The Emergent It: A Collective Awareness by Wesley Wayne Hansen

Wes

Thanks, I don't want to get into a repeat of the on-going exchange with Jochen, So I will say no more.

Paul

Wes, I agree with your answer that consciousness can be transferred to inorganic machines. I think we also have a shared interest in the mathematical aspects of physics and possibly some philosophical issues. I am quite comfortable with Ellis's essay on top down causality which makes perfect sense to me. I am not so keen on his ideas about temporal causality and the flow of time which he wrote about in another essay contest

However, our views diverge very sharply when it comes to these ideas about what consciousness can do via deltron moeity etc. I think this is one of those areas where we need to just politely agree to disagree, because it is unlikely that either of us could convince the other to change their mind.

Thank you for the link. I will check it out soon because the subject is really important for me.

And the sentence of Kauffman is great...

The subsequent processing of physical input received can have no affect on the physical circumstance, because:

1 That process is not physical, it does not involve a change in physical form, but the conversion of physical input into a perception thereof.

2 The sequence order means that is impossible, ie what existed did so before the processing, by definition, because something has to be received in order that this processing can then be initiated.

3 What was received was not the existential sequence anyway, but an existent representation of it, in the case of sight, this is known as light.

Paul

Wes

Curiousity is good. I have just picked up on a point you made in Philips blog. If you want to bring the response here, please do.

Paul

Wes

"We're embedded in that which we perceive"

Yes, but not what we receive. Which is a physical input, which is then processed into a perception of that. Forget all the complexities of what is received, and it is received at the individual level, etc, keep it simple, but generically valid.

"If subsequent processing of physical input can have no affect on the physical circumstance, how do technologies come about?"

Now, there are two aspects to that: 1 sensing (eg observation) 2 the differentiation of past/present/future.

1 As I have said elsewhere, the activity of sensing, ie subsequent processing, can have no affect on the physical circumstance. This is because:

-what occurred has already done so, ie the sequence order of existence makes this impossible

-what is received is not the existential sequence anyway, but an existent representation of it, in the case of sight, this is light

-the process being referred to is not a physical process, it does not involve alteration in physical form, but the conversion of physical input to a perception thereof. Think on this, if a brick had been in the spatial position instead of the eye, then it would have received the physical input, ie interacted with the light. The only difference is that the brick is not capable of subsequent processing.

2 There is no physically existent state commonly referred to as the future. Any concept which involves the notion of change to it, or that it can have some physical influence, is incorrect, because there is nothing in existence to affect, nor anything to invoke an effect. The idea of changing the future is based on the misconception that it is already existent, and hence potentially alterable, and/or capable of having some form of feedback influence. Whereas, all that exists is the present.

This notion is properly expressed as the circumstance where a physically existent state (ie effect) occurred which is different to what would otherwise have done so, had the causal factors been different. Which is meaningless, as by definition, any given effect is a function of a previously existent effect(s). What prevailed and became the cause of the next step in the sequence, was just different from any logical alternative which could have prevailed, but did not, and was therefore not the cause.

Paul

Wes

Blimey, that was a long post. Now I must just stress that in saying what I do, this is not dismissing the subsequent processing as irrelevant/whatever. Clearly we need to understand how it works generically and individually. But the reason for this is because the resulting perceptions are all we have as the start point. For example, there was a piece about the physiological basis of short term memory problems in the news recently, which I pointed out to Philip. We need to understand what physically constitutes colour, etc, etc. In simple language we need to understand the workings of the sensory systems/brain. But this is only so that we can properly extrapolate what physical input was received, not the perception thereof. In respect of the physical circumstance, this processing is irrelevant, all it does(!) is invoke an awareness of it.

Paul

Wes

Did not fully notice these comments towards the bottom of your post.

"the Copenhagen interpretation is an epistemological interpretation to begin with; its only proper claim is to distinguish our knowledge of a system's state from our ignorance of such"

Precisely. If you start with a presumption, then you are highly likely to prove it. The arguments are about how this presumption, which can be characterised as some form of indefiniteness in physical existence, manifests, not whether it should be there in the first place. Especially when the subject area is the form in which physical existence occurs, where a discrete physically existent state cannot be identified by real experimentation, only by conception (which is scientifically acceptable if effected properly). You either know something in its existent state, or you do not. Either way, that something is in a definitive physically existent state at any given time. It is not affected by our ignorance, or lack of it, or whether we observe it, or not, or detect it via any other sense. Because, apart from the fact that existence must be definitive, it has already ceased to exist in that state by the time you become aware of it.

"Einstein's mechanics are just a more accurate derivation, i.e. a closer approximation, and have been empirically validated over and over"

In form, the same argument applies here. Einstein incorrectly asserts (reifies) a characteristic which is a function of something else, as being an inherent attribute of physical existence. Because he did not understand timing and therefore introduced a non-existent superfluous 'layer', ie 'local' to 'common' time (Poincaré's simultaneity is the problem). Which counterbalanced the fact that although he talked about it, there was no observation in Einstein, since there was not observational light for potential observers to observe with (ie he conflated physical existence and the existent representation thereof-eg light). In other words, he shifted the actual time differential, which occurs in the receipt of light (observation) to the other end of the physical process, ie existence per se. Although obviously he does not say that as such, because he did not realise his own mistakes. Though he got very close, here is his best statement on his flawed concept of relativity:

Einstein para 4 section 9 1916

"Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultaneity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event. Now before the advent of the theory of relativity it had always tacitly been assumed in physics that the statement of time had an absolute significance, ie that it is independent of the state of motion of the body of reference. But we have just seen that this assumption is incompatible with the most natural definition of simultaneity; if we discard this assumption, then the conflict between the law of the propagation of light in vacuo and the principle of relativity (developed in section 7) disappears".

But there never was a 'conflict', because Einstein does not have any observational light, all he has is a constant used to calibrate duration and distance, which just happens to be an example of light, eg a ray of, lightening, etc. Indeed, even when Cox & Forshaw try to explain it, they have to introduce an example of light, in their case it is a light beam clock, thereby muddling the differentiation between obseervational light and an example of light, and hoping nobody will spot the flaw. We cannot see with a light beam, neither can we see with lightening, etc. In other words, his second postulate is irrelevant, because he did not deploy it as defined. But essentially the theory 'works' because the time differential is there, it is just not where it is thought to be.

Paul

Wes

Sorry, I do not understand the point of your car example.

My point is that physical existence is definitive, but that is at a level which could be described as a physically existent state. The car is not a physically existent state. Put it under an electron microscope for a start. Although that we not be capable of differentiating a 'degree of difference' (ie a physical state), it will certainly confirm what we know, ie nothing is in a fixed physical state. The car just looks as if it is, because we are defining it in terms of superficial physical characteristics. In other words, the 'car' that starts is not the same as the 'car' which finishes. Indeed, it is not the same after a vanishingly small duration from the start.

Now, obviously, this does not matter, and indeed cannot as we would all go mad, in 'ordinary' situations. But every situation, physically, is the same. As I said in my first post "How can physical existence occur in two 'different ways'? Existence and difference cannot be reconciled except by sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states. What has happened here is that although we know there is existence and difference, we have not taken this to its logical conclusion. And the proper way of understanding physical existence has thereby 'withered on the vine', and become depicted as a sort of 'two dimensional' view (classical, etc). Whereas in fact, the new 'dynamic' approach is wrong, because in order for it to 'work' it presumes indefiniteness of one form or another in physical existence. Which it then has to rationalise by all sorts of bizarre methods which have no correspondence in physical existence.

So, the point is, as said previously, measuring distance in terms of duration is purely conceptual. It does not correspond with how physical existence occurs. The result is just an alternative expression to, and the equivalent of, a specific spatial measure, ie the difference in spatial position as at the same time of existence. The event as conceived cannot actually happen.

Paul

Wes

I do not think your car example was a point about timing. But here is the argument why Einstein was wrong, on timing. It does not require the 'sequence' presumption. Einstein just did not understand timing, because he was using Poincaré's flawed concept of simultaneity.

The misconception of time and timing (the AB example)

4 Einstein: On the electrodynamics of moving bodies (1905), Section 1 Part 1, Definition of Simultaneity, is the reference.

5 The events A and B were each attributed a time ("local") of existence, ie t(a) and t(b). Either there was a relationship between these timings, or not. If there was a relationship, then there was no timing issue to resolve. If there was no relationship, then nothing further could have been discerned since they were therefore variables defined on the basis of different references with no known relationship.

6 Put another way, presuming that the times represented when the events occurred, then whether they were the same is potentially irrelevant. Any given event must occur at a specific time. Whether events happened to occur at the same time does not necessarily imply any physical significance. However the analysis involved the distance AB, and there cannot be a distance between something which exists and something else which does not. Therefore, A and B existed at the same time.

7 Yet another way of putting this is that establishing the timing relationship of A and B must involve another reference, so that the two can be compared and any difference identified. But this is what timing does, because the time shown on any device only has meaning if it is corresponds with the single reference to which all such devices are related, ie a conceptual constant rate of change. That is why they must be synchronised, otherwise the system is useless, allowing for the practicalities of so doing. That reference is not another time, but the time (in Einstein's terminology "common time"). Timing devices just 'tell' the time.

8 Hence the timing relationship which supposedly needed to be inferred, ie "local time" to "common time", was non-existent; a false distinction which resulted in a superfluous 'layer' of timing for which there was no justification. Presumption of the distance AB meant that A and B must have been existent at the same time anyway, although this, as with what is the reference for timing, was not understood. That is, t(a) must have equalled t(b), and there was no issue to resolve. This timing mistake reflects reliance on Poincaré's flawed concept of simultaneity.

9 Furthermore, the comparison of AB to BA was effected in terms of time incurred with consecutive, not concurrent, timings. This was also incorrect. Not only is there no duration in a spatial circumstance, but AB cannot be compared to BA on the basis of subsequent timings. Because such timings cannot be presumed to relate to AB, as either A and/or B could have altered over that time, and therefore the distance could have altered. The measurement can only represent whatever was deemed to constitute A and B, and therefore AB, at a specific time.

10 The quantification of distance in terms of a conceptual duration incurred was not an issue, had it been understood. Neither was the use of an example of light as the reference for calibrating distance and duration, with the condition that its speed be deemed constant, inherently a problem (although this was not observational light). Any method, involving any direction, and any constant, would suffice for measuring a distance, if properly calculated and represented. Leaving aside the failure to differentiate existent reality from the existent light based representation of it (see below), the errors, in this limited context, were assuming physical existence, and hence any artefact thereof (eg distance), continues to exist in the same physically existent state over time, and not understanding the reference used for timing.

The misconception of observation

11 It is argued that the AB example is explainable in terms of observation. Time of existence, and time of observation (ie receipt of light), were asserted by Einstein to be the same if whatever was involved was in the "immediate proximity". This is correct as an approximation, though would need definition. But in reality there is always a difference, which is fundamental to highlighting the flaw in his argument. The physically existent occurrence, physically existent light, and physically existent observer, are all physically separate. Therefore, there will always be a delay whilst light, which is a physically existent representation of the occurrence, travels and, in a few cases, is received (ie is in the line of travel of, and interacts with) by an entity which can process the physical input available.

12 Introducing the differential between time of existence, and time of observation of existence, is irrelevant. As before, the timing devices must have been synchronised, otherwise the timings were meaningless, and since the distance AB is presumed, then A and B must have existed at the same time. If A and B did not exist at the same time, then there could not have been a distance AB to observe.

13 In the context of observation then, assuming a simplification of the real conditions, these timings must represent the time at which light was received, and any difference could only have been a function of the time delay for light to travel from B to A, or vice versa. That is, again there is no issue to resolve. The difference in timing would have been because these were observations of reality (ie receipts of light), not the occurrence of reality. However, there was no observational light in Einstein's theories anyway, just a constant, which happened to be an example of light.

14 There is always a distance and therefore a delay whilst light travels. Indeed, what was the spatial relationship between the observer and the light as at the time of occurrence and the creation of that light, could alter whilst it is travelling. Neither is physical existence, either in terms of the occurrence, or the representation of it (eg light), affected physically by observation (eg receipt of light) and the subsequent processing. Because that was not existent subsequently, which is a necessary condition for any physical effect to occur. The physically existent representation of the reality just ceases to exist in that physical form upon receipt, as it would if the interaction had been with an inanimate entity. One of the physical features of light, as in what is physically existent and can be processed by a sensory system if received, being that it persists in the same (or nearly so) physical form over time.

15 By substituting c for v, ie a specific velocity for a generic one, c was asserted to be: 2AB/(t'(a) - t(a)). Which was wrong, because that time involved duration incurred from subsequent timings, apart from being deemed an elapsed time in both cases anyway, which it is not. Assuming the quantity is doubled, it should have been either twice A to B or B to A, or the sum of A to B and B to A incurred at the same time. So it should have been: c = 2AB/2(t(a) - t(b)). Or simply, as considering either direction is irrelevant, c = AB/(t(a) - t(b)).

16 Which, although correct, is a statement of the obvious. That is, the velocity is a ratio of total distance travelled to the time taken to do so, ie the definition of velocity. Apart from which, what this actually means in the context of physical existence needs to be understood, ie since there is no duration as such, it is a conceptual expression of a spatial quantity. Duration being concerned with differences between physical existences, ie the rate at which turnover occurs. And c was not the speed of observational light, it was just a constant which happened to be defined in terms of an xample of light.

17 A key statement in 1905, section 1, part 1, Definition of Simultaneity is:

"But it is not possible without further assumption to compare, in respect of time, an event at A with an event at B. We have so far defined only an "A time" and a "B time." We have not defined a common "time" for A and B, for the latter cannot be defined at all unless we establish by definition that the "time" required by light to travel from A to B equals the "time" it requires to travel from B to A. Let a ray of light start at the "A time" t(a) from A towards B, let it at the "B time" t(b) be reflected at B in the direction of A, and arrive again at A at the "A time" t(a). In accordance with definition the two clocks synchronize if t(b)-t(a)=t'(a)-t(b)."

18 In the context of a proper differentiation between reality and the light based representation thereof, this thinking is, essentially, correct. Recipients of light representing the same physical occurrence, will receive those lights at different times because they are in different spatial locations (ignoring any vanishingly small differences there might be between those lights). Fundamentally, comparing these times and distances will reveal the time at which the occurrence happened.

19 But Einstein did not differentiate reality and the light based representation of it, so there was no observational light. In actuality, his 'local time' must have been the time of receipt of the light based representation of the occurrence, but he deemed it to be the time of occurrence. At the 'local' level this mistake was rationalised with the notion that they were the same if in the "immediate proximity". Which is incorrect, as there must always be a time delay whilst light travels.

20 Beyond the 'immediate proximity' (which could never be defined because it cannot be a correct concept), he effectively asserted, ie by virtue of his mistakes, that the time at which the occurrences happened is a function of light, and particularly its speed, which is obviously incorrect. The time of receipt of the light representation of the occurrence is a function of light speed, not the occurrence. The actual relationship between any physically existent state (ie occurrence) and the light (ie representation thereof) created as it occurs, is a function of their physical attributes and hence the way they interact. But any such actual differences/complexities involved do no impact on this generic argument.

21 The critical point being that the light Einstein referred to was not observational light. He was using an example of light as a conceptual reference constant against which to calibrate duration and distance. In other words, the fact that it was light, was irrelevant, it could have been any constant. His light was just a dissassociated "ray of light", with an entity referred to as an "observer", and the concept of "frames of reference" (later examples used lightening). All of which can leave the reader with the impression that observation had been accounted for.

22 But he only invoked a constant, so the 'observer/frame of reference' is just the reference used for comparison in order to identify difference. It has nothing to do with observation, because there was no observational light. The determining factor being what he did, not what he said he would do. Which means that the second postulate as defined is irrelevant, because he did not deploy it as defined. Therefore all the ensuing attempts, including his own, to reconcile a presumed constancy in light with a rate of change in reality, are pointless, because the issue is non-existent.

23 In sum, Einstein shifted the time differential from the finish of the physical process, where it does occur and relates to the time of receipt of the physically existent representation of existence (eg light), to the start, by deeming it, incorrectly, to be a characteristic of physical existence itself.

Paul

Dear Wes,

I was surprised to meet an author whose thinking is so deeply rooted in Buddhist philosophy and meditation practice. I agree with many of your intellectual and spiritual positions including those published in VIXRA (i.e. Postmodern Mysticism).

I've studied the relationship between Buddhism and modern physics since more than thirty years. Meanwhile I've found some interesting insights that are closely related to your questions and answers as well.

(1) MIND (in Christian terminology we are often speaking of GOD) is the fundamental basis of the physical universe. It determines how the universe is organized at the most fundamental level. One of these determining conditions is a specific set of boundary conditions, which I am calling the "Principle of Radical Non-Duality". It follows directly Buddhist philosophy. Surprisingly our universe seems empirically (!) to satisfy this Principle.

In my FQXI-paper "Taming of the One" I've sketched this principle.

(2) A Mandala-like structure - being composed of squares and circles - shows how space and time are organized at the most fundamental level. This archetypal structure can be read in such a way, that it generates a sort of Lorentz symmetry that is slightly different from the relativistic one.

(3) The speed of light c is of dual nature like light itself! In other word, according ot the quantum mechanical view of the Wave-Particle-Duality the fundamental constant of c is given twice - in a particle-like way and in a wave-like way. (In Special Relativity only the wave-like face of c has been taken into account.) This "Dual Parametrization of c" corresponds directly with the geometrical structure of the Mandala in (2): The circle represents the wave-like version of c and the square represents the particle-like way of c. As both geometrical blueprints are parametrized in the same way, that is, c = 1, one of these two faces of c (i.e. the particle-like one) is still unknown. I call it the "Hidden Face of c".

May you will find these thoughts somehow interesting...

Kind Regards

Helmut

Dear Wesley Wayne Hansen

Your essay is very interesting and unique,only regret is the lack of specific on the conclusions.

http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1802

Hello Wesley,

Nice to see an approach from consciousness, of course we are all observers of information and empirically real ourselves, so why shouldn't this approach be used.

I wonder where consciousness is? The mind's eye infinite regression always stumps me. Perhaps a termination point is akin to 0 in the Fibonacci sequence (0-dimensionality in my essay).

Anyway - nice to read something so refreshing.

Best wishes,

Antony

Wesley,

If given the time and the wits to evaluate over 120 more entries, I have a month to try. My seemingly whimsical title, "It's good to be the king," is serious about our subject.

Jim

Wes,

Really enjoyable and fascinating essay with some important points.I agree that correspondence is central.

I'm also very interested in eastern traditions, meditation, contemplation and the concept of free will. I stayed very empirical with my own essay this time as it was already crammed full of ontology, but did just touch on it in the extended version I linked. I'll be very interested in your comments.

I most certainly agree your conjecture, and that there is an awful lot more to conciousness and the universe than we may perhaps ever know.

Congratulations, thank you, and I hope you make the final cut.

Peter