• [deleted]

Dear George,

The paper to which you referred me, 'Top down causation and emergence: some comments on mechanisms,' did indeed help to answer my earlier question about squaring your ideas with natural selection. Thank you.

I'd like to comment on the point you made in your example illustrated by the question: "Why is an aircraft flying?" You wrote, "And why was it designed to fly? Because it will potentially make a profit for the manufacturers and the airline company! Without the prospect of that profit, it would not exist. This is the topmost cause for its existence."

I question whether there may be an even higher level cause: some human somewhere along the line posed the question "If birds can fly, why can't I?" And then our fellow humans refused to stop seeking until they found a satisfactory answer. Human curiosity about the way things work.

We might ask why all these essays have been written and submitted to the FQXi essay competition. Was it primarily because all these authors hope to win some easy money? I suspect not. More likely it is because they all have thought about the workings of the universe and have developed their own ideas and explanations that they believe are sensible, and they seek to share their ideas with similarly thoughtful people and, hopefully, perhaps to receive validation in the form of recognition and appreciation, regardless of any potential monetary reward.

Is it possible that human curiosity and creativity and eagerness for constructive collaboration are among the top of the topmost causes?

jcns

    • [deleted]

    jcns,

    With George's point about planes existing because they make a profit for airlines and manufacturers, it is a top down logic of careful analysis of the situation and how it might be incrementally expanded. With your observation about flight being a consequence of human curiosity, it leans more toward a bottom up evolutionary striving, where all possible options get tried and those which succeed are the most repeated. Obviously there is no clear line between the two, but a constant feedback between experimentation and planning.

    One might define the basis or bottom, as simple, while the elevated state is simply more complex, rather than "higher." So that initial question, "If birds can fly, why can't I?" is not so much a higher cause, but a more elemental cause. George's top down position is rather a vantage point from where one might plan on how to push even further up.

    • [deleted]

    What sort of role might Erdos-Renyi networks play here? The sort of nearest neighbor approach with probability weights is a neural model of sorts. These networks are the basis for percolation theory and mean field theory. When the number of connected nodes reaches some threshold the properties of the system can change. In the case of percolation theory this can lead to a rapid failure of a material.

    • [deleted]

    It should be noted that complexity tends to multiply, until it becomes unstable, which is where our banking system currently is. The reason for this particular exponential complexity has been the advantage it provides those managing banking to drain resources from the rest of the economy. Obviously this is not to the benefit of society, or even the long term health of banking, which is built on trust, so the question it brings up is as to whether there is such a thing as a "top," from which one might look down, or is that always just a completely subjective point of reference?

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    John,

    You have raised some interesting points. Rather than comment directly on them myself I'd prefer to get George's own views; he clearly has given this topic far more thought than I have, and probably far more than both of us combined.

    It certainly is a fascinating topic. David Deutsch has offered what strikes me as a classic comment on the topic in his book 'The Fabric of Reality' as follows (apologies for the odd spacing; I know not how to fix it):

    "For example, consider

    one particular copper atom at the tip of the nose of the statue

    of Sir Winston Churchill that stands in Parliament Square in

    London. Let me try to explain why that copper atom is there. It

    is because Churchill served as prime minister in the House of

    Commons nearby; and because his ideas and leadership contributed

    to the Allied victory in the Second World War; and because it is

    customary to honor such people by putting up statues of them;

    and because bronze, a traditional material for such statues,

    contains copper, an so on. Thus we explain a low-level physical

    observation-- the presence of a copper atom at a particular

    location-- through extremely high-level theories about emergent

    phenomena such as ideas, leadership, war and tradition.

    There is no reason why there should exist, even in

    principle, any lower-level explanation of the presence of

    that copper atom than the one I have just given."

    jcns

    JCN

    But this is not a physical explanation as to why it is there, is it?

    Paul

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    jcns,

    Alot of it could be described as wave action. To compress the analogy somewhat, the stokers on an old coal ship may not know, or at least it doesn't matter if they know, where the ship is going. Even the cells in your arm don't understand the higher order functions of you writing at the computer. Yet in some ways, even those further up the conceptual food chain might be oblivious even higher order intentions, even to the point of those seemingly at the top. To use the banking analogy, there is the personal motivation of making money among bankers, yet there is a higher order function of circulating value within the economy. It is when the bankers start primarily focusing on their own intentions of making money and losing sight of that higher order function, that the wave crests, or goes into a terminal bubble phase. This might go back down the scale; when those cells in your arm stop serving some higher order function and only want nutrition, your arm would cease to function, either due to exhaustion, disease, etc.

    We could take this analogy much further up the chain and suppose life on this planet was trying to form a functioning central nervous system, with human civilization as its particular medium, the copper of the statue, so to speak. Yet it would presume some even higher order purpose, such as seeding the universe, then you get back down to the foundational functions of basic life and how it propagates, like fungi coming together to scatter spore. There are those endless feedback loops....

    " a very old dream, and one that is probably unattainable both because of Godel's theorem"

    Gödel's incompleteness theorems are often invoked as an argument against the possibility of complete and consistent axiom set from which all interactions at all scales of physical reality can be derived. The problem is, the incompleteness theorem apply to the formulation meta-mathematical statements about systems (arithmetic principally). But one has to remember that while, aside from basic rules of composition, there are constraints to the making of such meta-mathematical statements, theorems, (nothing prevents false statements or statements that can't be derived from any given finite axiom set), physical reality strictly constrains any system so that it must be consistent with the fundamental laws that govern forces and other interactions. So does Gödel's incompleteness theorems really preclude any possible answer to Hilbert's 6th problem?

    If the Universe is made of a finite set of fundamental objects which combine in accordance to a finite set of laws that a finite number of fundamental interactions to produce physical reality, then it follows that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem is, at least in its present form, wrong when applied to reality. Also, if you believe that the fundamental components and laws are a consistent and that the Universe is a coherent system, then a physical interpretation of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem must also be wrong.

    "in what way do these axioms and theorems exist, and where do they exist? Are they Platonic forms for example?"

    We need to distinguish the axiom from the fundamental aspects of reality they would stand for. And by definitions, axioms cannot be proven. They are merely defined. Once that is done, the axiomatic system may be put to the test. If the axiomatic system is complete and consistent, then all that interactions should be derivable from it. It should also enable the emergences of falsifiable predictions.

    " what decides the form they have? (there are various possible forms of logic: who chose this one?)"

    That is the tricky part. Any choice must be made based on a number of assumptions. There can be a number of viable axiomatic systems that may be used, but whatever the choice, it must be self-consistent an all interactions must be either derivable from or reducible to it.

    "how do they have the power to create any physical entity whatever? Actually axiomatic systems are rather limited in their powers and in their ability to represent reality."

    If the Universe is found to be both consistent and complete, that is, the fundamental particles and the laws that govern them are consistent (consistency) and all that they produce remains part of the Universe (completeness), then all physical processes are emergent. It can then be shown that it is possible to create an axiomatic system that represent the fundamental aspects of reality and that representation of all interactions can be derived within such axiomatic system. If the Universe is a consistent and complete, then axiomatic representation can certainly be powerful enough to represent it.

    Though a work in progress, I believe that I have shown that an hypothetical universe that is comparable to our Universe in complexity can emerge from an simple axiomatic set. My essay, titled "Questioning the Assumption that Space is Continuous" shows one way that can be done (my essay is based on a larger work, part of which can be freely).

    Correction. I meant to write:

    [...]But one has to remember that while, aside from basic rules of composition, there are ***no*** constraints to the making of such meta-mathematical statements,[...]

    Dear jcns

    I agree very much with your first posting: the topmost level in the human motivational system is purpose or meaning. One should carefully distinguish two things here: in Jaak Panksepp's book "Affective Neuroscience", he identifies the SEEKING system as one of the genetically determined primary emotional systems; this drives us to search for understanding and meaning as a primary drive. The kinds of meaning we attribute to ourselves, to life, and the universe are higher understandings that arise out of an emotional basis but are themselves of an intellectual nature; they are formulations of what is meaningful to us, embracing ethical and aesthetic issues and our purpose in relation to them. For many people this highest purpose is indeed money! But for many others it is the kind of higher ethical purpose you refer to. This is the highest level in our hierarchy of goals for it is such ethical understandings that determine what lower level goals are desirable or acceptable.

    So you ask "Is it possible that human curiosity and creativity and eagerness for constructive collaboration are among the top of the topmost causes?" These are hugely important in terms of motivation, yes; but the issue of whether they trump economics or not is an ethical decision or stance (some people let the one rule their lives, others the other). So I'd place that highest.

    The quote from Deutsch is great. I had not read it before. It is about how the ethical level (the level of Telos, or purpose) drives the rest in a top-down way. And of course this applies to scientists too, for the basic issue there is why do they do science? Why spend one's life on that pursuit? And on what kind of science (blue sky or applied)? It is one's purpose - a non-physical entity - that shapes it all.

    George

    Hi Lawrence

    there are some similarities because the brain a structured network, but it is not like the Erdos-Renyi networks because they are carefully constructed to be random whereas the brain is not: it's connections embody the results of our interaction with the world, encoding our knowledge and learnings. While the usual statistical approaches to networks are illuminating to some degree, they miss out on key issues such as identifying the structural motifs that enable brain circuits to function as they do. Uri Alon's writings are illuminating in this regard; see his book: "Introduction to Systems Biology: Design

    Principles Of Biological Circuits", and for example

    here .

      [corrected] Please ignore earlier reply.

      @ Prof. Ellis

      As a follow-up to our exchange.

      " a very old dream, and one that is probably unattainable both because of Godel's theorem"

      Gödel's incompleteness theorems are often invoked as an argument against the possibility of a complete and consistent axiom set from which all interactions at all scales of physical reality can be derived. The problem is, the incompleteness theorems apply to the formulation of meta-mathematical statements about systems (arithmetic principally). But one has to remember that, aside from basic rules of composition, there are no constraints to the making of such meta-mathematical statements, theorems, (nothing prevents false statements or statements that can't be derived from any given finite axiom set).

      Physical reality, on the other hand, strictly constrains any phenomena so that it must be consistent with the fundamental laws that govern forces and other interactions. So does Gödel's incompleteness theorems really preclude any possible answer to Hilbert's 6th problem?

      If the Universe is made of a finite set of fundamental objects which combine in accordance to a finite set of laws that a finite number of fundamental interactions to produce physical reality, then doesn't it follows that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem is, at least in its present form, wrong when applied to reality?

      Also, if you believe that the fundamental components and laws are a consistent and that the Universe is a coherent system, then shouldn't any physical interpretation of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem also be wrong?

      "in what way do these axioms and theorems exist, and where do they exist? Are they Platonic forms for example?"

      We need to distinguish the axioms from the fundamental aspects of reality they would stand for. And by definitions, axioms cannot be proven. They are merely defined. Once that is done, the axiomatic system may be put to the test. If the axiom set and rule set that makes the axiomatic system are complete and consistent, then all that interactions should be derivable from it. It should also enable the emergence of falsifiable predictions.

      " what decides the form they have? (there are various possible forms of logic: who chose this one?)"

      That is the tricky part. Any choice must be made based on assumptions. There can be a number of viable axiomatic systems that may be used, but whatever the choice, it must be self-consistent an all interactions must be either derivable from or reducible to it.

      "how do they have the power to create any physical entity whatever? Actually axiomatic systems are rather limited in their powers and in their ability to represent reality."

      If the Universe is found to be both consistent and complete, that is, the fundamental objects and the laws that govern them are consistent (consistency) and all that they produce remains part of the Universe (completeness), then all physical processes are emergent. It can then be shown that it is possible to create an axiomatic system that represents the fundamental aspects of reality and that representations of all interactions can be derived within such axiomatic system. If the Universe is a consistent and complete, then wouldn't it follow that an axiomatic system that is powerful enough to describe it can be devised?

      Though a work in progress, I believe that I have shown that an hypothetical universe that is comparable to our Universe in complexity can emerge from an simple axiomatic set. My essay, titled "Questioning the Assumption that Space is Continuous" shows one way that can be done (my essay is based on a larger work, part of which can be freely).

        Dear George:

        Following up on my earlier comments, there are additional physical and mechanistic arguments that support your statement -

        " ...the foundational assumption that all causation is bottom up is wrong, even in the case of physics......... The key feature is that the higher level dynamics is effectively decoupled from lower level laws and details of the lower level variables:......you don't have to know those details in order to predict the higher level behavior."

        The bottom up causation is used in standard cosmology to describe the universal reality based on the quantum reality exhibited by individual particles/fields. However, quantum reality represents only partial reality due the quantum measurement problem. A classical measuring instrument interprets the quantum phenomena (V~C) from a Newtonian (V~0) frame of reference, hence the quantum reality represents a truncated partial reality resulting in the observed weirdness and inconsistencies. The quantum phenomenon being observed occurs in a dilated space-time due to V~C, while the Newtonian space-time frame of reference of the observer remains fixed and undilated due to V~0. In order to describe the non-truncated wholesome universal reality, a top-down causation approach such as the one described in my paper - " From Absurd to Elegant Universe", is essential that satisfies laws of conservation of mass, energy, space-time, and momentum via proper inclusion of the relativistic effects. Paradoxes of quantum measurements and quantum reality (entanglement, tunneling, multiverses, multi-dimensions and anti-matter etc.) are artifacts of the quantum observational limitations imposed by the fixed space-time and not satisfying the overall conservation laws at the universe level. The top-down causation approach allows universal connectivity and non-locality via governing eternal and omnipresent conservation laws throughout the universe, which are missed out due to the consideration of only local or discrete realities of particles/fields in fixed space-time in the bottom-up approach.

        And yes, bodies and brains can be created as well as annihilated by the top-down causation. As explained and described in my paper, both the creation and dilation of matter are predicted by the top-down causation model without the need for any nucleo-synthesis or anti-matter concepts used in the standard model.

        The seriousness of the impact of the top-down causation should not be underscored. Without the top-down causation consideration, it is impossible to determine the universal wrongness or correctness of any assumption or theory. From the bottom-up causation, only a partial or local, and not universal, appropriateness of any assumption/theory can be estimated. For this very reason, the widely successful bottom up quantum theory at worldly level fails to predict 96% (dark matter and dark energy) of the wholesome universe.

        Sincerely,

        Avtar Singh

          Daniel

          Agreed. Any such concepts as incompleteness, etc are a reflection of our failure to comprehend all that existed, not a feature of physical reality. Which existed in a definite form, as at any point in time, and is, by definition, a sequence which is being driven by the lowest level of that which it comprises.

          Paul

          George/JCN/John

          All the above may be correct from the perspective being taken (ie non physical). But, at the physical level, there is no influence on the next state which will exist (commonly known as future), because it does not exist. What happens is that a state occurs which is different from what which would otherwise have occurred. Nothing has been changed, physically, because nothing existed physically to change. In terms of sequence, what might be seen as 'oscillation', 'reaction', etc, is just re-occurrence. For example: A B C B D, is not, physically, some form of 'return' to B, but a re-occurrence of B. And for those who would ask the next question, what if it was A B C B D D D E. The answer is that D continued to exist for more than one point in time, that being, by definition, the level at which the sequence is fully differentiatable, because it is the fastest at which any change occurs, and D was a state which did not alter at that speed.

          Paul

          Some while ago I said I'd post about a Feynman quotation which is illuminatng as to his view on which if any level is fundamental. Here it is:

          In his book "The character of physical law" , on pp.124-125,

          Richard Feynman summarises the hierarchy of structure, starting with

          the fundamental laws of physics and their application to protons,

          neutrons, and electrons, going on to atoms and heat, and including

          waves, storms, stars, as well as frogs and concepts like `man',

          `history, `political expediency', `evil', `beauty', and `hope'. He

          then says the following (pp. 125-126):

          "Which end is nearer to God, if I may use a religious metaphor.

          Beauty and hope, or the fundamental laws? I think that the right

          way, of course, is to say that what we have to look at is the whole

          structural interconnection of the thing; and that all the sciences,

          and not just the sciences but all the efforts of intellectual kinds,

          are an endeavour to see the connections of the hierarchies, to

          connect beauty to history, to connect history to man's psychology,

          man's psychology to the working of the brain, the brain to the

          neural impulse, the neural impulse to chemistry, and so forth, up

          and down, both ways. And today we cannot, and it is no use making

          believe we can, draw carefully a line all the way from one end of

          this thing to the other, because we have only just begun to see that

          there is this relative hierarchy."

          "And I do not think either end is nearer to God. To stand at either

          end, and to walk off that end of the pier only, hoping that out in

          that direction is the complete understanding, is a mistake. And to

          stand with evil and beauty and hope, or with fundamental laws,

          hoping that way to get a deep understanding of the whole world, with

          that aspect alone, is a mistake. It is not sensible for the ones who

          specialize at one end, and the ones who specialize at the other, to

          have such disregard for each other ... The great mass of workers in

          between, connecting one step to another, are improving all the time

          our understanding of the world, both from working at the ends and

          from working in the middle, and in that way we are gradually

          understanding this tremendous world of interconnecting hierarchies."

            I don't want to enter into to the territory of Godel's theorem Roger Penrose is the person to talk to about that. Rather I'll just commnent one statement:

            "If the Universe is found to be both consistent and complete, that is, the fundamental objects and the laws that govern them are consistent (consistency) and all that they produce remains part of the Universe (completeness), then all physical processes are emergent."

            This is a non-sequitur. "Completeness" above means that you can't get out of the universe by application of physical laws. It does not guarantee that everything in the universe can be attained in this way. Some physical processes are not emergent but are entailed in a top-down way. For example there is no bottom up process by which the computer memory states embodying a Quicksort algorithm can emerge from the action of the underlying physics acting in a purely bottom-up way. Indeed the same is true of the processes leading to creation of a teacup or a pair of spectacles (see my Nature article "Physics, complexity and causality" 435, 743 (2005)). If you believe this is wrong,please advise me of a physical law or process that unambiguously determines how a tea cup can be created in a purely bottom-up way.

            • [deleted]

            Dear George,

            Thank you for that Feynman quote; it nails the topic perfectly, in his inimitable way.

            On the theory that one good quote deserves another, here's another of my favorites by David Deutsch, this one from his book 'The Beginning of Infinity' (p.75).

            "Like an explosive awaiting a spark, unimaginably numerous environments in the universe are waiting out there, for aeons on end, doing nothing at all or blindly generating evidence and storing it up or pouring it out into space. Almost any of them would, if the right knowledge ever reached it, instantly burst into a radically different type of physical activity: intense knowledge-creation, displaying all the various kinds of complexity, universality and reach that are inherent in the laws of nature, and transforming that environment from what is typical today into what could become typical in the future. If we want to, we could be that spark."

            jcns

            • [deleted]

            In thinking about this I then ponder whether random networks subjected to some sort of selection process can then evolve into a form suggested here. This is in a manner of thinking a sort of Darwinian process. A random network might compared to some random noise or white noise system, but where given some sample of possible random networks subjected to a culling process plus some "survival criterion" results in networks which are less random and output what might be called pink noise.

            Thanks for the reference.

            Cheers LC

            Dear George Ellis,

            A very interesting read. In a reply to Paul you note that "reality is unclear" at the particle level because of uncertainty, wave-particle duality, and entanglement. In this sense any change in understanding of these aspects of reality might be expected to have some effect on the conception of 'the bottom' (although equivalence classes might not change). For this reason I invite you to read and hopefully comment on my current essay, The Nature of the Wave Function.

            At the other end of the spectrum, in a comment to jcns, you bring 'meaning and purpose' into the picture. This brings up the question, "where is the top?". Do you make an assumption here, or is the top an open ended concept?

            I agree that most discussions of emergence do NOT treat 'top down causation' and you are to be commended for doing so.

            Edwin Eugene Klingman