Hi Flavio,
I take it this excellent essay more or less summarizes your development of Gisin's application of constructive maths to classical mechanics? I'd be interested to know how you might see Brouwer's intuitionistic philosophy in relation to this mathematically indeterminate approach.
As I understand it, his intuitionism was derived from Kantian intuition (anschauung, intuitus) as intuiting/apprehending/perceiving the forms of sensibility, space, and time given in empirical (phenomenal) experience. From that perspective we intuit/perceive phenomenal patterns in our empirical experience of the world (thus information is physical!), and the constructive mathematics is based on that empirically intuited pattern perception. The formal, intersubjective communication of these empirical patterns (or information) is effected in that constructive mathematics, for which classical mechanics thus becomes necessarily indeterminate, at least from this intuitionist (also phenomenological) perspective.
What is objectively real in this sense are the phenomenal patterns themselves (or real patterns cf. Dennett) as given in empirical/phenomenal experience, rather than say, the Laplace demon's idealized external world of point particles with infinitely precise, initial physical conditions. Does this mean intuitionism, in your view, must reject the notion of a classical world defined as 'objective external reality' in favour of the actual empirical experience of such a merely potential reality? Or can potentia remain an idealized unobservable continuum from which our discrete actualitas emerges?
Best regards,
Malcolm Riddoch