Essay Abstract

Making predictions is a fundamental part of doing physics. Or is it?

Author Bio

Emily Adlam studied Physics and Philosophy at Oxford University and then did a PhD in quantum information and foundations at Cambridge University.

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A well written essay!

You may be interested in my concrete proposal for such a non mechanistic universe (ECD). It shows that we have been looking wrongly not only at QM (as you anticipate), but also at almost everything else.

A crucial feature of ECD, being an `all at once' ontology, which you have ignored in your essay, is quasi-locality. PDE's, being local, guarantee that apples are localized solutions irrespective of almost anything. You want to, at most, replace the constraint imposed by a PDE on the variables in an infinitesimal neighborhood of a spacetime point, by a constraint in a finite (but small enough) neighborhood.

With quasi locality, the universe becomes fundamentally non mechanistic (non IVP in my terminology) as opposed to the superficially non mechanistic Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics. I think that the notion of `retrocausality' can them be more easily sold to the general physics community, as it is no longer a statement about machines, which just propagate in time their initial conditions, oblivious to any interaction in their future.

Yehonatan Knoll

    Dear Emily,

    "Of course, this way of thinking does depend on the assumption that there exists an external reality and there are objective facts about the laws governing it. If you don't believe this, we're unlikely to have much common ground."

    I'd like to encourage you to think of the meaning of EACH of the the obove 39 words and then restate that " there exists an eternal reality and there are objective facts...".

    Heinz (nonbeliever)

      "Where and how does the mathematics required to determine the dictates of the laws of nature actually get performed? Most physicists shy away from these questions, and not without reason - they are very difficult questions, and we don't really need to answer them if our only concern is to produce correct empirical predictions." Consider 2 hypotheses: (1) If quantum probability distributions are irreducible then we get string theory with the infinite nature hypothesis. (2) If quantum probability distributions can be explained in terms of Fredkin-Wolfram information then we get string theory with the finite nature hypothesis. Have the string theorists underestimated Milgrom (as well as Fredkin and Wolfram)? What are the 2 greatest scientific predictions of the 21st century? My guess is that the answer to the preceding questions is the following: (1) The Riofrio-Sanejouand cosmological model is (approximately) empirically valid. (2) dark-matter-compensation-constant = (3.9±.5) * 10^-5 -- contradicting Newton and Einstein (who assumed that this constant = 0). The vast majority of experts believe the Gravity Probe B science team -- and not me -- concerning the 4 ultra-precise gyroscopes -- but are these experts correct?

      "At Long Last, Gravity Probe B Satellite Proves Einstein Right" by Adrian Cho, 4 May 2012, Science

        Let me be more accurate with regard to quasi locality: In discretized form, a PDE relates finitely many dynamical variables in the neighborhood of a spacetime point, all (almost) equally weighted. The ECD generalization involves infinitely many such variables, but those are highly non uniformly weighted, with weights rapidly decreasing with covariant distance to that point. This allows only for an approximate, rather than deterministic, time propagation of a system based only on its past and present states. The degree to which such an approximated local propagation departs from the exact solution is determined by its measure of `chaosity'.

        Note, nonetheless, that even if you somehow got access to the future state of a system (you `remembered' its future as well) which would allow you propagate it exactly, that information about the future would be represented in your present, so you would still be pre-dicting the future in a strict sense.

        Yehonatan

        I suggest Survival is a goal of humanity. To act on another major goal is to fail at surviving. Knowledge about our surroundings aids survival. Animal behavior demonstrates they have some ability to know and predict events in their world. Humans study science and religion to better predict and then to cause events because it aids survival. Thus we get TV, cars and guns. History (another study area that helps predict social events) has demonstrated those that advance (make better predictions ) physics tend to survive and conquer other societies that don't advance science.

        In the advance of physics, whenever a new set of observations is found, the first attempt at prediction is statistical. Thus when studies of disease started in the early 19th century, statistics help address the cholera disease before a microbe model was created. So to has Quantum Mechanics been created while awaiting a smaller particle model. The basic experiment to be explained is Young's double-slit (interference) experiment. The STOE (my model) has a computer simulation of a deterministic nature of Young's and other experiments that reject wave models of light.

          I noted your paper "Underlying Assumptions in physics:..." on RG. The STOE also suggests the universe is NOT adiabatic isolated which follows the Quasi Steady State Cosmology (QSSC).So, the universe is NOT time symmetric. The STOE has yet to address entropy but I'm thinking about it. The one study I did looked at the CMB temperature. A feedback model was formed which calculated (the only model to do so) the Temperature to be withing a few microkelvin of the measured value. This model suggests the input of energy (also suggested by the QSSC) balances the outpu. Hence, "time symmetry" is really input energy balances output in physical systems.

          I'll be loooking at a few more of your papers.

          Thanks

          Hodge

          Hello Dr Adlam,

          I liked your general analyse , it is well said about these unpredictabilities and uncomputabilities due to our limitations. Limitations that we must accept with wisdom after all.It d be pretentious and odd to beleive that we have all the answers, we just know a so small part of our universal quant and cosmol problems. But we improve our knowledges each day after all in respecting a kind of pure universal determinism. Wish you all the best in this Contest, regards

            Hi Emily,

            Thank you for a well-written and thought-provoking essay. You present an excellent analysis of the problem of a purely predictive physics within the orthodox conceptual model of physics. Your examples (references [37, 38]) are very telling. Both cases "prove" that what nature does (or likely does) cannot be algorithmically decided in finite time. You offer two potential resolutions.

            1) Physical reality may be limited to a subset of possibilities--I believe Tim Palmer explores this idea in his essay.

            2) The universe has infinite time, and nature acts globally across time.

            In my essay I explore a third possibility. Any proof is based on assumptions, and I suggest that the orthodox conceptual model of physics, on which the proofs in [37 and 38] are based, is lacking. Specifically, it rejects entropy and dissipation as fundamental properties of physics. As described in my essay, this is strictly a matter of interpretation of observations; this conclusion is not empirically based on observations. In thermodynamics, entropy is a fundamental measure of the relative stability of state, but in statistical mechanics, it is a measure of an observer's incomplete information and the observer's subjective description of the system's disorder.

            With no fundamental definition of stability, it is impossible for an algorithm to select one possibility or another. The orthodox interpretations of physics have no irreducible "values" by which it can assign relative stabilities to different alternatives.

            In my essay, I reference an essay ([13]) in which I define a measure of relative stabilities for alternative processes of dissipation. Referring back to your reference [37], this measure of stability would easily allow an algorithm (and nature herself) to decide which of different allowable emission spectra would (most likely) result as a quantum system transitions to a lower energy state. This third possibility interprets physical reality as objective, local, causal, and fully compatible with quantum observations, but with irreducibly random and irreversible transitions in state.

            Harrison Crecraft

              Someone who reads to the end of my comment might rightfully conclude that an interpretation of physical reality that is objective, local, and causal violates Bell's theorem. I respond that the notions of locality and causality, described in my essay's reference [12], are more nuanced than in Bell's theorem, and that such an interpretation is fully compatible with Bell.

              Harrison

              Hi Prof.Emily Christine Adlam,

              Well written essay, after seeing your words .......after all, even if you are only interested in making predictions, you will most likely be able to make better predictions if you are using a theory which comes closer to the true laws of nature..................in the finishing part of the essay,

              I thought I should ask you to see the predictions of Dynamic Universe Model's that came true. For that you dont mind seeing my essay "A properly deciding, Computing and Predicting new theory's Philosophy" and give your learned comments please

              Best

              =snp.gupta

                Emily, when I read the title of your essay some days ago I thought it was about the usual "stuff". Nevertheless, I read your essay today and I am really impressed. I didn't keep my code to rate essays but in my opinion it is a 10.0.

                With kind regards, Sydney

                  Hello Dr. Adlam,

                  - I enjoyed your essay. What are your thoughts on (local and non-local) hidden variables? ("...there are still physicists who argue that the conclusion of Bell's theorem can be avoided, for example by the rejection of the statistical independence assumption[13], and if they're correct then perhaps we can actually have both locality and determinism..."

                  - Do you ever have concerns about retro-causality? One could, after all, trace information and trajectories after something has happened (i.e. an electron was sent through a double slit and measured.)

                  - As I'm sure you are you are aware, excavating the universe through means of experiments that are induced by artificial means (conditions that are pushed and are unlikely to be encountered in nature such as trying to probe the standard model for more elements to join the particle zoo) is in order to see the nature of unnatural phenomena (such things that are difficult to find in nature such as Higgs boson particles).

                  - "...Now, it's useful to know that the halting problem is undecidable, but there's nothing particularly paradoxical about this, since after all the halting problem doesn't have to be decided in finite time in reality..." I don't know if you read Sabine Hossenfelder's essay "Math Matters". She argues that matters within realms of pure maths are not very helpful in practical areas of physics. Even though mathematics is extremely relevant to physics, physics is not mathematics. The latter is intuitive. Your above quote better succinctly describes pure maths and physics.

                  - Conventionally related to [pure] maths, you gave an example of a problem which occurs in the physical universe that is applicable to physics and it is undecidable (using 'undecidable' in the traditional context of a mathematician).

                  - I would also imagine that when you write about algorithmic programs terminating in some finite time, some time t would need to be somewhat reasonable.

                  - "...thus it might seem natural to suppose that the universe should not be able to decide undecidable problems..." Even with infinite time it would not surprise me if one could prove that undecidable problems are still undecidable.

                  - I'm currently reading "Quantum Mechanics and Global Determinism" that you wrote, too.

                  - "...yet it seems that the universe must be able to determine the answer to this problem in finite time, in order to avoid producing examples of non-locality which violate the laws of nature..." Are there problems that could [theoretically] be solved with some infinite amount of time or would such a dilemma remain unsolvable? I suppose part of the definition of solvable implies "in some finite time"- am I correct? "...there would no longer be any paradox if it were able to solve problems which require infinite time to solve..." Indeed, I concur.

                  - "...Well, first and foremost, physics will need to relax its emphasis on prediction. To be clear, this does not mean that we should stop demanding empirical evidence for out theories: if our aim is to understand reality, then our theorydevelopment and theory-selection need to be anchored in facts about reality, so I'm certainly not arguing that string theory or any of its similarly afflicted fellows should get off the hook for their failure to say anything empirically novel!..." Excellent point, worded wonderfully.

                  -

                  I will absolutely give you very high marks. I really enjoyed your essay, friend.

                  Best regards,

                  Dale Carl Gillman

                    Dear Emily, thank you for a very creative, well-argued and provoking essay. Although quite speculative, the ideas you introduce are remarkable and perhaps could help to oppose some form of scientific reductionism and take into serious account the possibility of more "holisitic" (in the sense of inputting the whole history of the Universe), as you say: "Insisting that all theories should take

                    a predictive form from the start places an unnecessary and unjustified constraint on the space of possible theories, and by removing that constraint we will probably be able to do better physics".

                    I also highly appreciated your general challenge, expecially when you write: "All of this amounts to a fundamental failure to distinguish between the laws of nature that scientists write down and the laws of nature that actually govern reality".

                    I have then some more to-the-point comments.

                    When you assert:

                    "Why do we assume that the universe can only take information about the past into account when deciding on measurement outcomes? Well, there are obvious social and historic reasons." Ithink this statement is quite strong. I understand that your aim here is to redefine the scope of science, but in my opinion science has been conceived, or invented if you want, to explain/understand and predict. You would like to relax the latter feature. Yet, in my opinion, there is more than a mere social-histioical reasons to this. It seems that the past leaves traces and that the future does not, for this asymmetry of "memories" (see e.g., https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.06687). This reason seems to be the actual cause of the predictive character of laws to me. We can surely question whether this asymmetry is fundamental in mature or if it is a fundamental limit of humans, but my point is that is not an arbitrary social construct.

                    About quantum mechanics, you write that the mechanism for probabilistic predictions is usually considered to be "objective chance". I don't think this is the case in the community of quantum foundations, for the propensity interpretation has hardly any supporters these days. On this note, I don't understand the following statement: "However the idea of quantum probabilities as propensities should raise red flags, because quantum systems don't have psychological states and therefore they can't actually have inclinations." What has this to do with propensities? The fact thet they are called 'propensities' or 'tendencies' should not mislead us towards any psychological state. Propensities are supposed to be objective properties, of the same kind of fragility. You need not to through on the ground a vase of fine crystal to know that (due to it composition and thus to its property of pragility) that there will be a high chance for it to break.

                    I wish you the best of luck for the contest!

                    Cheers,

                    Flavio

                      Thank you very much for your incisive comments!

                      With regard to the arrow of time - this is a good point, and I certainly agree that the arrow of time does need to be explained. However, I don't agree that `predictive' (i.e. temporally directed) laws of nature are the only possible explanation for this phenomenon - it could, for example, arise from global time-symmetric laws together with some sort of symmetry breaking. Thus the existence of the arrow of time is not enough to show that the laws of nature must be temporally directed - we should at least consider other possibilities, such as global laws.

                      I agree that within quantum foundations specifically it is less common to invoke objective chance when describing quantum probabilities, because many people in quantum foundations favour interpretations wherein the quantum probabilities can be understood as epistemic. Among physicists more generally, however, it is still very common to say that quantum mechanics is 'inherently probabilistic' and this usually seems to be understood as referring to propensity-like probabilities.

                      I appreciate that proponents of the `propensity' view don't actually intend to ascribe psychological states to quantum systems. My concern, however, is that using metaphorical language like 'propensity' and 'inclination' they are implicitly invoking psychological ideas which make the propensity view sound better founded than it really is. Once you take away all the psychological language it's much harder to understand what sort of property a propensity is - it seems to be an intrinsically counterfactual property, which makes it very different to fragility, which is a physical property relating to ta substance's chemical/physical constitution. My contention is that once you take away the unhelpful 'propensity' metaphor and consider what objective chance actually achieves, it is clear that objective chance is really a collective property of a set of systems involving coordination across space and time.

                      Thank you for your thoughts!

                      I'm impressed that you counted the number of words in that footnote! Which word in particular do you object to?

                      Thank you for your comments! Some interesting things to think about there.

                      That's interesting - I certainly agree that we have been too quick to jump to the conclusion that quantum mechanics is inherent probabilistic, but how does your model deal with the Colbeck-Renner theorem and similar results?

                      Thank you! Yes, I certainly agree that it's important to recognise that our perspective on the world is limited and thus the laws of nature we are able to write down are not necessarily identical to the `true' laws of nature (whatever that means!)

                      Thank you for your comments! Your third way out of the problem sounds very interesting and I'll read your essay as soon as possible.