Vladimir Rogozhin Greetings Vladimir,

Thank you for your sentiments and musings here, your perspective is much like my basic orientation even if we emphasize different details and aren't fully on the same page. Thanks also for bringing Vasily Nalimov to my attention. I either had not heard of him, or forgot. He too, is basically aligned with our perspective, although I note he frames this in terms of semantic expression of mind (more cognitively) rather than the "qualia" format that emphasizes sensory empiricism and as a distinction from abstract process. I will read more.

You don't have an alias like us contestants, in what manner are you a member of FQxI?

Regards.

      Neil Bates
      As for the ideas of V. Nalimov ("Self-Aware Universe", 1996), I consider these thoughts to be especially important for ontological construction:

      • the task of "building a super-unified field theory that describes both physical and semantic manifestations of the World."

      • "we must: (1) overcome some of the limitations that weigh on us, established in the paradigm of our culture; (2) outline the contours of a self-conscious universe."

        • 1. Overcoming interfering prerequisites_
          _1. We are still hung over by the rigid Cartesian distinction between mind and matter. The basis for this was the assertion that matter is spatially extended, but the mind is not. Now we can ignore this argument. We know that the spatial perception of physical reality is determined not so much by the World around us, but by the ability initially given to our consciousness to see the World as spatially ordered. We can also learn to spatially perceive the World of Meanings if we are able to set the image of the semantic field in some fairly visual way. So we can geometrize our ideas about consciousness and create a language close to the language of modern physics.

      • In order to set the image of the semantic field, it must be recognized that meanings are primary in nature. In other words, it is necessary to agree that elementary meanings (which are not yet texts) are set initially. Here we come very close to the position of Plato, by the way, formulated by him not clearly enough. Such an approach can no longer be considered unscientific - we recognize the initial predetermination of fundamental physical constants, the nature of which is more mental than physical." [https://web.archive.org/web/20111205183605/http://v-nalimov.ru/articles/111/395/]

      But I do not agree with his further approach to constructing the model of the "Self-Aware Universe". Building a model, one must simultaneously solve the century-old problem of the ontological justification/substantiation of mathematics (ontological basification).
      As for "qualia", the inclusion in the core of the model of the concept "ontological (structural, cosmic) memory - the "soul of matter" substantiates the nature of "qualia".
      I am not participating in this Competition, but only as a reader.
      Good luck in the Сompetition!
      Regards.

        My brief takeaways:

        1. Orchestrated Objective Reduction: (Roger Penrose & Stuart Hameroff) Human consciousness quantum processes occurring within microtubules inside neurons of human brain.
2. Panpsychism: (Philip Goff) Universal consciousness is a ubiquitous feature of the Cosmos like the Electromagnetic field and the interplay of mass and Charge in the interactions with the electromagnetic field -- Cosmic consciousness works within this framework.
3. Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH): is Max Tegmark's brainchild blurs the distinction between mathematical structure and physical reality.  No doubt that many mathematical constructs are a perfect match to describe aspects of physical reality.  The only rule I would apply is that nothing that has physicality has zero size, zero thinness, or zero volume. 
4. Modal realism: A position in metaphysics, advocated by David Lewis in On the Plurality of Worlds, which claims that all possible worlds are just as real as the actual world we inhabit.

        Clearly each of these perspectives bring to the table key ideas that can connect together.
        I would say that phenomena like Remote Viewing, ESP & Astro Projection would not be possible if Panpsychism was not the case --AND-- that the microtubules are a prime candidate as the interface between Human consciousness Cosmic Conscious Field. As for Modal Realism my personal view is that the past already existed, the present is exists now, and the future exists in the imaginary realm of possibilities. But, to be honest, my thoughts in this area are very preliminary.

        All-in-all I'd say each of the 4 perspectives above (with the caveats mentioned) contribute significantly to this most intriguing Cosmic puzzle we call our universe.

        Someday I'll have much more to say about the Quantum Measurement Problem, but it will take several pages to explain the ever-expanding Cosmic Event Horizon as being a mirror that reflects all of physical reality back onto itself.

          Loved the title! I'm not sure if I've ever read a more compelling argument against computationalism other than that of Penrose himself.

          While the title of my own essay "Schisms beyond Arithmetick" might sound like it deals with mathematics it is not a subject I broached. Still, I would be interested in your perspective if you have the time to check it out.

            John Wsol
            Hello, MustardLynx,

            Thanks for the thoughtful reply. You listed four key items which are indeed core concepts in the attempt to transcend reductionism, although #3 and #4 are fairly similar. Modal realism is more broadly "semantics" oriented, it is not strictly limited to "mathematical" description. It is based on whatever could be coherently stated in principle as a "possible world," the only essential requirement being logical coherent and consistent. Both MR and MUH make essentially the same point though: neither mathematical nor semantic logic really explain why some such descriptions should be considered "concretely real" or "more real" than supposed mere abstractions, whether the latter are framed in terms of math or in terms of propositions broadly defined.

            Arguably, if indeed parapsychological phenomena really happen, Panpsychism is further supported. I'm not too up on the firmness of empirical support for any of those. As for the relation of MR to possible futures etc: MR goes far beyond possible paths of future events, of the sort proposed in MWI. MR imagines every, literally every, possible universe to exist just like ours does. So that means cartoon worlds like Wile E Coyote and the Road Runner, with varying degrees of specific elaboration and detail etc.

            I'll take a look at your essay soon.

              Rick Searle

              Hello, thanks for the props. I will take a look at your essay soon, remind me if i wait very long to comment there.

              -- PC

                11 days later

                Neil Bates

                Dear PersimmonCatshark, thanks for your well thought-trough essay! Your examination of the MUH is to the point and your conclusion that AI isn't able in principle to transcend and therefore realise its physical existence is marvellous. I also appreciate what you wrote about the EQM interpretation and its problems, it is good to have an essay that addresses these problems, since they are not at all spelled-out in the popularised presentations of EQM.

                As you rightfully work out in your essay, the human mind must have a certain ability to transcend its own information-processing determinism. Otherwise we wouldn't get dizzy when seriously thinking about the possibility for the MUH to be a true statement about fundamental reality.

                Although the MUH at first sight appears to be overal consistent, the above mentioned dizzyness reveals in my opinion that if it where true, then Gödel's undecidability must be decided by the human mind in favour of inconsistency instead of incompleteness – since the human mind as part of the MUH is able to produce a whole plethora of inconsistent systems / lines of reasonings etc. That in turn would mean for the MUH that it mixes consistency with inconsistency to arrive at a desired new level of explanation (the MUH level of explaining consciousness).

                But on the basis of mathematical logics, this mix isn't useful to really fundamentally explain reality, since it is unable to explain that human logics is able to discriminate between consistent and inconsistent. It is unable to explain this transcendent feature of the human mind with the help of an inconsistent explanatory scheme. Moreover, when talking about information-processing, the term “information” must also be a kind of transcendental entity, different from any formal system, since otherwise we couldn't even discriminate between consistent and inconsistent!

                So, in my opinion you are totally right, there must me something more within and about ultimate reality, something different than just information-processing – since information-processing obviously cannot differentiate whether or not what it is processing is built up by a consistent or an inconsistent choice of logical operators. It needs a (human) mind to do that!

                So we both essentially come to the conclusion that formalisability has its limits in explaining fundamental reality. I totally agree with that, on the basis what I myself have written for that contest and subsequently in my several comments on other essays. At my own essay page I make a dualistic attempt to solve the mind-body problem. I would be happy if you could take your time and read that comment as well as my essay. Would be great if you could also leave your thoughts on what i've written there by commenting!

                Big thanks again for a really deep and far-reaching essay!

                  Neil Bates
                  Re “MUH still deserves credit for being a boldly contrarian total world-view with a surprisingly solid (so to speak) argument”. I disagree.

                  I think the biggest problem with the already absurd and over the top MUH concept is that this concept is completely blind to the many logically necessary algorithmic steps that would be required to implement such a concept.

                  The controlling, many-step MUH algorithm that would be logically necessary to run each world, goes something like this:

                  IF more than one possible numeric value outcome for a particular situation is detected anywhere in a world (billions of checking and detection steps required here), THEN:

                  • Count the number of possible numeric outcomes, while recording each individual possible numeric outcome in a table (this involves a massive number of steps).
                  • Record the current numeric values of every variable, everywhere in the world (e.g. mass, velocity, position, energy). This would require much research and billions of steps.
                  • For each individual one of the possible numeric outcomes: create a whole new blank universe out of nothing (quite a lot of work), assign all the stored numeric values to every variable in the world, including the abovementioned individual possible numeric outcome (quite a lot of work); give each world a copy of the controlling many-step MUH algorithm; start it up.
                  • When all the above is finished, clean up by deleting the original algorithm and the original world.

                  Logically, billions of algorithmic steps would be required to implement the MUH concept. Yet MUH adherents seem to believe that new worlds can just magically appear, without all the logically necessary intermediate steps that would be required to implement the MUH concept.

                      Lorraine Ford

                      Things get even worse for Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), since if the MUH is considered to be true, then also EQM must be true.

                      Since the wave function in EQM evolves not only deterministically but also continously, there would be a non-denumerable infinity of possible branches involved within certain physical events (like for example atom dedays where time may be infinitely dividable, Feynman's path integrals etc.).

                      Besides the question how nature should cross a non-denumerable infinity of spacetime points even in a non-EQM world, things get worse when combining the MUH with the EQM. Then the question is whether or not to attach to each quasi-independent mathematical universe within the MUH a different time-scale or not.

                      In your scribble of the needed steps to produce a new “mathematical” world, you seem to assume the core mechanism to be some kind of classical computer, that step by step performs its instructions. This I think would be true for the mathematics we use to do science.

                      The EQM is not like that, since it is assumed to be a continous process. But in both cases one can ask how mathematics should be able to clearly separate discrete from continous evolutions of “itself”.

                      Take for example the continuum hypothesis. The latter is a certain assumption. As had been shown by Gödel and Cohen, this assumption can be added to Zermelo-Fraenkel-Set-Theory (ZF) without making it inconsistent. Cohen then showed that when abandoning that assumption from ZF, the latter likewise is not rendered inconsistent. That use of the mentioned assumption is called the “axiom of choice”. As far as I know, the original assumption cannot be rigorously proven to be true or false by any mathematical system.

                      Now the question arises how mathematics itself should implement its many worlds without knowing whether or not the continuum hypothesis is true or false. Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility to use the axiom of choice for one world, and not use it for another world does make logical sense on a human basis – as long as maths cannot prove whether or not the continuum hypothesis is true or false, it cannot create a physical, deterministic world by simply discarding the axiom of choice (since it does not know how such a world should evolve).

                      So neither the question of time-scales nor the question of physically meaningful choices can be answered alone by pure maths. They not even can be answered by human beings. Hence there are mathematical questions that have no answers and we as humans know that. But how should pure maths – seen as information processing in the framework of MUH know that? It can't, since many mathematical problems are NP-complete and without some dramatic speedup of information processing (or in other words, a mysterious MUH time travel?), pure maths can never know what is possible to be existent as physical and what not.

                      Therefore, I would rather prefer to see the axiom of choice as a clever human way to say that there are choices possible for human beings which are independent from certain deterministically working mathematical systems.

                      This comment is thought just as an addition to what you wrote, not as some kind of falsification (since your critics is well justified in my opinion).

                          Stefan Weckbach

                          A little addendum to my previous post:

                          Let's assume that the continuum hypothesis is false. Let's further assume that there does no mathematical proof exist that it is false. This then would mean that it is false due to no reasons at all. At least due to no mathematical reasons. Thus, there would be mathematics that is true for no mathematical reasons at all, since there would exist no mathematical algorithm to ever derive the truth that the continuum hypothesis is false.

                          These “reasons” must then be taken as simply given, or one has to search for some non-mathematical reasons for something that is “mathematically” true for no mathematical reasons.

                          Here I think we arrive at the limits of deduction and face the land of beliefs: One can also believe in the existence of a Creator of all maths and all the rest – simply due to the logical equivalence that this too could be true for no reasons. At least not for some mathematical reasons.

                              Stefan Weckbach
                              I personally wouldn’t equate the axiom of choice with true, non-arbitrary choice. There seems to be a lot of ideas about choice: many physicists and philosophers seem quite content to settle for the superficial appearance of choice (i.e. the superficial appearance of free will) rather than true choice. Put simply and unambiguously and mathematically, I think that true real-world choice is equivalent to the assignment of a number to a real-world variable, e.g. the relative position variable. (This is in contrast to a number for a variable being determined via a mathematical law of nature relationship.)

                              Also, to my mind, maths can’t be “seen as information processing”. In maths, it is people that perform the information processing steps (or a computer program can represent these same information processing steps). People make mathematics work: people are performing the steps and changing and rearranging the mathematical symbols.

                                Stefan Weckbach
                                Dear AquamarineTapir,

                                Thanks for appreciating my criticism of the MUH. The other related theory of how the world works that you mention, EQM, compounds the absurdity of the MUH idea. But when physical reality is looked at very closely, it seems that there is no such thing as numeric continuity, there are only number “jumps”, tiny number resets. Many physicists seem to still be fighting for the simple idea of numeric continuity, because numbers jumps seem to point to a lack of mathematical simplicity in the real world.

                                But I agree that “one has to search for some non-mathematical reasons for something that is “mathematically” true for no mathematical reasons.”. As you imply in your essay, there is no mathematical or logical reason, that physics or philosophy can find, for laws of nature: neither their existence nor their particular form.

                                I personally wouldn’t talk about a Creator, or any sort of original source of all there is. This is because this is a much more difficult question: the origin of the aspects of the world that we might represent with mathematical and algorithmic symbols. I think that, first, we need to clearly articulate what choice (free will, creativity) is (and whether it even exists at all), and what consciousness is.

                                    Lorraine Ford Maybe I don't fully understand your critique, but as I understand the concepts behind MUH (which, BTW, I do not agree with for other reasons): universes literally are the embodiments of mathematical structures, as if a mathematical model of a real world simply was, by itself, a world. There is no need to create something out of "nothing," the Platonic existence (like ideal dodecahedrons) is already real and manifests as a thing. All possible structures exist, like all possible numbers and equations, so no matter how difficult it is for a model to do the job, if there is even one in possible existence, that model makes for a world with observers who can wonder why they exist. It is like the self-selection effect claimed for why our physical constants are helpful to the formation of life: among all the possible worlds, even the tiniest minority with favorable laws of physics will have life, and "there you are." Again though, I disbelieve MUH but not because of supposed representational problems. I don't think that pure math or anything that acts purely like it can be modeled by math, can have real feelings, real consciousness. (As I explained in my essay.)

                                        Lorraine Ford

                                        Dear CornflowerCicada,

                                        thank you also for your response and appreciation for my arguments.

                                        Of course, the quest for the existence of a Creator can be made logically independent of how the world works. And as such, it is my attitude to not see or use the assumption of a Creator as an argument against examining the world with all the tools we can find. It is only that I think that the other way round also does make sense: examining the world is not in opposition to the assumption of a Creator. It is more the question whether or not we need / will need that assumption or whether we may be able to find a “natural” explanation / definition (whatever “natural” then will mean) not only for what i. e. consciousness is, or choices, or Qualia and the like, but also how this would be linked to a possible original source of all there is (since it had to be linked in some way to the latter – if we assume that the world is a unity).

                                        My take on this is, that every such explanation / definition, for reasons of logical consistency, must be constructed by some logical lines of reasoning and as such is subject to incompleteness or subject to unprovability. Even if these lines of reasonings are motivated by empirical data, I cannot see how for example neural correlates could ever explain the phenomenon of Qualia. But I am open for any attempt that someone eventually does so!

                                        Some people say that there may be needed a totally new scientific “paradigm” in the future that would enable us to explain Qualia. A new maths, a new mode of thinking, a new philosophical twist etc. My take on that is that we depend on data about the brain and as such, data and its many possible interpretations / combinations is always just a way to arrange the data to achieve consistency, not necessarily truth.

                                        If such a data arrangement should indeed – inherently – be the one that faithfully represents what Qualia is, then in my opinion that wouldn't be provable within that system. It wouldn't also be provable from without that system, means by human beings, since the problem of Qualia is that it is fundamentally different from particles, numbers, motions, vibrations and the like, even if the latter occur in vaste quantities in the brain and are supposed to have in-principle emergent potentials. The latter may be true, but in my opinion it is exceptionally hard to demonstrate / to prove with consciousness, even if some AI would be conscious (means aware that it exists and guesses – not necessarily knows! – that what it fundamentally is itself is some kind of information processing).

                                        Therefore I also like to examine what it would mean when it where true that there simply does not exist any suitable deductively as well as empirically reachable theory for Qualia, one that at least convinces all philosophers and all scientists – and we humans do not and cannot know that.

                                        In that case, the Turing machine in our heads will never halt, since it cannot arbitrarily change the tools with which it is working on the problem. In other words, I guess that the more we learn about the brain, the more questions will arise how we should translate the data we will find into what is called Qualia.

                                        The hypothetical opposite would be that Qualia (then meant as the undeniable conscious impression that Qualia emerges from information processing) is able to explain Qualia. But in my view that would only amount to saying that information processing is able to explain information processing (if it where true that Qualia is merely a sophisticated form of information processing). Thus, if the information processing paradigm where true, then the question is why it should become conscious at a certain – highly abstract? – level?

                                        With your own lines of reasoning and your argument for number jumps, in my opinion you gave a clever argument that there is at least something missing within the information processing paradigm. I would apprechiate when one could develop a bigger picture with your argument and its consequences for explaining Qualia / consciousness. I think we are only at the very beginning here, but your argument seems to be a good starting point in my opinion.

                                          Neil Bates
                                          But my opinion is that

                                          “… the Platonic existence (like ideal dodecahedrons) … “

                                          where

                                          “…All possible structures exist, like all possible numbers and equations, so no matter how difficult it is for a model to do the job, if there is even one in possible existence, that model makes for a world with observers … “

                                          is a thing that only exists in the human imagination!

                                              Lorraine Ford Mathematicians and philosophers have been arguing for literally ages over the "reality" of math. Not everyone agrees that it only exists in the human imagination, or is constructed rather than eternally real by itself. I could ask, in what sense do the objects of math exist even in the human (or other sorts of minds) imagination? That isn't really clear anyway, either. And what about all the math that must logically have truths about it, that no human is smart enough to think about or be sure of? It's problematic. In any case, the argument in my essay shows that whatever math "is", no computational-type process can reveal a concrete reality beyond math to the "mind" in which that process occurs.

                                                  Neil Bates
                                                  As I said to VermilionGoldfish, just a minute ago:
                                                  In a world of “fake news” and “alternative facts”, fake realities that only exist in people’s minds, can science/physics be different? Can physics at least say what are the genuine characteristics of what exists “out there”?

                                                  In your above reply, you can seemingly find no reliable, foundational basis for anything: everything seems to be uncertain or questionable, or truths that “that no human is smart enough to think about or be sure of”.

                                                  So, do you have any solid basis for your claim that you, PersimmonCatshark, are an entity that can actually make an argument about the nature of the world in an essay?

                                                    This is really an interesting discussion and I would like to once more contribute some further thoughts.

                                                    Within the picture of reality that is assumed to be exclusively only information processing, not more and not less, awareness of a world outside and independent of consciousness, is seen as a highly sophisticated, self-referentially functioning model of the world. Within that model, the observing subject, the person, the “I” is thought to be also “merely” a part of that highly sophisticated modelling procedure.

                                                    Consciousness and its Qualia in this picture are seen as supervening on complex information processings outside consciousness (thus, in the brain). In other words, consciousness is seen as a virtual “thing”, it has no physical substance, it is immaterial (like the landscape in a computer game is immaterial, admittedly a bad example, since it presupposes the existence of consciousness – rather than explaining it). The contents of consciousness are seen to be governed exclusively by deterministic information processing, namely the one we call “computationally irreducible”: one has to run the computation to obtain the result, there is no other way to obtain computationally irreducible results, they cannot be predicted in principle.

                                                    Some people may go so far to say, because consciousness is a virtual “thing”, not material, therefore it doesn't even exist. Usually it is formulated as “consciousness is an illusion”. Besides the fact that an illusion is an existing “thing”, what these people probably mean is that the contents of consciousness are illusory, since they give no reliable and definite picture about what the external world is fundamentally like.

                                                    In my opinion this poses the serious question whether or not the paradigm of an exclusively information processing world and the paradigm of the mind/consciousness as a model-building process about that world is itself just an unreliable model. But in what sense would the existence of illusory models in the mind doubt the paradigm of universal information processing rather than merely “confirm” it?

                                                    For that question to answer one had to differentiate between the truth that humans indeed facilitate models about the external world in their minds and the contents of those models. Analogous to the claim that consciousness is an illusion (we all know that it isn't), the contents of the models which are part of the mind's approach to predict / grasp / understand what is going on in the external reality are often really illusions (as surely everybody has already experienced at some point in life).

                                                    Now, to compress my serious question posed above: is modelling an external world really the reason and cause for consciousness to exist? Or may that assumption (that model!) be incomplete in certain respects? Are there exceptions / inconsistencies to the informational processing model paradigm?

                                                    For answering these questions, let me assume that the paradigm would be true. Now, as a matter of fact, I don't like that paradigm and I don't believe in it. My own model is something that I believe can transcend the model paradigm. How can this happen if the model paradigm would be true? According to the latter my own model must be simply the result of an irreducible computational act I have no access to. Therefore, the intermediate result is that irreducible computation is able to compute something that denies the informational processing model paradigm.

                                                    Now, for my model to at all being logically possible and true, it would need something that could exist outside, beyond the informational processing model paradigm. Well, the latter assumes such a realm to be factually existent, namely the virtual, immaterial realm of consciousness mentioned above. But in the informational processing world view, this realm is thought of as a deterministic result of the underlying physical dynamics of the brain, and hence is overall information processing in nature, so my own model can't be true yet. But it will "become" true in the course of what I aim to further explain.

                                                    The motivation for assuming that consciousness has at all emerged from some death information processing in the external world is that it is assumed to enhance the survival of a huge collection of cells (human and animal bodies) as long as possible. So it must have an evolutionary advantage for a huge collection of cells to cooperate rather than each cell fighting for its own survival.

                                                    This may be true, but it really does not explain why in a genuinly information processing world my physical behaviour – which in the information processing paradigm is thought to be determined by computationally irreducible processes – should evolutionary be more adapted when that process is accompanied by some sophisticated model about the world called “consciousness”.

                                                    The trick for the information processing paradigm to be convincing is that it uses the - seemingly - logical undecidability about whether it should be considered true or not. Because it assumes that cells as well as huge amounts of cells have no clue that in reality their coalitions into bigger organisms is also pre-determined by blind information processing, as also consciousness and all the rest of history is assumed to be.

                                                    Besides the fact that what should be proven by that paradigm is then presupposed to already exist at the level of cells, namely that information processing naturally leads to model-making for the sake of better coping with the external world (what is surely in part true for human beings), the paradigm gives no reasons why the functioning of a pile of deterministically behaving cells should at all develop some consciousness.

                                                    The only reason that it gives is anthropomorphising our subjective impresssion to have some control over what is happening in our lifes to the level of cells. Thereby it is assumed that consciousness has some real control over what is deterministically happening with the organism, and that is a strikingly contradiction, since in a world that is seen as a finite automaton, certainly a very complex one, that automaton is a causally closed thing.

                                                    Therefore, attributing some causally effective power to the phenomenon of consciousness within the information processing paradigm must be an incorrect modelling and the correct modelling should be that consciousness is merely an unexplainable byproduct of the mentioned paradigm.

                                                    But since that paradigm aims to “explain” the existence of consciousness in a non-mystifying way, it tries to give consciousness a certain purpose, namely model-facilitating. When I go on a walk in nature, or when I relax in the open air bath with a beer in my hand, there seems no model-making involved other than to please myself. Does pleasing oneself give an evolutionary advantage? For a healthy person perhaps, since fresh air and fun is surely healthy. But if I have a huge beer belly and nonetheless want to enjoy another couple of beers, isn't that against longer living?

                                                    Moreover, there are people that do not wish to live long, how does this come about in a world where only things are valued which give an organism an advantage for living as long as it can? In my opinion, if there is any physical reason that cells have developed to cooperate with each other, this reason then has to be seen in blind selection of the fittest configurations to survive. There was no model-making involved at this stage.

                                                    The result of all of this is in my opinion that consciousness can deliberately act against the information processing paradigm with its ambigous assumption that consciousness should make a difference in the course of these information processing affairs.

                                                    My consciousness can do this by showing that if it is true that consciousness is a virtual, immaterial “thing”, emerging from underlying physical information processsing, then by definition it cannot causally influence any of these underlying processes, since it is defined as immaterial, virtual. Thus it could not exhibit any advantage for the survival of the organism, and therefore should be considered as superfluous in a mere information processing paradigm that assigns an evolutionary advantage for consciousness to exist.

                                                    The relevant point here is that the mentioned paradigm is defined as a causally closed system and that definition does not allow for any superfluous extra-ingredients that are non-material in nature. But nonetheless there does exist that “extra-ingredient”, which in my opinion shows that the information processing paradigm cannot be a complete description of reality and at the same time be consistent. This is also true for the assumption that reality is a kind of non-deterministic finite automaton, since every such automaton is equivalent to a certain deterministic finite automaton.

                                                    This is admittedly a very lengthy comment, but I think it may bring some clarity into the discussion and with that I do not mean the discussion here on that site, but generally the discussion about how to handle the phenomenon of consciousness scientifically.

                                                      Stefan Weckbach
                                                      I think physics has provided a genuine foundational basis for thinking about the real physical world, as opposed to the fake realities that can very easily exist in the human imagination. While this might not be the whole story, the real physical world is always described by physics in terms of an infrastructure of measurable categories, relationships between such categories, and numbers that apply to these categories.

                                                      While this might not be the whole story, this is saying something genuine and important about the real physical world, as opposed to the fake realities that can very easily exist in the human imagination. What physics says about the world should not necessarily be thought of as a mathematical universe: it is about a world that has a necessary reliable infrastructure, not a world of mad randomness, there is only a little bit of flexibility/ “randomness”. This infrastructure is always represented, using symbols that were originally devised in the creative minds of people, in terms of categories, relationships and numbers.

                                                      Regarding consciousness: I regard consciousness as a foundational aspect of reality, because the experiential/ knowledge aspect of consciousness, and the logical aspect of consciousness, clearly can’t be derived from the physical correlates of consciousness, i.e. can’t be derived from categories, relationships and numbers. Instead, consciousness is experience or knowledge of what would be symbolically represented as categories, relationships and numbers.

                                                          Lorraine Ford

                                                          Thanks for your reply, CornflowerCicada. Yes, I would totally agree with what you wrote. Physics uses the fact that the world is logically ordered. Consciousness also uses this fact, but itself not necessarily being equal to that fact.