An Accidental Universe

Rob,

It is a conundrum for those who view math as foundational, that after distilling reality down to its mathematical essence, that the result is effectively meaningless. By eliminating infinities from reality, in order to limit it, they end up with an infinity of realities.

Nature has the last laugh.

I appreciate your sensibility.

Tom,

I appreciate the sentiments in your last comment. And I will try to respond as clearly as I can to the best of my ability.

Let me respond directly to your comments in order:

You write, "These terms explain that a relativistic particle of nonzero mass and zero momentum possesses negative energy. Does that make physical sense?" No! This does not make physical sense to me! But the problem, imho, arises because we consider the mathematical construction of SR and GR as describing "what is" physically real. Were we not to make such assumption this (meta)physical mystery goes away. That is what I am arguing is possible.

You write, "The very same mathematics that describes energy entropy applies to communication entropy. Are these the same thing? -- that's a deep and open question." Yes, I do believe the two ideas (thermodynamic entropy and communication entropy) are the same. One of the results that comes out of my derivation of Planck's Law is to show that link. What 'thermodynamic entropy' and 'information entropy' have in common is that they are both 'amounts of evolution' (in one case energy in the other case information) over a given period of time. This is how 'entropy and time' are mathematically linked. And thus, the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not really about 'entropy' but about 'time'. This Law should really state that "a positive duration of time is needed for any physical event to evolve".

You write, "to try and characterize physical laws by mathematical formulations that are not derived from physical experience, contradicts both the rules of physics and the rules of mathematics". I am not sure I understand your reasoning here. Are you saying that unless a 'physical law' is discovered in the heap of experimental data it cannot apply to Physics? What gives validity to a 'physical law' is empirical evidence only? I disagree. And point to the Pythagorean Theorem as a counterexample. Certainly, this formula can be discovered in the measurements of physical distances. As the ancient Egyptians did! But what gives validity to this 'physical law' is the mathematical necessity which deduces its truth. Thus making it a 'mathematical identity' rather than a 'physical law' per se. Something analogous to this is true of Planck's Formula. I have shown this Formula is also a 'mathematical identity' rather than a 'physical law'. And based on this experience (and others as well) I argue that Basic Law of Physics can and should be derivable as mathematical identities. See The Thermodynamics in Planck's Law

Constantinos

John,

"By eliminating infinities from reality, in order to limit it, they end up with an infinity of realities."

Well said!

Rob McEachern

Paul,

In my statement, "consider 'what is' to be a person" I meant it in the sense of a "human being". And since this is what I meant, you must accept that is what I meant! You have no choice on the matter.

This is getting absurd!

Constantinos

Rob,

Thanks!

It's kind of difficult to distill out the essence of infinity.

Sort of like a dimensionless point is no more real than a dimensionless apple, but much more convenient than giving it dimension.

The power of belief is much more attracted to the clear image, than the messy reality. In its worship of precision, the Discipline seems repelled by the inherent fuzziness of action and willing to even accept blocktime as an acceptable alternative.

One can never doubt the God of math. It knows all, sees all and we only have to peer over its shoulder.

The only problem is that perception is also inherently subjective. There is no godly objectivity.

"It's kind of difficult to distill out the essence of infinity."

Much easier to just frame it and move on.

Constantinos

Indeed, that is why I said temperament, as opposed to bone, blood, etc. But temperament and any other such quality has to have a physical basis, for it to be considered in physics. It is physically existent entities that are being examined. Here is another example, a book can invoke all sorts of emotions, but physically, what is it-a quantity of wood configured...some chemical compound known as ink spatially distributed...

Paul

Anonymousse

"Time is an area where some people feel they can get away with being vague"

So what? I am Paul Reed, not "some people", why do I want to waste my time reading what some people say? Physical existence alters. The rate at which it does so in any circumstance is what timing is measuring, time or duration being the generic word for the unit of this measuring system. The timing system utilises timing devices to 'tell' the time, and the reference for this measuring system is a conceptual constant rate of change. That is why, for the measuring system to work, timing devices are synchronised. In just the same way that, within the realms of practicality, all rulers have the same spatial differentiation.

"where you say "physical existence is an existential sequence". You've said several things about the process of alteration that boil down to "That's just the way it is".

Indeed, that is the way it is, for us. We can only know existence, as opposed to invoking beliefs about it, based on an independent physical process. The physical existence we can know has two features: it is independent of the sensory systems which detect it, and it alters. So, the physical existence we can know, ie what science as opposed to religion is investigating, is existential sequence. This is the only form of existence which can result in physical existence. A definitive physically existent state, alteration, subsequent physically existent state. Successor has ceased .

"when the Rietdijk-Putnam argument proves beyond any doubt that if the standard view of SR is right, then this flow of time is in the perception of the observer only?

Leaving aside the 'red herring' of SR. Time, or more precisely rate at which physical existence alters, cannot be a function of perception. That is the subsequent processing of a physical input, which has already existed. So, as I asked in a previous post, how does a non physical process affect a physical process, especially when the latter has already occurred? Furthermore, what is physically received is not physical existence, but a physical representation thereof (aka light). Einstein, and many others, failed to differentiate existence and representation. The timing differential is in the receipt of representations, not existence. How can distance affect when any given physically existent circumstance occurred?

There is another important point here:

There is always a delay between time of physical existence, and time of observation of that existence, as light has to travel. The duration will vary as a function of the distance involved, and the speed at which any given light travels (or is presumed to do so). Assuming a constancy of light speed for the sake of simplicity, then the perceived (ie received) rate of change of any given sequence will remain the same, so long as the relative spatial position of whatever is involved remains constant. But, when relative distance is altering (ie there is changing relative movement), then the perceived (ie received) rate of change alters, because the delay is ever increasing (or decreasing) at a rate which depends on the rate at which the distances are altering. To the observer this gives the impression that the rate of change is slowing/speeding up, over time, but is an optical illusion, as the actual rate of change does not alter.

Perception is irrelevant to physical existence. The concern over moving/not moving stems from their original hypothesis that there is dimension alteration if an entity is caused to alter its rate of movement. Another twist in the story is that Einstein was not using light, as in observational light, anyway. He just used a constant, which he called light. So his second postulate is irrelevant, because that is not what was deployed in the theory, ie there is no dichotomy between constancy and light.

"I'm not going into this further, you need to read up on it."

No, I do not need to waste my time. You need to re-think how physical existence must occur, based on common sense, rather than what is said in books. Luckily, I have not been subjected to this indoctrination, and therefore was able to discern, very quickly, what must be happening and where the fundamental mistakes are.

Paul

Constantinos

I am getting tired of this. I also resent my factually correct statements being depicted as "blatant misunderstandings".

The judgement on whether a statement is correct/incorrect, depends on the reference. By definition, there is never an absolute reference, because if A, there is then always the possibility of not-A. In other words, it is not possible to externalise from whatever 'is'. There is always the possibility of an alternative. So from that perspective (reference) everything is always possibly incorrect, indeed, can never be validated, because the reference is, by definition, unattainable. This is therefore irrelevant/useless. What is required is a reference which can be validated, and that is based on the independent physical process which enables sentient organisms to be aware of that existence. It is a closed existential loop, but within it, correctness can be established.

You missed the point about 'mathematical identities'. We exist, that inevitably entails presumptions. You are, from an (unattainable) absolute reference trying to depict this as inevitably valid, which it might not be. In contrast to your notion of 'theory', which you depict as being inevitably not valid. Your reference is invalid.

Paul

Constantinos,

You write, " ... the problem, imho, arises because we consider the mathematical construction of SR and GR as describing 'what is' physically real."

No mathematics describes what is. Again, I invoke the example of C-A-T not being identical to a furry animal that eats mice. Mathematics (as relates to the physical world) describes what we measure, and how. Domain and range are important.

"Were we not to make such assumption this (meta)physical mystery goes away. That is what I am arguing is possible."

It's not a mystery, Constantinos. A realist view of physics allows that the unmeasured quantity is metaphysically real ("the moon really is there when no one is looking") -- as opposed to an anti-realist position that observation collapses the wave function and creates the real world. Metaphyiscal questions are simply a part of physics.

"Are you saying that unless a 'physical law' is discovered in the heap of experimental data it cannot apply to Physics? What gives validity to a 'physical law' is empirical evidence only?"

Of course.

"I disagree. And point to the Pythagorean Theorem as a counterexample. Certainly, this formula can be discovered in the measurements of physical distances."

Remember -- the Pythagorean theorem also applies to higher dimensions. Riemannian geometry is a four-dimension PT, and 'distance' has a different meaning in topology. Once again, domain and range define what is being measured.

"As the ancient Egyptians did! But what gives validity to this 'physical law' is the mathematical necessity which deduces its truth. Thus making it a 'mathematical identity' rather than a 'physical law' per se."

You're contradicting your own argument. The Egyptians closely approximated the value of pi by trial and error measures -- I think it was the Babylonians who applied the Pythagorean theorem in measuring land. At any rate, it doesn't matter; there was no mathematical necessity for these applications; the phenomena were known long before being described in formal language.

Tom

Rob,

You've gotten all too philosophical for my tastes.

You're using probability and existence in anthrocentric ways not tractable to objective science. I have no respect for the anthropic principle in the strong sense, and in the weak sense, it's trivial.

You make at least one false -- and falsifiable -- statement, however: "Unlike the laws of physics, the 'law' of natural selection is NOT time-reversable. That is why the perspective is so alien to the physicist."

Not at all. Most random mutations in fact, are not beneficial to the survival of the species. Because those that are beneficial survive along with the species by natural selection, one gets the illusion of irreversibility. Taking the world as a whole, one finds many, many more single celled organisms than multicelled -- every multicelled creature including us is a corporation of cooperating cells. There is nothing in evolutionary theory that says propagation of multicelled creatures is irreversible.

"The concept of 'Determinism' means different things to different people. To me, in order to be compatible with my free-will, and the laws of physics, it must mean that, after the fact, I can, at least in principle, determine how things came to be; hind-sight is 20-20."

Then you should have no problem with Albrecht's retodictions from our free choice of clocks. Why do you have such a problem? -- strip away the philosophy and let's talk about the science.

"But forward-sight is not; not all things can be 'determined', in the sense of being predicted before-hand; the problem is, that the entire 'computing resources' of the entire universe, are only sufficient to perform some predictions in real-time - making the prediction takes just as long as performing the action, because they are one and the same thing."

This assumes the world is a computer. I make no such assumption, nor do I find it either sufficient or necessary.

"'Sez who? What gives you the idea that final conditions are observables'"

Sez me. For me, my life is my final condition. I do not believe I will observe any other."

Then you are definitiely not a mathematician. :-)

Tom

Rob,

You write, "If all possible laws (which are not self-contradictory) exist somewhere in the multiverse, then there must exist at least one universe in which that universe's initial conditions and laws, including those of Natural Selection, are such that it is *Necessary*, rather than contingent, that things be as they are in this universe."

Not so. The hypothesis of equally likely universes does not imply necessity of one in particular, any more than one finds it necessary that a fair six-sided die always comes to rest on "6."

What I particularly like about Albrecht's result is that it implies the considerable worth of Einstein's relativity -- no preferred rest frame, and no collapse of the wave function. Observers in different frames would respectively see "1" and "6" and both observations are valid because all observers are only at relative rest.

"I merely point out that this *is* the universe we live in. All other universes within the multiverse are thus *unnecessary* to the existence of this one special universe, which is *necessary*."

Then you would find it necessary that a six-sided die be imprinted with but one number or at most -- two. This in fact is the weakness of standard quantum theory; if an observation collapses to 0, all unobserved phenomena have the value 1, or vice versa.

Tom

Tom,

"What I particularly like about Albrecht's result is that it implies the considerable worth of Einstein's relativity -- no preferred rest frame, and no collapse of the wave function. Observers in different frames would respectively see "1" and "6" and both observations are valid because all observers are only at relative rest.

"I merely point out that this *is* the universe we live in. All other universes within the multiverse are thus *unnecessary* to the existence of this one special universe, which is *necessary*."

Then you would find it necessary that a six-sided die be imprinted with but one number or at most -- two. This in fact is the weakness of standard quantum theory; if an observation collapses to 0, all unobserved phenomena have the value 1, or vice versa."

You don't need multiverses for different observers to have different views of the same reality, you only need to understand perspective is subjective. Clocks are a function of reality, rather than reality a function of the clocks, and other measures. Math models reality, not the other way around.

Paul,

Your "factually correct statements" may be factually correct to you. But they are "blatant misunderstandings" of my arguments.

We are not communicating ,,,

Constantinos

Tom,

Earlier, you stated that:

"For some time now, I have been studying the implications of Leslie Lamport's paper, "Buridan's Principle"" - "an ass placed equidistant between two bales of hay must starve to death because it has no reason to chose one bale over the other."

The fallacy in that is that the ass need not make the choice based on distance. Maybe it makes it by smell. Maybe I would make the decision based whether the Julian date is divisible by seven, or one of the bales is closer to Mecca.

Your whole argument is based on the false assumption that everything behaves like memoryless particles - when given a symmetric input, they have no way to "break the symmetry" (except via random, equiprobable statistics). But every entity, more complex than an electron, can exploit its memory (internal, alterable states) to break the symmetry, and that cannot be modeled by random equiprobable statistics.

I may have gotten all too philosophical for your tastes, but Albrecht's argument is too pseudo-scientific for mine.

"You're using probability and existence in anthrocentric ways not tractable to objective science."

There is no objective science in assuming that the behaviors of non-elementary particles lack any mechanism for "symmetry breaking", and can therefore be modeled via trivial, random probability theory.

"This assumes the world is a computer." It does not. I *stated* that only the world itself, in its entirety, can determine some outcomes, and even it can only determine those outcomes, by actualizing them, in "real-time", and no faster. If you wish to call it a computer, then it is an analog one, not a digital one, and, most importantly, it is an "analog" of itself. It "computes" its next state, by the simple act of entering its next state.

Rob McEachern

Tom,

You are correct in stating that "The hypothesis of equally likely universes does not imply necessity of one in particular".

But that is irrelevant to my argument. Another aspect of the multiverse hypothesis *does* imply it. My point is that the multiverse hypothesis does not forbid the "laws" to be such that *any* set of initial conditions, acted upon by those laws, always produce the same result - a universe that looks like ours. The rules of logic and avoidance of self-contradiction also do not forbid such laws. Hence, since the multiverse hypothesis assumes that all possible laws are instantiated, this peculiar law and its peculiar universe, must exist. It is a universe in which it is *Necessary* that any and all initial conditions result in the universe we actually experience. You may believe that you also live simultaneously in another universe, whose existence is *contingent* upon having just the right initial conditions. But that universe is not *necessary* to the existence of the other. Nor are any of the other universes, within the multiverse.

The definitive assumption of the multiverse hypothesis, that all possible laws be instantiated, is *sufficient* to cause the hypothesis itself, to be *unnecessary*, because, hidden within it, is at least one copy of our universe, whose existence is *necessary* as a result of a very peculiar law, rather than the law's initial conditions - a law that has "chosen" to ignore the initial conditions.

Rob McEachern

Rob,

If you want to discuss the Lamport paper, please read it first.

You write, "Your whole argument is based on the false assumption that everything behaves like memoryless particles - when given a symmetric input, they have no way to 'break the symmetry' (except via random, equiprobable statistics). But every entity, more complex than an electron, can exploit its memory (internal, alterable states) to break the symmetry, and that cannot be modeled by random equiprobable statistics."

Sheer gobbledegook. I do not assume memoryless particles; I simply assume physical laws. Not only statistical -- continuous functions as well.

"I may have gotten all too philosophical for your tastes, but Albrecht's argument is too pseudo-scientific for mine."

Whatever you think pseduo-scientific means, it does not apply to Albrecht's framework. Better be more specific here if you want to sound convincing.

"There is no objective science in assuming that the behaviors of non-elementary particles lack any mechanism for "symmetry breaking", and can therefore be modeled via trivial, random probability theory."

Complex systems science is loaded with examples of order from randomness. Try Gell-Mann's *The Quark and the Jaguar* or Steven Strogatz's *Sync* for easily accessible reading.

"I *stated* that only the world itself, in its entirety, can determine some outcomes, and even it can only determine those outcomes, by actualizing them, in 'real-time', and no faster. If you wish to call it a computer, then it is an analog one, not a digital one, and, most importantly, it is an 'analog' of itself. It 'computes' its next state, by the simple act of entering its next state."

You don't seem to understand that if the world cannot be described by an algorithm shorter than itself (Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity) -- i.e., is not algorithmically compressible -- then it *is* random at foundation. As I said.

Tom

Tom,

"I simply assume physical laws. Not only statistical -- continuous functions as well."

You have also assumed that the decisions based on your continuous function inputs, must also be continuous.

That is the assumption I object to. If you give me a continuous function, of finite bandwidth, I can digitize it. I can then use the entire bit-stream as a single serial number to look-up a set of instructions that dictate my subsequent behavior. My behavior is not a continuous function.

Rob McEachern

Rob,

You write, "My point is that the multiverse hypothesis does not forbid the 'laws' to be such that *any* set of initial conditions, acted upon by those laws, always produce the same result - a universe that looks like ours."

Yes it does. Because the bit is fundamental -- one binary choice from among an infinite set of initial conditions implies continuously branching probabilities. Think of the symmetry breaking at a table setting of perfectly symmetric silverware -- the first person's choice of left or right determines all the other choices.

"The rules of logic and avoidance of self-contradiction also do not forbid such laws. Hence, since the multiverse hypothesis assumes that all possible laws are instantiated, this peculiar law and its peculiar universe, must exist."

Nothing compels any universe to exist; existence is always framed by domain and and range -- this peculiar domain and range does not obviate other such. The universe is possibly self limiting, as Wheeler said, "The boundary of the boundary is zero."

"It is a universe in which it is *Necessary* that any and all initial conditions result in the universe we actually experience. You may believe that you also live simultaneously in another universe, whose existence is *contingent* upon having just the right initial conditions. But that universe is not *necessary* to the existence of the other. Nor are any of the other universes, within the multiverse."

So what? Existence of itself, any way one describes it, is not necessary. Objective existence is dependent on domain and range, and that what we are describing here when we discuss a multiverse. Hawking is reported to have said that the many-worlds hypothesis is trivially true -- I agree.

"The definitive assumption of the multiverse hypothesis, that all possible laws be instantiated, is *sufficient* to cause the hypothesis itself, to be *unnecessary*, because, hidden within it, is at least one copy of our universe, whose existence is *necessary* as a result of a very peculiar law, rather than the law's initial conditions - a law that has "chosen" to ignore the initial conditions."

As I told Peter, logical consistency alone is no test of a physical theory.

Tom