[deleted]
Rob,
You write, quoting Buridan's principle (Lamport): 'A discrete decision based upon an input having a continuous range of values cannot be made within a bounded length of time.' And comment:
"Start listening to a sound with a "continuous range of values", like a sinusoid. Then attempt to make a discrete decision - that you have tired of listening and wish to stop and reply to this comment. If what you say is true, I suppose I will never hear from you again, since you will be unable to ever make the decision."
As I said before, you are trying to apply anthrocentric reasoning to a general problem. Buridan's principle applies first to the arbiter problem -- how to assure allocation of computing resources to a fair decision at any particular moment. As you allow, *some* decision can always be made. What Lamport found, is that in any *bounded length of time* there is no way to prevent some 'ass' from starving, i.e., to prevent accidents: "The status of continuity in quantum physics is less clear than in classical physics. The laws of quantum mechanics (such as Schroedinger's equation) are continuous, and the Uncertainty Principle, like random noise, seems to prohibit only the deliberate starvation of the ass, not its accidental starvation."
Applied to the multiverse and assuming an unbounded length of time, Buridan's principle makes an accidental universe not only plausible but inevitable.
Quoting me: 'I do not assume memoryless particles'.
"You have, whether you realize it or not. An entity with sufficient memory can *always* use the contents of that memory to modify an input signal, to avoid all the problems you have discussed. If nothing else, it can digitize it, so that it is no longer continuous."
Right. See above. The problem is not that a decision cannot be made, it's that there is no schema to guarantee that any decision in a bounded length of time won't lead to "starvation."
Quoting me, 'You don't seem to understand that if the world cannot be described by an algorithm shorter than itself (Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity) -- i.e., is not algorithmically compressible -- then it *is* random at foundation.'
"I understand that quite well. However, I was not discussing how to formulate algorithmic descriptions of the world, I was discussing the 'hardware' requirements for running any such algorithm; the entire universe does not seem to contain enough 'hardware' to predict some events before they occur. That is the ultimate 'cause' of free-will."
A program can run on any substrate (that's the source of Minsky's description of humans as computers made of meat). What Chaitin found, is that the choice of program (equivalent in our context to Albecht's choice of clock) affects the computation; Chaitin's number - the halting probability of a Turing machine -- outputs a different result depending on the computer language running the algorithm. There's randomness even in arithmetic. (If you are interested, my ICCS 2007 powerpoint and paper discuss this subject.)
As to free will, I don't find it to be based in the inherent randomness of the universe; rather, I find that Wheeler's hypothesis of a participatory creation consistent with both relativity and quantum theory, in the free choice of initial conditions. I am also encouraged by Joy Christian's research in continuous measurement functions and quantum correlations -- because if nature has a free choice ("God had a choice in creating the world") so do we.
Quoting me: 'logical consistency alone is no test of a physical theory'
"I did not know we were discussing a testable physical theory. I was discussing the untestable, metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. What have you been discussing? If you have a testable physical theory that you wish to discuss, please identify it and the test."
Working on that. We haven't even gotten that far in this discussion, however. One has to accept that given an unbounded length of time' Albrecht's hypothesis *is* testable. Einstein relativity describes the universe as "finite but unbounded" -- meaning bounded in time at the cosmological singularity and unbounded in space by Riemannian geometry. I maintain that the theory does not suffer any loss of meaning when describing the world as finite in space and unbounded in time. Can one disprove my conjecture? -- if not, we have the physical basis for Albrecht's clock ambiguity.
Tom