Daniel

Agreed. Any such concepts as incompleteness, etc are a reflection of our failure to comprehend all that existed, not a feature of physical reality. Which existed in a definite form, as at any point in time, and is, by definition, a sequence which is being driven by the lowest level of that which it comprises.

Paul

George/JCN/John

All the above may be correct from the perspective being taken (ie non physical). But, at the physical level, there is no influence on the next state which will exist (commonly known as future), because it does not exist. What happens is that a state occurs which is different from what which would otherwise have occurred. Nothing has been changed, physically, because nothing existed physically to change. In terms of sequence, what might be seen as 'oscillation', 'reaction', etc, is just re-occurrence. For example: A B C B D, is not, physically, some form of 'return' to B, but a re-occurrence of B. And for those who would ask the next question, what if it was A B C B D D D E. The answer is that D continued to exist for more than one point in time, that being, by definition, the level at which the sequence is fully differentiatable, because it is the fastest at which any change occurs, and D was a state which did not alter at that speed.

Paul

Some while ago I said I'd post about a Feynman quotation which is illuminatng as to his view on which if any level is fundamental. Here it is:

In his book "The character of physical law" , on pp.124-125,

Richard Feynman summarises the hierarchy of structure, starting with

the fundamental laws of physics and their application to protons,

neutrons, and electrons, going on to atoms and heat, and including

waves, storms, stars, as well as frogs and concepts like `man',

`history, `political expediency', `evil', `beauty', and `hope'. He

then says the following (pp. 125-126):

"Which end is nearer to God, if I may use a religious metaphor.

Beauty and hope, or the fundamental laws? I think that the right

way, of course, is to say that what we have to look at is the whole

structural interconnection of the thing; and that all the sciences,

and not just the sciences but all the efforts of intellectual kinds,

are an endeavour to see the connections of the hierarchies, to

connect beauty to history, to connect history to man's psychology,

man's psychology to the working of the brain, the brain to the

neural impulse, the neural impulse to chemistry, and so forth, up

and down, both ways. And today we cannot, and it is no use making

believe we can, draw carefully a line all the way from one end of

this thing to the other, because we have only just begun to see that

there is this relative hierarchy."

"And I do not think either end is nearer to God. To stand at either

end, and to walk off that end of the pier only, hoping that out in

that direction is the complete understanding, is a mistake. And to

stand with evil and beauty and hope, or with fundamental laws,

hoping that way to get a deep understanding of the whole world, with

that aspect alone, is a mistake. It is not sensible for the ones who

specialize at one end, and the ones who specialize at the other, to

have such disregard for each other ... The great mass of workers in

between, connecting one step to another, are improving all the time

our understanding of the world, both from working at the ends and

from working in the middle, and in that way we are gradually

understanding this tremendous world of interconnecting hierarchies."

    I don't want to enter into to the territory of Godel's theorem Roger Penrose is the person to talk to about that. Rather I'll just commnent one statement:

    "If the Universe is found to be both consistent and complete, that is, the fundamental objects and the laws that govern them are consistent (consistency) and all that they produce remains part of the Universe (completeness), then all physical processes are emergent."

    This is a non-sequitur. "Completeness" above means that you can't get out of the universe by application of physical laws. It does not guarantee that everything in the universe can be attained in this way. Some physical processes are not emergent but are entailed in a top-down way. For example there is no bottom up process by which the computer memory states embodying a Quicksort algorithm can emerge from the action of the underlying physics acting in a purely bottom-up way. Indeed the same is true of the processes leading to creation of a teacup or a pair of spectacles (see my Nature article "Physics, complexity and causality" 435, 743 (2005)). If you believe this is wrong,please advise me of a physical law or process that unambiguously determines how a tea cup can be created in a purely bottom-up way.

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    Dear George,

    Thank you for that Feynman quote; it nails the topic perfectly, in his inimitable way.

    On the theory that one good quote deserves another, here's another of my favorites by David Deutsch, this one from his book 'The Beginning of Infinity' (p.75).

    "Like an explosive awaiting a spark, unimaginably numerous environments in the universe are waiting out there, for aeons on end, doing nothing at all or blindly generating evidence and storing it up or pouring it out into space. Almost any of them would, if the right knowledge ever reached it, instantly burst into a radically different type of physical activity: intense knowledge-creation, displaying all the various kinds of complexity, universality and reach that are inherent in the laws of nature, and transforming that environment from what is typical today into what could become typical in the future. If we want to, we could be that spark."

    jcns

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    In thinking about this I then ponder whether random networks subjected to some sort of selection process can then evolve into a form suggested here. This is in a manner of thinking a sort of Darwinian process. A random network might compared to some random noise or white noise system, but where given some sample of possible random networks subjected to a culling process plus some "survival criterion" results in networks which are less random and output what might be called pink noise.

    Thanks for the reference.

    Cheers LC

    Dear George Ellis,

    A very interesting read. In a reply to Paul you note that "reality is unclear" at the particle level because of uncertainty, wave-particle duality, and entanglement. In this sense any change in understanding of these aspects of reality might be expected to have some effect on the conception of 'the bottom' (although equivalence classes might not change). For this reason I invite you to read and hopefully comment on my current essay, The Nature of the Wave Function.

    At the other end of the spectrum, in a comment to jcns, you bring 'meaning and purpose' into the picture. This brings up the question, "where is the top?". Do you make an assumption here, or is the top an open ended concept?

    I agree that most discussions of emergence do NOT treat 'top down causation' and you are to be commended for doing so.

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

      "In a reply to Paul you note that "reality is unclear" at the particle level because of uncertainty, wave-particle duality, and entanglement"

      Indeed, to which I have responded with the point that this cannot be so, otherwise there would be no physical existence, which there is, and no alteration to that, which there is. Whatever reality 'ultimately' is, which we can never know, because we too are part of it, what we certainly do know is that there is 'something out there' ('out' being extrinsic to sensory detection systems)and it alters. The whole process of sensory detection(ie seeing, hearing, etc) involves the physical receipt of physically existent phenomena (eg light, noise, vibration), which are themselves the result of an interaction between other physically existent phenomena (one of which we tend to label the reality). That is the fundamental physics.

      So physical reality obviously occurs in a specific physically existent state. It does not exist in some "unclear" manner. The issue is our inability to identify that. The sensory systems evolved to ensure survival of organisms, not the sensing of the very constitution of reality ('the bottom'). The Copenhagen interpretation, and any other theory that assumes there is no 'bottom', or that sensing affects the 'bottom', is invalid. In the latter case, it is sheer nonsense. Not only do organisms not receive reality anyway, when sensing, by definition, reality has already occurred for them to be able to sense it!

      The question then becomes, having swept away metaphysical presumptions and invalid theories, what constitutes the 'bottom'? My definition, and I am perfectly happy with improvements thereto-just no the incorrect assertion that there is not one, is: " the physically existent state which occurs as at any given point in time, is a function of the particular state of the properties of the elementary particles involved, and their spatial position, as at that point in time"

      Paul

      George,

      I'm afraid that you (and everybody else, for that matter) confuse causality with reason.

      If we understand something only if we can explain it as the effect of some cause, and understand this cause only if we can explain it as the effect of a preceding cause, then this chain of cause-and-effect either goes on ad infinitum, or it ends at some primordial cause which, as it cannot be reduced to a preceding cause, cannot be understood by definition.

      Causality therefore ultimately cannot explain anything. If, for example, you invent Higgs particles to explain the mass of other particles, then you'll eventually find that you need some other particle to explain the Higgs, a particle which in turn also has to be explained etcetera.

      If you press the A key on your computer keyboard, then you don't cause the letter A to appear on your computer screen but just switch that letter on with the A tab, just like when you press the heck, you don't cause the door to open, but just open it. Similarly, if a let a glass fall out of my hand, then I don't cause it to break as it hits the floor, I just use gravity to smash the glass so there's nothing causal in this action.

      Though chaos theory often is thought to say that the antics of a moth at one place can cause a hurricane elsewhere, if an intermediary event can cancel the hurricane, then the moth's antics only can be a cause in retrospect, if the hurricane actually does happens, so it cannot cause the hurricane at all. Though events certainly are related, they cannot always be understood in terms of cause and effect.

      The flaw at the heart of Big Bang Cosmology is that in the concept of cosmic time (the time passed since the mythical bang) it states that the universe lives in a time continuum not of its own making, that it presumes the existence of an absolute clock, a clock we can use to determine what in an absolute sense precedes what.

      This originates in our habit in physics to think about objects and phenomena as if looking at them from an imaginary vantage point outside the universe, as if it is legitimate scientifically to look over God's shoulders at His creation, so to say.

      However, a universe which creates itself out of nothing, without any outside interference does not live in a time continuum of its own making but contains and produces all time within: in such universe there is no clock we can use to determine what precedes what in an absolute sense, what is cause of what.

      For a discussion why big bang cosmology describes a fictitious universe, see my essay 'Einstein's Error.'

      Anton

        Anton

        I am not going to make a judgement on the validity of your general point, but will alight on "then this chain of cause-and-effect either goes on ad infinitum, or it ends at some primordial cause which, as it cannot be reduced to a preceding cause, cannot be understood by definition".

        Now, there are two issues here:

        1 Cause must involve physically existent phenomena. In simple language, cause is not something which is somehow 'separate' from physical existence (and I am not implying you are saying that). So it is definitive and knowable, and must have correspondence with physically existent phenomena.

        2 We are concerned with knowledge of reality, not reality. In other words, assuming a valid closed system can be identified (which it can-sensory detection in all organisms), then there is a 'limit/confine', within which all is, potentially, knowable (only practical problems in the sensory detection process prevent this from being so, not metaphysical considerations). There is a valid limit to the knowledge that is potentially available to us. The confusion is in not understanding that we are ultimately dealing with knowledge of the actuality, not the actuality.

        Paul

        Paul,

        You have repeated your beliefs on FQXi probably more often than any one else. My question was addressed to George Ellis, who has not flooded FQXi with his opinions, and whose thread this is.

        Paul,

        What is or happens within a perfectly closed system has no physical reality to someone outside of it: it does not belong to his universe, is unobservable so he cannot say anything about it. The same goes for the second law of thermodynamics: if a system is perfectly closed, that is, if there's no physical communication possible with what's inside of it, then it doesn't even make sense to ask how much entropy it contains. As in a self-creating universe the observation interaction affects the observed, there is no absolute, i.e., objectively observable reality at the origin of our observations. It isn't that our observation is imperfect; the point is that in a universe where particles create one another, their properties are as much the effect as the cause of their interactions so the observation interaction unavoidably affects the nature of the thing to be observed. Here we cannot really distinguish between the properties of a fundamental particle and their expression. In such universe there is no reality separate from its observation, though imperfect observational equipment or methods of course blur observations.

        Anton

        Dear George

        (As a courtesy to Professor Ellis, and to keep discussions focused I hope other posters will not respond to this on his page unless he does.)

        You make a convincing case for being wary of simplistic down-up causation. Your arguments make sense but only in the context of present-day physics which is far from being a harmonious conceptual whole where one theory applies both to the very large and the very small - please see my present fqxi essay Fix Physics! about that. I am conviced that if such a simple theory of everything were to be found, causation would be always local and linear at the smallest scales and the effects of large systems will be the resultant of effects transmitted locally and causally down to the local level and vice-versa simultaneously in a balanced way:

        Think of a ripple tank where one 'simple local' point sends out waves to a 'complex system' consisting of points on a surrounding perimeter. Anywhere in the space between the 'local or down point' and those of a larger 'higher complex perimeter' system the resulting interference pattern will be caused by both systems simultaneously. Here is my tentative approach to such a ToE Beautiful Universe Theory .

        With best wishes from Vladimir

          Well said Edwin.

          Paul, has a gift for systematic analysis of statements by physicists. This may be put to very good use for example in writing a monograph on how historically various physicists changed their own positions on subjects such as SR , the ether, time, etc. That would be really interesting.

          Cheers to both of you

          Vladimir

          Edwin

          "You have repeated your beliefs on FQXi probably more often than any one else"

          First, why this concept of "repeated"? In your post you picked up, and mentioned, a response to me. To which I responed, particular since it is a fundamental point in this topic, but had no response.

          Second, why the concept of "beliefs"? If what I write is belief, particularly childish ones, then as I said before, and as would have been a better response here, why don't you point out, factually, where I am, obviously, wrong?

          Paul

          Vladimir

          You, and indeed many others (ie it is not a personal point) keep making statements about SR. I post, with evidence, that SR might not be what people think it is.

          In particular, when relevant, I ask if people can please read my posts on my blog, ie 11/7 1933 & 13/7 11.24, which since I now have a blog, I took the opportunity to post. These are 8 pages of analysis of the subject. So, although it is not quite the subject of the monograph you suggest, it is a monograph that is more relevant. I could be wrong of course, but as yet, I am not even aware of anyone having read them. And incidentally, this is not my essay, so it is not as if I am making a point in order to market my essay.

          Paul

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          Anton

          "What is or happens within a perfectly closed system has no physical reality to someone outside of it"

          Exactly. And we are part of physical reality, we cannot extricate ourselves from it. We can only know that which is 'outside', ie independent of, sensory detection. Which means we have a validated closed system. That determines the 'boundary' between scientific knowledge and belief. Bearing in mind that we have to hypothecate to overcome known practical problems in the physics of the sensory detection process, but must reference this back to validated direct experience, ie avoid belief when doing this.

          "As in a self-creating universe..." But this is not the reality of which we are a part. When we sense something, we are receiving a physically existent phenomenon, ie it exists independently of our sensing of it.

          Paul

          Paul this is the last time I will reply to any of your extremely repetitive comments.

          You say "physical reality obviously occurs in a specific physically existent state. It does not exist in some "unclear" manner. ... The Copenhagen interpretation, and any other theory that assumes there is no 'bottom', or that sensing affects the 'bottom', is invalid."

          You seem not to understand either wave particle duality or entanglement. The way experiments are done does indeed affect the properties of the bottom-most particles we can access. Please spend a bit of time reading Feynman or any other good text on basic quantum physics. I do believe that Heisenberg, Bohr, and Feynman understood the physics considerably better than either I or you do.

          You continue "The question then becomes, having swept away metaphysical presumptions and invalid theories, what constitutes the 'bottom'? My definition .. is: " the physically existent state which occurs as at any given point in time, is a function of the particular state of the properties of the elementary particles involved, and their spatial position, as at that point in time".

          I repeat what I have already said to you: in quantum field theory, particles are not the fundamental entities: they are just excitations of fields. They don't have either definite positions or momenta, according to the uncertainty principle. Your Newtonian model of basic reality is 90 years out of date.

          As for time, I have already agreed with your statement "What physically happens is that a different physically existent state subsequently occurs from that which would have otherwise occurred." True. The future does not exist now but it will exist later on. Yes.

          I can't see the point of all the further argumentation about this. Whatever else it is about time that bugs you is unclear to me, and repeating it yet again won't help. Please don't repeat it again on this particular forum.

          Dear Edwin Eugene Klingman

          you ask "where is the top?" A very good question, and the answer depends on context:in the case of structure of the human brain, no top is currently identifiable: things near the top seem to be non-localised. In the case of cosmology, one ends up with philosophy because the largest physical scales are unobservable (there are observational horizons in the real universe) so you can say anything you want about it and no on will ever be able to make observations that contradict what you say. So the claims I make are local claims (for any pairs of related levels) and independent of any global claims about any topmost level.

          This applies also to the bottom - there may or may not be a bottom-most level; if there is one we don't know what it is (it may be string/M theory, but then again it may not). Indeed all the levels we deal with in ordinary physics are effective levels, not fundamental;and this does not matter. This is just as well , else we could not do physics.

          George Ellis

          Anton

          "Causality therefore ultimately cannot explain anything." If so please explain to me how you go about your daily life. If you are unable to cause any changes about you in your daily existence, then you don't exist as a person (and you certainly won't be able to get a job).

          I explained carefully at the start of my paper that there are always numerous causes in action, and we get a useful concept of "the cause" by taking all except a few for granted. This produces a valid local theory of causation. You don't have to solve problems of ultimate causation to understand local physical effects (e.g. heating water causes it to boil). Your complaint seems to be that if you can't explain the entire universe you can't explain such local phenomena. The whole practice of science disagrees with you.

          George