What kills Schrödinger’s cat?

Michael Blasco

Steve Dufourny Yes, I think that epistemic humility is essential. Our present theories are extraordinarily successful within their tested domains but that doesn’t mean their mathematical entities are the final ontology of nature.

There may well be deeper physical parameters and organizing principles beneath what we currently observe, which is the distinct possibility my framework explores. But we also have to be careful not to turn our ignorance into evidence for whichever deeper ontology we prefer.

The proper route, in my view, is to distinguish clearly between what has been experimentally established, what our current theories successfully describe, and what we are proposing may exist underneath them. Any deeper framework, including my own, ultimately has to earn its place by explaining established results and producing testable consequences that distinguish it from competing possibilities.

Steve Dufourny

Michael Blasco yes indeed , only the proved laws, axioms, equations are accepted. And after we are free to extrapolate in trying to find possibilities, hidden parameters, it is not easy actually due to limitations, regards

Michael Blasco

Steve Dufourny That’s essentially how I approach it, although I would say that physical laws and equations are empirically supported rather than absolutely proven. We should preserve what experiments have established while remaining open to the possibility that our current theories are effective descriptions of something deeper (pre-quantum).

That’s where frameworks like mine come in. We are free to explore possible hidden parameters or deeper dynamics but those possibilities shouldn’t be confused with established physics. The challenge is to develop them precisely enough that they eventually produce testable predictions capable of distinguishing them from the theories we already have.

Veysel Batmaz

Michael Blasco "Yes, mathematics absolutely can describe reality extraordinarily well without the mathematical objects themselves necessarily being what physical reality is made of. However, we should remain very cautious about what we put in their place."

This is the crux of what mathematics is all about. It is just symbols and signs. I think we should be very cautious about what we put in mathematics. I have a lengthy discussion about what measurement, mathematics, observation, and experimentation are in my book. [Observation (Raw Reality)] ➔ [Experimentation (Isolation)] ➔ [Measurement (Quantification)] ➔ [Mathematics (Syntax/Symbols)]. They are all different things, ontologically. The ultimate value of science lies in the strict separation of its parts. Mathematics provides the logical constraints of what could be, while experimentation and observation determine what is. Without your book's emphasis on the translation layer of measurement, humanity easily falls into the trap of mistaken identity—confusing the language for the universe it is trying to describe.

Michael Blasco

Veysel Batmaz I largely agree with that distinction. Observation, experimentation, measurement, and mathematical representation should never be collapsed into the same ontological category. Mathematics gives us a remarkably powerful language for describing patterns and relationships in what we observe but the description should not automatically be identified with the physical reality being described.

I would add one qualification from my framework. Measurement isn’t merely a passive translation of an independently existing physical situation into numbers. Measurement is itself a physical interaction between systems, and that interaction can change the conditions of the system being measured. The numerical result is our representation of the outcome of that physical interaction.

That’s particularly important in QM. We don’t have to conclude that the mathematical wavefunction is literally physical substance, but neither should we treat measurement as though we are simply reading numbers off an untouched reality.

We should be asking what deeper physical dynamics could generate both the observable phenomena and the extraordinarily successful mathematical structures we use to describe them. Mathematics constrains the possibilities, experiment constrains them further, but neither by itself automatically tells us what the fundamental ontology ultimately is.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
If one does a mathematical systems analysis,

it is clear that “quantum number jumps” are number assignments, by matter, i.e. by small parts of the mathematical system.

However, it is also clear that philosophically, people want to believe that “quantum number jumps” are the outcome of equations, where the difficulty is finding the correct “killer” equations. Philosophically, people refuse to believe that we could live in the type of mathematical system where the small parts of the system can move some of their own numbers. Philosophically, people want to believe that mathematical equations are self-sufficient entities that move the mathematical system. However, the fact is that mathematical equations are NOT self-sufficient entities, and never have been.

These “quantum number jumps”/ number assignments are the only genuine movement in the real-world moving mathematical system. Equations can only ever represent relationships that “react” to movement from a source outside the equation; “quantum number jumps”/ number assignments are this source of movement.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford It’s true that equations are not self-sufficient physical entities and don’t make anything happen, but nobody needs to believe that equations literally move the physical system in order to reject your conclusion.

The crucial step that has not been empirically established is the unnecessary move from “equations don’t cause physical change” to “therefore quantum jumps are literal number assignments by matter and are the only genuine movement in reality.” That conclusion does not follow automatically from mathematical systems analysis. It is an additional ontological hypothesis that still requires independent justification. Until that justification is provided then it remains an unsupported ontological assertion and certainly not an established fact about physical reality.

There aren’t abstract numbers physically residing in matter that matter must somehow reassign. The numbers belong to our representation of measurable physical quantities. When those numbers change then the physical configuration represented by them has changed, not that matter has literally moved a number.

Nor am I searching for a “killer equation” that makes reality move. I have already stated this repeatedly, but apparently it bears repeating once again. An equation only describes the underlying dynamics but does not cause them. My framework instead explores whether apparently discrete quantum transitions can emerge from deeper continuous nonlinear physical dynamics.

We actually agree on the starting point that equations don’t move reality but we obviously disagree about what follows from it. You propose that matter fundamentally performs discrete number assignments, whereas I propose that physical change occurs within an underlying nonlinear substrate and that changing numbers merely represent that physical change.

Those are competing ontological hypotheses. Calling one of them “clear” from the mathematics absolutely doesn’t establish it. What would distinguish them is whether either can be formulated rigorously enough to derive known physics and produce empirical predictions that separate it from the alternatives.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco

“The numbers move in our representation because the physical quantities they represent change."

Change IS number change (for one or more categories). So that is a tautology.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford No, and that is precisely the distinction I’m making. You’re defining physical change as number change, whereas I am not.

Physical change is a change in the actual organization or configuration of the underlying nonlinear physical substrate (nonclassical, nonequilibrium aether). We then quantify aspects of that change by assigning numerical values to measurable quantities. The changing numbers are therefore our mathematical representation of the physical change but certainly not the physical change itself.

For example, saying that a measured quantity changes from one numerical value to another describes a physical difference quantitatively but it doesn’t establish that abstract numbers themselves have physically moved or been reassigned inside reality.

So my statement isn’t a tautology unless you first blindly assume that physical change and number change are ontologically identical. But that identification is exactly what is under dispute, and it can’t simply be built into the definition of “change” and then used to establish the conclusion.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
You have no reason for your mathematical system to move except a tautology:

“The numbers move in our representation because the physical quantities they represent change."

Change IS number change (for one or more categories).

And, by the way, we have agreed that we are symbolically REPRESENTING the real-world system mathematically.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford But those two claims don’t sit comfortably together. If we agree that numbers mathematically REPRESENT the real-world physical system, then physical change cannot simply be defined as number change without collapsing the representation into what it represents.

When a physical quantity changes, we represent that change by assigning different numerical values to the quantity. The numerical difference describes and quantifies the physical difference. It is not identical to the physical process itself.

So when you say “change IS number change,” you’re making an additional ontological claim and not merely describing mathematical representation. You’re identifying the map with the territory after agreeing that the map represents the territory, and that isn’t logically sound.

As for why the underlying system changes at all, that change is intrinsic to the physical nonlinear substrate and I seek to formulate the dynamics that describe how that change occurs. You can certainly ask the deeper metaphysical question of why reality is dynamical and not absolutely static, but introducing “number assignments by matter” doesn’t automatically answer that question either, it simply relocates it. I can equally ask why matter makes the next number assignment and what physically produces that transition.

So neither of us gets the existence of change for free. The difference is that I don’t identify physical change with changes in the abstract numbers we use to represent it. Doing so simply collapses the distinction between physical reality and its mathematical representation.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
No, no, no.

Quit the philosophising! We have agreed that we are symbolically REPRESENTING the real-world system mathematically. You have no reason for your mathematical system to EVER move. I'm saying that continually occurring number jumps (i.e. continually occurring number assignments to categories) are the only reason the real-world mathematical system can move.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford We’re going in circles now. You keep repeating the assertion that number assignments are the only possible source of physical change, but repeating it doesn’t establish anything whatsoever.

We already agree that mathematics symbolically REPRESENTS the real-world system. That’s precisely why I don’t identify changes in the representation with the physical process being represented.

You say I have “no reason” for the physical substrate to change, but saying “matter assigns a new number” doesn’t solve that problem either. I can simply ask why matter assigns that number instead of another one, or why it makes an assignment at all. At some point, every ontology reaches something it treats as dynamically primitive.

NVM provisionally places that primitive at the level of the physical dynamics of an underlying nonlinear vacuum medium. You place it at abstract discrete number assignments by matter. Those are competing ontological proposals.

The only difference is that you keep presenting your proposal as though it logically follows from the fact that we use mathematics to represent reality, but it doesn’t. It’s completely illogical no matter which way you spin it. You still need to demonstrate why physical change MUST consist of discrete number assignments rather than merely asserting it again and again ad infinitum.

Until you provide an independent mathematical or empirical argument establishing that necessity then repeating the same claim over and over will most certainly never move this discussion forward.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford And you keep saying I have no reason for my “mathematical system” to move but that isn’t what I’m proposing. The mathematics doesn’t move at all. The underlying physical substrate is fundamentally dynamical and nonequilibrium, and changing numerical values are our representation of that physical change.

Physical dynamics come first, and changing numbers come afterward in our mathematical representation of those dynamics. There are no abstract numbers physically moving around that require something to initiate their movement.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
We have agreed that we are symbolically representing the real-world system mathematically; i.e., no philosophising is required:

One can't escape the need to explain the "mechanics" of why the system is moving, why the system is "fundamentally dynamical", by trying to claim that "The underlying physical substrate is fundamentally dynamical and nonequilibrium, and changing numerical values are our representation of that physical change". In other words, you are trying to claim that movement (i.e. number movement) is a fundamental property of the universe, which is just a big cop-out. Also your complexity theory ideas are based on the assumption that there is someone or something overlooking the mathematical system and seeing patterns emerge, when in reality there is nothing overlooking the mathematical system, and from the point of view of the elements/ small parts of the system, nothing is happening. Complexity theory involves so much Platonic nonsense, I can't believe that people would subscribe to it.

I'm saying that the "mechanics" of a moving mathematical system are as follows:
A mathematical system CAN'T move UNLESS something jumps some of the numbers that apply to the categories in the equations, which results in other numbers that apply to other categories in the equations also jumping, due to relationship. I'm saying that small parts of the universe (matter is the only candidate) are continually jumping some of the numbers that apply to the categories in the equations. You need to use algorithmic statements to represent these number jumps, i.e. these number assignments. With algorithmic statements, one is representing what the universe (or small parts of the universe) DOES, as opposed to what the universe IS (we can't know what the universe IS).

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford Anyone is entitled to ask the deeper question of why the substrate is dynamical at all but your proposal doesn’t escape that problem because it simply chooses a different stopping point.

Now as I already explained, I take physical change in the underlying nonlinear substrate as primitive and then try to determine the laws governing that change. You take “matter jumping numbers” as primitive. But I can immediately ask what physically causes matter to jump those numbers, why it jumps one number rather than another, and what determines when the next jump occurs. Unless those questions are answered then “matter jumps numbers” hasn’t explained the existence of change any more fundamentally because it has simply renamed the primitive.

More importantly, I still outright reject your identification of physical movement with “number movement.” We already agree that numbers are part of our SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION of the real-world system. So when the physical system changes then the corresponding numbers in our representation change. That doesn’t establish that abstract numbers are literally what matter is moving. That simply makes no sense from a rational standpoint.

And complexity doesn’t require anyone or anything “overlooking” the system and recognizing patterns for those patterns to physically exist. Within my NVM framework, an emergent organization is a real, persistent physical structure with measurable effects on the system’s dynamics, and not merely a pattern that exists because an observer happens to recognize it.

Our disagreement is quite straightforward. I posit fundamental physical dynamics and use mathematics to represent them. You posit fundamental number assignments by matter and use algorithms to represent them. Neither position gets to avoid having something primitive but your proposal still needs to establish why physical change should literally be identified with abstract number assignment in the first place. And quite frankly, I don’t see how the fact that we represent physical quantities numerically could ever, by itself, establish that physical reality literally consists of numbers or that matter physically assigns them.

Lorraine Ford

The disease of Platonism seems to have infected quite a bit of maths and science. Platonism is the pseudo-consciousness that people invented long ago because they couldn’t philosophically face up to the need for actual consciousness as a fundamental part of the real-world mathematical system.

Here are some instances of Platonism:

The complexity theory idea that there is a Platonic someone or something overlooking the real-world mathematical system, which sees patterns emerge, when in reality there is nothing overlooking the real-world mathematical system, and the only actual viewpoint within the real-world mathematical system is the point of view of the elements/ small parts of the system, a viewpoint which only sees and responds to its immediate surroundings.

The idea that mere existence implies Platonic knowledge of what exists. I.e. the idea that, within the real-world mathematical system, the existence of mathematical categories, mathematical relationships between the categories, and numbers that apply to the categories, implies that the mathematical system, or small parts of the mathematical system, knows about these categories, relationships, and numbers, without there being the fundamental need for a separate knowledge aspect of the real-world mathematical system.

Michael Blasco

You’re attributing two assumptions to my position that I don’t actually make.

First, emergence does not require some Platonic observer overlooking the system and recognizing patterns. An emergent organization is a real, persistent physical structure with measurable dynamical consequences, whether anyone recognizes it or not. The pattern isn’t created by observation. “Pattern” is simply our description of an objectively existing physical organization.

Second, I don’t blindly assume without sufficient justification that simply existing implies having knowledge of that existence. A physical system can occupy a particular state and interact according to its physical dynamics without somehow “knowing” that state, the mathematical categories we assign to it, or the numbers we use to represent it.

You’re proposing something much stronger by arguing that the elements of reality require a separate fundamental knowledge component in order to respond to their surroundings. That may sound interesting but I don’t see how its necessity follows from the fact that we use categories, relationships, numbers, and algorithms to represent physical processes.

If you think my ontology logically requires a knowledge component then you need to demonstrate that implication from the premises I actually accept instead of introducing knowledge as an additional premise and then attributing it back to my framework.

Lorraine Ford

Michael Blasco
We are agreeing to represent the world in terms of categories, relationships and numbers (and I’m saying algorithmic symbols also). Are you claiming that other types of symbols are required? There is no separate physical structure because we are representing the physical structure in terms of the categories, relationships and numbers.

Given that basis, movement IS (what we represent as) number movement, where the number applies to a category. Unless you want to claim that new relationships/ categories emerge out of something like (the visual representation of) the Mandelbrot set, but that is a totally failed Platonic-type idea, as you must already know.

And “objectively existing” is also just another failed Platonic idea.

Lorraine Ford

Lorraine Ford
I should add that I am saying that the categories, relationships and numbers can’t and don’t move themselves. So, in order to have a moving real-world mathematical system, you need something to continually jump the numbers. This action of jumping (i.e. assigning) the numbers, and any rationale for number selection, can be represented algorithmically. But the various symbolic representations don’t say WHAT it is that knows about the numbers and what it is that jumps the numbers. I’m saying that the only candidate for WHAT knows about the numbers, and what jumps the numbers, is matter itself (defined as small parts of the universe). This is a conclusion, based on the nature of mathematics, NOT a first premise.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford We only agree that categories, relationships, numbers, and algorithms can be used to represent physical reality but we obviously disagree with the next step, where you effectively identify the representation with the physical reality being represented.

If physical movement is something we “represent as” number movement then you have already acknowledged the exact distinction I am making. The physical change is what occurs in reality while the changing numbers are how we represent that change mathematically. It does not follow that physical movement literally is number movement.

Likewise, saying that we represent physical structure mathematically does not mean there is “no separate physical structure.” A representation necessarily represents something, otherwise we are no longer talking about a mathematical representation of physical reality but identifying physical reality itself with mathematical objects, which is precisely the move I explicitly reject.

And I don’t see anything Platonic about saying that something objectively exists independently of whether an observer recognizes or describes it. In NVM, an organized physical structure exists because of the physical state and dynamics of the nonlinear substrate and not because someone is standing outside the system recognizing a pattern.

We absolutely don’t need additional kinds of symbols, but we do need to maintain the distinction between the symbols we use to describe reality and the physical reality those symbols are intended to describe.

Michael Blasco

Lorraine Ford From the fact that mathematical symbols cannot cause physical change, it does not follow that something in nature must literally “know about” those numbers and continually assign new ones. That introduces two additional ontological claims, namely that numbers themselves have some physical status within the system and that matter possesses a fundamental knowledge of them.

In reality neither assumption is necessary. In my model, matter and other observable structures are themselves emergent organizations of an underlying physical substrate. The substrate changes according to its intrinsic physical dynamics, while we represent those changing physical states using categories, relationships, variables, numbers, and algorithms.

I don’t see “matter knows and jumps the numbers” as a reasonable conclusion forced upon us by the nature of mathematics. At most, mathematics tells us that mathematical representations do not cause the physical processes they describe. What physically produces change remains an ontological question, and your answer of “matter assigning numbers” is one proposed answer to that question but certainly not something mathematics itself establishes.

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