Hello Zoran
Thanks for your reply. I will answer in detail, because I think it is important. I ask only that as you come to understand the strength of the argument and that it can make you own work stronger, you will rate me highly.
You said:
"Your "General Principle Of Equivalence" does not accommodate the means to places, place being the thing which differentiates "oments" which can not be differentiated in any other way.
I'm struggling a bit with some of your words, especially 'does not accommodate the means to places,' but before you begin this argument, recognize that in using the word 'differentiate' you are already relying on the principle being true for this statement, which is an omnet (a 'possible statement' omnet) that purports to model a concept you are seeking to convey. I think that if you think about it a bit more, you will see that your 'places' is quite closely aligned to my concept of omnets, in that differences in assets is what determines an omnet's 'place'.
Also consider that every word you use relies on there being an equivalence between the idea the word represents and the word itself, and a difference between that word's meaning and every other word you use. This is what I called our innate ideas of equivalence and 'inequivalence' (difference). I can prove that these ideas are not concepts brought from the external world, but are necessary if one is to even gain self-awareness. Let me know if you want the proof. Then recognize that the GPE is just an uncurling of this idea of equivalence within us; rather than saying something has identity, we say it has identity because it has the assets it has. This is just tautology, but when made into a global statement it becomes the foundation of a universe.
You said:
"In whatever structured hierarchical ontology you wish to build, precedence can not be successfully determined without taking into account places, because without the relativity of places you can not have a logically sound ontology." I am wondering how you justify this statement. Given that your own work seems to use Kant as part of the argument, recognize that you may be asking me, as endpoint skeptic and endpoint rationalist, to provide a background space within which things have relativity. Perhaps it's just the abstraction, because in the possible ontology there may be omnets that have no relativity, and so would sit at the same 'place' (as in Aristotle's idea of place, which I hope is what you mean). But these are inconsistent and degenerate at the first step anyway, so cannot enter the actual ontology--they are not part of the actual world. I suspect that we are arguing the same point, but you are not seeing mine.
Further, the 'logically sound ontology' assumes the use of formal logic. But the laws of thought - the foundation of logic - are actually subjugate to, and derivable (and moderated by) the General Principle of Equivalence. Just so. Everything is subjugate to the GPE.
You wrote:
"Furthermore, in reality (SJA comments: reality? but you have no authority to talk about reality until you have established such through indefeasible/indubitable knowledge of conditions of the world), being without a place is being without "identity", yet your definition of GPE depends on the absence of identity (SJA comments: the GPE is independent; that is the whole point. Identity comes from the GPE, and is just our recognition that what makes a thing what it is, is what it has. What it has is assets), and then the presence of identity without the means to differentiating between places (SJA comments: that again is the whole point. The empiricist is never in a position to differentiate between places in the first place because such argument from empiricism is dubious, as Descartes and Kant and lots of others have argued. But this is not the case for the endpoint rationalist, who simply watches the consequences of the GPE on the world.) Your ontology excludes gravity, the only universal coordinate system we know of, but then you are in good company because the field of Quantum Mechanics does not accommodate gravity either (SJA comments: this essay is about foundational questions. If one assumes gravity at the outset one has only produced a descriptive theory). Now, just because Quantum Mechanics says the (bit) is immaterial, doesn't mean computer science agrees; remember, computer science gave (bit) and (information) equivalency, both of which will remain material until quantum computing which is truly quantum computing, and not some trick, becomes a reality. You may also wish to rethink your use of the word "indefensible". (SJA comments: indefeasible was the word, meaning indubitable, meaning unable to be countered. See my note on Broughton's interpretation of the Method of Doubt).
Sorry for the long response, Zoran. I think that maybe your reading of my work is not seeing that it is a rationalist argument, wholly independent of the particulars of the universe, and not amenable to criticism from an empiricist perspective, even if only slight. Further, it is a GLOBAL argument, and nothing escapes it.
Best wishes
Stephen Anastasi.