Thank you Tom!
Good to hear from you. As you know, I have been thinking about these issues for a very long time (several decades). I did try to explain why now is not the time for small steps, why we *should* expect everything from "information" (there are no other big frontiers left).
But did you notice that I have some "well-wishers": within an hour or two from its posting it was rated 3, and today in the morning it was rated 1. I must have done something right to deserve such "honor". ;-))
Well, I can't vote yet, but you can be sure that when I can, it will be a good one! I think most just don't grasp your program.
Tom
Dear Joe,
Good to hear from you!
"You fail to mention that each real snowflake, each real star, each real molecule, and each real organism is unique and can only occur once."
Please note that, even though there was no space left, I did mentioned about the non-deterministic nature of the class generating system as well as its ability to interact with other classes "nearby": when it generates a new struct, it does so in a non-deterministic manner, and moreover during the generation/construction process other events from other generating systems may constructively intervene (and such events become a part of the strut being constructed). So both of these, in the case of non-trivial classes, guarantee that each class element is unique.
Robert, isn't that, basically, a part of what I am saying?
I did think that, despite one of your earlier suggestions, you will be contributing to this contest: the topic is too important to pass it. ;-)
Lev,
I agree with your analysis of the historical aversion to consciousness as a relevant topic for physics, and the conflict that this presents when physics becomes focused on "information". I also agree with your position on the unacceptable ambiguity of information. I particularly like your characterization of the present trend as the "path of least resistance". Finally I fully agree that information cannot be separated from the concept of structure. In short your analysis of information largely agrees with my own. As for your ETS proposal, but I'm sure you know what you're facing trying to sell new ideas in this market, so good luck.
You do remark that "the formalism will stand or fall based on the quality of such interpretation, or predictions." I'm curious about the predictions that arise from ETS.
Also, you postulate that "classes themselves are the basic units in the informational organization of Nature." Do you have a means of deriving such classes algorithmically? I treat a similar problem in my essay, which I hope to submit "real soon now".
Good luck with your essay,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
Hello Edwin,
Good to see you participating in this contest, and thanks for your positive analysis!
Forgive me for a somewhat pedantic form of my answer. ;-)
1. " I'm curious about the predictions that arise from ETS."
Probably the most immediate prediction is that concerning the nature of various particles as the stream of structured events, which should obviate the mysterious particle-wave duality.
2."Do you have a means of deriving such classes algorithmically?"
Of course, I do: you can find this in the endnote (v) and the reference there. But the definitions are fairly intricate and they are not short. ;-)
I also wait for your essay.
Thanks for the answers, the form is immaterial, like water under a bridge ;-) I did read your end notes yesterday, but not today as I was reviewing the essay and I forgot about (v) when I was writing the comment. I have not yet looked at the reference.
Best,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
Edwin, I forgot to mention refer. 12 and 13 as containing preliminary non-physical examples of classes.
Cheers,
Lev
For fun, I will periodically show the record of the essay's scores in the order received. ;-)
So far we have: 3, 1, 10, 2.
Lev
Re 1: in which case a struct must be a sequence of physically existent states. And just what is this information which it is comprised of relate to in physical existence? The event would be the cause of the difference between successive states.
Re 2: we know there is existence and difference thereto. The only way this can occur is by sequence. In other words, physical existence as knowable to us is a sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states, ie at any given time, whatever comprises physical existence is in a singular physically existent state (which is why there is no duration in reality). The degree of difference and duration involved is vanishingly small. No experimentation could identify discrete successive states, and specifically why each occurred.
In general my problem is that whilst I can accept this 'classification' methodology as being a potential way of ordering knowledge, I am unsure about its proposed role as some overarching replacement, and specifically the involvement of 'information'. Am I right in thinking that this concept of information really relates to the 'organisation/structure' of physical existence? In which case the label is something of a misnomer, because it is something physical. And anyway, I am then back to asking what is organisation/structure'?
Paul
Lev
You did no comment on Edwin's allusion to consciousness, sadly. Because I have been struggling with another underlying thread which is the concept of 'mental', but did not raise it.
Paul
Paul,
"You did no comment on Edwin's allusion to consciousness, sadly. Because I have been struggling with another underlying thread which is the concept of 'mental', but did not raise it."
By the way, Edwin said: "I agree with your analysis of the historical aversion to consciousness as a relevant topic for physics". He didn't ask me to comment on "consciousness".
But since you asked I should say that "consciousness" is as ambiguous as "information", and that is why it is hard to address it. But instead we should focus on more identifiable key processes such as pattern recognition / classification.
1. "Am I right in thinking that this concept of information really relates to the 'organisation/structure' of physical existence?"
Yes you are right in that thinking.
2. Please clarify this: "In which case the label is something of a misnomer, because it is something physical."
3. "And anyway, I am then back to asking what is organisation/structure'?"
This is what my essay is supposed to suggest, but of course I had the space limitations: structure -- section 3 and organization -- section 4.
Lev
Hmm, I rather took Edwin's comment to be: 'there is an aversion, but there should not be, and you think there should not be'. Apart from which my supplementary enquired what 'mental' refers to. My point being that consciousness, etc, etc, is irrelevant. Sensing involves the receipt of physical input. That is where the physics stops. The subsequent processing of that is not physics, it involves the formulation of a perception of what was received. The subsequent processing can have no affect on the physical circumstance, because 1) that has already occurred, 2) that interaction does not involve what occurred anyway, but a physically existent representation of it (aka light in the case of the sense of sight). So any physical theory that involves the subsequent processing is wrong.
Re 2. That comment goes along with my response to your question on my essay blog. Precisely what is the point of designating organisation/structure as information? It is, if identified correctly(!) physically existent fact. Even if it is generic, it is still so, generically. Labelling it as information, which therefore invokes the concept of not-information (ie one presumes real, or what?) seems unnecessary, and leaves me wondering why this differentiation is made.
Then in relation to section 3/4, again this concept of information appears. The processes are physical processes, there is bound to be degree of similarity with these, which means one could invoke a classification system. And if one differentiates the events to the existential level, then one is going to reveal cause/effect. This appears to be an important caveat: "because it is addressing the formative, rather than any apparent, structure". But one would hope(!) everybody is addressing what actually occurs, not what appears to be so, or certainly they should be. The whole issue here is that any chosen representational device must accord with how physical existence occurs.
Paul
"This appears to be an important caveat: "because it is addressing the formative, rather than any apparent, structure". But one would hope(!) everybody is addressing what actually occurs, not what appears to be so, or certainly they should be."
Paul, what I meant by that phrase--and it is clear in the context of the essay-- is that so far mathematics and physics have been dealing with the "apparent", or spatial, structure, while ETS is designed to address the formative structure.
Lev
There is nothing apparent about size/distance/space. Neither are people trying to explain physical existence solely in those terms. As with information, there is some way in which you are differentiating, which is not substantiated by reality.
Paul
Paul, I meant the "apparent features" from a pattern recognition, or common-sense view: e.g the shape of a stone, of a galaxy, or of a tree.
Lev
Fine, but they are not apparent. Which implies that existence is something else. They are physically existent features, and may well have similarities, as physical features. I have a feeling that this runs parallel with another false concept of emergent/fundamental which I came across when commenting on the first few essays published. I can't quite put my finger on it at the moment, but there seems to be a trend to differentiate reality into two types under the guise of information. This being yet another attempt to rationalise the inherent contradiction which stems from the false start point as to how existence occurs.
As I said in my response to your comment on my essay, the ony meaningful definition of information is that which is a representation of something else. Knowing of anything inherently conveys information.
Paul
Paul,
"the ony meaningful definition of information is that which is a representation of something else."
As you can see from my essay, I am a great believer in the importance of representation: I spent almost all my professional life developing one. I also believe in the idea of "information" as contained in the representation.
But the central question of representation can only be approached scientifically via a representational *formalism*.