What kills Schrödinger’s cat?

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford You have again repeated the exact same straw-man argument tactic, which has now become quite obvious. You’re still illogically attributing an assumption to me that I explicitly rejected multiple times. I don’t assume the existence of abstract or Platonic knowledge of physical reality, collated or otherwise, and I never once stated that I did.

When I say that a physical configuration exists I mean exactly that. A physical configuration exists. I don’t add the additional proposition that something must therefore possess knowledge of that configuration.

Categories, numbers, and mathematical relationships are how we describe physical reality. If an underlying nonlinear physical substrate exists then it does not need to know the categories or numbers that we assign to it, nor does it need a collated list of everything that is simultaneously true about itself before it can interact or change.

Your “(category1=number1 AND category2=number2...) IS TRUE” statement may be a perfectly legitimate symbolic representation of several conditions obtaining simultaneously. But what I don’t see is how writing “IS TRUE” establishes that some fundamental point of reality actually possesses knowledge of those conditions. That certainly is an additional ontological premise that still needs rational justification.

And no, I’m not searching for a “killer equation” that somehow makes reality move. Equations don’t make anything happen. I posit that the physical substrate itself is dynamical while equations are our attempt to describe those dynamics and eventually derive testable consequences from them.

So I think our disagreement can be reduced to one question. Why does a physical condition being the case require something to possess knowledge that it is the case? Until that implication is established then I don’t see any need whatsoever to introduce a fundamental knowledge-bearing component into the ontology.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
We don't know the "physical substrate".

Instead, we measure and represent the physical substrate in terms of categories, relationships/ equations and numbers. (And I am saying that we also need to use algorithmic/ logical connective statements in order to represent how the world knows itself, and how the world moves itself.)

The claim that "the physical substrate itself is dynamical" is just a lot of high-level human-level words describing the physical substrate. The words need to be translated into categories, relationships/ equations and numbers (and algorithmic/ logical connective statements). You are back to the same old problem of representing the world.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford Yes, we don’t have direct access to the underlying physical substrate, and saying “the substrate is dynamical” is not sufficient by itself. Any serious physical framework has to translate that claim into precisely defined quantities, mathematical relationships, evolution laws, boundary conditions, and ultimately testable predictions. That’s exactly the burden NVM has to meet.

But that still doesn’t establish your additional claim.

You keep unnecessarily adding that the world must “know itself” and then use algorithmic or logical statements to represent that proposed knowledge. I have no objection to using algorithms or logical connectives as mathematical tools, but what I don’t see is why their usefulness for representing a system demonstrates that the physical system itself possesses knowledge or evaluates propositions about its own condition.

So yes, we are necessarily back to representing the world. I don’t see that as a problem. That’s what physical theories do. The important distinction is between the physical reality being investigated and the mathematical or logical representations we construct to describe it.

NVM therefore does have a substantial burden ahead of it. The proposed substrate dynamics have to be made mathematically explicit and shown to reproduce or improve upon established physics. But an algorithmic description faces the same burden. Neither equations nor algorithms become the ontology simply because we need them to represent what we cannot observe directly.

The question I’m still asking is what independently establishes that a fundamental “knowledge” component exists in the physical world, instead of simply being something you’ve introduced into your representation of it.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
As I said, philosophers, you, mathematicians and others, have tacitly assumed that the existence of a mathematical system equates to knowledge of what exists in a mathematical system.

You, and others have tacitly assumed that a mathematical system WILL know itself, and all the while loudly proclaiming that a mathematical system doesn't know itself, and doesn't need to know itself.

You haven't noticed that you have missed a logical step, and I can't help you with that.

One can see the logical step when one has to represent a system algorithmically.

OR, to give you a bit of an idea, you could just observe mathematicians, and notice that manmade mathematics can't exist without the consciousness and free agency of mathematicians, who are conscious of the mathematical symbols, and who move the mathematical symbols.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford Well this certainly identifies our disagreement quite clearly. I don’t start from the illogical premise that physical reality is literally a mathematical system.

Mathematics is something we use to represent physical reality, nothing less or more. So of course manmade mathematics requires mathematicians who understand and manipulate mathematical symbols. But it doesn’t follow that the physical reality being represented must contain an equivalent consciousness, knower, or agent that understands and manipulates its own physical states. There is simply no rational basis to even entertain that notion.

That’s the step you’re adding but certainly not one that I’m missing.

Within NVM the physical nonlinear substrate exists and interacts independently of our representations of it. We introduce categories, numbers, equations, logical statements, and algorithms in order to model those interactions. The substrate itself doesn’t need to read those representations or possess knowledge of what our symbols say about it.

If you choose to call reality itself a “mathematical system,” then there is also a danger of importing properties of manmade mathematics back into physical reality. A mathematician manipulating symbols obviously requires awareness of those symbols, but that doesn’t demonstrate that a physical system requires an analogous awareness in order for physical change to occur.

I don’t blindly assume that the system “will know itself.” I reject that premise entirely. If you believe that physical change logically requires fundamental knowledge or agency then that requirement still needs to be demonstrated independently instead of inferred from the fact that humans require consciousness and agency to perform mathematics.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
As I keep repeating, but not all the time because it gets a bit boring, I keep repeating that we represent the underlying low-level real-world system with mathematical symbols; and so I, and others, call the real-world system a mathematical system.

But we call the real-world system a mathematical system because we symbolically represent the underlying low-level world in terms of categories, relationships/ equations, and numbers (and I contend that algorithmic symbols are also required).

And the term "mathematical system" is justified because physicists have measured the world in terms of categories, and the measurements have resulted in numbers, and physicists have looked at the numbers and found relationships between the categories.

Actual measured reality, and the relationships that have been found, is why we can justifiably call the real-world system a "mathematical system". The term is nothing to be scared of: it is a way of seeing and analysing the world.

The next issue is: What is a (moving) mathematical system?

And it is clear that categories, relationships/ equations and numbers are not sufficient to represent a moving mathematical system. For a start, as physicists have pointed out: “There’s nothing deader than an equation”; “equations can’t fly”, https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/John+Wheeler .

I'm saying that what is initiating and reinitiating movement in the numbers in a mathematical system is "quantum number jumps", BY matter (where matter is defined as small parts of the universe). And I'm saying that this moving mathematical system can only be symbolically represented via the use of algorithmic/ logical connective statements, plus the abovementioned equation-statements.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford With that clarification, I don’t have a problem with you calling the real-world system a “mathematical system” as long as we agree that the mathematics represents physical reality instead of literally constituting it.

Where we still diverge is what follows from the fact that equations themselves don’t move anything. I completely agree that equations don’t cause physical change, but that doesn’t mean physical change requires something to repeatedly “initiate” and “reinitiate” it.

The underlying physical system is not something fundamentally static that periodically needs to be kicked into motion. Change is part of the physical behavior of the nonlinear substrate itself. The equations are merely our attempt to represent that behavior and not the source of it.

That’s also why I don’t identify quantum jumps as the fundamental initiators of movement. A quantum jump could instead be an observable discrete transition produced by deeper continuous nonlinear dynamics. In other words, the jump is an effect of the underlying dynamics and not the thing that creates dynamics to begin with.

I also have no objection to using algorithms or logical connectives to represent physical evolution where they are useful. However, just because an algorithm represents successive changes then that does not imply physical reality itself must therefore operate by evaluating its situation and initiating discrete number jumps. That conclusion simply does not logically follow from the fact that we can represent physical change algorithmically.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
We don't know, and can't know, what the "physical substrate" IS, we can only symbolically represent it in terms of categories, equations/ relationships between the categories, and numbers that apply to the categories, and using algorithmic/ logical connective symbols.

The algorithmic/ logical connective symbols are the only symbols you can use to represent movement. Equations can only represent relationship. So, IF some numbers that apply to some of the categories in an equation(s) are jumped, that is when the relationships in the equation kick in, and other numbers that apply to other categories in the equation(s) also change due to the relationship. The ONLY actual movement occurring is the original movement, which was not due to, or explainable by the equation(s), and can only be represented algorithmically. I'm saying that "quantum number jumps" are the only actual movement in the system; the equations only extend the reach of this movement.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford It’s true that we only have models and representations of whatever the underlying physical reality ultimately is but I outright disagree with your claim that algorithmic symbols are the only way to represent movement. And I especially disagree with your further conclusion that quantum number jumps must therefore be the only actual movement occurring in nature.

A differential equation doesn’t cause anything to move but it can represent continuous change. If a field quantity varies continuously with position or an evolution parameter then its derivative represents the local rate and structure of that variation. We may use discrete numerical algorithms to calculate approximate solutions but the computational steps are not automatically physical steps in the underlying system.

More importantly, even if I accepted your claim that algorithms are necessary to represent movement then it still wouldn’t mean that physical movement itself consists of discrete number jumps. That would again be inferring the nature of physical reality from the particular symbolic method used to represent it.

I take the opposite possibility seriously. What appears experimentally as a discrete quantum jump is the observable endpoint of an underlying continuous nonlinear transition between organizational states. The discrete observation does not by itself establish that the underlying process was discrete.

Your central claim that still needs justification is that quantum jumps are the only actual movement in nature and that everything represented by continuous dynamics merely “extends” those jumps. I don’t see how that follows from the limitations you place on symbolic representation. That would most certainly need independent physical or mathematical evidence which presently there is none.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
No, no, no.

Equations with delta symbols and differential equations only represent relationships between categories, and they only apply IF a number changes or some numbers change. They don't represent movement. They represent number change for some categories in the equation, IF numbers for some other categories in the equation change/ are jumped.

I think you are suggesting that equations represent a perpetual motion machine, where numbers go in the front end, other numbers come out the rear end, and the rear-end numbers are then plugged into the front end, and more numbers come out the rear end. And so on.

In fact, equations don't represent the continuation of motion. If you plug numbers in "the front end", other numbers come out "the rear end" so to speak, due to relationship. And then they stop, job done.

Steve Dufourny

Michael Blasco Lorraine tries to explain important things
We search answers but we have deep limitations and we just measure and observe emergent properties from deeper not known parameters. We geometrize the things , and so we extrapolate metaphysics ontological possibilities about the primary essence, the fundamental substances, the origin philosophical of the universe.......but nobody knowns. The possibilities are numerous , our mathematical extrapolations depend of ontological choices of mathematical tools, we are free to extrapolate. The process is limited, so we can choose the strings, the bits of matter or others informational tools, or a pure geometry for the substance, and different ontological causes , a mathematical accident, infinitre eternal consciousness in 0D or others, we can utilise the finite systems or consider infinite maths, all depends of ontological and mathematical and physical choices. But we have these limitations and nobody has the answer, universal. Godel incompleteness d tell that no system actual of studies can completely gives the universal truth. Our symbolic representations are far for the primary ontology if I can say.
The maths and this primary essence have a kind of precise universal road and how to reach the truth if we don t think beyond the box and our actual tools, how to correlate the relations towards the truth, how to utilise correctly the numbers, categories to understand the truth about the primary essence and the fields, particles, numbers, informations. The universe seems to know what do and so we must go towards the moving systems and the consciousness from our actual static systems. The problem is there, our actual equations, tools , are static.So the fact to consider a conscious universe jumping the numbers and implying categories is essential.
So the platonism needs an update because the processes and relational structures imply moving universal systems.It is what I try with this 0D infinite eternal consciousness and the spherical topological geometric algebras and the spheres in 3D , there is something permitting the motions of universe and informations and consciousness.
What tells Lorraine is very important for the moving systems and the consciousness and the ontology of the universe.

Regards

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford A differential equation can absolutely represent continuous change. It doesn’t merely say “if I manually change this number, calculate that number and stop.” It specifies a local relationship that a continuously varying solution must satisfy throughout its domain.

For example, a field equation can represent how a field configuration varies across space or along an evolution parameter. A complete solution can represent an entire continuous trajectory or evolving field configuration. Nobody has to keep taking the output and manually plugging it back into the equation for that mathematical object to represent continuous change.

A numerical computer simulation may work differently by approximating that continuous solution through successive discrete calculations. Those computational steps then belong to the numerical method but they don’t establish that the physical process itself consists of discrete number jumps.

And I’m certainly not proposing a perpetual-motion machine. I never once stated that equations generate motion or supply physical energy. I’m saying they can describe continuous physical evolution. The physical substrate is what is proposed to undergo the change and the equation is our mathematical representation of that change.

It appears that we’re again returning to the exact same distinction. “An equation cannot cause movement” and “an equation cannot represent continuous movement” are two completely different claims. I agree with the first, but I don’t agree with the second.

Michael Blasco

Steve Dufourny We observe and measure effective properties of reality, construct mathematical models from them, and then try to infer what deeper physical structure might produce what we observe. So we should therefore be very careful not to confuse our mathematical representations with the underlying ontology itself.

That’s essentially the motivation behind my own framework. I treat particles, fields and eventually spacetime as potentially emergent descriptions of a deeper physical organization rather than necessarily fundamental entities.

But as with Lorraine I disagree with the unnecessary jump from acknowledging those limitations to concluding that a conscious universe that “jumps numbers” is essential. Since we currently don’t understand the universe’s fundamental ontology then consciousness, information, geometry, strings, discrete number jumps, or a nonlinear, nonequilibrium physical substrate (nonclassical aether) are all competing ontological possibilities until they are given precise mathematical formulations and confronted with observation.

I also don’t think the fact that equations are static symbolic objects means the reality they describe must contain a conscious agent that makes them move. The equation doesn’t move anything. Physical reality simply changes and the equation is our representation of that change.

My working hypothesis is that deeper nonlinear physical dynamics can produce the effective particles, fields, quantum behavior and eventually spacetime that we observe. Quantum jumps could then be observable transitions between organizational states and not fundamental acts of consciousness moving numbers.

I do agree strongly with the epistemic humility in your argument but I just think we should apply that humility equally to the claim of fundamental consciousness. If consciousness is genuinely fundamental and necessary for physical change then that should ultimately be scientifically demonstrated instead of inferred from limitations in our mathematical descriptions.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
No.

“There’s nothing deader than an equation”; “equations can’t fly”, https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/John+Wheeler .

A differential equation is "dead" and "can't fly" because an equation can't represent the source of movement in the real-world moving mathematical system; an equation can only represent what happens IF some number(s) are jumped/ moved for some other reason.

And that is what algorithms can represent that equations can't represent: number assignments, where numbers are assigned to categories, perhaps in response to a mathematical situation; these number jumps are the initiation/ re-initiation of number movement.

Steve Dufourny

Michael Blasco thanks for developing, it is this humility the important point about these limitations, physivcal, mathematical, ontological, we accept them and not assert assumptions it seems to me. We have evolved yes in 100 years of relativity ans others, we have evolved also in technology and sciences but we know so few still, the problem of us the humans is to think we are very evolved, we are not. That implies so deep possible ontological causes and deep hidden parameters, regards

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford An equation is “dead” in the sense that the equation itself does not physically cause anything to happen but where we disagree is what you infer from that.

The fact that an equation does not cause movement doesn’t mean that physical movement must therefore originate as discrete number assignments. Numbers are simply part of our mathematical description, nothing more. In my framework there aren’t literally numbers sitting inside the nonlinear substrate just waiting to be reassigned before something can happen.

An algorithm can certainly represent a discrete assignment such as x = 5 → x = 6. But the fact that we can represent change that way doesn’t establish that physical reality itself changes by assigning new numbers to its own categories. That is an additional ontological claim.

From my perspective, the physical substrate is proposed to undergo continuous nonlinear change. Differential equations are used to represent relationships within that change, while algorithms are used to calculate or simulate it. Neither the equation nor the algorithm is what physically makes the substrate change.

So I agree with “equations can’t fly” but my disagreement is with your next unnecessary step that “therefore something must jump the numbers.” There are no literal numbers that need to be moved in the ontology. The numbers move in our representation because the physical quantities they represent change. It’s really that simple and not hard to comprehend.

If you are proposing that fundamental physical reality literally operates through discrete assignments of abstract numbers, then that is a competing physical ontology that requires independent justification beyond the fact that algorithms can represent such assignments. Thus far, I haven’t seen any argument or empirical evidence establishing that this is actually how physical reality operates. At this point that is simply your own proposed interpretation of reality and not an established physical fact, and it should be presented as such.

Waddy

I just feel that true randomness isn't possible. Whether its math or laws of the universe that have a cause or effect?
I did a quick google before posting and I might not be far off
https://www.sciencefocus.com/science/randomness-doesnt-exist-bad-luck

Veysel Batmaz

Zeeya Merali Consciousness is not mediated via the micro "quantum" level. Aren't you tired of hearing that consciousness is a "murky," unsolvable quantum mystery? In my book, Consciousness of Consciousness: Refuting the Quantum Delirium, the boundaries of cognitive science, philosophy, and sociology are redrawn. By dismantling the popular but flawed trend of "quantum consciousness," my book delivers a grounded, quantifiable reality: consciousness is an extension of our social environment, functioning as a cognitive tool for survival.

Veysel Batmaz

Michael Blasco I totally agree... This is exactly why I wrote Shut up, and measure! CONSCIOUSNESS of CONSCIOUSNESS Refuting the Quantum Delirium (ASIN: B0HLF41KGW). You have perfectly diagnosed the exact ideological trap that plagues modern popular physics.
Too many theorists mistake their mathematical algorithms and abstract numbers for literal, objective physical reality. They confuse the tracking tool for the universe itself. In my book, I call this the 'quantum delirium'—an ideological projection that replaces actual physical existence with mathematical mysticism.
If you are looking for a grounded framework that rejects these unproven ontologies and instead returns to the hard realities of physical measurement, sensitivity, and orientation consciousness, you can get my book on Amazon.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
If one does a mathematical systems analysis,

it is clear that “quantum number jumps” are number assignments, by matter, i.e. by small parts of the mathematical system.

However, it is also clear that philosophically, people want to believe that “quantum number jumps” are the outcome of equations, where the difficulty is finding the correct “killer” equations. Philosophically, people refuse to believe that we could live in the type of mathematical system where the small parts of the system can move some of their own numbers. Philosophically, people want to believe that mathematical equations are self-sufficient entities that move the mathematical system. However, the fact is that mathematical equations are NOT self-sufficient entities, and never have been.

These “quantum number jumps”/ number assignments are the only genuine movement in the real-world moving mathematical system. Equations can only ever represent relationships that “react” to movement from a source outside the equation; “quantum number jumps”/ number assignments are this source of movement.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco

“The numbers move in our representation because the physical quantities they represent change."

Change IS number change (for one or more categories). So that is a tautology.

Michael Blasco

Veysel Batmaz Yes, mathematics absolutely can describe reality extraordinarily well without the mathematical objects themselves necessarily being what physical reality is made of. However, we should remain very cautious about what we put in their place.

My framework proposes an underlying nonlinear physical substrate but I don’t regard that ontology as established simply because it avoids treating mathematical abstractions as physical objects. It still has to earn its place through mathematical consistency, correspondence with established physics, and ultimately distinguishable empirical predictions.

We also must apply exactly the same standard to fundamental consciousness. If consciousness, sensitivity, or orientation is proposed as a fundamental ingredient of physical reality instead of something emergent from it then that’s also an ontological claim requiring independent justification and testable consequences.

We shouldn’t mistake the map for the territory, but we also have to determine what the territory ultimately consists of, and that’s where empirical evidence has to decide between competing possibilities.

Veysel Batmaz

Michael Blasco "Yes, mathematics absolutely can describe reality extraordinarily well without the mathematical objects themselves necessarily being what physical reality is made of. However, we should remain very cautious about what we put in their place."

This is the crux of what mathematics is all about. It is just symbols and signs. I think we should be very cautious about what we put in mathematics. I have a lengthy discussion about what measurement, mathematics, observation, and experimentation are in my book. [Observation (Raw Reality)] ➔ [Experimentation (Isolation)] ➔ [Measurement (Quantification)] ➔ [Mathematics (Syntax/Symbols)]. They are all different things, ontologically. The ultimate value of science lies in the strict separation of its parts. Mathematics provides the logical constraints of what could be, while experimentation and observation determine what is. Without your book's emphasis on the translation layer of measurement, humanity easily falls into the trap of mistaken identity—confusing the language for the universe it is trying to describe.

Michael Blasco

Steve Dufourny Yes, I think that epistemic humility is essential. Our present theories are extraordinarily successful within their tested domains but that doesn’t mean their mathematical entities are the final ontology of nature.

There may well be deeper physical parameters and organizing principles beneath what we currently observe, which is the distinct possibility my framework explores. But we also have to be careful not to turn our ignorance into evidence for whichever deeper ontology we prefer.

The proper route, in my view, is to distinguish clearly between what has been experimentally established, what our current theories successfully describe, and what we are proposing may exist underneath them. Any deeper framework, including my own, ultimately has to earn its place by explaining established results and producing testable consequences that distinguish it from competing possibilities.

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