Ken---
Superb job, one of a few essays I consider the very best I've read so far. I'll comment more on points of agreement later, but for now just want to record the way in which I'm engaged with these sorts of ideas, in part through your work and Huw Price's, in part through Matthew Leifer and Rob Spekkens, in part just from my own thinking. I tend to agree that the Bell correlations needn't worry one so much ... the absence of a "story" allowing one to get rid of them by conditioning on stuff in the intersection of the past light cones of the correlated events doesn't upset me. I am attracted to trying to understand this through a more "instrumentalist" account of what quantum theory does for us than the one you are suggesting for in this essay, but I tend to think that in the end the "instrumentalist" and "realist" approaches to "How to stop worrying and learn to love quantum correlations" (as I am thinking of titling a paper on the subject...) end up with something like the histories formulation. I'm not sure how the "no-dynamics" approach fits in... I tend to view any constraints between the events that comprise possible histories, as "substantive physics" and not care so much whether it's called "kinematics" or "dynamics". (I still need to read Rob Spekkens' winning essay from last year on exactly that subject...) And I see that you end up with a histories picture too. I view both an instrumentalist histories approach, and a micro-histories approach, as realist---just realist about different things. The thing I worry about is that *both* approaches may be committed to some level of "decoherence" arising from choosing a particular set of histories. It's the question of "what's the ontology". Even if it's a micro-ontology, it may generate decoherence. Now, maybe that's more likely on "standard" histories stories in which the "events" about which histories concern themselves are statements like "the particle is in this phase space cell" (or possible fuzzified, continuum versions that are more sophisticated...). Whereas the more sophisticated "microrealists" who wish to abandon Bell-like causality restrictions without worries, may have in mind more exotic kinds of "underlying reality", including, as Terry Rudolph likes to say, a reality that is not described in spacetime terms at all. Although it seems to me you may not want to go there! But then I wonder about getting the theory to avoid decoherence at a level that might be refuted by observation.
Possibly related is a certain similarity in my mind, which others in this thread (and elsehwere) have also drawn attention to, between "retrocausal" and "conspiratorial" explanations. I realize you have said they're not similar. But I'm not so sure. In situations like your description the two-slit experiment, the "retrocausal" influence seems to be coming from the different final measurement apparatus. Not sure how you would deal with a "which-way" measurement very near the slits (I guess you could put lenses there, too). But this seems almost as conspiratorial... the thing is that whatever determines some big macroconfiguration, determines the possible histories. And surely we *do* think we can predict, with high probability, that macroconfiguration from stuff in its past light cone... There is probably something I'm not understanding here, different in your explanation than in the conspiratorial one. It is likely in *just exactly what* the macronconfiguration is affecting: putting a different, and somehow less objectionable, kind of constraint on the set of histories in your case than in the conspiracy case. But I'd love to see an explanation of this that is as clear as what you've written on other points in this paper.
Just to be clear, again, this is not intended as criticism... just as a reaction. You wrote a paper that made me go back to what I've been thinking on these issues, and think about it some more... which is another sign of a good paper. Again, outstanding!
Cheers,
Howard