Here are some costs and risks of regulation. Regulation usually imposes costs of monitoring, enforcement, and administration. These costs tend to be larger for activities that are harder to observe, and when there are not clear bright lines separating desired from undesirable behavior. When regulation intends to discourage or encourage some activities, it usually accidentally discourages and encourages other nearby activities. Regulation is usually slow in adapting to changing conditions, and thus tends to discourage unforeseen innovation in activities. Most of these costs rise as variance in the activity context rises, and as regulators know less about typical details; these costs are usually less for more local regulation.
Regulator agencies are often captured by the industries that they regulate, and use regulations to prevent entry and competition. Regulation are also often captured to benefit some groups at the expense of others in society. Stronger regulation creates stronger desires to "rent-seek" by controlling the political process that determines regulation. With an open political system, regulation that tries to discourage competition in activities ends up creating stronger competition to control the political process. These problems tend to be less the more citizens know about activities and regulations, and the more easily they can influence the political process. So such problems tend to be less at the more local level.
There are many different scales of governments that could run regulation, from community to city to region to nation to world. There are many kinds of regulation of behavior. Some behaviors are regulated by custom and reputation. Some are regulated by liability law. Some are regulated by creating and enforcing property rights, such as to support emissions trading. Some are regulated by explicit rules constraining acceptable behavior. Sometimes governments endorse private regulatory bodies, such as medical licensing boards or bond rating organizations. Some industries self-regulate under the threat of possible government intervention. Sometimes local governments regulate and then try to coordinate regulations on larger scales.
I hope this makes it clearer why strong regulation directly by global governments is an extreme solution, and thus why it seems surprising that you always endorse this solution for all of the long list of problems you consider, These include using up finite resources, competition provoking conflict, wasteful competition, splintering of our descendants into competing factions, unequal price-based availability of innovations, and the formation of elites. Given the high costs of the regulation you favor, and the vagueness of these problems, it seems far from obvious that weaker, more local, less formal, and less governmental regulation would not be better. It isn't even obvious to me that all of these are really problems at all; we might do better to just live with them.