Jochen -
Thank you for working through an interesting problem in a very clear and thoughtful way. The argument is coherent and well-structured from beginning to end, despite its complexities.
Since I take quite a different approach in my essay on the emergence of meaning, I'm afraid my comments here may not be very helpful in clarifying your theme - I've tried to make up for that by giving your essay the high rating it deserves.
You understand meaning in terms of reference or representation, which is well-accepted -mainly because it has a kind of clarity that's otherwise hard to achieve. But of course there are many other ways for things to be meaningful - to "make a difference that makes a difference," in Bateson's phrase - without representing other things. You're right that to understand reference we need to include an "agent" as well as a sign and its interpretation... and the rest of your argument follows convincingly, on this basis. More generally, though, what makes things meaningful is the context of possibilities in which they may have some effect, that changes what can happen in other contexts. Such contexts are always complex, hard to represent symbolically. But I've tried to show they can be understood in terms of the functionality of three distinct kinds of recursive systems.
Your argument about replicators makes a great deal of sense in a computational context. But the original replicators on Earth apparently faced a very different kind of challenge - they could by no means take for granted the existence of well-defined structures more complex than small organic molecules, and there were no blueprints or constructors available. So I suspect there may be basic limitations to computational models of biological systems, including the brain, where information-processing has to operate through interactions that are largely random, at the molecular level. Even in physics, I argue that the mathematical patterning serves a more basic function - that of selecting meaningful, i.e. measurable information out of a background of random events.
Nonetheless, I find your point very interesting that computational self-replication is only possible through a two-stage process. As you know, von Neumann was also instrumental in developing the two-stage representation of quantum dynamics, which plays a role in my essay. I wonder if there's any connection between these aspects of his work?
Thanks again for your excellent contribution.
Conrad