I did think that, despite one of your earlier suggestions, you will be contributing to this contest: the topic is too important to pass it. ;-)

Lev,

I agree with your analysis of the historical aversion to consciousness as a relevant topic for physics, and the conflict that this presents when physics becomes focused on "information". I also agree with your position on the unacceptable ambiguity of information. I particularly like your characterization of the present trend as the "path of least resistance". Finally I fully agree that information cannot be separated from the concept of structure. In short your analysis of information largely agrees with my own. As for your ETS proposal, but I'm sure you know what you're facing trying to sell new ideas in this market, so good luck.

You do remark that "the formalism will stand or fall based on the quality of such interpretation, or predictions." I'm curious about the predictions that arise from ETS.

Also, you postulate that "classes themselves are the basic units in the informational organization of Nature." Do you have a means of deriving such classes algorithmically? I treat a similar problem in my essay, which I hope to submit "real soon now".

Good luck with your essay,

Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Hello Edwin,

    Good to see you participating in this contest, and thanks for your positive analysis!

    Forgive me for a somewhat pedantic form of my answer. ;-)

    1. " I'm curious about the predictions that arise from ETS."

    Probably the most immediate prediction is that concerning the nature of various particles as the stream of structured events, which should obviate the mysterious particle-wave duality.

    2."Do you have a means of deriving such classes algorithmically?"

    Of course, I do: you can find this in the endnote (v) and the reference there. But the definitions are fairly intricate and they are not short. ;-)

    I also wait for your essay.

    Thanks for the answers, the form is immaterial, like water under a bridge ;-) I did read your end notes yesterday, but not today as I was reviewing the essay and I forgot about (v) when I was writing the comment. I have not yet looked at the reference.

    Best,

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Edwin, I forgot to mention refer. 12 and 13 as containing preliminary non-physical examples of classes.

    Cheers,

    Lev

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    • Post #17

    Lev

    Re 1: in which case a struct must be a sequence of physically existent states. And just what is this information which it is comprised of relate to in physical existence? The event would be the cause of the difference between successive states.

    Re 2: we know there is existence and difference thereto. The only way this can occur is by sequence. In other words, physical existence as knowable to us is a sequence of discrete definitive physically existent states, ie at any given time, whatever comprises physical existence is in a singular physically existent state (which is why there is no duration in reality). The degree of difference and duration involved is vanishingly small. No experimentation could identify discrete successive states, and specifically why each occurred.

    In general my problem is that whilst I can accept this 'classification' methodology as being a potential way of ordering knowledge, I am unsure about its proposed role as some overarching replacement, and specifically the involvement of 'information'. Am I right in thinking that this concept of information really relates to the 'organisation/structure' of physical existence? In which case the label is something of a misnomer, because it is something physical. And anyway, I am then back to asking what is organisation/structure'?

    Paul

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    • Post #18

    Lev

    You did no comment on Edwin's allusion to consciousness, sadly. Because I have been struggling with another underlying thread which is the concept of 'mental', but did not raise it.

    Paul

    Paul,

    "You did no comment on Edwin's allusion to consciousness, sadly. Because I have been struggling with another underlying thread which is the concept of 'mental', but did not raise it."

    By the way, Edwin said: "I agree with your analysis of the historical aversion to consciousness as a relevant topic for physics". He didn't ask me to comment on "consciousness".

    But since you asked I should say that "consciousness" is as ambiguous as "information", and that is why it is hard to address it. But instead we should focus on more identifiable key processes such as pattern recognition / classification.

    1. "Am I right in thinking that this concept of information really relates to the 'organisation/structure' of physical existence?"

    Yes you are right in that thinking.

    2. Please clarify this: "In which case the label is something of a misnomer, because it is something physical."

    3. "And anyway, I am then back to asking what is organisation/structure'?"

    This is what my essay is supposed to suggest, but of course I had the space limitations: structure -- section 3 and organization -- section 4.

    Lev

    Hmm, I rather took Edwin's comment to be: 'there is an aversion, but there should not be, and you think there should not be'. Apart from which my supplementary enquired what 'mental' refers to. My point being that consciousness, etc, etc, is irrelevant. Sensing involves the receipt of physical input. That is where the physics stops. The subsequent processing of that is not physics, it involves the formulation of a perception of what was received. The subsequent processing can have no affect on the physical circumstance, because 1) that has already occurred, 2) that interaction does not involve what occurred anyway, but a physically existent representation of it (aka light in the case of the sense of sight). So any physical theory that involves the subsequent processing is wrong.

    Re 2. That comment goes along with my response to your question on my essay blog. Precisely what is the point of designating organisation/structure as information? It is, if identified correctly(!) physically existent fact. Even if it is generic, it is still so, generically. Labelling it as information, which therefore invokes the concept of not-information (ie one presumes real, or what?) seems unnecessary, and leaves me wondering why this differentiation is made.

    Then in relation to section 3/4, again this concept of information appears. The processes are physical processes, there is bound to be degree of similarity with these, which means one could invoke a classification system. And if one differentiates the events to the existential level, then one is going to reveal cause/effect. This appears to be an important caveat: "because it is addressing the formative, rather than any apparent, structure". But one would hope(!) everybody is addressing what actually occurs, not what appears to be so, or certainly they should be. The whole issue here is that any chosen representational device must accord with how physical existence occurs.

    Paul

    "This appears to be an important caveat: "because it is addressing the formative, rather than any apparent, structure". But one would hope(!) everybody is addressing what actually occurs, not what appears to be so, or certainly they should be."

    Paul, what I meant by that phrase--and it is clear in the context of the essay-- is that so far mathematics and physics have been dealing with the "apparent", or spatial, structure, while ETS is designed to address the formative structure.

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    • Post #23

    Lev

    There is nothing apparent about size/distance/space. Neither are people trying to explain physical existence solely in those terms. As with information, there is some way in which you are differentiating, which is not substantiated by reality.

    Paul

    Paul, I meant the "apparent features" from a pattern recognition, or common-sense view: e.g the shape of a stone, of a galaxy, or of a tree.

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    • Post #25

    Lev

    Fine, but they are not apparent. Which implies that existence is something else. They are physically existent features, and may well have similarities, as physical features. I have a feeling that this runs parallel with another false concept of emergent/fundamental which I came across when commenting on the first few essays published. I can't quite put my finger on it at the moment, but there seems to be a trend to differentiate reality into two types under the guise of information. This being yet another attempt to rationalise the inherent contradiction which stems from the false start point as to how existence occurs.

    As I said in my response to your comment on my essay, the ony meaningful definition of information is that which is a representation of something else. Knowing of anything inherently conveys information.

    Paul

    Paul,

    "the ony meaningful definition of information is that which is a representation of something else."

    As you can see from my essay, I am a great believer in the importance of representation: I spent almost all my professional life developing one. I also believe in the idea of "information" as contained in the representation.

    But the central question of representation can only be approached scientifically via a representational *formalism*.

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    • Post #27

    Lev

    "But the central question of representation can only be approached scientifically via a representational *formalism*."

    Not so. A representation is a represenation of something else. In discerning that something is a representation in the first place, and then determining whether it is a valid representation, one needs the something else which it is representing. As with information, you are applying this concept to everything, which is not the case, as I have just said in Vladimirs blog. Something is either existent or it is not. If it is, that is not inherently information. It may inform us, but that is irrelevant. We may construct a model to represent it, but that is irrelevant too, because it is a model, noit reality. It is whatever it is. The only correct application of the notion of information is in the context of light, etc. Because whilst that is physically existent, it is also a representation of something else that is physically existent.

    Paul

    Paul,

    I'm quite curious about your view on the following.

    Are you comfortable with the radically new way you propose to do science by "talking" rather than relying on some kind of formal language (as has been practiced for millennia now)? As you know, English or any other spoken language are very imprecise 'tools'.

    Lev

    No. In terms of representational devices narrative is a real problem. One can have a certain set of agreed terms etc, but after that I think only maths can cope with the complexity and precision necessary. In terms of methodology, calssification systems/models are fine, so long as they correspond with physical existence as it occurs.

    What I am drawing attention to is what physical existence is, and how it must occur, which then means certain rules must be adhered to in a science which examines it. In simple language, what is now, somewhat derogatorilly referred to as 'classical' has not been properly understood and taken to its logical conclusion (ie sequence of disrete definitive physically existent states). It has been left at the ontologically incorrect everyday usage mode (ie it changes). This has resulted, along with the apparent outcomes of experimentation, even though experimentation could never differentiate such states, in the development of an alternative view (relativity, QM, spacetime). Which presumes some form of indefiniteness in physical existence. That is impossible. The contradiction is then 'resolved' by such mechanisms as observer intervention, and ever increasingly bizarre concepts, even that physical existence can occur out of sequence order, for example.

    I have no doubt that despite this, much of the content of what has been discovered is valid. What needs to happen is that that must be re-ordered into a context of a physical existence where these false notions that it involves relativity, indefiniteness, time, have been eradicated.

    Will that happen? Doubt it. Even I have been stunned by the inertia created by the status quo. People will engage in differences of detail, presuming the status quo, but not the status quo itself. However, it givesme something to do in the early hours as I do not sleep well.

    Paul

    Lev, first my sincere condolences.

    Now to your essay, you rightly point out the ambiguity in the word information. A "information overload" is nothing more than an observation overload, nature cannot be overloaded with information.

    Your section 1 and 2, I can follow and can agree with but then I get lost in trying to understand your ETS concept, the beers and wine I had this Sunday lunch do not make it easier, so I will have to come back