Dear Sabine,
Because you are by far my favorite author on the curious state of current physics, and because I would love to have your comments on my essay, I'm a little at a loss how to respond to this beautifully-written piece. Though I don't disagree with you at any point, what was in my mind throughout was your blog-post from a couple years ago on "The Unbearable Lightness of Philosophy." Actually (as a philosopher) I'm very pleased that you take philosophical arguments seriously. But really - free will?
Surely the conscious decisions we make are the result of neurons firing in our brains, or more generally, the result of things going on beneath the level of our self-awareness. That seems like a very good thing to know about ourselves, if it makes us a little more humble. And if there were any meaningful issue about our choices being "free" - which I doubt - you'd think this is where it would arise.
But I can't see why it makes any difference to anything whether the behavior of neurons is predictable from physical principles. It's hard to see how it could be, if it's not even possible to predict when an atom will emit a photon. But what does it matter whether or not what happens in my brain is computable?
I have no problem with reductionism - except for the "ism" part. That seems to imply that this is the only kind explanation science needs, which is obviously wrong. Take biology, for example. I see no reason to doubt that everything that happens in a living cell is done by the laws of physics. On the other hand, none of these very complex molecules and patterns of interaction would exist if it weren't for the ability of cells to replicate themselves and so evolve. Nothing like this happens in physics or chemistry, so it's clearly "emergent." But that's not because it's independent of the laws of atomic physics. On the contrary, if those laws weren't so precisely uniform and reliable, self-replication would be inconceivable.
So my question is, how does distinguishing between "weak" and "strong" emergence contribute to our understanding of situations like this? I wouldn't call self-replication a "truly new fundamental law," but it is a truly fundamental functionality, on which a whole new world of possibilities is founded. It's completely new, and also completely dependent on lower-level functions.
In my current essay I try to imagine the foundations of physics in a similar light, asking about the functionality of a universe that's able to define, measure and communicate all its own information. It would mean a lot to me to know if the argument of my first three pages makes sense to you.
Conrad