Dear James Arnold,
A fascinating paper. Thanks for your review of Chalmers, Dennett, Nagel, Penrose, Pinker, Searle, Sperry and others. I haven't looked at them for years, but agree with all your analysis. Funny how one can achieve a name in this field when it's obvious one doesn't know whereof one speaks. Anyway, your summary is valuable, particularly for those who may not know recent history. Today it is apparently "integrated information" and "microtubules" approaches that are setting us up for new batches of spectacular papers rich in detail...
"There is no emergent transition from a network of firing neurons to conscious experience of pleasure or pain."
Elsewhere I quote Santayana:
"All of our sorrow is real, but the atoms of which we are made are indifferent."
I fully agree with you that "consciousness is not a system of extrinsic objective relationships; it is intrinsic." Then it falls upon us to identify the source or location or nature of this 'intrinsicity'.
You say Penrose is a quantum physicist, but he's really more of a general relativist I believe. Nevertheless, as you note, by locking himself into 'microtubules', he is a reductionist. I have not yet understood what, beyond pretty and intricate pictures, people see in a specific large molecule. Yes, microtubules dynamically construct themselves and deconstruct themselves at their ends, but what element in the cell does not in one way or another do the same?
Although it's only a change of terminology, I very much like your change of focus from 'random' and 'indeterminate' to 'spontaneity'. Despite that Searle says "quantum indeterminism is the only form of indeterminism that is indisputably established as a fact of nature", this is interpretation-dependent, leaning heavily on Copenhagen and 'collapse'. Wave functions evolve deterministically through Schrodinger, and there is conceptual conflict between the physical wave property and the 'wave probability' function that is beyond the scope of a comment to resolve.
'Spontaneity' brings something to the local event that seems missing in 'random' and 'indeterminism'. I encourage you to develop this idea further. You have perhaps captured it when you trace it to an inner dynamic. In fact, spontaneity in consciousness carries with it a sense of "appropriateness".
I also like your 'no-cause' analysis of indeterminacy. You ask 'what can spontaneity offer?'. I think it offers a sense of appropriateness.
I do not identify this feature as rooted in quantum mechanics. For an indication of why, I refer you to my recent paper:
Spontaneity may be the 'least biased interpretation of quantum phenomena', but, more so, it is probably the most appropriate characterization of consciousness, and fits my field theory fairly well. Unless one is a believer in 'entanglement' [which is in almost every case 'monogamous'-linking two and only two particles], quantum events are local, even if the locale is as large as a microtubule. No one believes (I hope) that a quantum relation spans the entire brain, whereas the field that I propose does exactly this. So mind and intelligence are locally global versus locally local.
You hint at this when you say "we need to discover a connectedness between levels of individuality in order to establish a continuity from quantum to human."
It is not as clear to me that "this is the comprehensive continuity that the concept of spontaneity can provide..."
For "comprehensive continuity" I believe one needs a field, operating at all scales from electron to brain. Rather than argue technical points about space "roiling with virtual particles" [leading to predictions that differ from reality by 120 orders of magnitude!] I would hope that you might keep the baby of 'spontaneity" and throw out the confused quantum basis, in favor of attempting to apply 'spontaneity to the field' that envelops all the many pieces of the puzzle.
I would change your final statement [before the conclusion] to:
"...brain function doesn't cause consciousness, it in-forms it."
Thank you for a most rewarding read.
Edwin Eugene Klingman