4 days later

Hello Prof. Josephson,

Your essay is a very nice essay. I am really thrilled to see a Nobel laureate participating in the essay contest. I am a high school student and have been participating in this contest for 2 years. This year I submitted an essay on "Is mathematics Fundamental?" Can you gie me some insights on my essay. I have a dream of being a good physicist in future.

Kind Regards

Ajay Pokharel

Post-materialistic science

Post-materialistic science is an alternative to the 'post-quantum theory' being pushed here and elsewhere by one Jack Sarfatti, which I don't believe addresses the deeper issues in ways apparent in a number of essays here.

Let's start from the idea that science advances on the basis of new concepts; for example Newton had to invent concepts such as inertia to develop his dynamics. These new concepts give rise to terminology and the possibility of characterising nature in such terms and the discovery of new laws of nature. Semiotics, biosemotics, and related ideas such as semiotic scaffolding and the semiosphere involve such concepts. An everyday case where such ideas are relevant is that of a language: one is able to characterise a given language in detail, and observe it at work. These new insights are associated with new regularities. These are also found in the studies of Barad, in particular the insight that there are agencies that 'intra-act' to create new phenomena.

Where does this leave regular physics with its precise laws? There seems to be a connection in that such laws may be emergent as a result of semiotic mechanisms. Maths as such may not be able to explain why the semiotic processes work: this may be additional physics, implying a new form of order. It may for example be necessasry to recognise that things as ideas, which may have their own physics in a more mental realm, have an objective reality. The key point is that adding concepts such as semiotic scaffolding and agential realism to one's mental toolkit can open up important new avenues of exploration.

    Hello dear Professor Josephson,

    Congratulations for your essays.I don't know well the biosemiotic ,it seems very relevant.The semiosphere what is it ? it seems relevant.I work about my theory of spherisation with quant and cosm sphères in the universal sphere.I have found this theory is ranking a little of all since the age of 17 , animals, vegetals, particles, brains ...and I have seen this universal link in seeing that brains also were in this logic.The evolution is important , I was fascinated by H ...CNO.....the primordial soap with CH4 H2O NH3 NHCN H2C2....and with time and informations we have this evolution and complexification.I find your works very interestin,g ,I d like to know more about this biosemiotic mechanic. Biology and brains are resulsts of evolution and it is so complex when we see the numbers of particles encoded since this hypothetical Big Bang.Semiosphere could you tell me more in a general point of vue please.

    Best Regards

    6 days later

    1. Despite their popularity, there is no substance to theories of "emergence" from complexity/ dynamical systems.

    You cannot logically claim that something could "emerge" because of "their ability to fill a gap" [page 4] or because "natural selection favours it" [page 5].

    Also, there is nothing backing up the supposition that complexity/ dynamical systems theory might be used to model "emergence": "Science does however possess tools that should prove adequate to taking these ideas further, for example computer modelling (which served to disclose the existence of the previously unsuspected phenomena of chaos and the edge of chaos), dynamical systems theory, and studies involving complexity" [page 5].

    Because, after all this time, we know enough to say categorically that nothing remotely resembling life comes out of, "emerges" from, deterministic mathematical or algorithmic systems, no matter how complex these systems are, and no matter how long you run them for. For example, nothing resembling life comes out of cellular automata (an algorithmic system) or out of a Mandelbrot set representation (a combination mathematical and algorithmic system), except in the subjective imagination of some people.

    What seemingly "emerges" is patterns. But there is no ability to precisely define what are these "patterns" that supposedly emerge, or how a system itself would know about such unstable system-wide "patterns" anyway. In any case, a system is driven by its rules (e.g. fundamental "laws of nature"), not by any system-wide patterns determined by its rules. New rules do not "emerge" out of a system. You have to, in effect, add new rules to get a changed behaviour in the system.

    The elephant in the room is: Where do algorithmic and/or mathematical rules come from? Clearly, new rules cannot just "emerge" out of an existing system, but 1) have these rules always been there, existing Platonically, since the beginning of the universe? or 2) do we live in creative universe where the elements of the system literally create their own rules? For too long, physics has gotten away with not attempting to explain the source of what they represent as mathematical rules/ relationships (e.g. fundamental "laws of nature"); but physics can no longer get away with it when it comes to algorithmic rules.

    2. In contrast to the conjecture about "emergence", there is substance to quantum mechanics.

    What is puzzling to some people, the "weird" aspects of quantum mechanics, are exactly the type of non-mathematical, non-algorithmic aspects of reality necessary for complex life to bootstrap itself i.e.: 1) the "knowledge"/perception aspect seemingly possessed by a particle; 2) the "free will"/creative aspect seemingly possessed by a particle; and 3) the "coherence" group behaviour of particles.

    Dear Lorraine,

    It is hard to know where to begin to answer your many points! Let me begin with the remark that physics knows and understands many instances of emergence, e.g. crystallisation, which can be related to the concept of broken symmetry. You say "we know enough to say categorically that nothing remotely resembling life comes out of, "emerges" from, cellular automata (an algorithmic system) or out of a Mandelbrot set representation (a combination mathematical and algorithmic system). That may be, but I envisage a different kind of picture, involving e.g. concepts such as nonlinearity, and fractality, rendering the kind of failures you refer to irrelevant. My picture is more true to the physics than the kinds of models you cite.

    Next, while you may find QM the 'bee's knees' as regards its capacity to explain the phenomena of nature, others disagree.聽

    Finally, you make many statements that seem to be more personal credos than things you have proofs for so I won't discuss these in detail.聽

    Dear Brian,

    Re crystallisation:

    Except in the eye of the beholder, has anything mysterious "emerged" with crystallisation, temperature, or weather? If a system is 100% mechanistic, where all outcomes are 100% determined by constraints, the environment and "laws of nature", then no outcome is more emergent or mysterious than any other outcome.

    But if quantum symmetry breaking is involved, then new information has in effect been input to the system. To paraphrase Wheeler: new information is created in quantum phenomena; this new information is not a deterministic consequence of the above-described mechanisms. I note you quote Wheeler in your essay, but a more telling quote of Wheeler's is: "Each elementary quantum phenomenon is an elementary act of 'fact creation'" [1]. If new information has been in effect non-mechanistically input to the system, then you cannot claim that the crystallisation outcome has somehow mysteriously "emerged" from a deterministic system.

    Re "I envisage a different kind of picture, involving e.g. concepts such as nonlinearity, and fractality, rendering the kind of failures you refer to irrelevant":

    The "kind of failures" I refer to are not irrelevant. Nonlinear systems and fractals are fully deterministic systems where some outcomes or behaviours might appear to "emerge", but in fact no outcome is more emergent or mysterious than any other outcome.

    1. Quoted in QBism: Quantum Theory as a Hero's Handbook, by Christopher A. Fuchs and Blake C. Stacey, https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.07308v2 .

    "In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is a phenomenon whereby larger entities arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities such that the larger entities exhibit properties the smaller/simpler entities do not exhibit...Almost all accounts of emergentism include a form of epistemic or ontological irreducibility to the lower levels", [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence ].

    Brian, by "emergence" you seem to mean something that is 100% reducible to the lower levels (or do you?), whereas I mean something that is irreducible to the lower levels. Quantum symmetry breaking in crystallisation is an example of something that is irreducible to lower levels, although the symmetry breaking itself has nothing to do with complexity/ dynamical systems. I'm claiming that the only way anything can "emerge" is via the input of new information to the system (this is only found to occur in quantum processes), whereas you seem to be claiming that something new can emerge from 100% deterministic processes.

    Wikipedia, which you quote, is hardly the last word on any topic. More authoritative I suggest is the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, which has this article on the subject: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/, and observes that there is more than one view on such matters. One point, which your comments fail to take into account, is that phenomena related to laws of nature are a function of the specifics of a given situation, as well as the underlying laws. In other words, certain situations are special. This includes life, see e.g. https://arxiv.org/html/1110.1768.

    Brian, I have printed your arxiv paper: I hope to read it some time today. But I have previously read the Stanford article. Re "certain situations are special": there is absolutely no way of identifying "special situations" in a deterministic universe, unless you add a meta-level to the universe which has special algorithmic criteria about the lower level. In other words, you have to add new equations and algorithms to the system in order to identify "special situations". To put it another way, you need to have a theory about what equations (laws) and algorithms are, and how they are "created".

    I have mentioned "the specifics of a given situation" in my reply on 15 March 2018 @ 14:17 GMT: "where all outcomes are 100% determined by constraints, the environment and "laws of nature"". The specifics of a situation includes the very import issue of what is the reality that underlies (what physics represents as) numbers. Despite the crucial importance of numbers, physics has no theory about what numbers might be.

    I treat the issue on the basis of my training in physics while you it would seem do the same on the basis of your training in philosophy! Philosophy has its value but can also be detrimental to the process of discovering what is the case, as e.g. philosopher Hugh Mellor's dismissal of ESP as 'impossible' on the basis of some philosophical principle.

    Brian, Re your paper "Limits to the universality of quantum mechanics" [1]:

    It is true that "quantum mechanics cannot give a complete account of life", or a "complete account of all natural phenomena", because quantum mechanics cannot give a complete account of anything. The mathematical formulation of QM is merely the currently best way of representing something about the fundamental relationships in QM situations, but the mathematical formalism can't explain the "weird" underlying reality: why individual particle outcomes are unpredictable, and how the particle "knows" things about the experimental setup etc. 100 years of experimentation has only been able to conclude that this unpredictability/freedom and this "knowledge" are just the inherent nature of reality. But it would be even more "weird" if nature didn't use these inherent pre-existing aspects for something.

    But despite the quotes in your FQXi essay about "observer-participancy" and "Matter feels" for which the "quantum" nature of reality is a natural fit, my impression is that you discount the "quantum" nature of reality, and you instead seem to be looking for latter-day duplicates of the "weird" quantum aspects to emerge out of a complex deterministic dynamical system and "circularity" [2].

    1. Limits to the universality of quantum mechanics, Brian D. Josephson, 8 Oct 2011, https://arxiv.org/html/1110.1768

    2. How observers create reality, Brian D. Josephson, 17 Jun 2015, https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.06774

    What you say is correct -- I anticipate quantum physics coming out of a wider, less quantitative picture (which may itself not be all-encompassing. For example, it will have wavelike aspects, allowing parallel aspects of reality, some of which have observable consequences while others do not (cf. Bohm and Hiley's 'active information'). There will also be an emergent semiotic aspect, as discussed by Peirce, and 'centres of control' operating in a critical regime, as in Hankey's 'complexity biology'. I should also bring to your attention Plamen Simeonov's idea of 'integral biomathematics' (see http://inbiosa.eu/ and https://philarchive.org/archive/SIMSBT-10) which discusses the possibilities of integrating the mathematical and biological aspects of nature. I think the 'weird' aspects of QM are correlates of a more general entanglement, itself the outcome of triadic correlation which is in itself a little counterintuitive as well as having biological aspects. The point to understand is that different phenomena have the capacity to be woven together, which one may understand as a new theme to be taken into account, if you like a synthesis of thesis and antithesis, but a synthesis that just has to be taken for granted rather than something to be deduced from something deeper.

    Hi Brian,

    Great addition to the dialogue. I have been interested in the local-global connection, the causes of system stability, and the minimum requisite variety for self-organization, for some time. I was not surprised to find that many of my own conclusions match yours--particularly the importance of triadic (triangle, 2-simplex) relations.

    "Measuring the Complexity of Simplicity": https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323685578_Measuring_the_Complexity_of_Simplicity

    Brian, with respect, surely there is a problem with definitions, or lack of definitions?

    1. How does one characterise what type of "thing" might emerge from complex deterministic dynamical systems? Is what emerges:

    a) representable as a number;

    b) a property (in the same sense that mass is a property) that can be mathematically represented as a relationship between other such properties;

    c) representable as an algorithm; or

    d) none of the above?

    2. How does one characterise what is expected to emerge; how would one know that the following had indeed emerged from a complex deterministic dynamical system:

    a) feeling ("matter feels") and knowledge (a particle "knows" things about the experimental setup); and

    b) "observer-participancy" in the universe, and freedom (for instance, it might be considered that the unpredictability of observed particle outcomes is due to the inherent freedom of a particle)?