Dear Noson,
yes, I am finding it hard to juggle the multiple conversational thread on here, and balance it with the general craziness of the world out there. The world has undergone a strange phase transition since this contest began.
Regarding your question, my structuralism, following Russell, is essentially an epistemic one---I don't believe that 'structure is all there is', as an ontic structural realist does, but rather, that our scientific inquiry tells us only about the structure of stuff---for instance, events that reliably correlate with one another, how things react when prodded (i. e. in experiment), and so on.
This sort of structuralism is threatened by Newman's objection: if that's truly all we can say about the world, then all we can say about the world is exhausted in statements of cardinality. Against this, one can hold that in experience, we have 'direct access' to the intrinsic properties of the world, which singles out a preferred structure, which overcomes Newman's objection.
In this sense, that structure of the world that's appreciable to us in experience does have an objective character, and thus, I would not call it nominalism---it's not merely a conventional issue. The ordering relation embodied by the books on my shelf is something that's real. I could define all sorts of other relations on that set---just take any collection of pairs of books, or triples, or what have you---, but they wouldn't necessarily connect to anything out there, and thus, be conventional---nominalist---in this sense.
Does that make sense to you?
Hope you're staying well!
Cheers
Jochen