Dear Markus Mueller,

You observe that orthodoxy is largely based on 'the lesson of Copernicus'. I address a specific instance of this in my essay which reviews the historical basis of special relativity.

You further note that "the orthodox view is incomplete", which is almost the basis upon which FQXi contests are held. I, and many participants in these contests, believe as you appear to that mind does not 'emerge' from matter. My previous essays have proposed that consciousness is the essential nature of a field, indivisibly merging awareness and matter. I have found it valuable to investigate the self-interaction that arises in such case, and I give you an example here.

As is quite popular today, you suggest a 'brain scan' that results in a "perfect copy" of one's brain in the form of a computer simulation. Since computers are logical machines, this has the effect of building a logical model of the mind. Many, if not most approaches to modeling the mind call on such simulations.

But if consciousness is truly associated with the self-interactive field, then it is not just the logic of synaptic firings, but it is the dynamical 3D field interactions that accompany the flows in axons and neurons, and that simply cannot be captured in a software simulation. Thus I hold out no hope for this approach.

This is presented as an aside; I do not interpret your essay as depending on the ability to simulate the mind. Certainly clever logical simulations exist and will continue to be built. But if the fundamental reality you suggest actually exists, it won't be copied.

I invite you to read my essay and comment.

Best regards, and good luck in the contest,

Edwin Eugene Klingman

    quote

    In other words, since that emergent world corresponds to a simple algorithm which represents an excellent

    compression of the observer's probabilistic state changes, we can regard its functioning as the causal

    background structure that gives rise to what the observer sees. Thus, we can use it to obtain algorithmic

    or "mechanistic" explanations for the observer's states (including evolutionary explanations), but we may

    want to keep in mind that this causal background algorithm is ultimately itself not fundamental.

    end of quote

    My nit with this is simple. You are assuming that the process of measurement is inheriently dependent upon the algorithm of investigation is not fundamental.

    Why I find this hard to believe. It is in the matter of the independence of physical law from a given reference frame

    I.e. the algorithmic search protocol is fundamental if it is INDEPENDENT of the reference frame used, in order to investigate foundational physics laws.

    Aside from that I enjoyed your essay and invite you to look at mine and remark on it, as given in December 21st

    Andrew

      Dear Markus,

      congratulations for your essay, which I found one of the best here, it conveys very interesting ideas and it's very well-written (and touching, as well).

      You write that:

      > Postulate 1 tells us that algorithmic probability determines what happens to an observer, and the right-hand side can be seen as a consequence of this: the properties of algorithmic probability imply that some notion of external world emerges. But, by the very definition of what this means, this emergent external world gives an excellent description of what happens to the observer, since its configuration evolves under the same probabilities as the observer's state.

      I completely agree - in my essay there's the same idea (§2) applied to causality, as a consequence of Nagarjuna's philosophy.

      In the end you state that:

      > If the ideas above contain a grain of truth, then the mind may ultimately be more fundamental than the world.

      But following your ideas, should't world and mind be, so to say, at par?

      All the best,

      Francesco D'Isa

        Dear Professor Mueller,

        Your essay is profound, and deeply intriguing.

        I would like to understand better the analogy of the mind-matter arrow with the nice example of non-commutative geometry that you give.

        When one maps from an ordinary geometry to the algebra of functions; and generalises this to a non-commutative algebra and maps back, one gets a non-commutative space, a non-commutative geometry. The properties of this geometry are entirely different from the geometry one started with. I suppose we can say the two geometries are inequivalent? One could perhaps think of thought experiments / actual experiments which would distinguish the two geometries.

        When you talk of Wheeler's mind-matter loop, do you also suggest that the mind to matter arrow is experimentally distinguishable, in principle, from the matter to mind arrow? That would be fascinating, if it were to be so. I am not quite clear if the mind to matter arrow is equivalent to the matter to mind arrow, or inequivalent?

        My thanks, and best wishes to you in this essay contest, and warmest wishes for Nadine, in whichever world she is ...

        Tejinder

          Markus,

          Physics studies our experience of the universe, but the universe is not made of experience. It is made of real stuff. This is a reversal of the objective - subjective points of view. All that we think is objective we make up ourselves as experience. The object of this experience (underlying reality) is in fact what is real (objective = object).

          So, much of physics is about ourselves ... not the universe. The 3D is just the definition of a punctual observer ...

          Best of luck,

          Marcel,

            Dear Professor Markus P Mueller,

            FQXI is clearly seeking to find out if there is a fundamental REALITY.

            Reliable evidence exists that proves that the surface of the earth was formed millions of years before man and his utterly complex finite informational systems ever appeared on that surface. It logically follows that Nature must have permanently devised the only single physical construct of earth allowable.

            All objects, be they solid, liquid, or vaporous have always had a visible surface. This is because the real Universe must consist only of one single unified VISIBLE infinite surface occurring eternally in one single infinite dimension that am always illuminated mostly by finite non-surface light.

            Only the truth can set you free.

            Joe Fisher, Realist

            Your essay is an interesting reading. It segues in part with physics because of quantum mechanics that, as you illustrate with contextuality, does not conform to a purely objective perspective on the universe. We are then in a funny situation with respect to the measurement or phenomenology of quantum mechanics an inability to completely divorce the observer from the subject of observation. Various quantum interpretations are set up to work around this problem, from "shut up and calculate," which amounts to don't worry about this, to ψ-epistemic interpretations that render the wave function unreal to ψ-ontoc interpretations that confer reality to the wave function by in effect fragmenting the observer. The Copenhagen interpretation is ψ-epistemic and the many world or Everettian interpretation is ψ-ontic. Personally I think quantum mechanics is not any of these.

            The Wheeler cycle or strange loop is in effect a form of Godel's theorem applied to physics. We could think of a quantum measurement as a case where quantum states encode some quantum states. This loop can never be complete which is one reason maybe that quantum measurement is not understood by any physics. By corollary we have no clear understanding of how the classical world emerges from the quantum world. We can say it does emerge, which would be more ψ-epsitemic, or that it is a complete illusion and manifested in an observer, which would be more ψ-ontic. The apparent self-referential nature of this would lead to an inability to know which type of interpretation holds, and far less which interpretation holds.

            Since this is physical we may think more according to Turing machines, which may be thought of as computing existing symbol strings. In this way was have a physical system prior to the computational incompleteness of any putative universal Turing machine. With pure mathematics what is prior or subsequent to what is not important. With physics we have more of this sense with respect to time. Of course this now takes us into deep questions on what we mean by the nature of time. My essay in part touches on this with issues of quantum state entanglements building up spacetime.

            It is then my sense that whether matter or mind is primary is not fundamentally decidable. I remember years ago reading Isaac Asimov quip about this:

            Matter over mind doesn't matter

            Mind over matter, never mind.

            This question leads us into a contact region between physics and metaphysics. Metaphysics is something we usually prefer to have a minimum of in physics. However, we seem unable to completely eliminate metaphysics.

            Cheers LC

              Dear Markus Mueller,

              instead of endlessly theoretizing about "what is fundamental?" you encapsulate your quest about what eventually could *not* be fundamental into a prequel and a sequel, both being very emotional. I hope that you haven't invented Nadine's story, for if it would be true, there would be a kind of hapiness within a rather abstract analysis of the orthodox worldview of hard science.

              "If the ideas above contain a grain of truth, then the mind may ultimately be more fundamental than the world. And more than that: the mind may ultimately not be a prisoner of the body, or of the world, since the latter is only a convenient fiction. But then there may be hope of a kind that we have almost given up, and freedom of a kind that we have never imagined."

              I think your attempt would have profited much more (not on the basis of scores, but on the basis of arguments) if you had mentioned that there are strong hints to support what you would wish to be true in the citation above. These hints are called 'near-death experiences' and are trivialized by 'hard science', despite the fact that they are able to show that conscious awareness isn't necessarily bound to the human brain / organism.

              Since these are valid phenomena, i wonder why nobody in this contest takes them into account, but rather circumvent them by loosely using wordings like 'consciousness field' and other abstract things like that. At least you were brave enough to question all these abstract musings at the beginning and the end of your essay.

                Markus,

                An ambitious undertaking, very well executed and quite uniquely interesting. Whether I'm convinced or not is another matter, not relevant or falsifiable! I certainly agree your comments on the cosmological issues.

                My own essay does comment on some key matters, partly in agreement as an SR friendly QM emerges, yet both mind and matter also emerge from the simplest underlying mechanism. I hope you'll read and comment.

                So yes, I think physics IS all about what's really going on in the world (universe) as John Bell did! You seemed uncertain so perhaps say if you agree after reading mine.

                Nice job.

                Very best

                Peter

                  Dear Edwin Eugene,

                  thanks very much for reading and for your comments! I'm going to read your essay once I'll be back from vacation.

                  To respond to what you wrote above, I think it's interesting to thjnk of consciousness as some kind of "self-interaction". Still I don't see why this would have anything to say about simulatability. As soon as you talk about axons and neurons, you talk about physical systems that, as far as we know, are subject to computable laws of nature.

                  But I'll look at your essay to see the arguments in more detail.

                  Kind regards, and good luck to you too!

                  Markus

                  Dear Francesco,

                  thanks very much for your kind words.

                  I'm on vacation now, but I'll surely look at your essay once I'm back.

                  Regarding your final question/comment, in a way I agree -- both are "on par", which is what I also write in the last section. I would say, both viewpoints (world being more fundamental than mind, or vice versa) are suitable for different kinds of questions that we may ask. For the question implicitly raised in prequel/sequel, I'd say that the latter (not the former) is the more relevant viewpoint.

                  Thanks again,

                  Markus

                  Dear Tejinder,

                  thanks very much for your kind comment!

                  Regarding the question that you raised, I'd argue as follows. First, in the example of non-commutative geometry, the non-commutative version of spacetime that we get (in particular if it correctly describes physics) will still look pretty much like an "ordinary" spacetime, in some regime (where we don't see any quantum gravity effects) resp. after some coarsegraining.

                  The idea is that the mind->matter arrow will give us something that still, in most "ordinary" regimes, looks like the physical world we are used to. Only in some extreme cases will we see differences. I don't know how experimentally accessible these would be; instead, they might manifest themselves in more subtle ways. An example in the essay is the "Boltzmann brain" issue, where the usual physics argumentation (intuitively, cosmologists simply "counting brains") would be replaced by a different argumentation based on algorithmic probability. Another example might be Wigner's friend-like scenarios, which are obviously extremely difficult to address experimentally.

                  I've just seen you have submitted an essay too. I'll have a look as soon as I have time.

                  Best wishes,

                  Markus

                  Dear Andrew,

                  thanks very much for your interest and for the comment.

                  Unfortunately, I have some trouble understanding your argument. Especially, when you write: "You are assuming that the process of measurement is inheriently dependent upon the algorithm of investigation is not fundamental."

                  It's not clear to me what you mean. Maybe you can clarify?

                  Thank you,

                  Markus

                  Dear Marcel,

                  thanks for reading and for your comment! Good luck to you too!

                  Markus

                  Dear Lawrence,

                  thanks for your comment! I agree with your skepticism of whether any of the interpretations of QM, or any of the viewpoints on the fundamentality of mind or world, is the "true" one. I think I'd just personally go one step further, and say that it's not only undecidable for us, but that there is simply no "matter of fact" to any of the alternatives over the other ones.

                  Best,

                  Markus

                  Dear Stefan,

                  thanks for reading and your comment!

                  No, the story of Nadine is not invented. It is true -- I've worked for a year at a day care place for blind and multiply disabled children.

                  You are raising an interesting point. I still think that there is a good reason that nobody mentions the experiences that you talked about. Namely, they correspond to subjective experience. Everybody should feel free to use their subjective experience (or that of other people they trust) as a guidance to this world. But scientific knowledge is still of a different kind: it is either empirically testable in a way that makes it more reliable in a specific sense, or it is based on mathematics and thus logics (if A and B are true, then C cannot be true etc.). The experiences you mentioned do not seem to be of that kind.

                  Otherwise, who distinguishes claims of near-death experience from simple illusions that we also sometimes encounter?

                  Best,

                  Markus

                  Dear Peter,

                  thanks for reading and commenting!

                  I'll make sure to read your essay when I'm back from vacation. We will see if I agree that "physics as all about what's really going on in the world". :-) I guess my answer will depend very much on the details of what this statement is supposed to mean. But I'm curious and will have a look.

                  Cheers,

                  Markus

                  Dear Markus,

                  thanks for your reply. I would not say that near-death experiences correspond to subjective experience. If you take a couple of people that had similar experiences, they can communicate their experiences, as well as we can communicate our subjective experiences of, say, sadness, happiness, fear, anger etc.

                  What distinguishes such experiences from 'simple' illusions is that they have some key features that repeat - but more important, that what was experienced and seen / heard etc. could it many cases be verified, although the experiencer's brain / senses / heart were at this time not functioning at all. These are objectiviable circumstances, checked for correctness by scientists, indepdendent of whether I was a direct witness or not. I surely wasn't neither a direct witness when Einstein's GR or SR was tested, but I trust the reports and results.

                  The key point here is that people don't trust those experiences because they simply don't like them, they don't fit into their conception of the world. There are things in the world that aren't reproducible, but they are nonetheless true. For example a geniously idea (like Einstein had some). But even Einstein couldn't reproduce such a revelation of an idea to come to grips with QM or with what a photon is.

                  I cannot accept your arguments for another reason. What does science when single events are not reproducable? It takes statistics into account. Exactly this has been done in the case of near-death experiences. Only one case is enough to falsify a pure materialistic and reductionistic worldview. That's the real reason why a majority does not mention such experiences too much. For relying on simple illusions, one had to disprove every case where verifiable information was brought back from the experience (for example about a person who died in the same minutes and was meet in some transcendental realm, or tons of other such facts). To statistically disprove them, one had to find experiences, where such information could be falsified - but there are none (except for one or two cases). This is an obviously statistical misbalance that has something to say, I think. And i think one cannot say that all those researchers have tweaked their cases to come to a certain conclusion. The same argument could be made for other scientific theories as well.

                  I really do not understand after having read your essay, how and in what sense the mind should be more fundamental than 'the world' - other than that this is simply a tautology, since all we have are our senses and our consciousness (until we die). When we are dead, what is left of such a fundamentality of the mind over the world?

                  Dear Peter,

                  I strongly disagree.

                  Of course I believe that these people *have the experience* of something that is common to many people in similar near-death circumstances. But all that this tells us is that there are similar processes in their brains that produce these experiences. It doesn't tell us in itself that our most naive interpretation of it ("looking beyond death" or something like that) is true.

                  In fact, people under drugs have similar experiences, and reliably so.

                  When you write "checked for correctness by scientists", then this is deeply misleading. No scientist can check that these experiences are a correct view into some afterlife-world. What they can check is, again statistically, that many people under similar circumstances report similar experiences.

                  All it tells us is that similar things are going on in their brains. It certainly does not "falsify a pure materialistic and reductionistic worldview". It shows us exactly nothing.

                  If you give a large number of people alcohol, many of them will report that they experience that the world is spinning around them (when they had too much and feel drowsy). This doesn't mean that the world is really spinning around them in any sense, it just means that their brains produce these experiences for biochemical reasons.

                  Certainly none of my arguments rely on any of those reported experiences that you mention.

                  Best,

                  Markus