Hi Edwin,

> I'm not sure what you have in mind when you say it doesn't have to be "physical".

Simply that, a simulation does not have to represent within it the "hardware" that is running the simulation. Second Life does not have to have a large server room appear inside its virtual world. (Nevertheless, there is such a server room running the simulation. )

If the "physical world" of our senses is really virtual, then there is no necessity for the "hardware" it runs on to be in evidence. Yet it is still there, unobservable from within the simulation. If our physical bodies are like avatars in Second Life, we will search in vain within Second Life for the big server room. Yet the source of the simulation must exist.

> Of course one instruction set can simulate another instruction set and the simulation can simulate another instruction set and so on ad infinitum, but this only goes forward. There must be the original physical instruction decoder on which the whole chain is based.

We may have a terminological ambiguity and some resulting confusion. There are two different kinds of simulation.

Lets call Type (1) what you describe here: One instruction set can simulate (or emulate) another one via a process of translation. The decoders for both must be of the same type (if one is physical the other is also). This is true down any chain of decoders, as you suggest.

Type (2) simulation is when an instruction set is used in a more complicated way. It is used to model (via computational geometry) a virtual world, snapshots of which are rendered to create an illusion. In this case, the result of the simulation is of a different type from the input. Objects that appear in a movie are not the same as objects in the theatre, even if a moviegoer might get caught up in a movie and start to believe it is "real". We do not expect objects in the movie to be able to interact with objects in the theatre. So the objects that result from this kind of simulation are of a different type.

The "orignal instruction decoder" must exist. The question is whether it should properly be called "physical". If we take the word "physical" to be what we normally take it for, the kind of stuff that tables and chairs (and our CPUs) are made of, then I argue that the decoder need not be that kind of "stuff".

I am saying that the physical world is a Type (2) simulation not a Type (1) simulation. That is, when we look out at the physical world we form our idea of objects from observing the dancing colors on a kind of 3D display screen, just like a gamer engrossed in their game. We and our bodies are immersed in a 3D movie and do not see the "theatre" it is playing in.

So if objects in our 3D movie are known as "physical" what shall we call the objects in the "theatre"? I used the term "unobservable hardware basis".

Hugh

Hi Hugh,

I understand simulation of the two Types (except that I would not say for Type 1 that "the decoders for both must be of the same type (if one is physical the other is also)". Only the root decoder must be physical. All higher-level decoders in the chain can be 'soft'. In fact, this is almost certainly the way all new instruction sets are debugged before committing to physical hardware.

For example, for several years in the 80s I made good money selling simulations of 8051s that ran on 80386s. The 8051s could have simulated another processor, in which case my simulated 8051 could simulate the other processor, and so forth. Only the root decoder (in this case the 80386) need be physical. [By the way, thanks for reminding me of this... one of many things in my past life that I tend to forget!]

And I agree that one can search in vain inside of Second Life for the "big server room".

So I agree that, in your scenario, the "unobservable hardware basis" need not be evident. Yet it must exist. You seem to agree as you say that "The 'original instruction decoder' must exist."

And it must be "hard". That is what I mean by "physical". You seem to be saying that my idea of "hard" is an illusion I've obtained from the virtual world, yet you also seem to agree that the "original instruction decoder" must exist. If this is not in some way isomorphic to "hard" (a.k.a. "physical") then I have no idea what you can mean by this.

Is that what you meant when you said in an earlier comment that "learning and memory do not seem to depend on the physical brain"? But then you asked "where is memory held if not in the brain?" I'm confused here also.

Finally, in your scheme, am "I" also a virtual construction, or am I made of the same "stuff" as the "original instruction decoder"?

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Hi Edwin,

> Only the root decoder must be physical. All higher-level decoders in the chain can be 'soft'.

Yes, I agree with you that at some point as you ascend a Type 1 chain, software might take over the work. So I was wrong (or at the very least misleading) to say "if one is physical the other is also". We should not consider software "physical", so that was a poor word choice on my part.

It will probably muddy the waters to try explain what I had in my head (a vague notion anyway) so I will just accept your hard/soft distinction and move on to what I think is the heart of this: That still does not mean the "root decoder" is physical.

> And it must be "hard". That is what I mean by "physical". You seem to be saying that my idea of "hard" is an illusion I've obtained from the virtual world, yet you also seem to agree that the "original instruction decoder" must exist. If this is not in some way isomorphic to "hard" (a.k.a. "physical") then I have no idea what you can mean by this.

Let us consider a situation that is a chain of Type 2 systems and distinguish the various levels of simulation. Level 0 will be the root level, level 1 will be the world simulated above level 0, and so on up.

For a given Level n to exist, then Level n-1 must exist. While a given level would have access to information regarding higher levels, the reverse is not necessarily true. The higher levels might be much simpler systems than the lower ones, just as Second Life is simpler than physical reality. They may have very limited hints as to what kind of systems are actually running them.

I am suggesting that what we take to be "physical" (or "hard", i.e. tables and chairs) may actually be at Level 1, not Level 0. The world of Second Life is then at Level 2.

If our physical world is at Level 1, then, while there must exist a Level 0, I do not want to call it "physical", since that term already denotes things we find at Level 1. In this case, I might call Level 0 "infra-physical", and Level 2 "super-physical", but I am not sure those terms are more helpful than the numbers.

> Is that what you meant when you said in an earlier comment that "learning and memory do not seem to depend on the physical brain"? But then you asked "where is memory held if not in the brain?" I'm confused here also.

The link I gave with the statement about learning and memory went to an article about a dramatic experiment done with flatworms, which have the capacity to regrow their heads. The flatworms were trained, their heads were chopped off, and then, after the heads regrew, they were tested again. They had retained the training. The implication I came to was that the learning must have been stored some place other than the worm's physical brain because that had been removed in between the training and retest.

This I take as evidence that there is a non-brain based, or even non-physical information storage mechanism available for memories and learning.

> Finally, in your scheme, am "I" also a virtual construction, or am I made of the same "stuff" as the "original instruction decoder"?

I think that our consciousness is at a lower level than our bodies. If our physical world is at Level 1, that would place it at Level 0. If our physical world is at (say) level 10, then our consciousness could be at (say) Level 5, so I do not know if it is at Level 0.

Hugh

Edwin, first I want to thank your for your open reply. Here are a couple replys to your questions.

You state: "I am subjectively aware of myself and this does not require either measurement or definition."

I can assure you that your subjective view of your "self" was developed by ALL the measurable information your personal biology obtained throughout your entire life. Remove all of this information and I believe I can say with high confidence that this "subjective self" you believe is present will no longer be capable of being defined. ALL your past, physical information sets the boundaries of your current state of "subjectiveness." This implies that your subjective self is built on your history of collected, measurable, information. So when you say "objective" and "subjective" you simply refer to information on the outer surface (current physical measures), and, information locked inside the boundary of this surface (the entire history of information alluded to above - the information that fills the "volume" in your life). Therefore, your subjective awareness takes root in all your past physical endevours and is not a seperate part .... like saying the leaf does not partake in the life of a tree as part of a whole -or- visa versa..... "sustaining a life" being the context here.

Also, you have stated: "And although I tend to view it, as a physicist, as the gravitational field, which possesses an inherent, if only primordial, self-awareness, it is just as valid for you to consider it a 'self' field possessing gravitational properties. But only the gravitational properties are measurable. "

Well, I too am a physicist, however, I also consider our conciousness as supplying a point symmetry to do all its analysis of information - this implies we measure everything as a geometric product - agreement and uncertainty in agreement - dot and curl... including our own "self measurement." Gravity may supply the measurable gauge to the self, however, we can only measure the differences within the gauge and this comes with a dot and curl value, and, this again may go back to requiring more then just the self .... to define the self....

You also stated" As for a single field explaining everything, my hypothesis is that initially only one "thing" exists, the field. There is no 'outside' or 'inside'. As it evolves, symmetry breaks, and 'local' and 'global' acquire meaning. Any attempt to describe a holistic 'system' has to start somewhere, but this should be arbitrary, since it all must tie together."

While there may have only been "1" thing at the very beginning of time, we are now immersed in times where there are MANY physically separated "selfs." In the beginning everything may have been "self parallel" and thus only a dot product solution to everything, all self's completely aligned (an incubation, accelerating growth period - like individual spin in a ferromagnet state) .. until a curl (asymmetry) sets in (birth).... increased temperature for the ferromagnetic to demagnetize .... and measured differences (curls) exist between all the "selfs." The "self's" part like the tribes of self's in ancient times. (a GUT on "self's" would need to explain measured past civilation movements also ... and markets... etc)

On a final note you stated: "You make some assumptions about science finding the correct "context" that indicates you've put a lot of thought into this."

Well, I like to "think" I put more then thoughts into it ... I like to think I put ALL measures (past and present) we make, and can potentially make, into it. This therefore creats a self that goes from the inner cell, beyond the cell wall out the skin, through the ecosystem and into the solar system (as a NASA scientist you know how we collect information here in the solar system)... and intimately connected out to the far reaches of the universe. If the real, physically measurable descriptions of this instantaneous "self" fosters many testable paths to it's description .... imagine what can transpire when we figure out that it is really a part of the "measurable self" that we physically describe with each valid GUT description (speak of potentially new understandings of the genomes measurable information structure (and when deemed and proven measurable .... becomes manipulative for cures to every physical ailments known and unknown to man)! Now "that" would truely be a Grand theory...... A Measurable Self Physics having the subjective part removed.

Best regards,

Tony

    Hi Hugh,

    First the flatworms. I'm assuming that these tests were not mental, but physical behaviors. Thus, even though the trigger (say a smell or taste) may have been in the head, I would guess that the behavior was mostly "muscle memory". Replace the triggering mechanism and the rest still works. So, while this is truly fascinating, I'm not that surprised, and I would consider this a purely physical storage mechanism.

    I would need more solid explanation of "infra-physical" to have even the slightest idea what you're thinking of. You're right that the term alone conveys no more information than the number zero.

    Finally you seem to be saying that our bodies are "real" (a.k.a. "hard", "physical") or are you? That is, do we have physical bodies which are "coupled to" virtual effectors, like LCDs over our eyes or special implants in our ears, etc., or are our bodies virtual constructions like the virtual things we believe are real? After I understand how you see our bodies, I'll come back to consciousness.

    Best,

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Tony,

    Thanks for your replies. You say "I can assure you... [that if you remove your personal biologically obtained information] this "subjective self" you believe is present will no longer be capable of being defined." While I agree with you (close to) 100% I would say you're focused on my self-identity, i.e., myself and this body with its particular history. But, if the situation is as I hypothesize, the basic awareness is fundamental to existence and, in that sense is the same awareness that you have. The individual biological details aren't that significant. And there are states of awareness (I refer to these as 'topological') in which the 'metric' overlay that is learned in infancy is suppressed and the 'connectedness' mode of awareness (pre-metric awareness) is dominant. While one can never completely abolish the particular history, I think it's much less relevant to this mode of awareness than you seem to.

    Mark Feeley commented above: "You make a sensible assertion that, for example, there is a sense in which we can say gravity is "aware" and proceed very carefully from there. If you assume there is only one real field the argument is even simpler: if there is only one field, then you (or anyone else) are a manifestation of that field, and combined with the apparent evidence that you are aware, you are quite logically led to a conclusion that the field is in some way aware."

    So when your say my "subjective awareness... is not a separate part", I never considered such awareness "a separate part". That is your conception. If I had to attach a label, I would probably call it an 'aspect' of the field, inseparable from the field.

    I'm not sure how to respond to your "gravity may supply the measurable gauge to the self" and the conclusion "requiring more than just the self... to define the self...". I'm not interested in "defining the self". I experience the self. That's the basic territory. Definitions are a map or overlay on the territory.

    And yes, while there may have been only "1" thing at the very beginning of time, obviously there are MANY physically separated biological 'self's today. But, if these are like vortices in an ocean, they do not stop being ocean, they simply represent locally concentrated or constrained activities, or behaviors. My interest is in explaining the physical evolution from the initial "1" to the current MANY. You seem to think this implies a need to explain tribes and markets and other socio-phenomena. On the one hand these seem self-evident and, on the other hand not strictly physics. I've stated that my equations relate to physical material (fields) and interactions, not the awareness or will aspects of the field, which I claim are not representable by equations (except perhaps in some statistical model.)

    Your description of your ideal GUT is pretty much that which I have in mind, except that I'm sure we are not using the same vocabulary when you say "having the subjective part removed". This relates to my first paragraph above. Remove the local experience, the field awareness is still there, it just lacks the "information" to interpret "things" it is aware of.

    I think we're closer than you think.

    Anyway I really do appreciate your perspective, and agree with almost all of it. But I don't think we conceive of awareness in the same way.

    Best regards,

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Edwin,

    In regards to your on-going discussion concerning "awareness", it is important to remember that "self-awareness" and "consciousness" are not the same thing, even though most people treat them as such. "Self-awareness" is neither hard to explain, nor hard to implement. The same cannot be said of "consciousness". My house has a limited form of self-awareness. So does my car. My house is aware of itself filling with smoke. I know this to be true, because it sounds an alarm. Similarly, my car is aware of keys being left in the ignition, and doors being left ajar.

    But consciousness is another matter. Consciousness is about *how* a system experiences itself, not *if* a system experiences itself, as in the examples given above. The latter can often be verified by an external observer. The former cannot.

    Although it is a bit oversimplified, consciousness might be considered to be a second-order effect of first-order self-awareness; how does a system "feel about" or "experience" its own self-awareness. Pain is part of a damage detection system, but how does the system feel or experience that pain.

    The real question is not if a system can experience things like pain and color, but do they experience it the same way that I do. Or that you do.

    Rob McEachern

      Hi Edwin,

      > I'm assuming that these tests were not mental, but physical behaviors. Thus, even though the trigger (say a smell or taste) may have been in the head, I would guess that the behavior was mostly "muscle memory".

      Right, the test involved sensitivity to light. Evidently flatworms shy away from light and they were taught to tolerate it. I should be clear that the idea that the physical does not store memory is my interpretation, as the researchers do devise an alternative explantion. But I think there is a variety of evidence for the existence of memory storage outside of the physical and can provide other examples.

      > I would need more solid explanation of "infra-physical" to have even the slightest idea what you're thinking of. You're right that the term alone conveys no more information than the number zero.

      Essentially, I am arguing by analogy to our computer hardware and software technology. Our computer systems are often layered, with one type of "world" layered on another to make it easier to implement. I am suggesting a layered computational model for the cosmos that places the physical at a level other than the lowest level. For example:

      Level 0: Consciousness

      Level 1: Life

      Level 2: QM hidden variables

      Level 3: physical world (atoms, tables, chairs, etc)

      Level 4: Second Life, etc.

      Each level of cosmos could have different laws of operation and a different virtual geometry to operate within (analogous to different opcodes and memory architecture).

      Because there are specific characteristics regarding information flow between layers (higher layers can't learn much about lower layers), the idea is that the layered model might provide an interpretation of some observations about the world such as the flatworm experiment, or the difficulty of observing the values of QM hidden variables.

      The idea of a layered architecture is not new, of course, and the conventional view is probably, for example, that Life is an epi-phenomenon of the physical and that Consciousnes is an emergent phenomenon of Life. I happen to think that the experimental evidence shows otherwise, but once you posit a layered system you can at least pose the question in a (hopefully) clearer way. I will try to write some more on my blog about the model.

      > Finally you seem to be saying that our bodies are "real" (a.k.a. "hard", "physical") or are you?

      Yes, I think our bodies are at the same level as tables and chairs; made of the same type of "stuff" (molecules and so forth).

      > That is, do we have physical bodies which are "coupled to" virtual effectors, like LCDs over our eyes or special implants in our ears, etc., or are our bodies virtual constructions like the virtual things we believe are real?

      Virtual constructions at the same level as the "real" things.

      > After I understand how you see our bodies, I'll come back to consciousness.

      OK, hope this helps.

      Hugh

      Hi Hugh,

      I would be interested in other examples of memory storage outside of the physical. I find this hard to believe. I don't consider the flatworm an example of such.

      I also have a tough time believing in a 'layered world'. My own intuition and experience tells me that existence is integral or holistic.

      It may not be relevant to your scheme but you say "higher layers can't learn much about lower layers". In an ISO seven layer scheme for example I think of the Presentation Level (seven) as being able to display status of lower levels such as physical, data-link, and network layers, whereas the physical layer would have no knowledge of the higher layers. This seems the converse of what you're saying. Similarly, debuggers and disassemblers (for example) can access breakpoint registers, decode global and local descriptor tables, and otherwise poke around in **and interpret** lower level status, whereas the raw machine level instructions don't know beans about email, calendars, spreadsheets, Second Life, etc. Perhaps I'm missing something here.

      I agree with your statement of the conventional view, (not with the view itself, only your statement of it) but in my view all of your layers fit into the physical or "real". Of course I don't believe consciousness "emerges" although "degrees of" consciousness are clearly emergent. In my schema, this is where "intelligence" enters the picture with "logic". Here again we get into terminology issues. I'll try to clarify some of this with Rob McEachern below.

      It seems pretty clear that we're going in different directions. It all fits into one whole for me, while you prefer layers of separation, which seem artificial to me. Once you posit that our bodies are real/physical, then I see no need for any other layer.

      I'll check your blog and I'd be interested in "non-physical memory storage".

      Best,

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Hi Rob,

      Thanks for jumping back in. Everyone has their own interpretation of the vocabulary of consciousness. Of course in most situations the only thing that matters is whether the parties can agree on the meanings of their words.

      I think it's a little different when one is dealing with a theory of consciousness and equations relating it physical reality. In this case it's not just agreement, but one definition or interpretation may be compatible with theory and another may not be.

      For example I define 'consciousness' as 'awareness plus volition', where volition is synonymous with will. This definition includes both 'self-awareness' (subjectivity) and 'awareness-of-other' (objectivity). And I do think it's hard to explain and tend to doubt that it can be implemented.

      To a trivial degree, by stating that the primordial field possesses the attribute or aspect of awareness, and claiming that everything evolved from this field, I lay myself open to the claim that everything may be said to "be aware". But that's a meaningless tautology. There is a threshold below which to say something is "aware" is silly.

      In my opinion, your house is not aware (i.e., it falls below the threshold). Cybernetic feedback of temperature or smoke density is not an example of "awareness", just physical sensing and response. And even if the 'smoke sensor' was aware, I would not identify it with the house. The car example might be closer, but still no cigar.

      My reasons for saying this are based on the hypothesis that the C-field, or local gravitomagnetic field is the key physical phenomenon (substance, agency, ??) that manifests awareness, and it does so according to the nonlinear reality approximated by the C-field equation (see essay). And the C-field equation relates changes in the C-field (which correlate with changes in awareness) to mass current density or momentum density. And the effect of the C-field is dynamic, in the sense that the C-field has no effect on static phenomena (momentum equals zero). Nor does it sense static phenomena. This is key. An analysis of living cells or monkeys or humans versus rocks or houses depends on this [in my theory]. For example a static electric potential, such as the output from a thermostat, has no momentum, hence is effectively "invisible" to the C-field, i.e., the C-field is unaware of it (unconscious of it).

      But, one might object, electrons have mass and momentum. That's true. But the ions that flow in neurons are approximately 100,000 times more massive than electrons, thus, for a given velocity, the C-field is 100,000 times "more aware" of the ions than of the electrons.

      And vesicles that flow across synaptic gaps in the brain are typically millions of times more massive than ions, or hundreds of billions of times more massive than electrons. And there are trillions of synapses in the brain, with (I'm not sure how many) vesicles flowing across a typical synapse.

      So the reason you spend your time earning money to eat is to keep these flows going in your brain (and in your cells, and in your blood, and the associated C-fields maintain, focus, and control such flows (although most of the flow is constrained by the biological structures -- neurons, arteries, veins, etc. that your body intelligently grew into place.)

      Recall that I define "intelligence" as consciousness plus logic, which I haven't even touched on here.

      My point is twofold. First, in the absence of the theory, the only thing necessary to discuss consciousness is that both parties agree on the terms they use. But when there is a theory, the definitions have to be compatible with the theory. Second, the above comment is not even the tip of the iceberg with respect to my theory. There are many other aspects of consciousness that make sense in my theory that, as far as I know, are unexplained otherwise. And the theory is designed to describe everything we know about the physical world AND to be fully compatible with subjective experience.

      This, to me, is worth insisting on which definitions apply.

      With best regards,

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Edwin,

      "I define 'consciousness' as 'awareness plus volition', where volition is synonymous with will"

      "Cybernetic feedback of temperature or smoke density is not an example of "awareness", just physical sensing and response. "

      I agree with your statement about definitions, but a problem remains. 'self-awareness' (subjectivity) and 'awareness-of-other' (objectivity) plus volition etc., all can be described in terms of information transfers and processing. But the way in which I actually experience them internally, cannot. For example, I can readily imagine a being that looks and acts like a human, but experiences itself as an information processing machine. It would be aware of the internal message from the hand on the hot stove (as I am aware of the receipt of an external sound), informing it that the hand was burning. It would be aware of the resulting messages to the arm, to pull the hand off, and aware of the messages to the muscles of the face, causing it to grimace and scream. It would be aware of all the algorithms employed to process this sensory information into responses. But that is nothing like my internal experience of the same external experience. I feel pain. My internal feeling per se, is experienced in a manner that is completely divorced from information processing, sensing and response. In other words, I am "conscious" of an experience, but not of any of the processing from which that experience seems to be constructed. As described in my book "Human and Machine Intelligence", I can imagine how to construct the latter. But not the former.

      Rob McEachern

      Edwin,

      Since my previous post, I have conducted my usual week-day observance of "Closer-to-Truth", on the local public television station. Today's episode was about consciousness, and one of the participants used a word, that I should have used in my previous post. So I will use it here. "Seeming" is the word.

      As far back as Plato's Socratic dialogues, it has been apparent that a distinction can be made between "being" and "seeming"; an entity can "be" one thing, but seem to be something else to an external observer. Much more interestingly, is the case of human consciousness, in which, to myself, I appear to be one thing, but seem to be something quite different.

      I can imagine building an intelligent machine that has sensory awareness (both external and internal state sensing), information processes that produce responses to those sensory inputs, volition etc. I can imagine that it could be aware of the nature of its "being", and that it would seem to itself that it was such a being. But that is absolutely not how I seem to be to myself. I believe I too must "be" such a being, I'm a materialist, but I do not "seem" to be such a being.

      How can the being and seeming be reconciled.

      Non-materialists claim that the seeming is caused by a soul.

      Many materialists, like Roger Penrose, believe that the seeming is caused by an undiscovered physical phenomenon, analogous to the discovery of atomic fusion, to explain the sun's energy output over time-spans too long to be explained by chemical processes.

      I believe seeming to be caused by an undiscovered information processing technique, analogous to the discovery of FM signaling; when first proposed, it was dismissed as impossible, just as Lord Kelvin dismissed geologist's estimates of the sun's age.

      I know how to build machines that sense red light in the same manner that the human eye does. And I can imagine building one that was aware or itself as "being" just such a machine. But I have yet to imagine how it could "seem to be" anything else, to itself; it would experience "red", but not the the way I "seem" to experience it.

      Rob McEachern

      Edwin,

      I agree with your statement: "I think we're closer than you think."

      What I always attempt to do is pick up a ruler and time clock to "measure" just how close we are because it is enevidable that we all "think" differently and it is he who actually predicts physical measures that take the podeum (and for good reason - we can then better mankind with new inventions). If "awareness" can't be physically measured, then what good can it do? If you say it apprpriates our existence to drive physical change (for example) then why is it not measurable?... we can measure all information received from our 5 physical senses that feed our state of conciousness. Adding a physical sense of awareness may be what is required to take all information entering our 5 senses and "coherently" store it as memory (your pre-metric awareness being like the coherent structure). If I call a "sense of awareness" as akin to a modeled point symmetry that derives the physical property of "awareness" from information derived from space-time splits (the geometric product - I was a student of David Hestenes) then I have information I can measure that "appropriates my physically derived awareness." This implies "awareness" measures in life to be accumulative. I am more aware today then I was yesterday... on multiple fronts.

      If you were asked to recall your earliest memories you can likely back track through a past time series of self experienced events ... to a point in time where memory no longer serves your inquiries to draw information. Were you "not" aware proir to this? (if you say you were aware then why can't you recall any events prior) -or- was your awareness today built from all the information you gathered since your first memories - when you first became aware? Optical vision is not present in the womb, and, takes practice to master when we are born ... as does the sense of balance, etc., why not also a sense of awareness that is accumulated through life?

      This may be where we disconnect.... you treat awareness as a self inflicted thing that was always present ... I treat awareness as a learned, accumulated trait that requires coherent information accumulation over time.

      Regards,

      Tony

      Tony,

      In general, of course, I agree with your stance on measurement. And I'm glad you asked "what good can it do?" and not "what good can it be?". You give the example of new inventions. As an inventor (my bio is out of date, I now have 39 patents) I can easily say that my awareness, measurable or not, is responsible for every one of my inventions. Or better, that I would not have invented anything without being aware. So by your measure awareness "does good". Rob below remarked on awareness of pain as a danger response system. That is good. Obviously there are numerous such examples.

      I don't have an answer for everything. You postulate that awareness is cumulative. "I am more aware today than I was yesterday... on multiple fronts." I don't know whether this is true or not. I tend to know more on a daily basis, but I also forget more. I lived a very productive life for at least four decades and am often surprised to realize that I forgot about major events and projects, not having thought about them for years. This mixes up consciousness and logic, which leads to thoughts, ideas, models, memories of the past, and projections into the future, while awareness is of NOW. So I haven't resolved that issue in my mind. You're probably right.

      But to return to "measure". The C-field (which manifests awareness) is measurable, at a point in time, but I don't think this correlates with awareness per se. Yet it may, I don't know.

      And this brings me to your point about recalling earliest memories. I don't know if my distinction between 'metric awareness' and 'topological awareness' makes sense to you, but it is key to my theory. Memories are awareness of stored information [see my many other comments about information], and you ask, reasonably, what were you aware of before certain types of information were received (say optical). It is largely from optical (and auditory and touch) that we learn to impose a metric overlay on our awareness (actually on our neural models). After this is firmly in place most of us forget that there was an earlier form of awareness or connectedness with everything. An extremely common first reaction to psychedelics is "how could I have forgotten this?" That, in my theory, comes from changing the thresholds that "maintain" the metric maps. If you have not read Jill Bolte Taylor's account of her stroke, [My Stroke of Insight], I strongly urge you to do so. It may go a long way toward addressing some of your questions. William James "Varieties of Religious Experience" also addresses such 'topological' awareness.

      So awareness of stored information probably drives most of your activities today. I believe you were also aware in the womb where it was biologically stored information that drove your (growing) activity. If one can't recall any of this, one must either take the word of those who've experienced such recall, or simply reject it.

      Your final paragraph really oversimplifies what is actually a very complex situation. But our comments illustrate how hard it is to come to grips with these ideas of awareness [a regression in itself].

      Thanks for making the effort to make these points. I've enjoyed it very much.

      Best regards,

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Rob,

      You claim that I say "'self-awareness' (subjectivity) and 'awareness-of-other' (objectivity) plus volition etc., all can be described in terms of information transfers and processing." Then you state: "But the way in which I actually experience them internally, cannot."

      No. I do NOT say that. [And I'm rather surprised that you think I did; it illustrates how hard it is to get past one's own terminology. I assume that you read my words and apply your interpretations, coming to this wrong conclusion.]

      I define 'consciousness' as 'awareness plus volition', where volition is synonymous with will. I define 'intelligence' as 'consciousness plus logic' and in my essays and in many comments scattered throughout this contest I specifically note that it is the existence of the energy threshold that provides the binary basis of information, and the crossing of this threshold and changes ('in-forms') a structure, resulting in stored information. And connected thresholds result in logic circuitry that processes information. Without this "logic" there is no information processing. -- Yet awareness exists without either! -- This is key. It is, as my previous comment discussed, the sensing of momentum density. Only when the mass flows are structured by neural (logic) circuitry does it become intelligent thought/thinking, and offer a means to become aware of the past and project the future. Awareness is always of NOW. If, right now, your logic circuitry is accessing info about the past, then you are now aware of the past, etc.

      So most of your long paragraph seems to focus exactly on what I mean by awareness. It seems hard for many to make this distinction between internal experience of external stimuli, probably because they know so much about the mechanics of processing the information received from the stimulus. You obviously can. Many just assume that the high order of complexity "leads to" awareness, that is, awareness 'emerges from' the complex circuitry. I say it does not. As a robot designer [in the past] and theorist, I fully agree with your statement about how one can construct the "intelligent" behavior from logic, but not the awareness.

      If you realize that you've attributed to me a very incorrect statement, I think you'll see that we are very much in agreement. It may require an effort to adjust your terminology, probably that used in your book, to my interpretations.

      Because your next comment is a big change of topic that looks quite interesting, I'll post this response and then spent some time thinking about the next one.

      By the way, I've had your book on my stack for a while, unfortunately the stack keeps growing!

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Rob,

      That's an interesting one to respond to: 'Being' versus 'Seeming'.

      You say "I'm a materialist, but I do not "seem" to be such a being." In your previous comment you remarked you could imagine how to construct automata, but not aware automata [I'm paraphrasing.]

      I think your definition of "material" is too constrained. Along with many others, I view the gravitational field as "material". As Ohanian and Ruffini say in "Gravitation and Spacetime, 2nd Ed.": "the gravitational field may be regarded as the material medium sought by Newton; the field is material because it possesses an energy density." And as Weinberg notes in "Gravitation and Cosmology" -- "the geometric interpretation of the theory of gravity has dwindled to a mere analogy."

      But you do not understand how gravity "pulls" on other mass. And you do not understand how gravity is "aware of" other mass. I contend that these mysterious aspects, plus the concept of energy/mass, pretty well define gravity. And gravity self-gravitates. And I am aware of gravity and of myself. And my theory explains how gravity evolved from an initial 'pure' symmetry to our current world, which is a complex manifestation of the original material substance.

      It seems to me you have several choices:

      1) enlarge your concept of material to include awareness and volition (like gravitational attraction).

      2) hypothesize another "field" to explain awareness.

      3) believe the conventional view that awareness emerges from complex automata (and hence has no fundamental reality, only artificial).

      4) believe in some "other" realm, such as Platonists do [Penrose is a Platonist].

      My bias is to prefer ONE thing to two or many things. And the one gravity field seems to work. I don't think the other ideas work, or if they do, I find them "ugly". It's a personal preference, but, as I've indicated above, my theory explains (qualitatively) anomalies in (material) physics that no one else explains.

      I've often used the example in your last paragraph (seeing 'red') to explain to others what I mean by awareness.

      I think you are mistaken in your belief that some undiscovered info processing will "explain" awareness, just as no undiscovered geometry will "explain" how gravity 'pulls'. It 'describes' at best.

      Although I believe everyone began in the womb with what I refer to as topological awareness, it is clear that most have no recollection of such and have effectively lost this mode of awareness. Psychedelics, strokes, and religious experiences restore this mode, temporarily. If none of these apply to you, then you will probably deny this fundamental mode of awareness even exists. I view such experience as a surefire way to put ideas of algorithms or mechanical explanations of awareness to bed. And I consider my theory a 'materialist' theory of physics, based on the two things I directly and immediately experience: gravity and awareness. Almost everything else is abstraction and idea, which requires working logic circuits to experience.

      While I've been beating this drum for years, it's good that FQXi has finally come up with a topic that causes numerous people to see that consciousness must be discussed in any fundamental theory of information.

      Thanks again for your always stimulating comments.

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

      Edwin,

      I was not claiming that you said that. Language is ambiguous, sorry about that. I was attempting to present MY claim, in the context of what you said. After watching the "closer to truth" episode, I realized there was a better way of stating my point, which is why I made the second post.

      "So most of your long paragraph seems to focus exactly on what I mean by awareness", I agree, but as I stated, awareness of "being", at least to me (and many philosophers), offers no explanation of awareness of "seeming".

      I agree that we are very much in agreement. But at the same time, the differences are significant. For example, you said that, from your perspective, "your next comment is a big change of topic", but from my perspective, it is exactly the same topic; I was merely attempting to say that the TV episode triggered my reflection, that the distinction between "being" and "seeming", is the best, most concise language, that I have yet encountered, to point out just what that topic is all about. I had encountered it many times before, but forgot about just how interesting the point is. As one of the episode's participants put it, "seeming" is our only real direct experience, "I seem to think, therefore I do", "being" is "merely" an inference about what causes the seeming. You can infer that a brain caused it, or you can infer that a soul caused it. But in any case, it *always* seems that you are exactly what you seem to be.

      Rob McEachern

      Edwin,

      We are crossing paths in our posts.

      "I think you are mistaken in your belief that some undiscovered info processing will "explain" awareness"; as I said, although we agree about many thing, differences exist.

      Keep in mind that my conception of important "undiscovered info processing" are ones, like FM, that explicitly exploit a priori knowledge. Obviously, such a process cannot be accomplished until the required info becomes a priori. It goes back to another ancient debate, that appears in Plato; How can you find something when you don't even know what you are looking for?" But merely asking that question seems (there is that word again) to imply that once you do know what you ought to be looking for, you ought to be able to do a better job of finding it.

      Rob McEachern