Lev
Hmm, I rather took Edwin's comment to be: 'there is an aversion, but there should not be, and you think there should not be'. Apart from which my supplementary enquired what 'mental' refers to. My point being that consciousness, etc, etc, is irrelevant. Sensing involves the receipt of physical input. That is where the physics stops. The subsequent processing of that is not physics, it involves the formulation of a perception of what was received. The subsequent processing can have no affect on the physical circumstance, because 1) that has already occurred, 2) that interaction does not involve what occurred anyway, but a physically existent representation of it (aka light in the case of the sense of sight). So any physical theory that involves the subsequent processing is wrong.
Re 2. That comment goes along with my response to your question on my essay blog. Precisely what is the point of designating organisation/structure as information? It is, if identified correctly(!) physically existent fact. Even if it is generic, it is still so, generically. Labelling it as information, which therefore invokes the concept of not-information (ie one presumes real, or what?) seems unnecessary, and leaves me wondering why this differentiation is made.
Then in relation to section 3/4, again this concept of information appears. The processes are physical processes, there is bound to be degree of similarity with these, which means one could invoke a classification system. And if one differentiates the events to the existential level, then one is going to reveal cause/effect. This appears to be an important caveat: "because it is addressing the formative, rather than any apparent, structure". But one would hope(!) everybody is addressing what actually occurs, not what appears to be so, or certainly they should be. The whole issue here is that any chosen representational device must accord with how physical existence occurs.
Paul