• [deleted]

Marcoen

"Could you explain what you mean by "there is no way in which we can differentiate reality to the level at which it occurs".

The physical existence knowable to us (science is concerned with know, not belief, and know is the function of a physical process, not philosophy) involves physical occurrence and difference (ie there is alteration). Therefore physical existence is existential sequence, as that is the only way to encompass both. That is, there is a sequence of definitive, discrete physically existent states, which means only one (ie a reality) occurs at a time.

We know this because we know things change. But that is where our conception of what is happening goes wrong. We conceive of physical existence in terms of 'things', which then change in some way or other, but that is incorrect. Because we are conceptualising physical existence by virtue of superficial physical attributes, ie at a higher level than what occurs. Following the logic of existence/difference what ultimately occurs at any time is the physically existent state of something. This involves a vanishingly small duration and degree of alteration, which is only calculatable mathematically. Although I am never keen on making such assertions, there really can be no doubt that we cannot actually (ie in experimentation, etc, differentiate this). Or at least anybody who says they have needs to be treated with a substantial degree of scepticism. [Incidentally I do not think this is Planck either, because that is associated with light, remember we receive a light representation of what is actually occurring]. Put simply, chair, dog, etc are not entities which persist in existence in the same format, or with change, which is a contradiction. The superficial physical attributes by which we identify it persist. Chair, etc, is a singular physically existent state a any given time.

Now, if you have followed that you are probably thinking that this covers the ground of QM. Which of course it does, and properly, because there is only one form of physical existence, and existence does not involve any form of indefiniteness, which is what QM presumes. Just precisely how something can exist, but in an indefinite way, needs to be explained! And of course one of the rationalisations of this contradiction is then the role of observation, the problem with that being that what occurred happened before it was observed! The point here is that the logical outcome of physical existence has been misconceived, so it has become tainted as 'classical'/two-dimensional, and overtaken by the 'relative/indefinite' model, which is incorrect. That is, had the former been understood properly, then the latter would never have gained traction. But either way, the 'bottom line' of physical existence is not actually identifiable for real, only conceptually, which is acceptable so long as that is based on a valid model of physical existence.

Paul

  • [deleted]

Marcoen

I agree with you, but think you are in danger of 'splitting hairs' and 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater'.

However, see my response above, because the key to this in general, as opposed to any specific manifestation, is what is physical existence and how must it occur.

Paul

Paul,

Following the language introduced in the EPR paper, there are two different questions we may ask ourselves when judging the success of a physical theory:

(1) is it correct?

(2) is it complete?

These are two different notions.

The point of the essay is that the CMS experiment at the LHC has found the Standard Model to be "correct", but it hasn't found the Standard Model to be "complete". The difference is not trivial. Neither is it the case that I'm throwing out the baby with the bathwater: that would be the case if I would say that the CMS experiment hasn't established anything. But that's not what I'm saying.

Best regards,

Marcoen

  • [deleted]

Yes, an inductive method can only SUPPORT, not prove or confirm any theory.

Overstatements like this are common in science today.

But what did you mean that we can't know the Higgs particle in itself?

The mind can know what's presented to it by the 5 senses, by which we know the

external properties, characteristics or accidents of objects.

But give us an example of a particle we know intrinsicly, in itself....

or anything we know in itself.

I thought someone would cover the logical contradiction posed by the Higgs claim

to be the source of mass for all particles - the 'God' particle.

If the claim is true, where does the Higgs get its own mass?

    Robert,

    Thanks for commenting on my essay.

    When I wrote that we cannot observe the particle itself, I was not hinting at Kant's famous distinction between a noumenon, a thing as it is in itself apart from how it is observed, and a phenomenon, the manifestation of a noumenon in human experience. What I meant is that an elementary particle, so also a Higgs boson, is simply too small for direct observation. E.g. things like tables, bears, needles, or any other macroscopic object subjectable to contact forces can be observed directly. However, for the experimental study of elementary particles one has to rely on measurement equipment that detects properties of microsystems: you can then observe those properties, but not the substance that is the carrier of those properties. So I was hinting at the distiction between substance and property.

    Particles get their mass - at least according to the Standard Model - by interaction with the Higgs field. The Higgs boson is a wave in the Higgs field.

    Best regards,

    Marcoen

    • [deleted]

    Marcoen,

    You wrote: "The point of the essay is that the CMS experiment at the LHC has found the Standard Model to be "correct", but it hasn't found the Standard Model to be "complete". The difference is not trivial."

    Actually, the LHC results did not prove the Standard Model is *incorrect*. *Complete* is an unachievable ideal since our intellectual capabilities are limited. These differences are not trivial, but are sensible enough that all physicists should know them and appreciate them, especially when they make judgments on theories outside their own belief systems.

    Rick

    Rick,

    Thanks for commenting on my essay.

    I wrote that the CMS experiment at the LHC has found the Standard Model to be "correct" - not "incorrect". So I agree with you that the LHC results did not prove the Standard Model is *incorrect*.

    By "complete" I meant the predicate that can be said of a given theory, as defined in the EPR paper: a theory is complete if every element of reality has a counterpart in the theory, and if element of reality, predicted with certainty by the theory, indeed exists. For a fundamental particle theory completeness is then indeed very difficult, if not impossible, to prove experimentally, because existential statements about fundamental constituents (e.g. "the Higgs boson exists") are impossible to prove.

    Best regards,

    Marcoen

    Marcoen,

    I suppose this puts you in the class of the "most curmudgeonly." :-)

    As you yourself say, though, we never have observed any elementary particle "itself." We know -- even particle physcists know -- that elementary particles may not even exist. The general public? -- most don't know a boson from a boombox. That isn't the fault of scientists or a failure of science.

    What we do know exists -- like the tracks of a unicorn -- is the product of physically real events. If one were speaking of cows rather than unicorns, one would be able to compare the hoof of a real cow with an imprint, which need happen only once; cow tracks thereafter imply cows.

    Particle physicists, constructing the classes of tracks that make up the standard model, calculated those identities in advance of looking for them. So even even though experimentalists don't "see" the "thing" that leaves a track, nor even if there is a thing, they know when the tracks predicted by theory correspond to the evidence of physically real events.

    Neverthless, your point is well taken and well argued.

    Tom

      Thomas,

      Thank you for commenting on my essay.

      If we talk about cows, then we talk about something of which we already know that it exists. I'm not a biologist, but let us suppose that the imprint of a cow's hoof is a unique pattern that doesn't occur with any other animal. If you then observe such an imprint, you may say: I know that there is/exists a cow somewhere around. This is an application of the following logical scheme:

      P Q, Q / P

      It is a correct inference.

      However, the case of the Higgs boson is different. You don't know that it exists: that is what has to be proven. You only know that IF it exists, THEN you will observe certain traces. But then you cannot say: I have observed these traces, thus the Higgs boson exists. It's a well known fallacy, which uses the logical scheme

      P => Q, Q / P

      And it doesn't matter how you pimp up the wording of the premises 'P => Q' and 'Q': it remains a fallacy.

      Best regards,

      Marcoen

      The first scheme in my previos post is not displayed correctly. It should be

      [math]\rm P \Leftrightarrow Q, Q / P[/math]

      Marcoen

      • [deleted]

      Hi Marcoen,

      I think that the case of the Higgs boson hiding in the upper range of the energy field is analogous to a unicorn hiding in a nearly impenetrable thicket. If one doubts the existence of a unicorn, one cannot doubt that the tracks we observe leading from the thicket when we set it afire differ from any tracks we have detected from any creature known before. It really doesn't matter whether we call the result a Higgs boson or a unicorn, the theoretical prediction is that a hot enough blaze will produce the signature of a creature that might exist but has never before been seen.

      I disagree with Rick that the LHC result is of the logical form modus tollens, rather than the positive modus ponens form you cite above. For this reason: If the LHC experiment failed, one could always say that the fire was not hot enough. The prediction wouldn't change, just the experimental parameters. The same is true of proton decay -- Georgi-Glashow originally predicted proton half life on the order 1 X 10^31 years and it now stands at least four orders of magnitude longer.

      Don't misunderstand me -- I'm a theorist and have nothing to do with the experimental culture and I don't really care much for the particle zoo that the standard model has birthed. I just know that formal logic has nothing to do with that culture, either. What you see is what you get, and one only sees evidence of existence, not anything real in the sense of, say -- a hammer that one can put to use, or a physically existing unicorn that can be harnessed and saddled.

      All best,

      Tom

      Hi there Tom,

      I'm a theorist too, although I'm in the "God-doesn't-play-dice" team. I also hold the traditional view that scientific discourse is only possible within a framework of professional ethics, and has to be centered around reason and logic, not around authority and blind faith.

      I agree with you that, at least in the present case, the top brass in experimental physics didn't care much for the principles of logic, and I would like to add that they didn't care much for professional ethics either.

      I get the impression that what we are witnessing is a transition, by which "physics" as a branch of science ceases to exist, and is replaced by "quantum politics".

      I wish you all the best,

      Marcoen

      • [deleted]

      Tom,

      My issue with Marcoen's statement was the lack of scope applied to the word "correct" in its application to the theory. So it is a premise issue and not an application of logic issue. I think there is more agreement here than you claim bringing LC in also, and it is imprecision of language applied rather than fundamental difference.

      The premise "if a theory predicts an outcome, and the outcome is found through experimentation, then the theory is correct" is false by such imprecision of language. The theory may have been only able to predict the single outcome experimentally verified yet produce a host of other predictions invalidated by other experiments, making it an incorrect theory. The lack of appreciation for this is the virus creating the pervasive mental defect in many theoretical physicists, a bit of a double edged sword though since it provides necessary motivation. In the Higgs/LHC experiment, there was an opportunity to invalidate the theory which did not come to be, so the true assertion is the theory was not negated, not that it was found to be correct without qualification or narrow scoping like correctly stating the expected collision energy produced the expected decay products and nothing more. As Marceon correctly states, it is difficult to assume the Higgs particle was found if high energy physics is not your thing and you have not taken the leap of faith that the production of the correct byproducts imply the existence of the whole no matter how short lived the whole is in the experimental setting even though the whole is never directly detected.

      As for Higgs theory validation, be careful with what you assume, for there is not necessarily group think between theorists and experimentalists even at CERN. I attended the last Robert Hofstadter Memorial Lecture at Stanford this April. I had the good fortune to have Dr. Hofstadter as my Mechanics professor at Stanford, but I digress. The invited speaker was the charming Dr. Fabiola Gianotti. If you are unfamiliar with her, she is a Senior Research Physicist at CERN, and the ATLAS experiment's spokesperson. She is an experimentalist deeply involved with the Higgs search, and made it completely clear in her talk the results found were not a validation of the Higgs theory in its totality even though she is quite certain they found what they set out to look for. This impressive woman is well grounded in reality.

      Rick

      Rick,

      Nice post, thanks. I intend to agree with you.

      It is true that experimentally one can only disprove a theory, but not prove it - at least in fundamental physics; e.g. a theory about a murder case is something else. When one has failed to disprove the theory - this is when the prediction is confirmed experimentally - and one wants to make a positive statement, then one has to use the word "correct" as defined in the EPR paper. But I agree that such requires an additional specification. That is why I wrote in the essay that the only substantial conclusion is that the Standard Model has been found to be correct by the CMS experiment at the LHC: the addition "by the CMS experiment at the LHC" refers to the fact that only the prediction involving the decay products of the Higgs boson has been confirmed.

      When I submitted an earlier version of the present essay as a letter to Physics Letters B, the referee - who obviously was a member of the CMS collaboration - said that the criticism was essentially correct, but that the phrase "observation of a new boson" didn't mean that actually a new boson had been observed, but only its decay products. According to him/her, physicists need no reminder of that fact, so (s)he recommended a rejection. The editor subsequently rejected the paper, although he deemed it appropriate for a forum or a popular-scientific journal. After incorporating the referee's comment in the essay I then posted it here at the FQXi forum, so that at least one critical noise can be heard in the cheering crowd. I agree with you that there is this "mental defect" (as you call it) in the heads of many physicists: they fail to see, or just don't know, the nuances involved in establishing the correspondence between theory and reality. The essay then confronts them with these nuances - at least, if they would read it. But I also agree with you that, at least among the top physicists (you mentioned Dr. Gianotti), there are some who are quite down to earth.

      Best regards,

      Marcoen

      Hi Rick,

      I'll second Marcoen's opinion. Well said. Any disagreement we have ever had is over detail, not principle.

      My own worldview, including my view of science and its role in objective knowledge, has taken quite a turn in the last few years -- though I find it as true as ever that no science is objective without strict correspondence between theoretical prediction and physical result, my opinion is softening in favor of that which you and Marcoen share, with a caveat:

      You speak often of reality; the implied assumption is that something is "really" there. I don't think experimentalists start with such an assumption. They are working within theoretical limits -- parameters that are adjusted according to experimental evidence -- as the saying goes, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Hence, my comments on adjusting the "unification energy" upward.

      You're right, though, this doesn't indicate what "reality" is -- only where certain limits lie. The reality of the question is impossible for any experiment to answer: what happens when an absolutely hot body meets an absolutely cold surface? That's why I'm more comfortable with the degrees of freedom that theory affords to bound those limits.

      Where I differ with you and Marcoen, though, is that I don't call that "reality," either. I still maintain that reality has nothing to do with objective knowledge.

      All best,

      Tom

      Tom,

      You wrote: "I still maintain that reality has nothing to do with objective knowledge."

      Interesting. What is your rationale for that statement? Do you have the Kantian inaccessibility of the noumenal world in mind? Could you give a concise description of your view?

      Best regards,

      Marcoen

      Sure, Marcoen. Just to recapitulate and expand the points I made in the post that started this thread:

      None of us are sure that fundamental particles exist as physically independent, real things (" ... having a physical effect ... not affected by physical conditions.")

      The products of physically real things -- what we measure following an event -- only tell us that the event was made of smaller though more energetic things that we cannot say existed "before" we observed the event; i.e., we don't know that those elements whose tracks we record are causal. If we knew that they were, we could say that the unicorn was responsible for creating everything, and the tracks that he left are his signature.

      OTOH, if the field is real and causal, the unicorn and his tracks are from one and the same continuous source. Field theoretical predictions apart from the standard model of particle physics, are invested in general relativity, quantum field theory and string theory. If the field is irreducible -- where, how? Our measured values are not good enough to tell us that that they existed before we made a measurement; the objective knowledge that we glean from a measurement, therefore, is independent of the source. Does the wavefunction collapse to a unicorn and the tracks he left, which implies an observer quantum entangled with the unicorn -- or does the wavefunction never collapse, which implies that the observer is continuous with the unicorn's creation?

      My bet is on door number two. Wheeler's participatory universe.

      Tom

      Tom,

      I see that your view is similar to that of Kant. In his view, we cannot possibly know the thing-in-itself that is the source of a perceived phenomenon.

      I agree that if we rely on perception as the source of knowledge, then it is not possible to attain true knowledge about the fundamental workings of the universe. In my PhD thesis I have mentioned a transition from modern physics to a postmodernism in physics: this is the situation that at any time you have several rival theories explaining the facts, but no instrument to decide between these rival theories at that time. But that's another topic.

      Best regards,

      Marcoen

      Marcoen,

      You're right. Kant does influence my view -- I imagine a thinkng machine: is it self aware? Consider the android character that Sean Young portrayed in the movie Blade Runner -- (the movie is based on Philip K. Dick's story, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*) -- she doesn't know that the source of her consciousness is a program.

      In Dick's future world, authorities have devised elaborate interrogation methods and technology to detect distinctly human emotional reactions, reminiscent of the Turing Test for intelligent machines -- I think it is significant, though, that the "Replicant test" is for emotional response, not knowledge or logic. My guess is that Dick's message is that the human tribe will not forbear persecuting the android tribe even if the two are shown equal in every rational respect. Kant being a major figure of the Enlightenment, I would like to think that he would support the equality of sentients of the same species, no matter their origin.

      However, while androids may possibly be shown to dream of electric sheep as a result of their programming -- the human mind is capable of dreaming of androids dreaming of electric sheep. Though we may be born with noumenal qualities, they are not transferable to the objects of our creation. I am convinced thereby, that we are not programmed creatures -- programs are replicable; consciousness is transcendant.

      All best,

      Tom

      Hi Tom,

      I agree with you that we are not programmed creatures. My PhD thesis contains a chapter on free will. I have written a paper based on that chapter; if you are interested you can access a preprint by this link:

      my paper on free will

      It contains an (incomplete) overview of ideas in that area.

      But we are going off topic here. I see that we agree on most parts.

      Best regards,

      Marcoen