• [deleted]

  • Post #88

I am pleased that you appreciate my work. I gave a brief tutorial in the blog section for my essay on the BCFW recursion relationship. This forms a major part of the work I have been doing. It is a way of working Feynman diagrams without explicit reference to either locality or unitarity. There are scattering processes in QCD which were found to reduce to this simple form by standard techniques, and this has revealed a whole new way to think about scattering physics.

I generally vote on essays towards the closing period when I have a sense of most of the better one's. I will give your essay a high mark.

Cheers LC

Edward,

We think about the universe as something we can, in our imagination, observe from without: as in this view the universe has a beginning and evolves, as a whole, in time, a concept like cosmic time (the time passed since the bigbang) makes sense. In this view, i.e., in a Big Bang Universe, it is the same time everywhere, so here it takes light to go from A to B, the problem being that this universe lives in a time continuum not of its own making, so here it is the question why the speed of light is what it is.

In contrast, we may imagine a universe which creates itself out of nothing, without any outside intervention, that is, without cause. According to conservation laws whatever comes out of nothing, should add to nothing, so such universe only exists as seen from within. A Self-Creating Universe therefore does not live in a time continuum not of its own making but contains and produces all time within. In a SCU any (inside) observer sees clocks run slower, showing an earlier time as they are more distant, even if they are at rest with respect to the observer, so here we expect a linear relation between the redshift of galaxies and their distance, so this universe doesn't need dark energy to explain observations.

In contrast to a BBU, in a SCU it is not the same time everywhere, so here the 'speed' of light doesn't refer to velocity but to a property of spacetime, which is something else entirely.

In a SCU light is transmitted instantaneously between A and B since (only) in a SCU a space distance is a time distance. As you obviously cannot bridge a space distance in a shorter time than corresponds to their time distance, superluminal velocities are impossible: in this universe there is no such thing as cosmic time, nor do we need a spooky action at a distance to explain observations.

As I argue in my essay, we confuse causality with reason: If we understand something only if we can explain it as the effect of some cause and understand this cause only if we can explain it as the effect of a preceding cause, then this chain of cause-and-effect either goes on ad infinitum, or it ends at some primordial cause which, as it cannot be reduced to a preceding cause, cannot be understood by definition.

If in a SCU particles create, cause each other, then they explain each other in a circular way. Here we can take any element of an explanation, any link of the chain of reasoning without proof, use it to explain the next link and so on, to follow the circle back to the assumption we started with, which this time is explained by the foregoing reasoning, that is, if our reasoning is sound and our assumptions are valid. If we have more confidence in a theory as it is more consistent and it is more consistent as it relates more phenomena, makes more facts explain each other and needs less additional axioms, less more or less arbitrary assumptions to link one step to the next, then any good theory has a tautological character, fitting a self-creating, self-explaining universe. The circle of reasoning ought to work equally well in the reverse direction.

This of course is not to say that there is no relation between events: the problem is that causality requires that we can determine in an absolute sense what precedes what, that we can actually observe the universe from the outside, which we cannot, not even in a BBU.

Anton

    Edward,

    I found your essay a very enjoyable read. I have a few questions/remarks.

    1. I am not sure to what extent you are questioning the nature of spacetime structure at the fundamental level, and to what extent you are merely not relying upon it for certain explanatory purposes. The geometry of spacetime in conventional physics has many other consequences; for example, the Poincare symmetry group of Minkowski space goes a long way toward determining the possible particle types in quantum field theory, and these restrictions correspond well to observation. Are you questioning the validity of SR and GR, or simply their interpretation?

    2. There is another way to deal with locality/causality issues, and that is to define "spacetime structure" in terms of what actually happens, rather than to assume that what happens is governed by spacetime structure. I am not merely talking about allowing spacetime to interact dynamically with matter-energy as in GR, but to completely deny the existence of a separate metric structure that could cause clashes. If A directly affects B, then A and B are local, and B is in the future of A. The causal set theorists take this view, and to that extent, I agree with them. I discuss this in my essay:

    On the Foundational Assumptions of Modern Physics

    3. I am also wondering what your preferred interpretation of quantum theory is. If you are questioning spacetime structure, then this becomes relevant because the Hilbert spaces in ordinary quantum theory are often interpreted as "function spaces" on spacetime.

    Take care,

    Ben Dribus

      Anton,

      I read your essay, and you have a truly distinctive point of view. If I have time, I will read it again to understand more of your arguments. Your point about conservation of energy was interesting.

      Ed

      Ben,

      These are very good questions. I will try to deal with the first two together.

      I am NOT questioning the validity of either SR or GR. I am arguing that the symmetries that define these theories are not (only) a result of spacetime structure. So they provide very limited information about that structure. We should not assume that relativistic structure governs all physical processes,or that it describes all of the ordering relations that might be necessary to provide a coherent account of those processes. On the one hand, we have to relax the prohibition against superluminal effects in order to explain the correlations that Bell identified. On the other hand, we have to assume some type of genuine "quasi-temporal" sequencing beyond what is recognized within a relativistic framework (in fact, even beyond what is provided by a notion of absolute time). This is necessary in order to provide well-defined outcome states, on which subsequent interactions can operate.

      Your approach of DEFINING spacetime structure in terms of what happens has a great deal to be said for it. But I would argue that we still need to carefully distinguish between what happens, and what is observable. If all physical processes were perfectly deterministic and reversible, then there would not be any need to make such a distinction. We could, in principle, observe everything that happened. However, since physical processes are partially nondeterministic, information about what happens is not completely conserved. Observations exist only on a mesoscopic or macroscopic scale. Any particular observation is consistent with a huge range of distinct sequences of elementary physical happenings. (Note that"observation" does NOT imply a human or other intelligent observer. Observations are definite, reasonably stable records of physical occurrences.)

      So we have to think in terms of two different types of structures. At the most elementary level, the structure describes what happens. The general characteristics are determined from both observation and logical inference. This structure (or "description" if you prefer) must be able to accomodate both local and superluminal effects. The local effects would correspond to what you are calling causes. We need a different structure to describe the level of observation. It is at this higher level that we recover Poincare invariance. Since physical theory is based on observation, it is framed in terms of the relativistic structures that are appropriate for describing this higher level. The wave functions, which live in Hilbert space, are intended to give the best account possible of our observations, so, natuarally, they are defined with reference to a Lorentzian spacetime (or configuration spaces based on Galilean spacetime).

      I believe that this viewpoint helps us to understand some of the recent, very interesting developments in quantum foundations. The Pusey-Barret-Rudolph result supports the idea that quantum states refer to real physical entities, and not just to statistical ensembles. The work of Hardy, and the recent paper of Masanes and Mueller that shows that the quantum formalism is a generalized type of probability theory seem to point in the opposite direction. If we accept the premise that physical processes are nondeterministic at the most fundamental level, we can start to understand why the best description of those (real) processes is in terms of generalized probabilities.

      Concerning interpretation: as just stated, I believe that quantum states describe real processes that behave nondeterministically. Wave function collapse is a real, nonlocal, nondeterministic phenomenon. The challenge is to incorporate these nonlocal, probabilistic effects at the most fundamental level in a unified description that also covers the ordinary, deterministic evolution of wave functions.

      Thanks again for your excellent questions.

      Ed

      Ed,

      In your last paragraph above you state your preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics, which makes it clear where you are coming from. You state: "I believe that quantum states describe real processes that behave nondeterministically. Wave function collapse is a real, nonlocal, nondeterministic phenomenon."

      I held similar views some ten years ago, under the influence of my former PhD supervisor Abner Shimony, and of the gravitationally induced collapse model of Roger Penrose. Today my views have changed dramatically because of the contrary results I have obtained during the past five years. These are collected in my book, as I mentioned earlier.

      In my local-realistic framework there is no measurement problem or wave function collapse. In fact there is no entanglement, or non-locality, or wave functions, or Born rule, or objective chance, or objective indefiniteness, or potentialities, or many worlds, or quantum potential, or compromise in the free will of an experimenter, or backward causation, or non-reality, or a split between the classical and the quantum. Within my framework ALL quantum correlations are understood simply as classical, local-realistic correlations among the points of a parallelized 7-sphere, or equivalently among unit octonions.

      It is unfortunate that this simple and transparent picture has attracted largely negative attention, such as that by Richard Gill you mentioned earlier. You also mention Lucien Hardy's work above, who happens to be a friend of mine. Lucien has independently verified my calculations of the first chapter of my book in great detail, thus confirming my results against Gill's fallacious claims. Sadly, however, Gill's real motivation had always been negative propaganda against my work, and in that he seems to have succeeded. Considering Lucien's high ranking in the foundations community however, his verification of my results may change the effect of negative propaganda gradually, provided he decides to come out and declare his findings publicly. In other words, the biggest obstacle against my work seems not to have been physics or mathematics, but sociology.

      -- Joy

      • [deleted]

      • Post #94

      Ben, you wrote to Ed:

      "If you are questioning spacetime structure, then this becomes relevant because the Hilbert spaces in ordinary quantum theory are often interpreted as "function spaces" on spacetime."

      Ed noted: "The wave functions, which live in Hilbert space, are intended to give the best account possible of our observations, so, natuarally, they are defined with reference to a Lorentzian spacetime (or configuration spaces based on Galilean spacetime)."

      That's correct. However, the underlying assumption of the Hilbert space as a metric space that invokes complex conjugation leaves the wave function incomplete. Among the beauties of Joy Christian's framework is its algebraically closed structure (octonion algebra closed under multiplication) that allows a measurement function continuous from the topological initial condition; by this explicit structure, one realizes an implicit demonstration of the theorem that all real functions of a real valued variable are continuous.

      Wave function collapse is thereby obviated as a real physical phenomenon. The best account possible is not probabilistic; it is mathematically complete. Classical.

      Tom

      6 days later

      Dear Edward,

      The central idea of your well-written essay is one I had not encountered before and it is interesting how it shifts perspective. It appears to me, though, that there may be potential problem with the conclusion you draw from your argument, and I would be grateful if you could clarify.

      Before mentioning the objection, let me paraphrase the gist of what I understand your argument and conclusion to be, so that if I misunderstood, you can correct me.

      As I understand it, you say that our current conception of relativity as a theory about the structure of spacetime and in particular one in which its features of local causality and Lorentz invariance imply a metric structure, is a profound misunderstanding. That is because the EPR tests have shown that evidently not every influence propagates in accordance with this conception. However, such phenomena do not lead to the demise of relativity because they are fundamentally probabilistic and hence cannot be used to falsify its central tenets. Nevertheless, because such phenomena do exist, and the clash between quantum theory and relativity is avoided because of an inherent feature of quantum theory and not of relativity, one should conclude that relativity must be more fundamentally interpreted (largely) in terms of the non-deterministic nature of elementary interactions rather than the structure of spacetime.

      If I understood the argument and the conclusion correctly, I agree with the argument but not with the conclusion. Here is why: We cannot rule out the possibility that the superluminal influence is not itself the consequence of a metric connection between the quantum objects that is independent of the spacetime metric. To arrive at your conclusion, it seems to me, one must rule this possibility out. Otherwise, one may well arrive at the exact opposite of your conclusion: Relativity is a theory about the metric spacetime structure, and entanglement is also about a metric structure, just not that of spacetime. Because there is currently no mainstream interpretation of quantum mechanics (that I know of) which makes such claim about a metric connection independent of the spacetime metric, this possibility might seem bizarre at first (due to unfamiliarity), but it is not logically ruled out.

      It is now time that I reveal my own bias: I believe that quantum mechanics is fundamentally another geometric theory and have attempted to formulate an interpretation (actually more than an interpretation because it makes a testable prediction which does not obviously follow from standard QM). In my essay, I briefly touch upon how it addresses the issue of non-locality, although my essay is more about the relation between quantum mechanics and general relativity.

      While we can continue the discussion about your conclusion here, I'd like to invite you to take a look at my essay. fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1431

      All the best,

      Armin

      PS: By the way, it is good to see another entry from someone affiliated with U of M. Do you still live in the Ann Arbor Area?

        Edward,

        Einstein did indeed base special relativity on the idea of a continuous electromagnetic field but at the end of his life he suggested that this idea had in fact killed physics:

        You wrote: "In the nineteenth century, the work of Faraday and Maxwell fully established the idea of continuously propagating electromagnetic fields, and suggested to some the existence of a luminiferous ether. It also led to a clear conflict with Newtonian mechanics, which was resolved by Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity."

        http://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/pdf/files/975547d7-2d00-433a-b7e3-4a09145525ca.pdf

        Albert Einstein (1954): "I consider it entirely possible that physics cannot be based upon the field concept, that is on continuous structures. Then nothing will remain of my whole castle in the air, including the theory of gravitation, but also nothing of the rest of contemporary physics."

        Clues:

        http://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/papers/0101/0101109.pdf

        "The two first articles (January and March) establish clearly a discontinuous structure of matter and light. The standard look of Einstein's SR is, on the contrary, essentially based on the continuous conception of the field."

        http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/einstein/genius/

        "And then, in June, Einstein completes special relativity, which adds a twist to the story: Einstein's March paper treated light as particles, but special relativity sees light as a continuous field of waves."

        http://www.amazon.com/Relativity-Its-Roots-Banesh-Hoffmann/dp/0486406768

        Relativity and Its Roots, Banesh Hoffmann: "Moreover, if light consists of particles, as Einstein had suggested in his paper submitted just thirteen weeks before this one, the second principle seems absurd: A stone thrown from a speeding train can do far more damage than one thrown from a train at rest; the speed of the particle is not independent of the motion of the object emitting it. And if we take light to consist of particles and assume that these particles obey Newton's laws, they will conform to Newtonian relativity and thus automatically account for the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment without recourse to contracting lengths, local time, or Lorentz transformations. Yet, as we have seen, Einstein resisted the temptation to account for the null result in terms of particles of light and simple, familiar Newtonian ideas, and introduced as his second postulate something that was more or less obvious when thought of in terms of waves in an ether."

        Pentcho Valev pvalev@yahoo.com

        Armin,

        Thanks for your comments. Your characterization of my argument is generally correct, but I would qualify it in a couple of ways. I hope that you won't mind if I take this opportunity to restate the basic argument in outline form.

        Lorentz invariance (LI) can be looked at as the defining feature of special relativity, and that is how I am viewing it. LI implies that spacetime possesses a metric structure, including a light cone structure. This light cone structure is typically taken as enforcing local causality, although (as pointed out by Maudlin and others) this is not strictly true. Bell describes the "typical" view very well: "To avoid causal chains going backward in time in some frames of reference, we require them to go slower than light in any frame of reference". On this typical view, local causality is a CONSEQUENCE of special relativity, not a defining characteristic. One of the points that I am making, is that because we have such a strong intuitive belief in local causality, we are inclined to adopt the view that the metric structure which SEEMS to enforce local causality reflects deep ontological features of spacetime. This view tends to reinforce the erroneous idea that contemporary physics incorporates the principle of local causality. It does not. The reason that special relativity is not falsified by the nonlocal effects that have been observed by Aspect in the Bell-EPR experiments is that the LOGIC of special relativity does not imply the absence of nonlocal effects, even though there is a widespread perception that it does.

        Standard contemporary quantum theory is based on a weaker notion of signal causality. (General relativity, of course is a classical theory, and it is consistent with the stonger, more restrictive concept of local causality.) Signal causality is adequate for maintaining consistency with special relativity at the level of observation, but as Bell, Maudlin, and Norsen have pointed out, it is difficult to interpret it at the most fundamental level. The reason for this is that what distinguishes signal causality from local causality are nonlocal, nondetermistic effects, which standard contemporary physical theory has chosen not to try to describe at the fundamental level.

        So, I think that the way you describe my fundamental conclusion: "one should conclude that relativity must be more fundamentally interpreted (largely) in terms of the non-deterministic nature of elementary interactions rather than the structure of spacetime" is basically accurate. However, I don't think that there is an essential conflict between this view and the possibility that there are other structures (possibly metric structures) that regulate the transmission of the superluminal effects that have been observed. The appearance of a possible conflict is a result of thinking that the relativistic metric description entails the prohibition of superluminal effects.

        In attributing various structures to spacetime, it is important that we do not introduce conflicting constraints. Since the nondeterministic aspects of elementary interactions can (largely) explain the relativistic properties of the transformations between alternative descriptions of physical phenomena (viewed from different reference frames) , there just is no reason to assume that these properties reflect deeper ontological constraints on physical processes.

        I have read your essay. It is very well written, and indicates a very solid grasp of a wide range of issues in quantum theory and gravity. I think that there are possible problems with your distinction between "actual" and "actualizable". But a full discussion will take a little more time. I will try to post a follow-up on your thread.

        Sorry for the delay in responding, but I usually only have time on weekends. As to my location, I do live just outside Ann Arbor (although it has been a long time since I graduated, and I have been several other places between then and now).

        More later,

        Ed

        • [deleted]

        • Post #98

        Dear Edward,

        Thank you for your thoughtful reply. Your summary has indeed helped me better understand your argument, and it is evident to me now that whatever I did not understand before may have been because of a possible difference in how we apply the notion of causality. How do you define causality? Do you consider the apparently non-local effects, say, as confirmed by Aspect et al., as causal? My impression now is that you do.

        In my view, such correlations do not rise to the level of causality (at least as usually understood). Perhaps it might seem strange to think that in these situations one could have correlation without causation (of course, elsewhere it is so common that it has become an aphorism), and I myself would probably have thought so as well, were it not for the fact that I imagine that entanglement is enforced via a particular mechanism which simply fails to fulfill a key criterion indispensable to the definition of causality.

        I will attempt to keep the description of my imagined mechanism at minimum, but I will have to mention at least a little in order to convey why I believe that entanglement fails to meet a key requirement of causality.

        As I understand it, we would think as two events to stand in a causal relationship when one is a consequence of the other, but what exactly do we mean by that? Although there are probably many divergent views on this, I think it is fair to summarize it broadly as follows: What we mean when we say that event two is a consequence of event one is that when the first event occurs, the "world" is changed in a certain way compared to a world in which event one did not happen, and this change can be linked (perhaps via a chain of other such changes) to the occurrence of event two.

        Now, if you disagree with this way of characterizing causation, then what follows may be irrelevant, but allow me to suppose that you find this characterization reasonable.

        In the case of an entangled system it is perhaps not uncommon to encounter the view that whoever performs the measurement first and reduces the wave vector, by reducing it has "caused" the other part of the system to be in a definite known state, and in a special relativistic context, this conception does not change except that for spacelike separated events who "causes" what becomes frame-dependent. A subtle assumption underlying this conception is that the arena for the transmission of any effects, the "world" in which the change due to event one leads to event two, is spacetime. This seems like such an obvious auxiliary assumption that I don't think most people are even aware of it. In particular, at present hardly anyone would question that, in whatever indefinite state the quantum objects may be prior to the first measurement, they still in some form exist in spacetime.

        Since you have read my paper (thank you), you know that I interpret the wave function as the spacetime manifestation of entities that don't even exist in spacetime. A 'measurement' in my view is the name we give for the emergence of spacetime objects from such entities. If this view is correct, then, when the first measurement on an entangled two-particle system occurs, *there is no second particle to exert a causal influence on*. When the second measurement reveals a definite correlated outcome, this merely reflects the fact that there was another portion of the underlying areatime entity giving rise to the two spacetime objects which had not yet had the opportunity to emerge but now just did.

        Therefore, in my mind, the causal link between the two events is broken. I am satisfied with characterizing the relation as one of a correlation without causation but if one insists on "causal" talk, then I would say that the the *second* observer "caused" the empirically observable correlation because he "caused" the second particle to exist in spacetime.

        If this still doesn't seem clear, allow me to give a crude analogy. Suppose you have a green marble, and I have a red one, and we are to throw our marbles in a funnel emptying into containers 1 and 2, such that when one marble fills one container, the second marble is automatically diverted into the other container, and further let us suppose that it is truly random into which of the two empty containers a marble might fall. You throw your green marble, and let's say it lands in container 1. You now immediately now, that *once I throw my marble* the second container will contain a red marble. Immediately after filling container 1, did you "cause" the second container to contain a red marble? No, because the second container is still empty. Even after it is filled with a red marble, I would say our usual notions of causality would be more in accord with saying that I "caused" the second container to be filled with a red marble because it was I who threw the red marble into the funnel.

        The big shortcoming of the marble analogy is that all events occur in the same "world", spacetime, so we can still ascribe an indirect causal influence due to your throwing of your marble first on what happens to the other container. In the case of entanglement, we don't even have that: The change in spacetime due to the first measurement does not have any causal link to the outcome of the second measurement (according to my imaginations) because there simply is no "change" in spacetime which would enforce the second measurement outcome to be correlated with the first.

        If my view is correct, and the apparent non-local phenomena we have empirically confirmed fail to satisfy a key criterion for causality (namely, a link between changes in the world from event one to event two), then it would seem to me that this supports the notion that the metric structure of spacetime implied by the LT does indeed reflect a deep ontological feature (namely in this context, precluding non-local causation), particularly since the objection to this notion arose from these very correlations in the first place.

        The reason I agreed with your argument up to the conclusion is that it supports my view as well as yours. I pointed out that to come to your conclusion you would have to rule out a possible metric connection between apparently non-local events because I made the implicit assumption that nature as a whole is consistent: Either it is wholly about metric structures playing deep ontological roles, or it is wholly about non-deterministic interactions giving rise to the appearance of such structures. Of course, under this assumption, for me to come to the opposite conclusion, I have the burden of showing that such metric connections are not just possible as a matter of vague speculation, but can be formulated in a concrete way to give positing such connections explanatory power for the phenomena we observe, especially with respect to showing how the deep ontological significance of spacetime is preserved in the face of apparently non-local phenomena. I tried to meet that burden at least somewhat in the above exposition of my ideas about entanglement.

        Naturally, you don't need to make this consistency assumption about nature, but then, it seems to me, you end up with an argument that supports equally well two opposite conclusions. Is it then an argument at all?

        Finally, I really look forward to your objections on my distinction between actual and actualizable mass. I have not had yet the privilege of sharpening my own arguments through the process of defending them against thoughtful objections.

        All the best,

        Armin

        5 days later

        Armin,

        Your definition of "cause" is a reasonable one, Obviously, for such an important concept, additional discussion would be required. Maudlin, in his excellent book, describes the nonlocal changes in quantum states that are brought about by measurements as superluminal causation. I agree with his analysis, but I have avoided using the term "cause" for these situations. The reason is that the way the term "causality" has come to be used in physics tends to conflict with Maudlin's usage, so some people regard the phrase "superluminal causation" as almost contradictory.

        Although I believe in these superluminal effects, when I use the term "signal causality" it does not refer to the existence of these effects, but rather to the fact that these effects cannot be used to transmit observable information. What I call 'signal causality' is often referred to as 'no-superluminal-sinalling', or simply 'no-signalling' (by Bell and others). Norsen uses the term 'signal locality'. Again, my reason for using the term 'signal causality' is that this is what is called 'causality' in almost all quantum field theory texts (Weinberg being the exception). I maintain that this relatively weak, generalized notion of causality is one of the main foundational principles of contemporary physics. The failure by many to clearly distinguish between this concept, and the much stronger notion of local causality is one reason that we have not been able to develop a solid understanding of quantum measurement effects.

        Modern physical theory (at least outside of General Relativity), does not assume local causality. It assumes that any legitimate description of a physical process can be given as an alternative description by an appropriate Poincare transformation (as long as we ignore gravity).

        I disagree strongly with you statement that in order for nature to be consistent, "Either it is wholly about metric structures playing deep ontological roles, or it is wholly about non-deterministic interactions giving rise to the appearance of such structures." There can be alternative structures (metric or otherwise) that govern physical processes, but because of a limited nondeterminism, they permit equivalent descriptions at an observational level. That is to say, that the mathematical characterizations of the processes transform under a symmetry group.

        Your other points call for a more extended reply, but I should do that on your thread. I hope to be able to do that this weekend, but I have quite a few things that I need to do, so I might be delayed somewhat.

        Thanks again for your comments and for your patience,

        Ed

        13 days later

        Dear Edward,

        In the Theory of Infinite Nesting of Matter (my essay) there is the idea of Scale dimension as a fifth dimension of spacetime and SPF symmetry . It means that there must be principle of relativity for observers at each level of matter, and motion along scale axis does not change physical equations. Macro spacetime and micro spacetime have the same properties. What do you think about it?

        Sergey Fedosin

        Dear Edward,

        Apology for the late reply I just saw your comment. In Planck's Loading Theory many waves impinge on an atom and it absorbs various portions of energy from each (not whole quanta and not a whole photon at a time). Emission occurs when a threshold is reached. Eric's detecting two events at once from a single quantum of gamma radiation shows that in each detector there was at least one atom almost at the emission threshold. No conservation laws are violated because the remaining energy is quietly absorbed in other atoms but not yet emitted.

        Thank you for your comments about my views about Bell's Theorem. I may be wrong, but I think that all discussions of Entanglement and Bell's Theorem , including EPR, accept from the start that a photon's state is probabilistic from the start, not only due to the state of the detector atom.

        Best wishes,

        Vladimir

        Hello. This is group message to you and the writers of some 80 contest essays that I have already read, rated and probably commented on.

        This year I feel proud that the following old and new online friends have accepted my suggestion that they submit their ideas to this contest. Please feel free to read, comment on and rate these essays (including mine) if you have not already done so, thanks:

        Why We Still Don't Have Quantum Nucleodynamics by Norman D. Cook a summary of his Springer book on the subject.

        A Challenge to Quantized Absorption by Experiment and Theory by Eric Stanley Reiter Very important experiments based on Planck's loading theory, proving that Einstein's idea that the photon is a particle is wrong.

        An Artist's Modest Proposal by Kenneth Snelson The world-famous inventor of Tensegrity applies his ideas of structure to de Broglie's atom.

        Notes on Relativity by Edward Hoerdt Questioning how the Michelson-Morely experiment is analyzed in the context of Special Relativity

        Vladimir Tamari's essay Fix Physics! Is Physics like a badly-designed building? A humorous illustrate take. Plus: Seven foundational questions suggest a new beginning.

        Thank you and good luck.

        Vladimir

        After studying about 250 essays in this contest, I realize now, how can I assess the level of each submitted work. Accordingly, I rated some essays, including yours.

        Cood luck.

        Sergey Fedosin

        If you do not understand why your rating dropped down. As I found ratings in the contest are calculated in the next way. Suppose your rating is [math]R_1 [/math] and [math]N_1 [/math] was the quantity of people which gave you ratings. Then you have [math]S_1=R_1 N_1 [/math] of points. After it anyone give you [math]dS [/math] of points so you have [math]S_2=S_1+ dS [/math] of points and [math]N_2=N_1+1 [/math] is the common quantity of the people which gave you ratings. At the same time you will have [math]S_2=R_2 N_2 [/math] of points. From here, if you want to be R2 > R1 there must be: [math]S_2/ N_2>S_1/ N_1 [/math] or [math] (S_1+ dS) / (N_1+1) >S_1/ N_1 [/math] or [math] dS >S_1/ N_1 =R_1[/math] In other words if you want to increase rating of anyone you must give him more points [math]dS [/math] then the participant`s rating [math]R_1 [/math] was at the moment you rated him. From here it is seen that in the contest are special rules for ratings. And from here there are misunderstanding of some participants what is happened with their ratings. Moreover since community ratings are hided some participants do not sure how increase ratings of others and gives them maximum 10 points. But in the case the scale from 1 to 10 of points do not work, and some essays are overestimated and some essays are drop down. In my opinion it is a bad problem with this Contest rating process. I hope the FQXI community will change the rating process.

        Sergey Fedosin

        Dear Edward,

        You've written an excellent essay, in my opinion. I agree with your agnosticism about spacetime structure (well, actually, I like to go much further and try to replace the manifold structure with something else at the microscale, but I admit it's speculative). Some of your reflections potentially raise substantial challenges to my own favorite ideas about the role of causality. Of course, I don't mean exactly the same thing by this as you do by "local causality." In any case, I agree that it's less profitable to regard relativity in purely geometric terms than as a way of describing the interaction of actual events. A few more thoughts:

        1. I've often thought that perhaps locality ought to be defined in terms of interaction rather than metric structure; i.e., that maybe phenomena like entanglement are indications of nonmanifold structure of spacetime rather than "nonlocality" of interaction in a metric manifold. This view might even be useful to explain things like the homogeneity of the CMB without invoking inflation. However, this is perhaps too simplistic to understand both entanglement and the no-signaling theorem. I think "intrinsic quantum effects" are involved, in a sum-over-histories sort of way.

        2. You make an intriguing point with the statement that "it is impossible to say which of the two (or more) measurements is affecting the other. In other words, there is no observable sequence of these spacelike-separated events." Of course, you expand much more on this point later in the essay.

        3. Regarding Weinberg's elevation of the property of Lorentz invariance in the S-matrix, I think that covariance in general ought to be reinterpreted in terms of refinements of partial orders, and that the clue to this is the relativity of simultaneity. This doesn't necessarily clash with the lack of an observable sequence, but that's a long story...

        4. I agree that Goedel's theorem isn't necessarily links to quantum indeterminism. But I do think it's relevant to physics.

        Thanks for the great read! I wish you the best of luck in the voting; I boosted you as much as I could. Take care,

        Ben

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        • Post #107

        Dear Edward!

        Sorry could not read your essay before, during rating.

        1. For setting a new conceptual structure of the world, which means the space-time, we need a new deep ontology. It is necessary to get to the farthest depths of meaning, seize ABSOLUTE FORM of existence of matter. Assistant may be only dialectical logic, the logic of Heraclitus and Cusa: "coincidence of opposites" and the ancient principle of "what is at the top, there is a at the bottom».

        2. Quantum mechanics and general relativity is operational theory, but without the ontological foundation. They work in some parts of the whole world. Mathematics - science also not ontologically grounded. So now the main problem of fundamental physics - the problem of FOUNDATION KNOWLEDGE. And for that we need a new ontological revolution.

        3. You correctly captured category "information». FORM first essence (Aristotle). This is all the more necessary in the Information Age.

        4. Many physicists want to "kill time". But to «kill time» is to kill the "memory." There is only one way: a new model of the universe is a model of an ETERNAL UNIVERSE. Here mathematics (especially geometry) comes to the fore as the language of nature. Sincerely, Vladimir