding linearly, is far from George Ellis' nonlinear potential. In the latter, not only is the objectivity of time's arrow locally preserved; events are not spatially separated in the predictable way that you imagine.

Me: "Spacetime is well grounded, however, in both theory and experiment."

You: "And we still use Newton to get men to the moon."

Would you prefer an M-16 over a flyswatter, when the object is to squash a fly?

Tom

Hi James,

You wrote: "I see no lapse, quantum theory included, where continuity between bounds exists."

Not even between particle and wave?

"That continuity eliminates discreteness. However, in the approximations fed to us by the delivery of information performed by quanta, we very often receive information in discrete amounts."

Actually, I would say the same thing another way: we always receive information in continuous waves and our organs process it discretely. Brain mechanics -- or any other conceivable way of sorting information -- slices the continuum informationally in ways that benefit the continuity, or survival, of the organism or machine. A computing machine, independent of a biological organism, doesn't "like" to halt; a universal Turing machine is characterized by an infinitesimal halting probability (see Chaitin). A living organism, futilely climbing the slope of nonequilibrium, solving problems ("All life is problem solving" as Karl Popper put it), *must* halt its general function to perform specific functions that maintain the nonequilibrium state. Complex multicelled organisms thus become corporations of cooperating cells that split their functions for common survival, i.e., continuity. So if the brain were to be seen as a computing machine, it would relay only the information suited to the function of each of its divided parts. The parts then recombine as organs cooperating toward higher functions.

"This limitation is corrected by our intelligences. We fill in for missing gaps of information. We can do this because we know what is coming before it comes. I don't mean that we know what information is about to arrive. I mean that we know already how to interpret it in a continuous manner by adding its 'maybe' missing parts."

Or -- more than maybe -- organ intelligence feeds back missing information for the organism to process. Point is, cooperating parts of a self organized system have to continuously coordinate information and tasks toward a common purpose to keep the system continuously functioning.

"The purpose of my message is to emphasize that: Understanding exists before it is needed for interpretation. I say this because it cannot be generated after the creation of the universe.

What say you?"

Sure, I agree. That's what I mean when I say that consciousness lies on a continuum from the lowest levels -- of matter organization and information utilization -- to the highest.

I boil it down to: meaning precedes construction.

Tom

James,

You wrote, "Empirical evidence is representative of patterns in changes of velocity delivered to us in a wildly mixed storm of photonic activity. There is no sense in such a voluminous quantity of wildly varied information until an observer interprets it."

By means of theory.

"That interpetration process has no grounding in science."

I can't know what you mean by "science" that differs from correspondence between abstract theory and physical measurement.

"So far asa physicists are concerned, they think they get it for free."

If only it were that easy.

"Theoretical physics attempts to pretend that it accounts for the existence of the interpretive process."

It does. What other means do you suggest is available for the conscious interpretation of data, than theory? If you mean, perhaps, that automatic functions -- such as the lower levels of chemical self-assembly, or the higher levels of an organism's breathing or hearts beating -- explain themselves independent of theory, one can't disagree. If one wants to consciously understand the function, though, theory is primary.

"That pretense ends with me. The categorization of empirical evidence in any form, no matter how well it is presently organized, does not explain what cause is."

What? I thought we agreed that cause and consciousness are identical. :-)

Tom

Tom,

""That interpetration process has no grounding in science.""

"I can't know what you mean by "science" that differs from correspondence between abstract theory and physical measurement."

What I mean is that science has no means for explaining the interpretation of data as processed by lifeforms. By the way, the "...correspondence between abstract theory and physical measurement." does not confirm theory. It merely makes clear that the equations in their present form accurately adhere to the limitations imposed upon it by theorist.

The theorist, by their intervention, limit the meaning of physics equations. Those limited equations fit the theory by design of the theorist. Yet, they do not add to our understanding. They subtract from our understanding. They subtract becuse their meanings have been artificially limited.

"":So far as physicists are concerned, they think they get it for free.""

"If only it were that easy."

What I mean is that they invent cause and inject it onto the equations of physics that are best in their empirical form. Their empirial form consists of modeling the patterns observed in changes of velocity. The free remark refers to the imaginative inventions of the theorist.

""Theoretical physics attempts to pretend that it accounts for the existence of the interpretive process.""

"I don't know why I said 'attempts' to pretend. Theoretical physics believes in many of its guesses about the nature of cause, but, it has no knowledge to access that would explain cause. Its attempts to explain case are invented. This inventive process occurs because coices must be made. Those choices have to do with making the equations of physics useful. And, they are useful. But, the action taken consists forcing imagined properties onto the equations of physics."

"For example, I return to f=ma. No one knows that mass is an indefinable, or a primary property as referred misleadingly to in modern texts. The theorist invents names for the unknowns in physics equations. That is not the problem for physics. The problem is that their choices prompt them to invent units of measurement that themselves are indefinable, or primary. The additon of names and new indefinable units of measurement give the appearance of moving physics forward. Again, the equations remain useful."

"hat usefullness results from the equations having a form that accurately models the patterns observed in empirical evidence. Empirical evidence consists of patterns observed in changes of velocity of objects. The loss that occurs because of the theorists' intervention is that the equations were most informative in their untheoreticalized forms. Theory limits their meanings."

"I guess I will end this at this point. Others do not see the problem that I think I see. Anyway, my essay, had the purpose of showing how to proceed with physics equations without limiting their meanings by adding on theory. I see some typos that I will not bother to correct. The reason is that as I type sometimes suddenly portions of my text disappear."

James Putnam

Tom,

""Theoretical physics attempts to pretend that it accounts for the existence of the interpretive process.""

"It does. What other means do you suggest is available for the conscious interpretation of data, than theory? If you mean, perhaps, that automatic functions -- such as the lower levels of chemical self-assembly, or the higher levels of an organism's breathing or hearts beating -- explain themselves independent of theory, one can't disagree. If one wants to consciously understand the function, though, theory is primary."

Theoretical physics accounts only for its additions added on to equations of physics about patterns in changes of velocity. Those add ons are always guesses about how mechanical effects might occur.

""That pretense ends with me. The categorization of empirical evidence in any form, no matter how well it is presently organized, does not explain what cause is.""

"What? I thought we agreed that cause and consciousness are identical. :-)"

But, science has no explanation for either one. Perhaps it is helpful for me to point out that empirical evidence does not give us the answers about the natures of either cause or consciousness. Empirical evidence is always about effects. If those effects occur in patterns, then they are helpful to us because we can form equations that model those patterns. The modeling process does not add to, and even may take away from, the meaning being made available to us in those patterns. The modeling process often takes away from the meaning available by being incomplete or only approximate.

James Putnam

Tom,

Equilibria get punctuated when there is a build up of stored energy, ie, static energy. It is that very stasis which creates the conditions for the avalanche. It is when the energy is more fluid/dynamic, ie. less static, that such situations do not occur. When there are many small bubbles constantly building up and popping, rather than a few, or one large one.

"You seem to think that system-changing ideas come in flashes of insight unrelated to anything that came before."

And where have I said that? The one point I keep making, that explaing time would be more effective if we think of it as the future becoming past as a consequence of dynamic processes, as opposed to treating it as a measure from prior to succeeding events, has endless precedence. To quote you, quoting Ellis, " with the potential of the future continually becoming the certainty of the past." That, in a nutshell, is what I keep saying we should examine. How can you say it has no precedent, simply because it is overlooked? There are lots of things that get overlooked. That is not the same as lacking precedence.

"Your naive idea of past events receding linearly, is far from George Ellis' nonlinear potential. In the latter, not only is the objectivity of time's arrow locally preserved; events are not spatially separated in the predictable way that you imagine. "

Where do you get that I'm arguing the past recedes linearly? I'm the one who keeps comparing it to temperature!!! From Ellis' paper: "We also can't retrodict to the past at the quantum level, because once the wave function has collapsed to an eigenstate we can't tell from its final state what it was before the measurement." I've basically argued the past decays. From my entry in this contest: "It is as though the thread of time is being woven from strands frayed off from what had previously been woven and the past becomes as unknowable as the future." How do you get "linear" from that?

"Would you prefer an M-16 over a flyswatter, when the object is to squash a fly?"

The point is that the math works, even if the assumptions on which it is based, such as absolute time and space, are in error. The extent of your proof of relativity is that the math works. No time traveling wormholes yet.

John, I know you have convinced yourself that we are talking about the same things. We're not. I'm satisfied that I have done my best to explain why the state of science is not as you claim. Further I am not willing to go.

Tom

James,

You wrote: "Perhaps it is helpful for me to point out that empirical evidence does not give us the answers about the natures of either cause or consciousness."

More than that, empirical evidence (observed phenomena) gives us no answers at all about *anything*, other than by means of a theory that incorporates the observation.

The relevant question is, where does one stop the infinite regress of cause? If I say that consciousness causes life, and you ask in turn what causes consciousness, the word "cause" loses all meaning entirely. On the other hand, because we know -- empirically -- that many forms of causality are hidden in the feedback between a system and its environment, we can form closed logical judgments by setting boundary conditions on the environment. As George Ellis has also allowed, no real physical phenomenon is infinite.

With what boundary conditions would you be satisfied, James? None? You might be right -- there may be no absolute standard by which we can understand "cause." I find that the capacity for infinite regress is a unique product of human imagination, however, in that no bounded system -- e.g., a scientist performing a quantum experiment or a computer performing a calculation -- contains in itself any information beyond the arbitrary boundary conditions assumed in the initial condition. There's a way out:

A self organized system is, in its definition, self-limiting; therefore, all cause-effect relations are local. Experiments aren't self organized, and computers aren't self organized -- so allowing a self organized universe, unless we include metaphysical realism we cannot even say what is real. A universe of infinitely regressive cause is not a real universe.

Tom

Tom,

No, as I've pointed out before, we are very definitely talking past each other. While it may frustrate you, I still find it enlightening for a number of reasons. Thanks for carrying on the conversation as long as you have.

Tom,

Me: "Perhaps it is helpful for me to point out that empirical evidence does not give us the answers about the natures of either cause or consciousness."

Tom: "More than that, empirical evidence (observed phenomena) gives us no answers at all about *anything*, other than by means of a theory that incorporates the observation."

Me: We don't need the theory. The information is in the empirical evidence. My point is that the empirical evidence always consists of effects. We do not know what cause is, but, empirical evidence tells us everything we can know about what it does. We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory. The theory is a constraint on ahieving understanding about the nature of the universe. Theory consists of adding guesses about the nature or natures of cause or causes onto physics equations. The damage done is that those invented causes represent artificial endpoinst in understanding the meaning conveyed to us by empirical evidence.

Tom: "The relevant question is, where does one stop the infinite regress of cause? If I say that consciousness causes life, and you ask in turn what causes consciousness, the word "cause" loses all meaning entirely. On the other hand, because we know -- empirically -- that many forms of causality are hidden in the feedback between a system and its environment, we can form closed logical judgments by setting boundary conditions on the environment. As George Ellis has also allowed, no real physical phenomenon is infinite."

Me: There is no infinite regress of cause. I understand that the common usage of the word cause gives that impression. When I speak of cause, I am referring to that which results in patterns in changes of velocity at the level of the foundation of physics. For example, a line of billiard balls is set up with small gaps between them. The first in line is hit with a cue stick and each ball hits the next ball causing all to move in turn. This example contains the common usage of the word cause. At the foundational level the cause for all those effects is the same one. It is called electric charge. Electric charge is a theory. Mass as the cause of gravity is a different theory. Those two theories restrict our understanding of cause by the role they play, due to the theorists, in introducing fundamental disunity onto physics equations.

Tom: "With what boundary conditions would you be satisfied, James? None? You might be right -- there may be no absolute standard by which we can understand "cause." I find that the capacity for infinite regress is a unique product of human imagination, however, in that no bounded system -- e.g., a scientist performing a quantum experiment or a computer performing a calculation -- contains in itself any information beyond the arbitrary boundary conditions assumed in the initial condition. There's a way out:

A self organized system is, in its definition, self-limiting; therefore, all cause-effect relations are local. Experiments aren't self organized, and computers aren't self organized -- so allowing a self organized universe, unless we include metaphysical realism we cannot even say what is real. A universe of infinitely regressive cause is not a real universe."

Me: The infinite regression of cause is actually an infinite regression of effects. Effects are not causes regardless of superficial appearances. One effect leads to another, but, no effect causes another. There are no self-organized systems except in appearance. All effects that have and will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from te beginning of the universe. That is the way it has to have been if we are to rule out allowing theorists to introduce later miracles. That first cause is unknown but it certainly was real. These theoretical causes, by their presence in physics equations, restrict and mislead us in learning about the original and truly foundational cause. It didn't go away. Theory helps to hide it, but, it is always the same cause behind all effects. That cause must account for what physics theory cannot account for. For example, intelligence. We receive all information from a constantly changing wildly mixed storm of photons. Intelligence makes sense out of that mess and it doesn't use theory to do it.

James Putnam