Dear Mr. Schneider
Being myself involved in model theory, I read your article with great interest. And I fully agree with you that the understanding of physics is not exclusively a question of math. On the contrary, here in France and in Europe, many of us are grateful especially to Richard Feynman for his way to revolutionize the pedagogy of physics.
However, if the understanding of physics is not exclusively question of math, the latter plays an essential role in the elucidation of physical reality, and at this level, there is a great mystery remaining until further notice.
You say in your essay that math is a language like English. It is true that math, like English, can describe things that do not match reality, and that only experience determines if mathematical or English proposals correspond to the part of reality we try to describe. But I think that math has "something" than English or Spanish or Nipponese etc. do not have, and that this "something" plays an essential role in the relationship between math and physics.
Let us consider cartography, a domain on the periphery of physics. Of course, we can try to replace a map by a description of the area in question in English, Spanish, Nipponese. But the semi-offshore amateur sailor I am - I do not like the term "yachtsman" - prefers a map. On a map, rather basic mathematical tools allow me to establish and correct my course, to determine my position etc. This would not be the case with an even meticulous English description of the waters where I am sailing. Being a projection of a spherical surface on a plane, a map always involves deformations. But mathematical tools depending from the adopted type of projection - in non-polar navigation it is usually the Mercator projection - allow to effectuate the necessary corrections. Here again, English or Spanish alone would not be of much help.
On the other hand, in order to establish not a simple picture but a real map, the cartographer in turn needs mathematical tools, including differential geometry beginning with the famous ds, even if this ds does not exist in the physical reality.Let us now a bit of science fiction and imagine space-time relativistic cards destined for future and hypothetical space vessel diameter pilots traveling at a speed close to c. The establishment of these maps, necessarily computerized to be quickly accessible, requires the use of the imaginary number i, i2 = - 1, although the latter, by definition, in turn has no real existence.
For all these reasons I think that math have "something" that other languages do not have. Regarding the nature of this "something", there is a great mystery, and this mystery is in my opinion the main motivation for the present contest.
In my own paper "A Defense of Scientific Platonism without Metaphysical Presuppositions" (posted Feb. 25), I try - among others - to show that modeling of mathematics and modeling of physics by mathematics meet in both cases objectively given constraints and that this issue differs math from any other language and any other modeling procedure. In this connection my own paper defends a Platonic perspectiveand therefore a metaphysical position. But I try to show that any form of anti-Platonism is neither less nor more metaphysical than Platonism and that the latter is finally simpler and needs less (metaphysical and other) assumptions than its challenging theories, especially regarding the difference between existence within material reality and mathematical existence.
Your paper and mine diametrically opposed positions express. But boths papers have a common denominator: they refer to the concept of modeling. Since the purpose of this contest is a constructive confrontation of ideas about a mystery where, in absolute terms, no one may be right, I would greatly appreciate to know your comments about my own essay.
I would also like that this discussion could be continued for further, even after the closing of this contest.
With best regards
Peter Punin