Jochen
Sorry, but you are just not answering my questions.
Going back to the start of this exchange: "entanglement..is...the resulting correlation (say, between the spins of two particles, to be precise). Finding out one spin then gives you information about the other...if I have a red and a green ball, and place each in a box, shuffle them, and give you one, if you open your box and find the red ball, you will immediately know that mine contains the green one, no matter our spatial distance. The difference is just that in classical mechanics, you can meaningfully infer that the red ball was in your box before you looked; but in quantum mechanics, that inference leads to observable contradictions. This is encapsulated in the fact that quantum correlations are 'stronger' than classical ones."
Now, in respect of the balls, distance is irrelevant, so the caveat is spurious, as this has nothing to do with an interaction, ie a physical occurrence. If it was then spatial position and sequence order (as per my previous post to this) would be relevant. This is just knowledge of 2 'things'. The two things are known, it is known they are each in a different box, and there are only two boxes. By definition, once we know one, we know the other. It is not a case of: "in classical mechanics, you can meaningfully infer that the red ball was in your box before you looked". Again, as with distance, this allusion to classical mechanics is spurious. You can "meaningfully infer" because you know! The only guess needed is in the first instance, and it must be either/or. The notion of 'strength' appears to be a metaphysical conception, which is, along with other such metaphysical concepts, how QM rationalises the impossible conundrum it creates (see below).
When this scenario is turned into a physical proposition, it immediately collapses, because 'balls' as such do not physically exist (as I kept on saying in respect of chair, St Paul's, etc). The underlying incorrect assumption is that they persist in that physically existent state. Which they do not. They neither exist in that state in the first place, and neither does this state persist over time. This state is a conceptualisation of the physical existence at a higher level than what actually occurs, ie it relates to superficial physical attributes, which we then deem to be the 'thing' for ease of identification/differentiation from other 'things'.
We know this, because if you wait long enough, you will see the balls manifest alteration. To speed that up, as we need to get on with life, put them under an electron microscope. So, the real question is: what physically constitutes these 'things'? And the answer must be, given that there is existence and difference, at any given time one physically existent state in an existential sequence of discrete, definitive, physically existent states.
Then: "but in quantum mechanics, that inference leads to observable contradictions. This is encapsulated in the fact that quantum correlations are 'stronger' than classical ones."
This is expressed the wrong way round. It must be that some validated event proves this law of existence, not the inference, and especially if understood correctly and not as manifest in the incorrect superficial 'thing' mode, to be not correct. So, something in QM is contrary to the law of existence. Which from a scientific standpoint is fair enough, in that the possibility of an alternative must be accepted, and the existence of that alternative must be accepted if proven. This being, of course, within the confine of the physical existence we can potentially know. Any assertion can be invoked, but it needs to be proven in accord with how knowledge is validated, etc. That is, not a belief. Especially in this case, since whatever this assertion is, it overturns the 'natural order'. Perversely, as I keep on pointing out, the 'one definite state at a time rule' is presumed in QM, but then, apparently, proven to be flawed. There are two particles and a physically existent state known as spin, and there is a relationship of some form because "Finding out one spin then gives you information about the other". Whether we can identify that is irrelevant, it exists. So what is the argument?
There is reference to experiment. But the simple fact is that it is impossible for us to differentiate, other than by conception, one physically existent state from another, the duration and degree of alteration involved is too small. One needs to understand how existence must occur first, in order to mentally have some conception of what is involved. That is, to eradicate the notion that physical difference is exemplified by the 'superficial identification' mode. Therefore, and in the proper spirit of science, what must be an inherent feature of our physical existence, must remain as the null hypothesis, until, within the rules of validation, that 'world order' is proven incorrect.
It has always struck me how people have been attracted to an alternative, this is of itself understandable, it is the clique mentality, desire to be one that knows superior truth, etc, etc. Apart from the simple fact that they genuinely believe this 'new world order' is correct. Another factor in this is the misunderstanding of the 'old world order' in the first place. Without any background/baggage, which obviously helps, it took me a while to discount all intuitive tendencies and realise what must be going on. Our entire ontological conception, and hence language, is incorrect. Go and stare at that bush I keep referring to, and dump all preconceptions. How can it be different sizes, have leaves/no leaves, different colours? Just follow the logic through. And you arrive at, maybe, 'quanta'. It does not matter, the point is you eventually arrive at the 'bottom line'. In other words, there are not two forms of mode in which physical existence occurs.
Taking the argument as such, it does not work anyway. Unless there is some relationship between the spin states of the two particles, then knowing the state of one does not give a clue as to the state of the other. The relationship could be that there is none. But the point is that there cannot be particles, a state, and a relationship between them, in a condition of physical anarchy. That is, not one, &/or not a definite, physically existent state at a time. The stance of QM is self-contradictory.
If there is such a relationship then they are effectively one. All that is happening is that if everything cannot be measured, or is not measured, then the other can be inferred, so long as one is measured. And if measurement as such involves practical difficulties then a probability as to the state, and hence the state of the other, will have to suffice. That makes no difference to the logic of the argument.
The next problem is sequence. The position in the sequence of the state measured is unknown. So therefore, relating the measurements from different times to each other is impossible. That is, the statement "I multiply the numbers to find out their correlation" is incorrect, because you do not know the relationship of the measurements in order to relate them. All that is being achieved is relating two states of this particular physical characteristic which are existent at the same time. Furthermore, the characterisation of this feature (ie spin state) as being depictable in terms of only two conditions, is suspicious. It has a sense of being a simplification of the actual physical reality.
Indeed, if this is a physical circumstance, then spatial position as well as sequence order is a factor. As physical influence does not 'jump' physical circumstance. As I said in the previous post to the one from you I am referring to, physical influence can only involve 'next to' and can only occur if the sequence order is 'consecutive'. And physical influence must involve physical existence, ie not some allusion to an effect which has no physical 'presence' underpinning it.
All of which begs the question as to what QM has 'found'. And the answer is: it presumes, incorrectly, uncertainty/indefiniteness/duplicity as an inherent feature of physical existence at the outset. And then has to invoke a number of flawed concepts in order to rationalise the conundrum thereby created. This includes the incorrect presumption that measurement has an effect on the physical circumstance. That physical existence can be characterised as a wavefunction, which is irrelevant, because it is the physically existent state at any time which needs to be identified. Etc, etc.
Paul