Essay Abstract

I argue that a recently developed framework for emergence in the physical sciences prompts a conception of fundamentality that is relative: namely, fundamentality as limited to a given level, domain or subject matter. The conception is also ontological: for it concerns relations between the distinct ontological levels associated with theories. I argue that, although the kind of fundamentality that appears in ontological emergence can, in some cases, be understood as grounding, this understanding is limited to very special interpretations of physical theories: namely, to those for which supervenience obtains. Thus the resulting picture of the world, suggested by emergence in theories of physics, is one of ontological levels or domains, which are relatively fundamental and are partially, though not totally, ordered.

Author Bio

Philosopher of physics at the University of Amsterdam. PhD in theoretical physics (2001) under Gerard 't Hooft, seminal contributions to holographic renormalization and gauge-gravity duality. Currently Tarner scholar in Philosophy of Science and History of Ideas at Trinity College, Cambridge.

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Sebastian,

I usually check works of (or about) metaphysics for two words; substance and cause.

If these two words are not present, the work has not even touch the subject matter of metaphysics...

Marcel,

Dear Sebastian,

I'm very enthusiastic about this essay and the ideas it contains. Right of the bat, I'm wondering about the relation between your notion of fundamentality as it is conceived of in the sciences traditionally (via, as you say, deduction and linkage) and mathematical deformation: traditionally more fundamental theories can often be thought of as deformations of the classical theories they replace---quantum mechanics, most obviously in its phase-space formulation, is a deformation of classical statistical mechanics for nonvanishing hbar. Taking the deformation parameter (i.e. hbar) to zero recovers the original object, in the same way as taking an ellipse's eccentricity to zero recovers a circle, making an ellipse a deformation of a circle.

And in a sense, ellipses can be thought of as more fundamental than circles---they're the more general objects, with circles simply being a special case. So maybe the notion of deformation could be used to give a more formal sense of fundamentality as it is traditionally treated in physics.

In the framework that you go on to construct, it seems to me that deformation may be the converse of approximation, at least in suitable cases---the top theory approximates the bottom theory by virtue of the latter being a deformation of the former.

It seems to me that the condition you place on the emergence map has the somewhat striking consequence that the world can't be thought of as a single, unified domain, but instead, becomes a collection of (partially overlapping) domains of different theories---do you consider those to be ontologically real, or merely descriptive artifacts? (I think you may get to that later on, but I'm jotting down notes as I read.) My own essay presents a similar conclusion, although I arrive at it via a different route, considering instead limits placed onto our capacity of modeling the world through how (I think) this modeling works (essentially, I worry about how the interpretation map is implemented, without leading to regress)---so I come down on the subjective (perhaps intersubjective) side of this.

You go on to describe the tree-like structure of approximate theories emerging from a more fundamental one. But is there really a good reason to believe in the tree-structure with a single root? Can't the world be like a forest, or like a web? It does not seem implausible to me that two different bottom theories can give rise to the same top theory, via approximation. A circle can be deformed in more than one way, after all.

Is the worry here that this would lead to a more pernicious ontological pluralism, with all the associated troubles, such as questions regarding causal influence (i.e. what the 'nexus of causality' between two different 'roots' might be)?

Also, it seems prima facie plausible that a single theory may have different interpretations---we might take the analogous case from mathematical model theory, where a formal system generally admits many different interpretations beyond the intended one, i.e. there exist many models fulfilling a given set of axioms. So shouldn't we expect that the formal apparatus specifying a given theory likewise possesses many possible domains? You might intend your notion of 'internal interpretation' to address this, but if so, I confess I didn't quite understand how.

All in all, this is an exceptionally well-constructed and thought-provoking essay. I think the apparatus you develop may be tremendously helpful for ordering some of my own thoughts, too. It was a pleasure to read!

It is an interesting essay, and a good read.

I am thinking that there is a third possibility for a final theory in physics: a theory that describe the previous theory like an approximation at low energy, that it is not verifiable experimentally at high energy, and that unifies, or simplifies, the mathematical description of the previous theory; I am thinking, for example, the Hamiltonian description of analytical mechanics, that it is true like the Lagrangian decription but that only have mathematical object.

For example, if there is a string theory that unify electomagnetism and gravity at low energy, and that contain non-observable object, then there is not a problem because of the low energy description contain the verified experiments; if there is a paradigm shift, then the experiments are necessary.

Regards

Domenico

Dear Marcel,

Thank you for your comment. The scope of metaphysics has been significantly broadened in the last hundred years or so, and it is certainly not restricted to substance and causality (which notions were criticised by Hume and others, for several reasons, though they of course remain important and useful, especially in physics). I invite you to have a look at a contemporary book on metaphysics or at the recent literature, and you will see that the issues discussed are very diverse, and include some of the topics of this essay--reduction, supervenience, possible worlds, etc.--together with many others, which I do not discuss. We live in a golden age of metaphysics, in a sense. But thanks again for reading and taking the time to comment! By the way, I found one of your previous essays, and look forward to reading.

Best,

Sebastian

  • a l replied to this.

    Dear Jochen,

    Many thanks for your enthusiastic comments. I am glad that you like the essay. I agree that, on a deformation quantization of statistical mechanics, the relation between the underlying quantum theory (the basic theory) and the top theory can be described as an approximation of the type discussed in the essay. (But I would say that the top theory is the one with hbar going to zero, because the idea is that the top theory is the one where we take a parameter to a special value, while that value is generic in the bottom theory).

    Yes, these domains are thought to be ontologically real and not merely as descriptive artefacts. What the nature of their reality is, though, depends on each case one considers (i.e. each theory), and I have not discussed it in this essay--that is the remark at the end of the essay, about the Quinean vs. Aristotelian projects in metaphysics. I found your essay, and I look forward to reading it, it looks interesting!

    The single root in the tree structure: you are right that there is no need to have just one bottom theory--as I say somewhere in a footnote, there need to be a "lowest rung" theory. There could be several disconnected bottom theories. And yes, very often different bottom theories do give rise to the same top theory. So, the worry you ask about is not there.

    And yes, I also agree about the different interpretations--I am glad you saw this! You are absolutely right that there can be more than one interpretation of a single theory (the internal interpretations are just a very special case, though they are of interest). Thanks again for the comments!

    Best,

    Sebastian

      Hi Sebastian,

      you're right, I got confused with nomenclature there for a bit---the 'bottom' theory should be the deformation, yielding in the limit of vanishing deformation parameter the 'top' theory. Special relativity and Newtonian mechanics are similarly connected, with the deformation parameter here being the speed of light, c, which can be taken to infinity (alternatively, one can thing about v/c being taken to zero).

      However, that case actually brings up another question your framework raises for me---isn't it sometimes possible that the domain of bottom and top theories might coincide? Aren't, for example, the references of Newtonian mechanics and special relativity the same?

      Of course, one can hold that a special relativistic spaceship is simply a different object from a Newtonian spaceship, even though both are the same physical thing, but this seems to necessitate a sort of additional layer above the physical where the theories' references attach, so to speak---since as a physical object, both spaceships are identical.

      I guess maybe I'm asking how one should treat identity across domains---I mean, it's often the case that one can describe the same object under the aegis of different theories. So I can take a Newtonian system, and by a mere coordinate transformation to a moving frame of reference, introduce the need to describe it relativistically. How does your framework treat such cases?

      Anyway, you can see that your essay still occupies my mind, so there'll probably be more questions in the future. I'll also need to dig in to the other works you reference. Hope it's OK if I just pop in here occasionally with more questions!

      It is a really impressive essay and I hope to find the time to read some more of your work. Just now I am tempted to see a vague similarity between ideas exposed here and what I submitted ('A fundamental loop'): both essays consider emergence, metaphysical priority, and argue for relative fundamentality. There are, of course, substantial differences but, first of all, your rigorous approach and polished style cannot fail to grip any interested reader.

      Best.

      a.losev

      Dear Dr Sebastian De Haro,

      You wrote: "The question whether there is a bottom level to the series of scientific theories, with increasing fundamentality, has received two traditional answers: one says that there is a final, bottom-rug fundamental theory, on which all higher-level theories supervene; while the other denies that there is such bottom level, and claims that the chain of theories continues indefinitely ('it is turtles all the way down!')"

      I have concluded from my deep research that Nature must have devised the only permanent real structure of the Universe obtainable for the real Universe existed for millions of years before man and his finite complex informational systems ever appeared on earth. The real physical Universe consists only of one single unified VISIBLE infinite surface occurring eternally in one single infinite dimension that am always illuminated mostly by finite non-surface light.

      Joe Fisher, ORCID ID 0000-0003-3988-8687. Unaffiliated

      Dear Sebastian,

      Well done on your essay! I admit that I am still working through your recent papers - but this usefully, and concisely, introduces your new framework as well as demonstrates its implications for different conceptions of fundamentality.

      I am particularly interested in your idea of ontological emergence, and its relations to reduction and partial grounding, so I just have a couple of clarificatory questions at this stage, please. Does the ontological novelty that characterises emergence obtain because of the reduction being "almost always partial" approximation, rather than pure deduction, or is it the "specificity of behaviour" aspect? And the approximation maps are understood as ontological (rather than being approximate due to limitations on our knowledge or computational power, etc.)?

      I know you have some case-studies elsewhere, but may I ask how prevalent emergence is in physics, on your account? Could it be understood as applying to all (or, at least, most) physical theories?

      Best,

      Karen

      Dear Karen,

      Thank you. I also enjoyed reading your essay, and I may have some comments and questions about it later.

      It is an honour to get questions from you about my framework for emergence of course.

      I would say that there are several sources of (or, I would prefer to say, several conditions for) ontological novelty in this framework. Indeed both the specificity of behaviour (e.g. deduction is present only once additional conditions are specified) and the fact that reduction is usually partial (e.g. one does not get exactly to the top theory, but to something close to it), and the fact that this leads to different interpretations.

      I understand the approximation map primarily as formal, but indeed describing an ontological relation, once the two theories are interpreted.

      Re: how prevalent emergence is. I would say that the account as such applies to most physical theories: since most theories in physics (a) deal with approximations between formal models, (b) admit a notion of interpretation as a map of the kind I describe. But whether ontological emergence is somehow pervasive or not in nature I dare not here say. One would have to look at many more examples, over many fields (and there are many examples in the literature, in other frameworks).

      I hope this helps.

      Best,

      Sebastian

      Dear Jochen,

      Thank you for your questions. Yes, it is of course perfectly possible that the domains coincide. In that case there is no emergence. It is also possible, as far as I know, that the domains are distinct, but partially overlap. This is the case of the example you mention: some elements of the domain, such as the space ship, may agree between the two domains; but many others, such as photons and their geometry, are distinct.

      Interesting case about the moving frame. I also think of Einstein's famous elevator example here, which prompts one to go from special relativity to general relativity (getting Rindler coordinates from Minkowski space). I would say: (i) A coordinate transformation cannot be the approximation map, because it is invertible, and so it is not a case of Approx (not a surjective map): as long as one only makes a change of coordinates, it is not a case of (this kind of) emergence. (ii) As soon as one changes the theory, even if motivated only by a coordinate transformation, there may be emergence (of course, one would have to check the other conditions as well--see below). So, if rather than having the equations of motion of special relativity one now writes down Einstein's equations for gravity, there is novelty of interpretation But again, one would again have to check whether this is a case emergence: I actually don't think it is. For usually, the emergence map goes the other way: the bottom theory is special relativity and the top theory is classical mechanics, or the bottom theory is general relativity and the top theory is special relativity, rather than the other way around, as we discussed in previous correspondence.

      Best,

      Sebastian

      Dear A. Losev,

      Thank you for your comments. I am happy that you liked the ideas and the essay, and I look forward to reading yours!

      Best,

      Sebastian

      5 days later

      Dear Sebastian,

      You wrote a beautiful and insightful essay, and brought serious arguments for fundamentality being relative to its domain, and for ontological levels of domains. I agree that there is some irreducibility of one level to another, and I developed this last year. But last year I also suggested that there is also some co-dependence, which would break the partial ordering relation you mentioned, introducing loops in the tree from your figure 2. As an example, the quantum level seems to predict a much larger Hilbert space, so the macroscopic level should be populated by Schrödinger cats, in other words the supervenience map you mention is a partial map (a distinct possibility from it being merely surjective or not surjective but still a map). Since Schrödinger cats don't happen, it appears that the macroscopic domain constraints the quantum domain. Well, in fact I think that it is actually possible that the quantum domain is constrained from within, by something that looks similar to the superselection rules (there is also the idea that decoherence makes the macro level break into different classical branches).

      This year I went in a more radical direction, that there are multiple isomorphic representations, leading to multiple possibilities to choose what is fundamental, somewhat similar to how you choose a basis in a vector space. This may seem to contradict the "relative fundamentality", but I think it doesn't, since last year I argued that it is possible to have a single mathematical structure underlying everything, but multiply constrained, and that the formal reductionism doesn't work because of

      (1) these constraints (I guess this qualifies as the "novel" element of a theory you mention),

      (2) the limits of provability and computability, which inevitably take place in finite length proofs or computations, but don't exclude that it is a single mathematical structure, only that axiomatization and calculability are limited, and

      (3) the apparent independence of some phenomena at a higher-level from those at a more fundamental level (emergent properties like classicality, thermodynamics, topological properties, which may be the same even if the lower level is implemented differently, and which are subject to metatheorems whose domain of applicability is not restricted to the fundamental level. I guess this is what you call "partial grounding"?).

      I liked your essay very much, it is well explained, you considered various possibilities and gave examples and criteria to distinguish them, and has essential new implications and clarifications over the usual views of reductionism and emergence. I wish you success in the contest!

      Best wishes,

      Cristi

      Dear Dr. De Haro,

      thank you for sharing this nice contribution, its very interesting indeed. I am also close to a position that tries to relativize foundations, as a series of discrete progressive falsifications. And although I see a botto, this is also relative to the scientific method. You might like to have a look at my assay, and we can discuss the

      common ground and the diffrences.

      meanwhile, congratulation for a well-written essay.

      I wish you success,

      Flavio

      Hi Sebastian De Haro

      "Thus the resulting picture of the world, suggested by emergence in theories of physics, is one of ontological levels or domains, which are relatively fundamental and are partially, though not totally, ordered." Wonderful conclusion of Relative Fundamentality dear Sebastian De Haro.............

      For your information....

      Dynamic Universe Model says that the energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation passing grazingly near any gravitating mass changes its in frequency and finally will convert into neutrinos (mass). We all know that there is no experiment or quest in this direction. Energy conversion happens from mass to energy with the famous E=mC2, the other side of this conversion was not thought off. This is a new fundamental prediction by Dynamic Universe Model, a foundational quest in the area of Astrophysics and Cosmology.

      In accordance with Dynamic Universe Model frequency shift happens on both the sides of spectrum when any electromagnetic radiation passes grazingly near gravitating mass. With this new verification, we will open a new frontier that will unlock a way for formation of the basis for continual Nucleosynthesis (continuous formation of elements) in our Universe. Amount of frequency shift will depend on relative velocity difference. All the papers of author can be downloaded from "http://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.in/ "

      By the way..................... Please post reply on my essay also....

      Main foundational points of Dynamic Universe Model :

      -No Isotropy

      -No Homogeneity

      -No Space-time continuum

      -Non-uniform density of matter, universe is lumpy

      -No singularities

      -No collisions between bodies

      -No blackholes

      -No warm holes

      -No Bigbang

      -No repulsion between distant Galaxies

      -Non-empty Universe

      -No imaginary or negative time axis

      -No imaginary X, Y, Z axes

      -No differential and Integral Equations mathematically

      -No General Relativity and Model does not reduce to GR on any condition

      -No Creation of matter like Bigbang or steady-state models

      -No many mini Bigbangs

      -No Missing Mass / Dark matter

      -No Dark energy

      -No Bigbang generated CMB detected

      -No Multi-verses

      Here:

      -Accelerating Expanding universe with 33% Blue shifted Galaxies

      -Newton's Gravitation law works everywhere in the same way

      -All bodies dynamically moving

      -All bodies move in dynamic Equilibrium

      -Closed universe model no light or bodies will go away from universe

      -Single Universe no baby universes

      -Time is linear as observed on earth, moving forward only

      -Independent x,y,z coordinate axes and Time axis no interdependencies between axes..

      -UGF (Universal Gravitational Force) calculated on every point-mass

      -Tensors (Linear) used for giving UNIQUE solutions for each time step

      -Uses everyday physics as achievable by engineering

      -21000 linear equations are used in an Excel sheet

      -Computerized calculations uses 16 decimal digit accuracy

      -Data mining and data warehousing techniques are used for data extraction from large amounts of data.

      Have a look at

      http://vaksdynamicuniversemodel.blogspot.in/p/blog-page_15.h

      tml

      Best Regards

      =snp

      Dear "Sebastian De Haro"

      kindly have a look at essay of BASILEIOS GRISPOS... There is a striking resemblance in thinking with his essay......Best wishes to your essay...

      Best

      =snp

      Dear Fellow Essayists

      This will be my final plea for fair treatment.,

      FQXI is clearly seeking to find out if there is a fundamental REALITY.

      Reliable evidence exists that proves that the surface of the earth was formed millions of years before man and his utterly complex finite informational systems ever appeared on that surface. It logically follows that Nature must have permanently devised the only single physical construct of earth allowable.

      All objects, be they solid, liquid, or vaporous have always had a visible surface. This is because the real Universe must consist only of one single unified VISIBLE infinite surface occurring eternally in one single infinite dimension that am always illuminated mostly by finite non-surface light.

      Only the truth can set you free.

      Joe Fisher, Realist

      • [deleted]

      I just read your essay. I would overall say that what is at the foundation is relative to what we can observe. To the middle 19th century natural philosopher Newtonian mechanics and its variants due to Lagrange and Hamilton were fundamental. An increased domain of observation or experience ultimately lead to relativity and quantum mechanics.

      Cheers LC

      23 days later

      Dear Sebastian

      If you are looking for another essay to read and rate in the final days of the contest, will you consider mine please?

      A couple of days in and semblance of my essay taking form, however the house bound inactivity was wearing me. I had just the remedy, so took off for a solo sail across the bay. In the lea of cove, I had underestimated the open water wind strengths. My sail area overpowered. Ordinarily I would have reduced sail, but this day I felt differently. My contemplations were on the forces of nature, and I was ventured seaward increasingly amongst them. As the wind and the waves rose, my boat came under strain, but I was exhilarated. All the while I considered, how might I communicate the role of natural forces in understanding of the world around us. For they are surely it's central theme.

      Beyond my essay's introduction, I place a microscope on the subjects of universal complexity and natural forces. I do so within context that clock operation is driven by Quantum Mechanical forces (atomic and photonic), while clocks also serve measure of General Relativity's effects (spacetime, time dilation). In this respect clocks can be said to possess a split personality, giving them the distinction that they are simultaneously a study in QM, while GR is a study of clocks. The situation stands whereby we have two fundamental theories of the world, but just one world. And we have a singular device which serves study of both those fundamental theories. Two fundamental theories, but one device? Please join me in questioning this circumstance?

      My essay goes on to identify natural forces in their universal roles, how they motivate the building of and maintaining complex universal structures and processes. When we look at how star fusion processes sit within a "narrow range of sensitivity" that stars are neither led to explode nor collapse under gravity. We think how lucky we are that the universe is just so. We can also count our lucky stars that the fusion process that marks the birth of a star, also leads to an eruption of photons from its surface. for if they didn't then nebula gas accumulation wouldn't be halted and the star would again be led to collapse.

      Could a natural organisation principle have been responsible for fine tuning universal systems? Faced with how lucky we appear to have been, shouldn't we consider this possibility?

      For our luck surely didnt run out there, for these photons stream down on earth, liquifying oceans which drive geochemical processes that we "life" are reliant upon. The Earth is made up of elements that possess the chemical potentials that life is entirely dependent upon. Those chemical potentials are not expressed in the absence of water solvency. So again, how amazingly fortunate we are that these chemical potentials exist in the first instance, and additionally within an environment of abundant water solvency such as Earth, able to express these potentials.

      My essay is an attempt at something audacious. It questions the fundamental nature of the interaction between space and matter Guv = Tuv, and hypothesizes the equality between space curvature and atomic forces is due to common process. Space gives up an energy potential in exchange for atomic forces in a conversion process, which drives atomic activity. And furthermore, that Baryons only exist because this energy potential of space exists, and is available for exploitation. Baryon characteristics and behaviours, complexity of structure and process might then be explained in terms of being evolved and optimised for this purpose and existence. Removing need for so many layers of extraordinary luck to eventuate our own existence. It attempts an interpretation of the above mentioned stellar processes within these terms, but also extends much further. It shines a light on molecular structure that binds matter together, as potentially being an evolved agency that enhances rigidity and therefor persistence of universal system. We then turn a questioning mind towards Earths unlikely geochemical processes, (for which we living things owe so much) and look at its central theme and propensity for molecular rock forming processes. The existence of chemical potentials and their diverse range of molecular bond forming activities? The abundance of water solvent on Earth, for which many geochemical rock forming processes could not be expressed without? The question of a watery Earth? is then implicated as being part of an evolved system that arose for purpose and reason, alongside the same reason and purpose that molecular bonds and chemical process arose.

      By identifying process whereby atomic forces draw a potential from space, we have identified means for their perpetual action, and their ability to deliver perpetual work. Forces drive clocks and clock activity is shown by GR to dilate. My essay details the principle of force dilation and applies it to a universal mystery. My essay raises the possibility, that nature in possession of a natural energy potential, will spontaneously generate a circumstance of Darwinian emergence. It did so on Earth, and perhaps it did so within a wider scope. We learnt how biology generates intricate structure and complexity, and now we learn how it might apply for intricate structure and complexity within universal physical systems.

      To steal a phrase from my essay "A world product of evolved optimization".

      Best of luck for the conclusion of the contest

      Kind regards

      Steven Andresen

      Darwinian Universal Fundamental Origin