Dear Jochen,

thanks for your reply. The time you take for this is highly appreciated!

Before going into details of what you write, I think that the answer to many of your comments is: it depends on what we mean by "structure". In my essay, I'm not really defining it properly (in particular in the section on the physical world). Any serious philosophical approach that tries what I've sketched will have to give a clear(er) definition. Also OSR has to do that (and I suspect that it does, but they mean something slightly different from what I mean).

Regarding your example of the Maxwell's equations and String Theory, I think that what this tells us is that we should define "structure" in terms of "big enough equivalence classes", or admit "coarse enough isomorphisms" when we define it. In particular, there may be two theories T and T' that talk about the same structure S. I would say that your example of Electromagnetism (i) and String Theory (ii) is of that kind: two theories that give the *same* structure.

Being a structural realist in *that* sense, I'd say that there is no ontological difference between the statements that "(i) is true" and that "(ii) is true". But I admit that this does not really come across in my essay, because I'm not giving a clear-enough definition of "structure". And there are many questions that such a view leaves open.

You are right that it would be nice to talk more to Karl Svozil; I've only met and chatted with him once, and he seems to have many clever ideas and insights that touch these topics.

But I'd also find it nice to meet you in person at some point in the near future. Perhaps I can invite you to visit IQOQI when the Corona crisis is over? It would be a lot of fun to chat in person! Also, we have a regular Physics-Philosophy-Meeting here that you might enjoy.

Now, regarding your second email and quantum mechanics:

Again, I was clearly not detailed enough to say what I mean by structure or differentiation in this context. That is certainly a drawback of my essay (also due to space limits, of course, but also I don't really know how to do the definitions properly -- it's more an idea than something fully worked out.)

Here's what I do *not* mean. I don't mean to say that the world now is structure S, and once we learn an additional measurement outcome, it evolves into a more differentiated structure S'.

Instead, consider the quantum world on all of spacetime. There are certain "real patterns" in accordance with quantum physics: for example, certain events that happen earlier on (perhaps "preparations") are in correspondence with frequencies of certain types of events later on (correlations with "measurement outcomes"). This would be structure S.

A more differentiated structure S' would be the world according to de Broglie-Bohm theory: additional (unobservable) events earlier on that are deterministically correlated with outcomes later on. The corresponding theory T' makes more claims than T, and so S' would be more differentiated than S.

In other words: I'm just saying that views in which quantum probabilities are not "knowledge *about* the world" are in some structural sense less differentiated than view in which they are. So a structural view may increase one's confidence to accept views of the former kind.

I'm really curious to find out about your "middle way", but I'll postpone commenting on it until I have read your essay. I'm having a busy time with some deadlines next week, but I'm eager to read your essay directly after that.

Best,

Markus

We are not on the same page...

What I want to say is that Turing's (and Godel's) result expresses a limitation of machines - systems which can be realized even within a classical, objective ontology.

In contrast, Bell's result expresses a limitation on the ontology: If particles were machines ("robots" in Bell's words) then his inequality would need to be satisfied (under reasonable assumptions). In my essay I define the notion of a "non-machine" to overcome Bell's limitation within a definite ontology. I argue that this new category of physical systems, which is mandated not only by Bell but even by classical electrodynamics(!) is the more generic, with machines being in some sense an `uninteresting' private case thereof.

I'm very sympathetic to your project in re.f [30]. Being under the spell of Hofstadter and Penrose in my high-school years, I also believed that was the right way to proceed. But I have since discovered the limitations of a system called Yehonatan Knoll, and that system, if it is to produce any real progress in physics, must stay as close as possible to a `pedestrian' objective ontology :)

Dear Marcus,

I have you to thank for engaging with my comments in such an open way! These contests are always at their best when they stimulate frank exchanges on views that may go slightly beyond what one would normally put into a journal article or the like.

And I'd very much like to come for a visit to Vienna---although thinking about traveling plans seems almost frivolous these days. Perhaps one lesson we could take away from the present situation is that we should try to create more and better avenues for online exchange of views---something like virtual research/discussion groups, where people interested in some topic can congregate, discuss with either live-sessions or in a chat/forum based manner, exchange drafts for articles/request comments and the like. Could be as simple as a Teams channel, or something like that.

But back to the things themselves, as Husserl said---or to their absence, as it were. Regarding the 'modding out' of equivalences between structures, I'm afraid that this might leave us with altogether too little in the way of substance to account for the world and out experience within it---if we agree that in my example, electromagnetism and string theory yield in some sense the same structure, then one could also draw in all manner of 'different' systems---say, for example, the three body problem is at least conjectured to be computationally universal, so you could encode the requisite data into its initial configuration, and then just let Newton's laws do the rest. Or, of course, any other theory that allows for universal computation.

So fine, one might try to say that then, most of the structure is in the initial condition---the program, so to speak. But this, too, is far from unique: you can instantiate the three body problem with all manner of initial states, implementing different Turing machines that then instantiate the requisite computation from different initial conditions. In each case, that would add some constant number of bits to the length of the initial program, corresponding to the specification of a Turing machine to be simulated.

So suppose that you have an initial condition for the three body problem that can be specified using n bits, such that the resulting system implements the 'structure of the world' in some sense, by essentially implementing some Turing machine T executing the n bit program. Then, it seems to me you could find a TM T' such that it takes at most n O(1) bits input to implement the same program, with the O(1) factor corresponding to T' simulating T. But then, have you really said more about the world other than 'it contains at least n bit of information' if you specify its structure in this way?

I think this is essentially the Newman problem again. In some sense, all 'universal' structures---structures corresponding to theories allowing for universal computation---are equivalent: whatever you can describe using one, you can describe using another, with at most some constant overhead.

Maybe one could try to argue for parsimony, and single out that structure which yields the most compact specification---which has the problem that the question which one this is will be undecidable, due to the uncomputability of Kolmogorov complexity. Or, one could try to adapt the various attempts at solving the threat of trivializing computationalism---because that's essentially the same problem, again: virtually every system can, naively, be viewed as instantiating virtually every computation. There are, I think, certain avenues regarding dispositional/counterfactual/causal accounts of computation that one could pursue, in order to arrive at a notion of isomorphism between structures that's coarse-grained enough to allow for the identification of 'obviously identical' structures, without being so coarse-grained as to trivially identify virtually all structures with one another. I'm not sure if that'll work, but, with a more careful fleshing out of the notion of structure, I think there's at least a few avenues to explore here.

Regarding the concrete application towards quantum mechanics, I think I understand your proposal somewhat better now; but if the structure, as such, only accounts for the correlations in measured data, then how are concrete measurement outcomes accounted for? Pre-measurement, only a certain probability distribution over outcomes exists, but post-measurement, we at least seem to have observed one definite outcome.

Now, I suppose one way to account for this without appealing to some sort of coming-into-being of a more differentiated structure is to appeal to a sort of facts-as-relations account: before the measurement, relative to the '|ready>' state of the detector, the (say) qubit is in an equal superposition; after the measurement, relative to the '|detected 1>'-state of the detector, the qubit is in the state |1>, and relative to the '|detected 0>' state of the detector, it's in the state |0>. We think about this as moving from a superposition to a definite state, but this is really thinking as if we could hold the state of the detector fixed---but thinking about this as a relation between the detector and the qubit, the three propositions 'relative to |ready>, the qubit is |0> |1>', 'relative to |detected 1>, the qubit is |1>', and 'relative to |detected 0>, the qubit is |0>'---which are not actually in conflict at all, and hence, can well be part of a consistent structure.

As for my 'middle way' between the naive box-of-things view of the world, and the---to my way of thinking---somewhat too rarefied view of relata-less relations, I don't really go into that in the present essay, but the germ of the idea---which is still pretty much all I've got---is in my entry into last year's contest, where I essentially propose that there are fundamental facts only relative to a certain perspective on the world, or a certain way to split the world into distinct subsets, or sub-objects, or perhaps, subject and object. It's a bit of a tightrope walk, and I'm far from certain something like that can be made to work at all, but not really liking to drop to either side, it's kinda all I got.

I hope you manage to meet all your deadlines!

Cheers

Jochen

Dear Marcus,

I think the sort of explication of structure you're looking for might work along the lines developed by Lutz in 'Newman's Objection is Dead; Long Live Newman's Objection!'. Lutz essentially points out that there's no real way out of Newman's objection if the usual, Ramsey-sentence based notion of structure is used, but argues that this notion is insufficient anyway, and proposes to use an isomorphism-based notion: some sets A and B provided with relations R and S respectively have the same structure if and only if there is a one-to-one relation between A and B such that for all elements a1 and a2 of A such that a1Ra2, they are mapped to elements b1 and b2 of B such that b1Sb2.

I haven't gone through the complete paper yet, but so far, it seems promising.

Cheers

Jochen

Dear Yehonatan,

I fully agree: Turing's result is about the limitations of machines, and Bell's is about ontology. These are very different things! That's also why I believe that Goedel's theorems do not directly apply to physics (as I also write in my essay), and why my use of the notion of "structure" in both cases is not identical, but only an analogy.

About your idea of non-machines, let me hold off commenting before I finally come across reading your essay. At the end of this week, I'll have more time and should be able to start reading.

"Limitations of a system called Yehonatan...": I'm fully on board with this. :-) I'm also encountering the limitations of a system called Markus Mueller on a day-by-day basis. Perhaps the most important lesson in studying physics is to find out about one's own limitations.

Best,

Markus

Dear Jochen,

the points that you are raising are very interesting, but going into quite far-reaching details so that I feel I really want to read your essay first (and last year's again) before commenting much further.

In a very brief nutshell, I've tried to lay out my view in detail in arXiv:1712.01826. It is in some sense much more radical. In a nutshell, I would say that the following two situations are absolutely ontological identical:

(1) We are parts of a physical universe in roughly the way that we intuitively believe.

(2) We are brains in a vet or a simulation, yielding exactly the same observations as in case (1).

My argument is that all that there is, in a way, is an observer's state, and some chance of what this state might be next (and the form of this is the unique primitive structural claim). There is not *one* world, or *many*, but *zero*. To a view of this form, many standard objections and problems don't apply. Instead, one then has to argue why it typically so looks to the observer *as if* they were part of some "world", with computation, "things" and intersubjectivity. That's what I'm claiming to do, in an abstract sense, in that paper.

Now, I don't jut want to spam the world with the details of my pet view, so let me not go much further into this, and instead read your essay and comment on it to continue our discussion.

Maybe a final comment for now: the "simulation" problem that you mention is discussed a lot in the context of algorithmic information theory. As an arbitrary example (that you may enjoy), here's a paper by Marcus Hutter: "A Complete Theory of Everything (will be subjective)". What's said there (and elsewhere) is that it's not enough to have a theory that contains what you see (otherwise: dovetail all computable universes, done!), but you have to say where you are in it (observer localization).

Best,

Markus

Dear Markus Mueller:

I very much enjoyed your essay. It closely parallels ideas in my essay, in which I distinguish between empirical models and conceptual models. An empirical model, like your description of theory, describes objects of observations and their empirical relationships. A conceptual model, like your structure, describes what the theory is talking about, i.e. it tries to define physical reality.

You note that Special Relativity tells us that we cannot answer whether two events are simultaneous. Is this the end of the story? Or should we, as the Theorem and final paragraph in Section II suggest, take this unanswerable question as a deep insight into the possible existence of distinct differentiations?

Special Relativity assumes that all inertial reference frames are equally valid. This is empirically consistent with SR, but it is an added assumption about the nature of physical reality. It leads to 4D spacetime and no definition of simultaneity. Klingman's essay describes an alternative reality, based on a contrarian assumption that physical reality is contextually defined with respect to a particular inertial reference frame. This structure/conceptual model is also empirically consistent with special relativity, including time dilation, but it describes a 3D space with a single time frame, and it embraces simultaneity.

In my essay, I describe the Copenhagen Interpretation as an empirical model of QM. It is focused on predicting measurement results and explicitly avoids questions of underlying reality. As such it is an undifferentiated theory, in which the question "Is randomness fundamental?" is unanswerable.

I consider more-differentiated structures to describe contrasting conceptual models of quantum reality. One conceptual model (I call HCM) adds an assumption that denies fundamental randomness. This assumption equates the wavefunction with physical reality, and both are fundamentally deterministic. I also describe an alternative model, which I refer to as DDCM. It recognizes that absolute zero can be approached but never attained, and it assumes that physical reality is contextually defined with respect to a positive ambient temperature. It describes physical reality as fundamentally random and irreversible. Both structures are empirically consistent with QM, but they yield contrasting answers to the questions of fundamental randomness and irreversibility. (DDCM also resolves the measurement problem and other conceptual difficulties of QM.)

I suggest that the metaphysics of "things" corresponds to a context-free physical reality. Things have independent existence. The metaphysics of structure, which "manifests itself by, and weaves together, 'real patterns'" corresponds to a contextual physical reality, in which elements of reality are defined by their relationship to their objective physical context. Contextual reality with respect to a positive ambient temperature provides a firm foundation for your final hypothesis of a fundamentally probabilistic quantum reality.

I hope you will take a look at my essay and provide your thoughts.

Sincerely,

Harrison Crecraft

    Dear Markus,

    This is a very insightful and very well written essay you have got there!

    The structural realism you put forward coincidentally resonates with some of my recent readings on Poincaré who was also advocating for a form of structural realism well before quantum mechanics.

    A naive query I would have about an ontology based on structure is that it seems to rely on a form of first order logic where predicates, and the rules they may obey, are what remains when what they can act on is forgotten. But I cannot help wonder how would that work if the predicates themselves are instantiations of models in higher order logics; it would seem to run into a form of infinite recurrence of Russian dolls structures that in some sense never stops; unless we select a given model or order of logic.

    I would be interested to read your thoughts on this :) .

    In case you would be interested I develop a similar view in my submitted essay where, as far as I understand your perspective, we claim that finding meaningful differentiations within a given structure (of observational phenomena for example) is in fact a defining feature of scientific practice https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3477 .

    Best of luck for the contest.

    Fabien

      Hi Markus,

      I enjoyed reading your essay. You present some an interesting an very unique perspective.

      If I understand correctly, you are proposing we focus on the structural patterns between elements of physical theories. That is, the relationships between things in the theory are fundamental, not the things themselves? Is this what you meant by real patterns? It was a little vague.

      If I have understood this correctly, I do believe I could get behind this idea with a bit more convincing. There are considerable overtone in your essays to the structuralist ideas of contemporary philosophy which I have been somewhat sympathetic too. I think it might provide some useful insights for the physical sciences.

      In any case, I will be checking out a few more of your papers on this topic!

      Thanks again,

      Michael

        Dear Harrison (if I may),

        thanks very much for your thoughtful comments!

        I really like your insight that "being undifferentiated" can also mean that something is defined in a contextual way. Your example with reference frames in SR is a very good example.

        I would like to find out more about your view on QM (especially what you mean by DDCM), and will try to have a look at your essay if I manage to find the time.

        Best,

        Markus

        Dear Michael,

        thank you for your comment!

        I agree that the notion of "structure" in my essay is a bit vague. One would have to invest more work to make this mathematically and philosophically sound.

        What I do *not* mean by "structure" is simply the relations between things (in the sense, for example, of Newman's objection). What I rather mean is, basically, whatever we can say about the "real patterns" we encounter.

        Ladyman at al. have clearer definitions of this. They write, for example, that certain patterns behave like "things". But the notions of "things" or "relations" are not taken as primitives to ground the notion of pattern or structure.

        Thanks again for checking out my essay!

        Best,

        Markus

        Dear Fabien,

        thanks so much for taking the time to read my essay, and for your comments!

        It's very interesting to hear that Poincare was already advocating for some form of structural realism. Off the top of your head, do you perhaps know a reference for this? I'd be curious!

        Now, regarding your question on the "Russian dolls structure" in an ontology of structure. First, note that answers to your question -- more generally the question of how to think of an ontology of structure, and how to define it much more carefully than in my essay -- can be found much better in the works of philosophers who have written about this in much more detail. My favorite source is still Ladyman.

        Now, second, I guess that the way I understand "structure" is different from how it is used in your argument. I totally agree that there is this infinite-recurrence problem that you describe -- if one relies on a view in which we have "mathematical objects" (the individuals) and their "relations" (the predicates etc.), and that an "ontology of structure" means to drop the former and keep the latter.

        But this is not how I want to understand "structure". Rather, I'd use "structure" as the whole package of what a given consistent formal system, or theory, talks about. It is what all models of a given theory have in common.

        This is vague for two reasons. First, because for the essay I didn't do the hard work one would have to do to make this philosophically and mathematically more rigorous. Second, I believe that it *must* appear vague to some extent because our intuitively "most concrete" ideas are those of things and their properties, and these notions are exactly what's avoided here to begin with.

        Good luck for the contest to you, too!

        Best,

        Markus

        Hi Markus,

        Congratulations to the well-organized essay. I learned so many quantum foundations topics from this. In your quantum-optimistic hypothesis, how to deal with the data-driven science to be approached to quantum mechanics? On quantum mechanical objects or events, this seems to NOT be reproductive even by the future AI technology if this hypothesis is true.

        Best wishes,

        Yutaka

          Dear Markus,

          Thank you so much for writing this essay. I enjoyed reading it very much, and learned a lot of stuff. I think the message is somewhat orthogonal to my essay, but not necessarily contradictory. I like your viewpoint regarding how we implicitly assume there to be a metaphysics of things, and how this may be mistaken.

          Thanks again, and all the best,

          Gemma

            Dear Markus,

            I really enjoyed reading your essay, and I sympathize with a lot of your ideas.

            Especially, the fact that letting go of the concept of "things" and acknowledging that some questions have no answer, "dissolve" the paradoxes and avoid the invocation of weird ontological phenomena. Indeed, quantum theory invites to consider the notion of "entities" (as they were defined since Aristotle, individual objects with determinable intrinsic properties) as an "epistomological obstacle" as philosopher Gaston Bachelard might say. A metaphysical distancing from the notion of "things". While I was preparing my essay, I came across this quote from Rothstein, which I think might be in line with your "dissolution of questions" : an `` operational meaning can be assigned to question with respect to a system of interest which does not include the observer. Applied to the universe as a whole, these question lose their operational significance and become physically undecidable, they become metaphysical questions.''

            I really enjoyed your defense of an "optimistic" view. It is true that interpretations acknowledging this analysis are very often mistaken with "incomplete" knowledge (epistemic restrictions) about ontic things ; or they are straightforwardly labelled as anti-realistic, without specifying "anti-realistic towards what". Not towards the existence of an external word, but towards the notion of "things".

            I guess there might an ambiguity in your essay (or a misunderstanding from me), because I don't see QBism as "an epistemic restriction" which can be compared with Spekkens's view. I rather see it as something that might get along with your view, an optimistic position based on acknowledging that some "questions don't have answers" not because of a lack of human ability, but based on a fundamental, logical argument.

            Instead of taking a metaphysical stance as you do, arguing for an ontological realism of structures ; I tend to be sceptical towards sentences such as "the world is" (which are often related to a naïve realism (based on "things")). So I am not sure that I completely rely on your view that "the world is about structure". The word "structure" seems quite vague and ambiguous... and I prefer (for now) to strive for an "epistemological modesty" rather than designating what is ontological or not. However, you solution is way more appealing than naïve realism, since it is proposed after a careful analysis about the (un)decidability of questions. So I rather prefer your conclusion : "We can know what there is to know." Which resonate with Bohr-like sentences : "There is no quantum world. Physics is about what we can say about nature".

            If you ever find the time to read my essay, I would be glad to have your feedbacks on it. You go further than my analysis, proposing an ontological path to follow (structuralism) while I stopped at the dissolution step (for now). However, your notion of "Structural differentiation" seems rather close to my concept of "meta-contextuality", and I am very curious to have your thoughts on this.

            I hope that your essay will do great in the contest.

            Best,

            Hippolyte

              Hi Markus,

              your essay is definitely my top pick for this contest, thank you for contributing! You state in your concluding hypothesis:

              "The quantum world is probabilistic structure. In other words, it is not a "thing" or a collection of things, but it is the multitude of statistical patterns and their structural relations that any observer encounters in their data."

              So is the question here then how our discrete observational experience of a 3D world emerges from the probabilistic structure of our observations? And for you might this ontic structural - quantum - realism also be a form of wave function realism where the quantum side of that realism equates to a pure potentiality for experience rather than a thing-like external quantum world? A sort of QBist realism meets radical empiricism for which there is only the real patterns of our observational experience?

              I've long been a fan of Dennett's take on phenomenal experience (the manifest image) and its 'real patterns', or the persistent regularities of our sensory perception (cf. Husserl). Our species has evolved to perceive complex patterns in the phenomenal flux of visual, auditory, chemical, and somatic sensory experience, and where those patterns are predictive they can be considered 'real', with the natural (phenomenal) numbers being a case in point. I take it Peano's axioms would then be an account of the modern structural relations evident in the real patterns of our natural/phenomenal counting experiences, along with whatever ontological assumptions that might motivate those axioms? Such as, for some, a rather quaint (and in this case a posteriori) belief in Platonic realism for numbers.

              The ontic/conceptual structure then consists of identifying the dynamic relations between factical/real patterns--with structure defined by ontological and mathematical concepts that can explicate those patterns in terms of formalized predictions--and the history of science becomes the history of technological advances in our real pattern finding (from Kepler's telescope to the Michelson-Morley experiment and on to Aspects' entangled photons) leading to whatever necessary paradigmatic updates might be needed on the structural relations side with their subsequent technological innovations and so on... Which brings us to the contemporary conceptual mess of 21st C quantum foundations!

              In this way the structural 'laws of physics' and the ontology that informs them emerge from the real patterns observed in scientific/empirical experience. So your ontic structural realism is then an observer dependent realism? I assume this is where your 'law without law' research project begins, with a first person perspective using algorithmic probability to assign structure to sense data patterns? What is real are the patterns (the information) ... where an observer might be defined as nothing more or less than the flux of its observations situated, by simple definition, at the centre of its observable universe of real patterns and their probabilistic structural relations.

              And finally, is it this first person ontology of the observer that might provide a structural differentiation from the early modern (delusional) godlike third person perspective that reduces the observer to a simple automaton located in an unobservable classical container world of the Ding an sich?

              Apologies for crowding your thread but I find these questions fascinating and closely aligned with my own philosophical prejudices!

              All the best,

              Malcolm

              Je suis, nous sommes Wigner!

                Dear Markus,

                Your essay is one of the few that I could identify with. While I am not very sure of how close our views are it seems we agree that reality is computable. My model sort of points outs that nature is a mathematical structure that represents probability structure as in "geometric probability", also taken line-line or circle-line picking as examples. you can see that the expectation value characterizes the "process", I would guess similar to you idea. Moreover, when I interpret the line lengths(after some summing procedure and inverting and normalizing) as energy many results that agree whith QM and QFT is obtained. Also my model sort of agrees generally with

                https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-thermal-interpretation-of-quantum-physics.967116/

                I hope you are discouraged by my low score, since I am not into political chit chating just for the score. Thanks

                  I hope you are discouraged by my low score, since I am not into political chit chating just for the score. Thanks

                  of course that shout read

                  I hope you are NOT discouraged by my low score, since I am not into political chit chating just for the score. Thanks

                  Dear Professor Markus

                  I got a very nice introduction to you from Prof. Malcolm Riddoch, this post is about furthering that discussion...

                  This will give me a fundamental approach to the quantum mechanics. I will go thro' your essay soon of them and contact back to you ASAP.

                  I mainly worked in cosmology , I am yet to enter into the world of Quantum Physics, i will do that in discussion with you and your friends...

                  Meanwhile he asked me about my possible fundamental concepts??

                  These are the Fundamental concepts of Dynamic Universe Model taken from my essay, Have a look at my essay for further details....

                  C.1. Logical and Physical foundational points of Dynamic Universe Model:

                  -No Isotropy

                  -No Homogeneity

                  -No Space-time continuum

                  -Non-uniform density of matter, universe is lumpy

                  -No singularities

                  -No collisions between bodies

                  -No blackholes

                  -No warm holes

                  -No Bigbang

                  -No repulsion between distant Galaxies

                  -Non-empty Universe

                  -No imaginary or negative time axis

                  -No imaginary X, Y, Z axes

                  -No differential and Integral Equations mathematically

                  -No General Relativity and Model does not reduce to GR on any condition

                  -No Creation of matter like Bigbang or steady-state models

                  -No many mini Bigbangs

                  -No Missing Mass / Dark matter

                  -No Dark energy

                  -No Bigbang generated CMB detected

                  -No Multi-verses

                  C.2. Main ETHICAL foundational principles of Dynamic Universe Model:

                  -Human Accrued knowledge should be free to all

                  -Concept should come out from the depth of truth;

                  -Authors / Scientists thinking should go towards perfection;

                  -Logic should be simple

                  -Theory's predictions should be verifiable experimentally, by anyone and anywhere with the same conditions

                  -Computations / computer programs should be simple

                  -ontological realism of senses produced information

                  -New theory lead us forward into ever-widening thought and action experiments

                  -Let the new theory lead us into that heaven of freedom.

                  C.3. Main PHYSICAL and COSMOLOGICAL foundational principles of "N-Body problem solution: Dynamic Universe Model":

                  -Natural universe regularly undergoes change in shape due to mutual Dynamical

                  Gravitational forces.

                  -Accelerating Expanding universe with 33% Blue shifted Galaxies

                  -Newton's Gravitation law works everywhere in the same way

                  -All bodies dynamically moving

                  -All bodies move in dynamic Equilibrium

                  -Closed universe model no light or bodies will go away from universe

                  -Single Universe no baby universes

                  -Time is linear as observed on earth, moving forward only

                  -Independent x,y,z coordinate axes and Time axis no interdependencies between axes..

                  -UGF (Universal Gravitational Force) calculated on every point-mass

                  -Tensors (Linear) used for giving UNIQUE solutions for each time step

                  -Uses everyday physics as achievable by engineering

                  -21000 linear equations are used in an Excel sheet

                  -Computerized calculations uses 16 decimal digit accuracy

                  -Data mining and data warehousing techniques are used for data extraction from large amounts of data.

                  Best wishes to your essay

                  =snp

                    Dear Mueller:

                    Excellent scholarly article.

                    I basically agree with your views:

                    "I argue to replace this perspective by a worldview in which a structural notion of 'real patterns', not 'things' are regarded as fundamental. Instead of a limitation of what we can know, undecidability and unpredictability then become mere statements of undifferentiation of structure."

                    ..... but only partly, because "undifferentiation of structure" acknowledges our persistence ignorance. In fact, that is point of my essay.

                    Please, make time to read my essay and grade it.

                    "Complete Information Retrieval: A Fundamental Challenge"

                    https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3565

                    The universe is fundamentally stochastic because the observable radiations and particles are emergent oscillations/vibrations of the universal cosmic space, which is, at the same time, full of random "background" fluctuations. These fluctuations, however weak they may be, nonetheless are perturbing any and all other interactions going on in the universe. Since, human initiated measurements are also interactions between our chosen interactants in our apparatus, stochastical changes will be inevitable in every measurements, classical or quantum.

                    I am an experimentalist. Aprreciating persistent & continued incompleteness in our knowledge does not require complex philosophical arguments. Our measurements will always be imprecise. That we had been, we now are, and we will always be, information limited, emerges naturally when we enumerate the basic steps in any measurement:

                    (i) Data are some physical transformation taking place inside the apparatus.

                    (ii) The physical transformation in a detectable material always require some energy exchange between the interactants, the "unknown" and the "known", where the "known" is the reference interactant.

                    (iii) The energy exchange must be guided by some force of interaction operating between the chosen interactants.

                    (iv) Since we have started with an unknown universe, from the standpoint of building physics theories, the "known" entities are known only partially, never completely. This also creates information bottleneck for the "unknown" entity. Note that in spite of innumerable experiments, we still do not know what electrons and photons really are.

                    (v) All forces of interactions are distance dependent. Hence, the interactants must be placed within the range of each other's mutual influence (force-field). Force-field creates the necessary physical "entanglement" between interacting entities for the energy transfer to proceed. In other words, interactants must be "locally or regional" within their physical sphere of influence. They must be "entangled" by a perceptible physical force. Our equations are built on such hard causality.

                    (vi) The final data in all instruments suffer from the lack of 100% fidelity. This is another permanent problem of imprecision. We can keep on reducing the error margin as our technology enhances; but we do not know how to completely eliminate this error.

                    Many of my earlier papers have also articulated this position. They can be downloaded from:

                    http://www.natureoflight.org/CP/

                    You can also download the paper: "Next Frontier in Physics--Space as a Complex Tension Field"; Journal of Modern Physics, 2012, 3, 1357-1368 , http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/However, mp.2012.310173

                    Sincerely,

                    Chandra.

                    Prof. ChandraSekhar Roychoudhuri