Seeking truth using different methods by Roger Schlafly

Your quest to circumvent mathematics and physics goes cycling on a very long road!

Great luck!

Kind regards,

Miss. Sujatha Jagannathan

Roger,

I like the stance your essay attempts to consider in the opposed view that Mathematics and Physics are separate entities. Logically we may assume the correlation of Mathematics and Physics aren't unified concepts because we have not understood fully certain aspects, but then again, we must also consider at our "current state", regarding the appropriate interpretations and understandings of Physics, we simply did not discover the "proper model" of describing nature and perhaps this is fundamentally the reason why we have not found unison within these separate disciplines.

It is my strong conviction and belief, once we find the appropriate laws describing nature we will also find these separate disciplines describe the same reality- the concepts and beautiful truths regarding the observable and detectable existence of nature itself.

Best Regards,

D.C. Adams

Dear Roger Schlafly,

While you wrote "How Einstein Ruined Physics", Thomas Phipps ruined Einstein's mystic theory. I acknowledge your effort to at least put together different opinions of philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians.

For my taste, you are a bit too much reflecting the mainstream of the latter.

You wrote: "The mathematics is air-tight [within Cantor's paradise of course], and not subject to debate" and "The Newton-Leibniz discovery [from the word discovery I infer you are a Platonist] of differential and integral calculus was simultaneously [sounds like just by chance] a huge advance for both fields." If things are so simple then you might judge my essay fundamentally wrong.

I don't understand the word BUT in "Most philosophers ... agree that causality is crucial to all sciences except physics, BUT the big majority [of them?] say that causality has no role in fundamental physics.

Perhaps, a reference could clarify.

If I understood you correctly, you consider yourself a positivist while not an anti-realist.

Maybe, I am not someone serious if I too don't exclude that fundamental physics may evade perfect mathematical solution to all imaginable questions.

In so far, I support your main idea.

Kind regards,

Eckard

I have thought about things in your essay beyond the disconnect between math and physics. I find your explanations of infinity and randomness very valuable. I do not consider them your opinion but statements of fact. I am lost in the philosophy discussions. I offer some points because the above has become part of my knowledge base from which I view the universe.

Thank You

Very interesting. But, so what? How is the dilemma of any thing in the world to exist when it does or does not. I believe in Chaos where chance is supreme. In the 2012 contest, "To Seek Unknown Shores" I was criticized because there was no focus. In my thinking since, I realized a model would be helpful to resolve all the pluralities that exist. "Duality, The War for Existence", should be ready to submit by March 1 or 2. I am making it merge my expertise's, which includes swimming, geometry, and thermodynamics. ....and a big of Yoga from my roomie. It applies to the action of all things from photons to electrons, electrons to protons, ...molecules to animals, etc.So far so good. It is an attempt to define "panpsychism" as action(s) of all.

Thanks for your essay. I follow these contests because there usually are 3-4 papers with something interesting to me. Yours is one such paper. I'm finishing a study about the double--slit experiment and am beginning to search for the next project.

What do you think about the following for discussion?

(1) Would you classify the group models of particle classification the same as you classify statistical analysis. The periodic table was developed first by noting common characteristics of elements. A few holes were filled (predicted) by where the hole was in the classification scheme. Later, the causal underlying structure of atoms explained the periodic table. Indeed, the position of an element indicated something about the atomic structure. The same type of classification is true for the group models. Can this be used to imply an underlying structure of particles? How would such a study proceed? Is anyone working on the structure of particles (papers I see seem to stop with the group description with no indication of an underlying structure)?

(2) You stated the statistical approach like in thermodynamics could be used to measure and predict when an underlying causal model is lacking. But could the parameters in the statistics be used as causal physics? For example, the Schrodinger equation is viewed as a probabilistic (`shut up and calculate') version of quantum mechanics. My view of the double slit experiment started with the postulate that the wave function was a real wave in a `plenum'. It worked. The sticking point was what creates the wave in the postulated plenum. The answer is the same thing that causes waves in General Relativity - matter. This view has the advantage of providing correspondence to the Big Bang model and to Quantum Mechanics. The advantage of this causal model is that more is explained and predicted with less. Here, the big is linked with the same causes as the small.

(3) We may not be able to define truth much less know when we have found it. But we can determine if a model predicts observations or not. Or better, we can determine if a model predicts an observation within some zone of applicability. I think physics and philosophy can unite with this view. They each are looking for some model to predict outcomes of decisions. A philosophy that is inconsistent with future events is soon discarded. The same is true for religions.

I know that. It what I had in mind. What about the questions? What about any implications of structure?

Dear Roger Schlafly,

I agree with your view that physics and mathematics are two separate branches of knowledge - physics is physics and mathematics is mathematics. However you have not mentioned whether mathematics has any role in physics. Do you think mathematics has any special role in the domain of physics (other than for measurements)?

Dear Roger,

You have brewed a sweet mix of philosophy, mathematics and physics.

In your conclusion, you said, "While they both (i.e. physics and mathematics) agree that 2+1=3,..."

I argue that this statement while true most of the time is not always so. There is an underlying, unstated assumption present in the statement, that whatever exists cannot perish. This is what I called the Parmenidean curse afflicting our physics and mathematics. Let me illustrate this curse...

If you want to demonstrate the truism of the statement 2+1 = ?, you put two apples in a bucket, then you add one more and finally count how many apples in the bucket. If you count three, then you write 2+1=3. If you count 4, then you write 2+1=4. If you count 2, then you write 2+1=2.

Now if existing things can perish contrary to the Parmenidean theory, and after all as I argue in my essay, cosmology says our universe can perish, then 2+1 may not always equal 3, especially at the quantum scale. If an atom perishes from the apples we are putting in the bucket, 2+1 will still equal 3. One atom perishing out of the billions in an apple does not affect the existence and identity of the apple. However, if what we are putting in the bucket are atoms, i.e. 2 atoms plus 1 atom = 3 atoms, noting that you mentioned radioactive decay in your essay as well, we cannot be sure any longer that when we count 1+2 will equal 3. It could be less, or if there is quantum fluctuation it could be more.

I don't know how to make myself clearer. But you are welcome to seek clarification, if necessary.

All the best in the competition.

Akinbo

Dear Dr. Schlafly

First I have to present my apologies for my English. Being (i) French and (ii) under the pressure of time, my expression may be catastrophic.

I read with great interest your article, and I totally agree when you say that logical positivism is today seriously challenged. That being said, the virtual disappearance of this philosophical approach, not necessarily regrettable as such, leaves, in my opinion, a great void. It seems to me that great efforts should be made to fill it.

You rightly say that math and physics are essentially different things, working with different methods, based on different assumptions and pursuing different goals. This is incontestable. But the problem is precisely there, and the contest is about THIS PROBLEM. Despite these differences seeming insurmountable, there IS a kind collusion between math and the research field of physics.

You mention Kolmogorov and his axiomatization of probability. Such an axiomatization, by definition, does not found anything regarding physical reality. You are absolutely right to insist on it. HOWEVER, in physical world, there ARE events that comply with laws of probability.

In my own essay "A Defense of Scientific Platonism without Metaphysical Presuppositions" (Feb. 25, 2015, technical end note 2.) I try to show myself - by relying on Kolmogorov - that the law of large numbers has a significance in physical reality if and only if there are factual probability laws, knowing that, by definition, FACTUAL probability laws cannot be founded by the law of large numbers, nor by anything. (It would be my pleasure to know your opinion on this end technical note). HOWEVER, in the physical world, there ARE factual probability laws. "Something" - but what ?? - implies that certain sets of events are provided with specific factual probability laws. This point is mysterious until further notice, but belongs to the foundations of physics. Without this strange "something" physical science would not be possible, whether it may be statistical mechanics, control of experimental error or what you call "quantum mysteries." Or, taking the notion of physical reality in the broadest sense, without this mysterious "something" all insurance companies would go bankrupt.

Regarding the notion of infinity, I also agree with you agree that in the light of the current state of knowledge, the physical reality does not comprise anything that could match this infinite. HOWEVER, without the notion of infinity as MATHEMATICAL TOOL, physical knowledge would not be what it is. Relating to experimental error, for example, the notion of infinite values allows to write ideal laws, i.e. limits to what tend "sufficiently often repeated" empirical measures. Certainly, since the number of measurements effectively taken is always finite, we generally note a gap between ideal laws and empirical data. But the effective observation and appreciation of this gap presupposes the presence of an ideal law, i.e. a limit that could not be written without the notion of infinity as mathematical tool. And finally we would not have any knowledge very close to ideal laws if these latter were not there. Here, the example of insurance companies escaping from bankruptcy can still serve.

Unfortunately, I can not respond to all of your article, and a too long post on my part would take too much of your time. Permit me just yet to return to logical positivism.

This doctrine advocates the "elimination of metaphysics". That is its right. But personally, I reproach to logical positivism not having seen that its own doctrine is in turn undermined by metaphysics. The latter is everywhere. When we open a door, when we put a pan on the stove, etc. we are already doing metaphysics by adopting ontological realism which Carnap, the main reference of positivism, range himself within the same metaphysics than competing theories of realism, such as idealism. HERE, I agree with Carnap. But how, in these circumstances, can we be interested in foundations of physics - including the links between physics and mathematics - while denying dogmatically any consideration of metaphysics?

My position - I defend my article posted feb. 25 - is this. Since all knowledge regarding foundations, whether we like it or not, is metaphysically undermined, we must take note of it, rather than perpetuate the positivist legacy considering all metaphysics as a kind of mental illness. On the other hand, a metaphysical proposition, by definition, is neither provable nor refutable. All we can do is (i) determine the body of the various metaphysical conceptions behind EACH theory dedicated to the foundations of physics and (ii) compare these metaphysical conceptions under epistemological criteria such as simplicity, economy of assumptions, consistency and so on. Since, in most cases, we put our pans on the stove without asking ourselves why our physical reality - including pans and stoves - exists finally, knowing that it could also not exist, I wonder why it would be forbidden to note that some aspects of this physical reality are in turn provided with ideal laws interpreting at least a part of mathematical structures we are knowing. I believe that this position - a kind of Platonism - can be defended, unless the dogmas of logical positivism are regarded as absolute truths.

The article I posted on Feb. 25 is diametrically opposed to yours. But for my part, I participate in this contest with the sole order to seek discussion confronting opposites. Within a philosophy of science which is - according to my personal and obviously debatable vision - undermined by metaphysics, only such an approach may be legitimate.

If you have the time, and provided that this discussion interests you, I would be obliged if you would take notice of my paper and let me know your comments and objections.

With best regards

Peter Punin

Russell has discredited himself by declaring causality a relic of bygone time as is monarchy too and by suggesting a preventive war which could have killed me.

If philosophers like Russell are denying causality then I blame them for taking idolized do called basic theories for granted. Of course, the block universe implies denial of causality.

You might wonder why my favorite essay has been written by Phipps. I need no modern philosopher as to conclude that the conjecture of causality is indispensable and spacetime therefore wrong. While I often used non-causal tools as lazy approximations myself, I maintain that the conjecture of causality is the only alternative to futile mysticism.

Kind regards,

Eckard

Dear Roger,

I found your essay to be one of the rare ones having significant quality (among those I reviewed for now).

I agree about the difference of view of randomness between maths and physics, as I also expressed in my essay (that is, coexistence of possibilities with weights in maths, vs. realization of only one possibility in physics). I agree that randomness in physics does not make absolute sense as opposed to unpredictability, which may depend on the range of considerations to which the considered event may be related. However we do have a law of quantum physics that gives some probabilities quite successfully.

You wrote: "There are deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, so not everyone agrees with quantum randomness."

Indeed it is interesting to wonder what is behind quantum randomness, since randomness does not make absolute sense. The main interpretation of quantum physics that actually tries to be deterministic is Bohmian mechanics and other hidden variable theories, which I criticize (one of the reasons being that I see their claim of determinism as meaningless). As I explained in my essay, I see the source of quantum randomness as metaphysical, which, depending on circumstances, may either be the expression of free will by individual minds (diverging from the quantum probability law), or of a hidden, impersonal aspect of universal consciousness (usually obeying the quantum probability law, as far as "obeying a probability law" is relatively meaningful). So I disagree with the argument that "quantum mechanics adds only randomness to decision making processes, not freedom".

"Statisticians have taken the task of interpreting probability theory so it can be applied to the real world. Interpretations range from probability being a physical entity like temperature and called propensity, to being just a subjective measure of how persuaded you are of something. The major interpretations are the frequentist and Bayesian."

I see no sense of "interpreting probability theory" in the absolute. I can agree that it is an intrinsically unclear concept (a defect which can be seen as a quality, that is how I see mathematical probability laws as the perfect formalism by which mathematical laws of physics can leave a door open to the non-mathematical laws of free will), but I still consider it as a primitive concept in physics, i.e. I do not see a sense in trying to reduce it to something else. For example, frequentism suggests to set a limit to how far may frequency depart from average expectations. The fact is that probability laws induce values of the probabilities for different frequencies to occur in any given sample, so that frequencies away from the probable average just have a very low probability to occur, but a very low probability is not an impossibility, so that we still need an a priori concept of probability to interpret the frequentist interpretation of probability.

Instead, I see more sense to discuss more specifically about interpreting quantum theory: you wrote "A physicist might say that [some things] are random if current theory cannot predict them."

Sorry, I do not see things so vague as this. Lack of prediction does not mean randomness because randomness is a precise concept that refers to a specific probability law, which needs a theory to be specifically formulated. We are not in generic unknown universes with long series of successive speculative theories that might more or less be tried to fit, but in a specific universe where the specific probability law of quantum theory was found extremely successful. This law is the reference by which physicists can meaningfully speak about randomness, instead of simple ignorance. So, I consider the need to distinguish whether a considered probability law comes from quantum theory or not. And I actually do not see well where can serious probability laws come from, if not as particular cases of quantum probabilities. I mean, I see most probability laws that emerge in practice in this world, as actually particular cases of quantum probabilities, even if they do not directly look like such. I commented this further in my page on the problems with Bohmian mechanics.

"To the patient, a cancer seems like bad luck whether it came from genes, smoking, or mutation. All three factors presumably have completely causal explanations, if cancer were better understood. The reason they call the mutation bad luck is just that they have no good way of modeling it as a causal factor."

For most phenomena where microscopic physics or the butterfly effect is involved, deterministic explanations cannot exist in a non-deterministic world (do you mean anything else by "causal" ?), but in guise of causality, only probabilistic laws ultimately apply. In particular, I see mutations as directly coming from quantum randomness. Smoking is a conscious choice, which comes from free will, which uses quantum "randomness" as a medium of expression but departs from quantum probability laws. But I guess that genetic mutations are not subject to psychological bias away from quantum probabilities, since otherwise I would not understand why it is not also manifested in the form of intelligent design.

"A common view is that quantum mechanics describes true randomness, while all the other sciences have a pseudo randomness that results from complexity or uncertainty. Physics also has pseudo randomness, such as in the study of statistical mechanics."

There are good reasons to consider quantum randomness as fundamental in physics, since alternatives (hidden variable theories) have lots of troubles as I said. Statistical mechanics and other sciences express a practical randomness, and can happily remain agnostic about the nature of their randomness. This practical randomness can be logically compatible with explanations by pseudo randomness from complexity or uncertainty, but there is no point for positively claiming it to be pseudo randomness, so this is usually not claimed either ; and most cases, especially statistical mechanics, actually have their source or randomness in quantum randomness, so that this conceivable difference between the nature of randomness of diverse sciences is usually not real.

"Regardless of the branch of science, attributing causality to randomness does not explain it at all. Randomness is just a buzz word to replace an admission that the some causal factors are unidentified."

Hilbert spaces, at the basis of the formulation of quantum physics, are not a buzz word, but a very high, rigorous and elegant mathematical concept that is amazingly effective in explaining physical observations with a high degree of accuracy. Quantum probabilities are their direct logical consequences. Quantum theory is a well identified theory, leading to well identified mathematical evidences that any try to "explain" its randomness by hidden variables would lead to a lot of troubles. And, as I showed in my essay, we can find a well-identified logical connection between the paradoxes of quantum theory and what, in my view, can be naturally expected for the universe to allow the presence of consciousness, which I see as strongly suggesting a well-identified source for quantum randomness which is a metaphysical one (consciousness, which is non-physical and non-mathematical).

"When a uranium atom decays, it is often assumed that it is a spontaneous event that is independent of the history of the atom. But we have no proof of that. We can collect a large number of apparently similar atoms, and notice that they decay at much different times, but we do not truly know that the atoms are all in the same quantum state."

We do know it, not just assume, as the proof is found from the mathematical formalism of quantum physics: a system of rigorously identical particles behaves very differently in how they mix together (by the interferences between them), than would behave a system of different particles with only superficially similar properties that we would fail to distinguish by measurement.

I did not notice that "Physicists believe that causality is fundamental to physics, and philosophers reject that idea." On the contrary, I once saw a philosophical work followed in academic philosophy, which insists that causality is fundamental in physics, while I notice that the notion of causality is only an indirect one in the fundamental equations of physics which are time-symmetric (and, in many cases do not even fundamentally distinguish time from space), while causality is a philosophical concept which is fundamentally bound to the time dimension and is time-asymmetric; still I see a sort of concept of causality as important to describe the quality of quantum physics as "causal" in the sense of letting the probabilities of measurement results only depend on a "finite number of causes" from the state of what is there at a previous time. Otherwise, as people, physicists may talk about "causality" but I would say this is only a philosophical interpretation from outside the equations of physics in a strict sense.

It seems to me that the Bayesian/psi-epistemic view is actually a position of agnosticism with respect to the idea of hidden causes, and thus a non-interpretation, so I would not really classify this in the list of views, except if taken as a case of logical positivism.

You point out the diversity of views on quantum physics, but these divergences are internal to the small part of the community of physicists who care, and thus does not point to any idea of opposition between maths and physics which you took as the main topic of your essay, or does it ? (We might also find "controversies" in the foundations of maths if we search well)

I agree about the difference between math and physics on the role of infinity. I also commented this in my essay : how quantum physics, despite being a mathematical theory formally involving infinite sets, avoids any effective dependence with respect to actual infinity and its undecidabilities that can be found in other branches of mathematics.

We have the same interests in the foundations of mathematics and its paradoxes :)

Since the fine structure constant is only the macroscopic limit of the effective value of the charge, while some possible determination, if it exists, would rather come from the Planck scale, there is no surprise that it is not algebraic ; its deduction from the renormalization process would make it algorithmic but not algebraic (even though it would be very hard to write down the relevant algorithm). But I'm not even convinced that mathematicians would be troubled at the idea that physical constants are just arbitrary real numbers without any specific definitions (and thus possibly escaping countable models of set theory). After all, that would leave the axiomatic system of physical laws incomplete, just in a similar way as axiomatic systems of arithmetic or set theory are. Do you know, the most naturally "constructed" countable models of ZF also have wrong arithmetical properties (with a nonstandard model of arithmetic). The failure of countable models of ZF to contain the correct values of physical constants would be quite a similar phenomenon.

I also (moderately but for many practical purposes of truth research) agree with logical positivism. Your position seems unclear as you seem to promote logical positivism at the end, yet you argued about the impurity of the concept of randomness (the difference between pure randomness and pseudo-randomness) at the beginning, a difference which logical positivism would dismiss as senseless metaphysics. Some physicists do argue about it, as they look for interpretations (other than the logical positivist non-interpretation of Copenhagen and Bayesianism), but they are a minority. Having pointed them out, suggests that you give it importance yourself, in seeming contradiction with your final expression of support for logical positivism.

I guess your 2012 essay should be interesting as well, but for now I wish to focus on reviewing other essays of this year :-/

Fear Dr. Schlafly,

You began the abstract of your essay with a wrong assumption when you wrote: "Mathematics and physics are entirely different subjects, both in their methodology and results. The differences are illustrated with how they view randomness, enumeration, and truth."

Accurate writing enabled me to write sensibly about unified reality: Proof exists that every real astronomer looking through a real telescope has failed to notice that each of the real galaxies he has observed is unique as to its structure and its perceived distance from all other real galaxies. Each real star is unique as to its structure and its perceived distance apart from all other real stars. Every real scientist who has peered at real snowflakes through a real microscope has concluded that each real snowflake is unique as to its structure. Real structure is unique, once. Unique, once does not consist of abstract amounts of abstract quanta. Based on one's normal observation, one must conclude that all of the stars, all of the planets, all of the asteroids, all of the comets, all of the meteors, all of the specks of astral dust and all real objects have only one real thing in common. Each real object has a real material surface that seems to be attached to a material sub-surface. All surfaces, no matter the apparent degree of separation, must travel at the same constant speed. No matter in which direction one looks, one will only ever see a plethora of real surfaces and those surfaces must all be traveling at the same constant speed or else it would be physically impossible for one to observe them instantly and simultaneously. Real surfaces are easy to spot because they are well lighted. Real light does not travel far from its source as can be confirmed by looking at the real stars, or a real lightning bolt. Reflected light needs to adhere to a surface in order for it to be observed, which means that real light cannot have a surface of its own. Real light must be the only stationary substance in the real Universe. The stars remain in place due to astral radiation. The planets orbit because of atmospheric accumulation. There is no space.

Warm regards,

Joe Fisher