Hi Ken,
As you know, we agree on a lot of this stuff, although I wish you wouldn't perpetuate Feynman's fallacy that the double slit experiment contains the whole mystery of quantum theory. The double slit experiment, delayed choice, Elitzur Vaidman bomb, and similar phenomena that only rely on basic interferometry can all be accounted for by perfectly sensible local and noncontextual hidden variable theories within the standard framework. Because of this, one cannot derive compelling arguments for abandoning the traditional initial state+dynamics framework from them. On the other hand, you are right that considering the "all in one" framework puts a lot of options back on the table, e.g. locality, noncontextuality and epistemic quantum states, so it is definitely worth considering given that the potential gains are so high.
However, I think there is an important conceptual issue that has not been adequately addressed to date. There is a big difference between a presentation of a theory that makes it look like it is not an initial state+dynamics theory and a theory in which an initial state+dynamics picture does not exist. What we are really looking for is a theory in which the latter is true. After all, Newtonian mechanics can be presented in a Lagrangian form, and one may be tempted to argue that it is an "all at once" theory when it is presented that way, but it also has a perfectly adequate Hamiltonian formalism, so such an argument would be misguided. Now, one can come up with all sorts of fancy quantum-like theories defined on spacetime involving Lagrangians, future boundary conditions and the like, but how do you know that the theory does not also have a reasonable initial state+dynamics formalism?
Part of the problem is of course that all theories do in fact have an initial state+dynamics formalism and it is just that we may view such a formalism as not a good representation of what is going on in reality. For example, there is always the "encyclopedia of the world" ontology wherein the ontic state is just a list of absolutely everything that will happen in the universe and it is replicated at every point in space. We would normally want to reject such an ontology as being superdeterministic. What this indicates is that we cannot reject initial state+dynamics on its own, but if we add extra principles like no superdeterminism locality then we may prove that there is no initial state+dynamics formalism that is consistent with both of them. This is how Huw Price sometimes likes to present Bell's theorem, as an implication from realism+locality to retrocausality. However, the problem with this is that we have not actually established that there are "all at once" theories that are local. This is because the traditional definition of locality only applies to initial state+dynamics theories so we need to generalize it to make this statement meaningful. For specific theories, one can come up with arguments that the theory is local or that "all the action happens in the lightcones", but what we really need is a general statement of what locality is in this context that is at least as general as Bell's definition of locality for initial state+dynamics theories. Indeed, we also need to do this for the concepts from the other no go theorems, such as noncontextuality and epistemic quantum states. Until we have such general definitions, claims as to whether one theory or another are genuinely "all at once" theories or not are question begging in my opinion.