Dear Francesco,
since in my previous post the blank lines have been eliminated, I post my comment again, trying to convince the system to behave in the normal way.
So thank you very much for your reply.
I would agree on most of what you wrote, except for the case of absolute truths in relation to relative truths.
There is a subtle difference in constrasting the relative with the absolute. It mustn't be another relationship as we usually think about all the other relationships that mutually define each other and do both vanish if one part of such a relationship vanishes.
As I tried to outline in my essay, for logically thinking about reality, one has to presuppose that there is truth and falsehood independent of personal evaluations.
If something turns out to be true, its possible truth value 'False' vanishes, but its truth value 'True' remains. If something turns out to be false, its possible truth value 'True' vanishes, but its truth value 'False' remains.
By presupposing that both truths values, 'True' and 'False' can only coexist and if one of them vanishes, the other must vanish too, one introduces absolute relativism. But the crucial point here is that this absolute relativism is constructed by the premise that a realm of absolute truths must have something to do with a realm of relative truths and the concrete ontological connection is identified in the subject's mind and its inability to unequivocally discriminate between some absolute and some relative truths.
My point to deliver was to elucidate that absolute relativism is arbitrary in exactly the sense that the subject is free to correlate whatever it wishes to correlate with each other. As you rightfully noticed, if the results of such deliberate correlations would in every case reflect an ontological truth, we would end up not only in a deeply contradictory world, but also in a deeply arbitrary ontological world and the very notion of an external world (ontology) would vanish - together with the epistemological world. All the mutually exclusive opinions of different conscious subjects about certain possible truths cannot all be true at the same time, unless one denies the existence of some fundamentally invariant ontological elements.
Again here too: making the terms epistemic and ontological interchangeable and strongly interdependent, if one part of the equation vanishes, the whole equation vanishes. But this can't be the case, since if one nonetheless adopts to absolute relativism, nothing really vanishes, neither the external world nor the internal world. It is only in the imagination of the subject, since this subject is confronted with the vanishing of the world - of *his/her* world - when the subject dies. This shows that absolute relativism isn't a realistic option, since when a subject dies, the ontological world will remain in existence.
According to your framework, the same must then be true for the truth values 'True' and 'False'. If one of them vanishes, the other isn't forced to vanish, but must remain existent. Since we can adopt the same logic to the values 'absolute' and 'relative', even here, if one of those attributes should vanish, the other attribute should further exist. Surely and obviously, it is an unreasonable thought to assume that some 'relativity' or some 'absoluteness' should 'vanish' at all - how should this be possible without some magic or deep irrationality one is tempted to ask.
If we nonetheless erase 'absoluteness', we arrive at absolute relativism with its inherent problems described above. So the only possibility left is to erase 'relativism'. One can only do this by realizing that 'relativism' is a concept that is intimately intertwined with the human ability to make certain choices. In fact, human choices can deny the existence of absolute truths. But can human choice also deny the existence of relative truths? I think human choice can't do that, because relative truths absolutely depend on the human ability to make choices. In this sense, relative truths are no truths, their truth values are undefinable for the single case. Relative truth values can only defined globally as 'relative' - due to the fact that human choices are possible, but not for the single case, since these single cases the whole lot depend solely on the choice of the subject.
If one denies that humans have a choice at all to accept something as true or false - for example due to a strict determinism - then even the concept of absolute relativism must fail, since there is an absolute truth behind everything, namely strict determinism. Even the assumption of such a strict determinism may occur as a relative truth in your framework, since it cannot be proven or disproven. But this does not mean that neither of both possibilities is an ontological fact. It is simply unclear (maybe forever) whether or not such a strict determinism is ontologically the fact or not.
One can surely also say that neither determinism nor 'inderterminism' (human choices) are ontologically the fact. I think Nagarjuna would have replied so. But what would such a statement *mean*? I think it would simply mean that we really don't know what's really, really ontologically most fundamental. But again, that we don't know this does not mean that it doesn't exist. Nagarjuna may again reply that it surely also can mean that such a most fundamental does simply not exist, because the 'most fundamental' is incomprehensible emptiness. But that is only the perspective of a human being imaginating his/her own being dead. The ontology of existence does survive this, otherwise we end up with solipsism.
Francesco, I would like to thank you for an engaging discussion and for your openess to discuss some fundamental issues. It will always be a pleasure to discuss with you these things.
Best wishes from germany,
Stefan Weckbach