"We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory."
This is called inductive logic, James, and were it an honest standard of truth, we would be doing science according to Aristotle.
"There are no self-organized systems except in appearance."
Then there's at least one case for which your "empirical evidence" doesn't work, isn't there? Can't have it both ways.
Tom
Tom,
""We interpret meaning from the empirical evidence before we force that meaning to fit into theory.""
"This is called inductive logic, James, and were it an honest standard of truth, we would be doing science according to Aristotle."
No it isn't. It is recognizing that before we do anything at all with information we discern it from that mess of photons. It is the first act of foundational intelligence. What one does with it afterwards depends upon their belief system and their acquired abilities.
""There are no self-organized systems except in appearance.""
"Then there's at least one case for which your "empirical evidence" doesn't work, isn't there? Can't have it both ways."
If you mean that my remark contradicts what I said about all effects that have occurred or will ever occur in the universe, no it doesn't. It wasn't intended to be applied to the evolution of the universe. It applied to any systems one brings forward as being self-organized along with the impression that a new miracle is occuring because of and within the system. I don't care what one wants to believe about the nature of the original and continuing single cause for all effects in the universe. I stress only that all effects that have ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from the beginning of the universe. And, I stress that later imagined miracles should not be tolerated in science. Complex systems do not accomplish anything that wasn't provided for from the beginning of the universe. Complex systems do not reveal to us what cause is. They reveal effects, effects, and more effects.
James Putnam
James,
"I stress only that all effects that have ever occurred or will ever occur in the universe were provided for right from the beginning of the universe."
I agree. So does George Ellis, as you can see from the post that started this thread.
"Complex systems do not reveal to us what cause is. They reveal effects, effects, and more effects."
Nothing else reveals to us what cause is, either. Science is not revelation -- religion is revelation. Science is a process of discovery, and for that, one needs a theory of what one expects to discover. It may be revelation-like to discover what one did not expect; however, without expectation we induce correct physics only by accident.
Tom
Tom,
Nothing else reveals to us what cause is, either. Science is not revelation -- religion is revelation. Science is a process of discovery, and for that, one needs a theory of what one expects to discover. It may be revelation-like to discover what one did not expect; however, without expectation we induce correct physics only by accident."
Science does put itself forward as revelation. It explains causes such as four fundamental forces.
The role of theory is to substitute for the unknown. Its role in physics equations is to fill in blanks with ideas that are not made known to us by empirical evidence.
"...one needs a theory of what one expects to discover."
And I say this is not true. I have enterred several eassays in the contests communicating why this is not true. All the useful meaning that one can gain is from the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence consists of patterns in changes of velocity. Those patterns make extrapolation and interpolation possible, not the theoretical add-ons. Those add-ons are subtract meaning from empirical evidence. It is possible and more revealing to learn what is available to be discovered by removing theory from physics equations. Making certain now that my meaning for theory here is: Theory is the practice of inventing causes.
James Putnam
James, the physical forces weren't revealed to us from a burning bush. They were theorized and tested by experiment.
Theory may indeed be the invention of causes -- or as I like to say, the art of good guessing -- however, any other way of abstracting meaning from phenomena is not science.
Tom
Tom,
"James, the physical forces weren't revealed to us from a burning bush. They were theorized and tested by experiment."
Yes they were theorized. It was necessary to theorize because the differences in patterns of changes of velocity appear so different that the physicist could not show that they were due to the same cause. So, the theoretical physicsist does not get stopped by lack of evidence, they introduce by theory artificial end points that give the impression that something unique has been discovered.
The reason that this situation results is because of earlier theory. The disunity introduced by the introduction of theory right from its start interferes with our ability to see how these 'four' forces might actually only be one cause.
"Theory may indeed be the invention of causes -- or as I like to say, the art of good guessing -- however, any other way of abstracting meaning from phenomena is not science."
The removal of theory from physics equations makes them better science. Science is that which empirical evidence communicates to us. Empirical evidence is patterns in changes of velocity of objects. Science does not tell us what cause is. Theory is the practice of substituting guesses about the nature of cause into physics equations. This practice is useful and not a permanent problem so long as theorists acknowledge the situtation must be corrected as soon as possible. I have used another way of discerning meaning from empirical evidence. So, I say there is another way. This other way is to return the equations of physics to their empirical states. In their empirical states all properties will be definable in the same terms as is the empirical evidence from which their existence is inferred. All units will be definable in the same units as is the empirical evidence. This does not make the nature of cause known to us. It does, however, remove invented properties from the equations. Some of those invented properties are the artificial definitions of cause put forward as physics theory.
James Putnam
James Putnam
"It was necessary to theorize because the differences in patterns of changes of velocity appear so different that the physicist could not show that they were due to the same cause."
Maybe they weren't! One would not know unless the conjecture is tested.
"Science is that which empirical evidence communicates to us."
No it isn't. Science is an entirely rationalist enterprise -- the measured correspondence between theory and physical result. Empirical evidence does not communicate anything at all to us; phenomena are *always* intepreted in theory, no exception.
Tom
Tom,
""It was necessary to theorize because the differences in patterns of changes of velocity appear so different that the physicist could not show that they were due to the same cause.""
"Maybe they weren't! One would not know unless the conjecture is tested."
If it is understood how two or more patterns can be generated by a single cause, then, that is the choice to be made and ested. The idea that they actually may be due to unique separate causes, if adopted, continues the practice of forcing fundamental disunity onto the equations of physics. That practice starts at the beginning of the adoption of theory. Theory is not necessary if all properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence have units of measurement that are the same as the empirical evidence from which their existence is inferred. That evidence is patterns in chanes of velocity. The units of changes of velocity, in various combinations, are the ones in which all properties should be expressed. This act keeps all physics properties firmly rooted in their empirical evidence. Theory is not a part of this act. It is seen as not being a part of this act by the elimination of all artificially indefinable units added to those of empirical evidence. Only the units of empirical evidence are naturally indefinable units. That is because there are no other units before them by which to define them. All units of properties inferred to exist from empirical evidence are definable in the units that exist before them. Those units are combinations of the units of changes of velocity.
""Science is that which empirical evidence communicates to us.""
"No it isn't. Science is an entirely rationalist enterprise -- the measured correspondence between theory and physical result. Empirical evidence does not communicate anything at all to us; phenomena are *always* intepreted in theory, no exception."
You are correct that it isn't presently. That is because theory reigns supreme. Guesses are easier to come by than are some facts. The meaning of my statement was to define science as being the gathering of empirical evidence and learning the meanings which it conveys to us. The act of learning the meanings does not include a need for theory. Theory is needed to substitute for meaning that has not yet been made clear. There are times when finding meaning can be challenging.
Such a time occurred, when f=ma was discovered and its properties were in need of clarification. It was clear that acceleration was a naturally indefinable property. It was not clear how to define both mass and force with acceleration as the prior naturally indefinable property. It was guessed that one of them needed to be declared to be an indefinable property. Mass was chosen to be the new indefinable property. The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration.
James Putnam
"The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration."
James, one has to understand that neither force nor mass are defined by acceleration. These are measured effects of *relations* between states of motion, in a straight line (uniform), or curved (accelerated). Physics is fundamentally concerned only with space and time.
Tom
Tom,
""The error made was that it is possible to define both force and mass in terms of acceleration.""
"One has to understand that neither force nor mass are defined by acceleration. These are measured effects of *relations* between states of motion, in a straight line (uniform), or curved (accelerated). Physics is fundamentally concerned only with space and time."
Theory is concerned with space and time as if they suffer changes of velocity. Theory-free physics is concerned with objects that do suffer changes of velocity. There are measured effects between such objects. Both force and mass must be defined by acceleration. There is no other way to define them. When theorists assumed that they could not be defined in terms of acceleration they recognized that one must then be theorized to be an indefinable property joining with length and duration.
The empirical evidence is acceleration. Acceleration is measured in length and duration. Both length and duration must be accepted as indefinables because there are no other properties before them by which they may be defined. However, since they are the only properties of empirical evidence, all properties inferred to exist from observation of that empirical evidence must be defined in terms of length and duration. Otherwise the theorist is freed to introduce their own 'after-creation' miracles. In other words, their imaginings become staples of physics.
It is possible to define mass and force in terms of acceleration. The act of doing so frees empirical evidence to reveal to us its fuller, if not full, meanings. The artificial restraints of theory are removed. The removal of kilograms in favor of units for mass that consist only of a combination of units of meters and seconds immediately reveals the nature of mass. We must know the nature of mass right from the beginning of its use if we are to understand the meanings of all the physics equations that follow after f=ma such as e=mc^2.
James Putnam
James Putnam
"Theory is concerned with space and time as if they suffer changes of velocity."
No it isn't, James.
Your starting assumptions of relativity are completely out of touch with what relativity actually says. Once you get your mind around Minkowski space, where space and time are not physical and space-time is, you will see that your conclusions cannot hold.
There is no simpler nor more meaningful way to say it than Wheeler already has: "Matter tells spacetime how to curve; spacetime tells matter how to move."
Tom
Tom,
"Your starting assumptions of relativity are completely out of touch with what relativity actually says. Once you get your mind around Minkowski space, where space and time are not physical and space-time is, you will see that your conclusions cannot hold."
Why are space and time not 'physical'? Space gives us room to move around in. Effects use time. Actually, I don't think that I have referred to space and time as being physical. I think that would require some empirical evidence from the patterns of changes of velocity of other objects. They are properties of the universe. However, either way spacetime is not physical either. It has never been demonstrated to exist. It is pure theory. There is no empirical evidence for it.
james Putnam
"Why are space and time not 'physical'?"
Because space and time independently have no physical effects of their own. They depend on physical conditions -- e.g., a meter stick measured locally to be one meter in length is foreshortened in its direction of travel(from the perspective of an outside observer) at a significant percentage of the speed of light.
James, length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime. So long as you deny the known science, I'm afraid we aren't going to get anywhere in this discussion.
Tom
Tom,
"length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime". This statement of you is definitely incorrect. Length contraction and time dilation were fabricated as crutches as to explain the null result of the experiment by Michelson and Morley. Minkowski's concept of spacetime arose on Einstein's reinterpretation, i.e. much later.
I found a perhaps decisive mistake in the adopted in 1887 by Michelson and Morley after suggestion by Potier and by Lorentz correction of Michelson's 1881 mistake. Besides this logical argument of mine there is experimental evidence too. You are repeating like a paternoster your belief that length contraction and time dilation were experimentally validated. What experiments do you refer to, and how can you refute my arguments and the experimental evidence e.g. by Feist and by Shtyrkov?
Eckard
Tom,
"... length contraction and time dilation are real physical results (validated experimentally) predicted by the physics of spacetime. So long as you deny the known science, I'm afraid we aren't going to get anywhere in this discussion."
Length contraction of objects is a real physical effect. Time dilation is a misrepresentation of a change in cause that results in slower rates of change. Length contraction is validated. Space contraction is not validated. Time dilation is not validated. Slowing rates of operation are validated. What I am denying are theoretical guesses about the nature of the universe. Scinece for me is about the nature of the universe as it is presented to us by empirical evidence. Actually, I think that the discussion has wondered far enough away from Dr. Ellis' subject that the discussion should not be continued, at least not here. Thanks for taking the time to participate.
James Putnam
James and Tom,
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/SR/experiments.html : "At this time there are no direct tests of length contraction, as measuring the length of a moving object to the precision required has not been feasible."
Eckard
If time dilation is true (it is, which has been experimentally validated), length contraction follows.
Space and time in relativity theory are not, independent of each other, physically real.
Tom
Hi Eckard,
My approach to physics is to remove theory. My treatment of mass is a very important part of this effort. There are many results that follow from my treatment of mass. One is that length contraction is real. It is the many other results I have presented that support this conclusion. All properties are part of a fundamentally unified derivation of physics equations. Therefore, each property is dependent upon all others, and vice versa, for the derivation to be correct. It is the success of all the other results that I present that supports my view on length contraction.
There is no time dilation. There is evidence that effects vary. Those effects tell us that cause is varying. Time is not cause. My definition of mass tells me that light is cause and there is only that one cause.
James Putnam
Tom,
While I did also not find a direct verification of time dilution in the link I referred to, and some experiments seem to be overly complicated and opaque except for highly specialized experts, I found at least a lot of very obvious mistakes among the claimed evidence for SR.
For instance, the null results of Michelson and Morley as well as of Kennedy-Thorndike, Brillet and Hall, etc. are claimed at odds with the one-way anisotropy of light. However, Feist found out that they only confirm the round-trip isotropy, which is not questioned by those who question Lorentz crutches.
Isn't the following sentence funny? "A "one-way" test that is bidirectional with the outgoing ray in glass and the return ray in air." I rather agree with the admission: "the one-way speed is isotropic only in an aether frame" and "the one-way speed of light is anisotropic".
Observations from Supernovae show that the speed of light does not depend on the velocity of the source. Beckmann, also v. Essen, critics of SR, showed the same. I do not see this at variance with the propagation of a wave in a medium. It is merely an argument against the imagination of photons like particles.
So called measured limits of photon mass vary between 10^-15 and 10^-19 eV/c^2. Does this indicate a weakness in theory?
What about measurements with clocks, I feel not in position to reveal possible mistakes. I merely suspect that we have to be aware of Einstein's observer-related notion of time. His denial of the distinction between past and future might also affect measured lifetimes. Moreover I wonder how to use magnetic store rings as to confirm SR.
The Sagnac effect is certainly not a confirmation of SR. Robert calls it merely consistent with SR.
Eckard
