Hi Jochen,
You began by observing that "a stone rolls downhill because of the force of gravity, not because it wants to reach the bottom." In fact, life is almost defined by its ability to work its will against gravity. One might ask how this happens.
But your paper, on the homunculus fallacy is excellent. The main problem of representations 'using' themselves [thus somehow invoking 'intentionality'] is two-fold. First, there is usually an infinite regress hiding somewhere, and second, as you note in your essay, in the absence of one replicator, "it is not clear how the dominant replicator is selected in order to guide behavior." This is clearly a major problem.
Along the way quite strong assumptions are introduced:
"Suppose the system is simply capable of scanning itself, producing a description that then enables it to construct an exact copy." [Maybe, for strings of bits, but how scan ones 3D self?] Svozil addresses this. Even so, past the DNA level, it's difficult to envision "mapping all possible responses of an automaton to binary strings...".
Then one assumes producing "images of the world that are capable of looking at themselves - representations that are their own users." You "create mental representations (CA patterns) that are their own homunculi, using themselves as symbols." This strikes me as easier said than done!
I love automata. My PhD dissertation, The Automatic Theory of Physics dealt with how a robot could derive a theory of physics, [see my Endnotes] but, significantly, the goal was supplied from outside, leaving only the problem of recognizing patterns and organizing Hilbert-like feature-vectors. I made no attempt to have the robot formulate the dominant goal on its own.
You then ask that we "imagine the symbol to be grabbing for the apple." Despite that you presume "employing a replicating structure that interprets itself as something different from itself" [??] I have trouble imagining the symbol doing so. You've lost me. This is how you achieve "the symbol becomes itself a kind of homunculus."
The core of the problem, as I see it, is the concept of "the internal observer, the homunculus." In other words, an internal system must both model itself and understand itself. Your treatment of this problem is masterful.
May I suggest a different approach. In my essay I note that there experiential grounds for speculating that there is a universal consciousness field, a physically real field, that interacts with matter. This can be developed in detail [I have done so] but for purposes of discussion, why don't you willingly suspend your disbelief and ask how this solves your problem.
It allows a homunculus to model or "represent" itself (as pattern recognizer and neural nets can do] while not demanding that the device understand itself, or even be aware of itself. All infinite regress problems disappear, as does the need to explain how consciousness 'emerges' from the thing itself.
I hope you will read my essay and comment in this light.
Thanks for an enjoyable, creative, well thought out essay.
Best regards,
Edwin Eugene Klingman
