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  • Post #17

Dan,

Unfortunately Robert doesn't seem to be participating in the conversation.

There are various entries in this contest which do a very credible job of addressing the topic of questionable assumptions built into theoretical physics, yours included. Given the rather conservative judging of previous contests, it seems reasonable to think the winner of this will be one which doesn't raise serious issues for the status quo. I'm thinking those of us who do think a serious review is necessary should select one entry to give a ten, then eights and nines for our other favorites. I feel Robert's entry would be the best candidate. Besides its many strengths for those us who have followed the topic for years, I think it would be most accessible and informative to the young technogeeks thinking of a career in theoretical physics. We don't need another generation chasing string theory and multiworlds.

What do you think?

Why "spooky"? Suppose we had two real coins, like pennies, and I told you, so that you have a priori knowledge, that I have positioned them such that no matter how you look at one, the other will be in the opposite state (imagine them floating, motionless, in space). Then, at some latter time, I inform you that one is in the state "heads", when viewed from a particular aspect angle. Nothing spooky happens when you then view the other coin from the same aspect angle, and see that it is "tails". You knew, a priori, that that was bound to happen - I told you so previously. The real issue is that in the standard misinterpretation of quantum mechanics, the "state of the object's attribute", it's "heads" versus "tail-ness", is not supposed to be in any definite state until it is observed. But the "state" of an object like a coin is not an attribute of the coin at all. Rather, it is an attribute of the relationship between the coin and the observer. When you finally observe a two-sided coin, it does not suddenly "collapse" into a one-sided coin. Only the relationship between the coin and the observer has "collapsed" into a definite state, either "heads" or "tails".

Hi, Robert

OK, the state of a given coin is relative to the observer's position. But is the relationship between the two coins themselves also an artifact of the observer? By specifying that at the outset you have made it a matter of definition, but is it so in nature? A physical explanation of entangled correlations might be, for example, that they are two localities on a common wave front. How might that sort of explanation relate to the coin analogy, I wonder?

thanks,

Dan

Hi, John

I agree with you about the merit of Robert's contribution, though I don't follow all his arguments and confess I haven't read many of the submissions. Last year I simply abstained from "voting", and will probably do the same this year.

cheers,

Dan

The relationship between the two coins is not an artifact of the observer. It is an artifact of the "creator" of the relationship; that is, the person who first positioned the coins in that relationship, or the experimental apparatus that entangled two objects.

I did indeed make it "a matter of definition" for the real, macroscopic coins. But I did not define it that way "in nature". But somebody else did. That is the point. That, and nothing else, is what the word "entangled" means, in this context. The "creator" knows, a priori, that this type of relationship exists, because he/she/it deliberately created the pair that way.

However, there is a subtlety that you might have missed regarding the nature of this relationship. Even the creator does not know what state (heads or tails) would be observed, if an observation of one of the coins was attempted. He only knows that whatever state is eventually observed, an observation of the other entangled object must produce the opposite state.

The situation is somewhat analogous to saying the creator created a pair of gloves. Then, when a later observer spots one of the gloves, and realizes that if is a "right hand" glove, he then can infer, from the a priori definition of what is meant by "a pair of gloves", and without ever having seen it, that the other glove must be a "left hand" glove.

The absolutely critical difference between the pair of gloves and the pair of coins is this; the right hand glove is a right hand glove, from the moment it was first created. It is in a definite state, because "handedness" is a real attribute of gloves. But a coin is neither heads nor tails when it is first created. It is both simultaneously, because it has two sides. Unlike a glove, only an observation of a coin can put "it" into a definite state of being either "heads" or "tails". But "it" does not refer to the coin, unlike the case with the glove, "it" refers to the state of the relationship between the coin and the observer.

Bell failed to consider this distinction in his proof. That is where all the "weirdness" originates.

Hi Robert, Dan,

I've noted elsewhere that d'Espagnat claims the world is based on reality, inductive reasoning, and locality, and that most Bell'ists have decided to give up reality and locality and retain 'logic'. Some current essays suggest banishing space-time, unitarity, and causality but still assuming that logic and math are available when every thing else is 'as close as possible to "nothing". Having developed a theory of logic and math as emergent from structure, I question whether one can assume that these are still available when all structure has vanished.

I am also increasingly inclined toward the view that local realism is to be preserved [see my essay, The Nature of the Wave Function ] even at the cost of 'universal logic'. Arguments for this have been presented on my essay thread. But a key aspect of this is, I believe, associated with Robert H McEachern's point about "the state of the relationship between the coin and the observer". In other words, if logic is going to fail, it will probably do so when the necessity for 'self-referential' logic is encountered, as may be the case for Bell's theorem.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Bernard d'Espagnat also claimed one other thing, about what Bell's theorem is based on. Since Scientific American is one of the co-sponsors of this essay contest, allow me to quote from "The Quantum Theory and Reality", by Bernard d'Espagnat, Nov., 1979, p. 166:

"These conclusions require a subtle but important extension of the meaning assigned to a notation such as Aplus. Whereas previously Aplus was merely one possible outcome of a measurement made on a particle, it is converted by this argument into an attribute of the particle itself. To be explicit, if some unmeasured proton has the property that a measurement along the axis A would give the definite result Aplus, then that proton is said to have the property Aplus. In other words, the physicist has been led to the conclusion that both protons in each pair have definite spin components at all times."

The problem is, that as the coin example illustrates, this "extension" and "conclusion" are not even true in a classical, macroscopic case. Consequently, there is no logical reason to assume they would be valid in the quantum case.

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  • Post #24

Robert,

just want to say I really like your description of the coins here. Aug. 20, 2012 @ 21:55 GMT.

Food for thought:

I was hoping someone would pick up on this, and generate some interesting discussion about

"What, exactly is the significance of the Uncertainty Principle?"

If you look at the relations given for the Uncertainty Principle and Shannon's Capacity, for the single particle case mentioned, in which S/N =1, then the uncertainty principle boils down to the statement that "1 = maximum number of bits of information that can be extracted from an observation, in the worst case."

Duh

So what is the big deal? What makes this so significant?

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    • Post #26

    Robert, All,

    isn't it the whole uncertainty idea that an observable isn't something definite until it is measured, and the measurement is what makes it something rather than a superposition of possibilities (as the where and when and what to sample has not yet been decided.) I'm starting to feel really comfortable with the idea now, whereas I used to find that strange. Having realised that it is also the case for macroscopic objects.

    All of the ways in which an object might be observed must exist simultaneously as potential sensory data in the environment, as the observer can choose to regard the object from any distance away, from any orientation and at a time of choice. It is the selection of the data at a particular position and time that determines the manifestation that will be observed. That manifestation will be regarded by the observer as what the object is, not the other possibilities that were not selected. Though it is in truth all of them. The object being the "parent" of all of the possible manifestations of it, generated from interception and processing of EM data.

    Everyone might find this recent experimental result interesting, if you haven't seen it already:

    http://arstechnica.com/science/2012/05/disentangling-the-wave-particle-duality-in-the-double-slit-experiment/

    Dan

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    • Post #28

    Georgina,

    The "idea" is something like that. And that is the problem. That idea is a misinterpretation of what is happening.

    The point of my previous post, is that the uncertainty principle amounts to no more than the statement that the minimum amount of information that can be extracted from an observation, and still be an observation, is exactly one bit. In other words, it amounts to nothing more than a very curious way of stating the definition of a "bit of information". Consequently, the uncertainty principle says nothing at all about the real world; Nothing about particles, nothing about waves, nothing about physics. It is merely a truism; It is true, by definition.

    Recall the distinction made above between the entangled gloves and the entangled coins. One involves an observation of an actual attribute of the object. The other does not. The two quantities, position and momentum, in the uncertainty relation, are not actual attributes of any object. Like the coin example, they are attributes of the relation between the observer and the object. Consequently, these types of observations are not about the object, and they can therefore not say anything about the object.

    In the case of obtaining only a single bit of information about the actual object, this single bit signifies the answer to the question "Was an entity observed to exist, that is, detected, by the detector?" Yes or No - a single bit answer.

    Thus, for example, when a particle is detected after passing through a double slit apparatus, as a spot on a screen behind the slits. Then you have observed exactly one bit of information about the particle -it exists -it has been detected. The location of the spot on the screen conveys no information about the particle. It only conveys information about the relationship between the particle and the observer.

    Physicists have consistently confused these two very different things. That is the cause of all the "weirdness" in their misinterpretations of reality.

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    • Post #29

    Anonymous,

    "In the case of obtaining only a single bit of information about the actual object, this single bit signifies the answer to the question "Was an entity observed to exist, that is, detected, by the detector?" Yes or No - a single bit answer.

    Thus, for example, when a particle is detected after passing through a double slit apparatus, as a spot on a screen behind the slits. Then you have observed exactly one bit of information about the particle -it exists -it has been detected. The location of the spot on the screen conveys no information about the particle. It only conveys information about the relationship between the particle and the observer.

    Physicists have consistently confused these two very different things. That is the cause of all the "weirdness" in their misinterpretations of reality."

    You think that the information conveyed by observing existence of anything at anytime is one bit of information???

    James

    The "Anonymous" post a few minutes ago was from me. For some reason, the system logged me out just before the post.

    James,

    You asked:

    You think that the information conveyed by observing existence of anything at anytime is one bit of information???

    Yes. That is the definition of what is meant by a "bit of information", in Information Theory.

    If you ever learn anything else, other than the mere existence of the object, then that represents additional bits of information.

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      • Post #31

      Dear Robert H McEachern,

      Thank you. I understand your point.

      James

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      • Post #32

      Robert,

      IMO you are correct in that what something -seems to be- to an observer is the product of the interaction between data and the observer, not a property of the independent object/entity alone.

      The velocity of a visible basket ball in flight could be recorded or a location at any chosen time could be captured. It can not have both at once because velocity involves changing location and location is a static observable. So it depends upon what is measured, which is the relationship the observer wishes to consider. The bit of knowledge is what the observer selects to know, not what the object is.It(object)is not static in any single location and it (object)is not spread over time. Nature wins by refusing to co-operate with our reductionist stereotypes.

      In the explanatory framework I have shared there is a change from considering what exists independently to what is fabricated as a reality by an observer from received sensory data. That switch is for the observer the equivalent of wave function collapse because there is one output reality from many other possibilities that were not chosen.

      Georgiana,

      Your stated:

      "The bit of knowledge is what the observer selects to know, not what the object is."

      Not quite. The central issue is not concerned with what the observer wants to know. It is concerned with what the observer is able to know. You might want to know how to decode a secret message. But you might not be able to do it. You might want to "look inside" some physical object, like an atom, but you might not be able to do it.

      In Information Theory, a "bit of information" means something very specific, and something rather different than what it means in common parlance. And it has some very, very, very counterintuitive consequences. It is concerned with the information content of "messages".

      Think about this message, that I am trying to communicate to you. Think about it as if it arrived in the mail, written on a piece of paper. The attributes of the paper are irrelevant to the attributes of the message. The alphabetic symbols I am using in an attempt to communicate my message are quite independent of the paper's location and momentum etc. The latter are irrelevant to the message content.

      The basic question that Information Theory seeks to answer is:

      How can the sender of a message encode the message, employing the least number of bits, and still ensure that the message can be received, by the intended recipient, free from all errors?

      This may seem to be only remotely related to making observations of naturally occurring objects. But in fact, the exact opposite has been discovered to be true. Why?

      Because it can be shown that one's ability to extract information from observations is highly dependent upon what the two entities (sender and receiver) know about each other. This is why, in my essay, I kept stressing the importance of the information content of the "initial conditions" over the information content of the equations. It is not just the case that the former's content is often much larger than the latter's, but that it also play's a much greater role in ones's ability to recover any information from the observation at all. Knowing Maxwell's Equations is not going to get you very far when it comes to trying to "observe" messages being received by a modern smartphone, or from the DNA in your genes.

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      • Post #34

      OK Thanks for your explanation. I've talked a bit about initial conditions, in my own way, as I see it, in my essay. The observer decides where, when and what selection of data to make but nature decides what that selection will"look like". You are talking about something different though. Sorry I thought the central issue was just uncertainty, because of your question, not how information theory works.

      Now you are starting to see. The central issue can never be just uncertainty. The issue is, exactly WHAT is uncertain? What exactly is SIGNIFICANT to the sender of a message? What is significant to the intended receiver of the message? What is significant to an unintended observer of a message?

      What is significant about the fact that I capitalized some of the words above? Does "What" signify the same meaning as "WHAT" or "what" or "wHaT"? Are you sure I am using the same alphabet that you are, or that you think I am? Perhaps, to me "W" and "w" are entirely different letters of a very large alphabet. Perhaps what you perceive to be as merely a different font, is really an entirely different letter.

      Here is where it starts to get interesting. Suppose you make an observation (think of trying to read a letter written by someone with "bad handwriting") of something that appears to be familiar, but appears noisy or distorted (think about why your new HDTV image is so much cleaner than your old TV image). Is the difference between the familiar, and the distorted copy significant? Maybe, maybe not. It all depends on what the entities know about each other. An entity that knows that the sender is always using a very limited alphabet might be able to assume that an observed "badly written" character is in fact just a noisy, distorted version of a member of the known alphabet. He may then replace it with a "clean" copy. When your new digital TV started doing things like this, then like magic, the image on your new HDTV screen suddenly became noise-free.

      You stated that: nature decides what that selection will "look like"

      But in the HDTV case just described, it is no longer just nature doing the "deciding"

      Nature decided to add noise and distortion (uncertainty) to the received TV symbols.

      Then the TV receiver decided that the received symbols were noisy and distorted.

      Then the TV receiver decided to replace the noisy and distorted symbols with clean ones.

      Then, like magic, you see a noise-free image. Then uncertainty has been eliminated.

      Where does the uncertainty lie? In the decision as to which "clean symbol" should be used to replace the "noisy and distorted symbol".

      And then, in the next steps in the process, things start to get really interesting. But that is another story.

      I hope you can see how these types of behaviors can have a major impact on "observing" "attributes of objects" and "attributes of the relationship between an object and an observer".

      If you do, then you are seeing something that the physicists have heretofore missed. And it is something not to be missed.

      Dr. McEachern,

      Hi. I think your essay was very good. While I can't say I understood it all, the main points I got out of it are that physicists seem to confuse the mathematical description of a thing with the thing itself and that the relationship between the observer and an observed thing can affect one's view of the observed thing (from above discussion). About these two things, I totally agree. In a previous FQXi essay and at my website, I make similar points about:

      1. An observer's view of an infinite set as discrete or continuous depends on the reference frame of the observer relative to the set.

      2. In regards to the question of "Why is there something rather than nothing?", I've tried to point out that the thinker's conception of a thing (non-existence in this case) is different than the thing itself. I think this leads to real problems not only in math and physics but in philosophy.

      One more observation is that several essays in this contest seem to point out that physicists seem to confuse mathematical descriptions of the world with the world itself. Perhaps, this point should be considered by academic physicists? I doubt that it will be, though, since the use of unfounded and unexplained assumptions (ie, poor reasoning) by physicists seems to be rampant.

      My entry in this year's contest is about what I believe to be a misapplication of a mathematical situation (comparing the size of an infinite set to the size of an infinite subset derived from it) to the corresponding real world situation.

      Anyways, great essay!

      Roger

      (sites.google.com/site/ralphthewebsite)