Dear Jose, thanks for your more precise description of your lines of reasoning.
I have some more questions and annotations to make for fully understanding whether or not nature exhibits unnatural choices.
I consider a Boing 747. In our world, it is very unlikely that the natural path is such that the probability that nature facilitates this Boing 747 must be considered very low.
According to some quantum mechanical 'fluctuations', it nonetheless isn't forbidden by nature that a Boing 747 is facilitated without the help of any human being. Of course, this 'unnatural' possibility is just of theortical interest, because the assigned probabilities are too low to ever witness such an event.
If I define 'freewill' in the sense that human beings have the limited freedom to choose between two - or more - alternatives by some causa finalis which stands outside any formal system, does your framework then say that nature indeed exhibits 'unnatural' choices? Since human beings can built a Boing 747 by making some choices, I am forced to conclude that the finished Boing 747 is a totally unnatural event.
Surely, due to your lines of reasoning, there is no way to empirically decide whether or not some true freewill was engaged in the building of that Boing 747, since we have not a multitude of identical earths at hand with the same initial conditions that would lead - or not lead - to the same Boing 747 at the exact same time in all histories for all earths.
But now I read in a comment from you to Heinrich Luediger that
"based on it, I will argue that there exists a finite number of finite universes in infinite space."
If I take the existence of a finite number of finite universes in infinite space for guaranteed, does this premise allow you to - logically - decide whether or not nature (whatever it is in its completeness) does exclusively only follow the first three causes Aristotle once defined, or whether it also allows freewill in the sense that not only some choices aren't predetermined in nature, but follow a teleological reason, a causa finalis that cannot be captured by any formal system only?
I think this is an important question regarding the search for some 'fundamentals', albeit the answer to these questions regularily do not make any practical difference for the life of the person who answers them.