Zoran,
Actually, I find it intriguing for a somewhat different reason. Basically, by definition, that which cannot be known can never be known, since by definition, such becoming known would mean that such never was in fact that which 'cannot' be known. And as such, the definition itself refuses this as a possibility. For example from my essay, the exact decimal value of PI cannot be known within our perceptual reality; if this were ever to be known within this context, then the example itself would be falsified by definition, but the definition would stay intact.
However, your presentation provides a somewhat different philosophical avenue which may support the concept that there is nothing manifest which cannot be known, as suggested in my essay. In the case of my essay, I excluded that which cannot be known from the realm of information by definition, and thus such is excluded from the realm of physics, since that which cannot be known can never be known and thus presents no information and is thus not within the context of physics, at least within our perceptual reality. And as you've recognized, I've scoped this to our perceptual reality.
Though I have not yet solidified this pattern of thought, it may be that any scope beyond our directly perceptual reality may also follow a similar hierarchical logic, thereby allowing some manner of indirect detection of realities not directly perceived via some hierarchical construct; this also speaks to a subset of your essay.
Though it doesn't change the essence of the duality of information and material objects, it does suggest that there is a possibility that the duality exists beyond a direct perception but not beyond detection via inference. The question here becomes again one of definition, in that if something were inferred outside of being directly perceived, should it still be considered to be within our perceptual reality as it has now been perceived albeit indirectly? It seems so, and thus the term 'perceptual reality' appears sufficient and proper to then to encompass all such hierarchies and needs no further hierarchical description; such was partly the basis of my response.
Chris
P.S. As I had posted earlier on John Brodix Merryman's essay thread, I will say that in my own estimation, I find 'time' an abstract contrivance of information (that is, a measurement) that is simply based upon an observed state in accordance with an equally abstract definition.
To clarify, we've defined time as the passing of motion according to some arbitrary reference; thus, it should be of no surprise, and perhaps expected, that motion of that reference itself may create a different time measurement. Of course, experiments suggest this is true (i.e., tests of SR). But, to attribute more character to time than this measurement by which it is defined is to abstractly extend its meaning into areas of which are not defined and which there is no evidence and perhaps no meaning at all.
Without getting into extensive detail, based on the above there is no reason to think, given current evidence, that a future or past exists as a physical reality other than our own fiction in creating it from imagination. If we can show via experiment that a time measurement somehow confers an existence of its own future and past (that is, not speculate or imagine such, for instance as sometimes done with certain double-slit explanations) then we would have evidence, but that's simply not the case - all time measurements provide us instantaneous information from which we then abstractly draw conclusions.