Anon
"Paul Reed has built an axiomatic system..."
Not so. I have taken what is known (in generic form to save the distraction of substance) and shown that this inevitably leads to a conclusion as to how physical existence must occur. Which, given the simplicity and integrity of the argument, must be the null hypothesis in physics (ie the underlying rules). And indeed was, although not properly understood, until a 'new order' arose to supplant it. One can of course, remain open to an alternative, but this would have to be beyond dispute, etc, to warrant overturning those rules.
There are two components to the argument:
1 What constitutes physical existence?
This is usually where most people go wrong, because they allow not knowable alternative possibilities to be part of physical existence. The start point is that there is existence of some form or other. But we can only be aware of, what must be regarded as, a particular form of existence, ie that which has detectability (for want of a better phrase), or has the proven potential thereof based on previously verified detection. That is because awareness is a function of a physical process which culminates in the receipt of physical input, which is then processed by the sensory systems/brain . Whether there 'are' alternative forms of existence is irrelevant, because we cannot be aware of them.
In simple terms, we are trapped in an existentially closed system. We can only know what it is potentially possible for us to know. And what it is potentially possible for us to know is the equivalent of physical existence, for us. We do not have some form of 'direct access' to existence, which is tantamount to asserting that we can externalise ourselves from our own existence, which we cannot. Proper hypothesis is, in effect, virtual sensing. Because it must follow the rules of the process, ie effectively it is defining what could have been sensed had there not been some identifiable problem. That is, it is not belief, which has no basis of experienceability.
Another way of expressing this is: an absolute extrinsic reference is never available, because that can only ever be the possibility of an alternative. That is, given A (where A is 'is'), there is always the logical possibility of not-A, however, this cannot be defined from within A, as a reference from within not-A is required for that. So all that can be defined is A, from within A, and that that is not not-A. But not what not-A is.
The corollary of this being that 'is' must be definitive in itself (ie a closed system), and therefore possible to define, albeit only from within. That is so because the reference for that is 'of ' (or 'not of'), ie the only 'absolute' reference there can be is the factor which determines inclusivity. In the context of existence this reference is detectability (either actual or properly hypothesised).
2 How must physical existence occur?
Having delineated what physical existence must be, for us, we can then define how that must occur, without falling into the trap of involving possible alternatives, this is science not religion. Based on input received, we can identify that the form of physical existence we can know has two fundamental characteristics:
-what occurs, does so, independently of the processes which detect it
-it involves difference, ie comparison of inputs reveals difference, and therefore that there is alteration.
Physical existence and difference must mean that physical existence is existential sequence. Sequence is the only way the conundrum of existence/difference is resolved. Physical existence must be definitive, physical occurrence cannot involve any form of vagueness, duplicity or change, otherwise, by definition, it has not occurred. So it is a sequence of discrete, definitive, physically existent states. That is, the entirety of whatever comprises it can only exist in one definitive physically existent state at a time (and that, obviously, applies to conceptualised components of that entirety). In sequence, the predecessor must cease to exist so that the successor can exist. Put another way, whatever constitutes the elementary substance of physical existence (which could involve different types) each cannot be in more than one physically existent state at a time. Something cannot be something, and also be different, at the same time. The difference must be something else.
One of the problems is that the true impact of sequence is not understood. It can be characterised by 'there is only ever a present'. For understandable reasons, we conceive of physical existence (and this conception is embedded in our language) differently. That can be characterised as 'it changes'. We conceive of physical existence on the basis of superficial physical attributes, ie not what actually occurs. Any given collectivity of these attributes is deemed to be a 'thing'. Indeed, we even accept change to this 'thing', but still maintain that the 'thing' persists in existence. Which is a contradiction. A difference is a difference. In reality, any given 'thing' actually comprises a different physically existent state at any time. So it is not a 'thing which changes', but a sequence of different, definitive, discrete physically existent states. All that is happening is that the differences are not sufficient to alter the superficial features which are the basis upon which the 'thing' is delineated. Indeed, even if difference is manifest at that level, then this is rationalised as 'it changed'. The point here being that if this was understood in the first place, then arguments which explain it would not be depicted as 'wooden/old fashioned' philosophy. Neither would an alternative, incorrect, depiction of physical existence have been able to gain credence.
Paul