Dear Lawrence Crowell,
i just read your essay and must say, it is power-packed with several concepts which are hard to grasp at first glance. You seem to follow the maxime that to know what constitutes consciousness, aims and intentions it is necessary to first figure out how the inanimate nature works in detail.
You state that "This means that a proposition that is a fixed point of some predicate built from provable and true functions is equivalent to a functional combination of false statements."
Isn't this a huge drawback to your approach to figure out how the inanimate nature works in detail - to then conclude what within this nature could lead to the phenomenon of consciousness? Your statement reads to me that there could be a whole landscape of inconsistencies, means, false statements which nontheless built - 'at the macrostate' a consistent system! How can one, under these circumstances, develop a realistic theory of consciousness? Does this not need what you - rightfully - wrote, namely that the world is open? I interpret the word open as a dimensional realm that resolves the deterministic character as well as the character of freedom in mathematics by transcending it. Don't you need such a transcendent realm to come from a network of possible false statements to some kind of reliable truth about the world? And if this cannot be done by mathematics alone - because therefore all assumptions which are imposed on a certain mathematical system would have to be necessarily true and not only possibly true - what is left over from the computational picture you describe in your essay?
Best wishes,
Stefan Weckbach