Essay Abstract

What are the limits of physics' explanatory power? Can physics explain everything? In this paper I discuss a somewhat broader question: can physics explain existence itself? I argue that genuinely ultimate explanations---those that really explain everything---involve the most basic and most general elements of logic. Such explanations cannot be done within physics unless physics undergoes a methodology shift more closely aligning itself with mathematics and logic. However, I give reasons for thinking that just such a shift might be in operation.

Author Bio

Dean Rickles is a historian and philosopher of physics at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime (Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, Volume 3. North Holland: Elsevier, 2007) and editor of The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity (co-edited with Steven French and Juha Saatsi; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) and The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics (Ashgate, 2008). He is currently working on a project devoted to the history of quantum gravity.

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  • [deleted]

Hi Dean,

Your essay is very clear for such an abstract subject (or at least I think I understood parts of it). But I have two questions/comments.

(1) I agree that mathematical systems "exist." But I should think that the only ones of interest would be those which can lead to some kind of awareness. That is, I think the question of existence is somewhat tied up with awareness.

(2) It seems one could imagine existences--with aware beings--which are not based on mathematics. Are you saying that any kind of non-chaos, any kind of awareness, any ability to distinguish "this" from "that" implies mathematics?

  • [deleted]

Hi Dean, there is [undoubtedly] much thinking behind mathematics; although mathematics requires relatively narrow thinking in comparison with the highest/true form of genius.

In taking [the] mathematics further, one must determine what is the integrated, relational, and "as extensive as possible" significance of/behind the mathematics -- ideally, that is, how mathematics applies to experience in general.

A good example of this is the mathematical union of gravity and electromagnetism/light in a fourth dimnension of space. There is a physical basis/reality behind this. It takes even more genius to describe what this reality is.

Importantly, mathematics demomstrates that the integrated and interactive extensiveness of being and experience (including thought) go hand-in-hand in and with time.

Good luck in your work.

Author Frank Martin DiMeglio

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Dear Dr. Rickles,

Congratulations on an excellent essay. I am still reading it carefully, but I disagree with the main idea that it is not possible to be nothing. An empty set is a trivial counter example. You may argue that the notion of a set presupposes some mathematical construct and therefore this is not a truly "nothing", but this is only a semantic argument. If nothingness is impossible/inconsistent, then we should not be able to represented it and use in any proof, (and in particular in proving that there should be something rather than nothing).

But the question remains: why there is something rather than nothing? My take on this is that your 2 ways of answering it (existence is necessary, or bootstrap) are both wrong. The simple answer is that we have something rather than nothing because "something" can be. (You may argue that I am only shifting the discussion towards introducing a first cause, but I am not, and I will address this at the end).

So what is existence? What are its core critical requirements? Those are 3:

1. "universal" logical consistency: meaning the truth value of existence should be universal and not confined to the boundary of an axiomatic system.

2. interaction. Without interaction we are confined to the frozen Platonic word of math

3. infinite complexity. This is necessary to escape a brain in a vat argument.

If you now look carefully at the 3 requirements, we observe that they specify precisely how our physical world is different than the Platonic world of math. But here comes the truly remarkable part: one can extract mathematical consequences from them and prove very important uniqueness results about our universe. (see my essay entry: Heuristic rule for constructing physics axiomatization)

Now it seems that there are 4 classes of "existence": A. complete nothingness, B. the frozen Platonic world of math, C. an universe nursery satisfying only requirements 2 and 3 and D. our universe satisfying requirements 1,2, and 3. Time does not exists in cases A, B, and C, and while in the D case we have standard quantum mechanics, in case C we have split-complex (or hyperbolic) quantum mechanics. (I ran out or room to describe the cosmological ideas in my essay, but there is no first cause because there is no time in hyperbolic quantum mechanics which violates requirement (1) because it violates the von Neumann's uniqueness theorem regarding different representations) I strongly believe we can mathematically prove that our universe is unique: it should have 3 spatial and one time dimension, it should have quantum mechanics, the 4 forces, the elementary particles we observe and their properties, etc. But a new question arises: why is our universe happening only once? This is at odds with a Copernican principle which states that we are in no way special. Here the class ( C ) of existence can potentially come to the rescue IF this speculation will turn out to be true and we will be able to work out the math into proving it.

Hi Casey. Thanks for the comments.

You wrote:

"(1) I agree that mathematical systems "exist." But I should think that the only ones of interest would be those which can lead to some kind of awareness. That is, I think the question of existence is somewhat tied up with awareness.

(2) It seems one could imagine existences--with aware beings--which are not based on mathematics. Are you saying that any kind of non-chaos, any kind of awareness, any ability to distinguish "this" from "that" implies mathematics?"

I don't agree with your (1) here, though I appreciate the Wheelerish sentiment in it, but I think to make better sense of your idea I'd need to know what you meant by 'awareness' and 'existence'. On (2): I challenge you to imagine a world in which, say, the law of non-contradiction did not hold. Also, I didn't mention non-chaos, awareness, or identity and indiscrenibility issues. The point was that no matter what kind of situation you envisage (chaotic, non-chaotic, aware, non-aware, etc.) you will find that the same mathematical truths hold in all. So if you agree that these mathematical truths exist, and you agree that they are necessary, then you have to also hold that there is no conceivable situation in which they do not exist. That is enough to get the conclusion I need.

Cheers,

Dean

  • [deleted]

Thanks for one of the few essays that actually address the ultimate in physics or the ultimate role of it anyways. "Why anything?" seems to be most profound. If physics were to answer this, it will certainly be something ultimate, although you have not much expounded on the role of physics (rather than math) in answering it. Anyways, your discussion of why this is a pseudo-question stops at the surface. Since your essay evidences a serious author behind it, I encourage you to go further, say towards the Robert Nozick or Wittgenstein level and understand so called "category mistakes" [G. Ryle: The Concept of Mind. (1949)]. It is "pseudo" because it only looks like a well formed question. You either split into modalities (possible, existent, necessary) or not. If not, you cannot ask about any of them. If you do, you cannot afterwards mix them up haphazardly like "Either existence is contingent or it is necessary" [page 6]. It is muddleheaded use of terminology.

A few miscellaneous remarks since I am at it (please take my blunt criticisms as a compliment: I will not comment if I do not consider an essay quite reasonable):

1) "Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). Therefore, there is existence." [page 6]

The "effectiveness" is simply due to the co-evolution of our thinking along with our problems; basically, we keep the useful and toss the useless, the most abstract and thus widely applicable we then call "math". It is also mere PR (Look how effective our stuff is). One could just as well point out how ineffective math is. A completely arbitrary attribution does not evidence anything. The "there is existence", i.e. existence exists constitutes again a category mistake.

2) "We do not have the same kind of problem with the existence of mathematics. Mathematical statements are necessarily true in the sense that if they are true in one world (in the sense of modal logic) then they are true in all worlds" [page 9]. The axiom of choice does not have to be true in all worlds, except in case the statement is to be understood as an empty tautology (all is everything and includes all cases where it is either true or not but not both at once ...). The bare validity of math would be just the same even if no worlds were possible and nobody existed to appreciate it. Everything else is a redefinition of "existence" into something it is not meant to distinguish.

3) The "theory has overtaken experiment in very recent years" [page 2] is over appreciating what happens to be in vogue. Apart from that much of the "overtaking" is speeding in useless directions, it is also not a phenomenon of "very recent years". Just a few examples: Riemann geometry (turned out useful), GRT of black holes (maybe no experiment possible that probes inside the horizon), quaternions/octonions (counter example to your general position, beautiful math probably never finding any widely accepted use in physics).

Sascha. These are excellent comments. Thanks.

I'm sure you appreciate that it's very hard to do more than scratch the surface of this question in 10 pages and was intent on keeping it as close to math/physics as possible. There was an awful lot I wanted to put it, and I'm not happy with the actual argument itself. Also, however, this essay was for fun rather than part of my serious research: I am only a hyper-Pythagorean in my spare time!

On to your comments:

You are perfectly correct that it is mathematics doing the work here rather than physics, but that is why I included the merger between physics and mathematics. Physics would then amount to the probing of those parts of the mathematical universe that interest us humans.

On the category mistake issue. My original conclusion had Wittgenstein's stuff about letting the fly out of the bottle, essentially by dissolving the "big questions" into such simple category errors. I disagree with such objections. I didn't split into possible, necessary, existent. Existence was descried as something that can be possible or necessary. When I say existence is necessary I always mean *some kind of existing 'thing'*. We are rather constrained by language here. Of course Wittgenstein and the ordinary language brigade focused squarely on how concepts are used in practice. I thought we'd gotten beyond that straightjacketed form of philosophizing?

By the way, Nozick does not fall into this category. He expresses genuine perplexity over the problem, noting that it is compounded by the fact that anything we might use as explanatory ammunition is part of what needs to be explained, so we end up with circularity (this is the incompleteness problem I mentioned in my essay). I have a copy of his Philosophical Explanations, and what he says is:

"The question appears impossible to answer. Any factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain why there is *anything* at all." [Phil. Exp. p. 115]

Nozick views the problem as forming the absolute limit of our understanding. The point beyond which we cannot go. Incidentally, my title is based on a section title from his book! I also like his claim that: "The question cuts so deep...that any approach that stands a chance of yielding an answer will look extremely weird". That is, of course, a necessary rather than sufficient condition.

(1) On the effectiveness of math issue. It's true that there is selection bias going on here: we ignore the unsuccessful. But the successful still needs explaining. How is it that the mathematical representations we construct enable us to make often surprising successful predictions? It doesn't matter that sometimes we get unsuccessful predictions. Of course we do. Consider the prediction of the white spot in the center of the shadow cast by an opaque disc onto which light is shone, predicted by Poisson (on the basis of Fresnel's theory). The unsuccessful cases do not mitigate against cases such as this. There is a sense here in which our mathematical representation and parts of reality are isomorphic. One easy (but hard to stomach, no doubt) way is to assume that reality is itself mathematical.

The "there is existence" was supposed to be elliptical for there is the existence of *something*, but something sounded to hard and concrete. The section this comes from was certainly the worst bit. But I'd run out of space by this point and didn't really have time to revise - have a conference talk to write as well!

(2) You say: "The bare validity of math would be just the same even if no worlds were possible and nobody existed to appreciate it." That is the root of my point.

(3) When I say theory has overtaken experiment, I am referring (as you can probably tell) to quantum gravity and 'beyond the standard model'. When I say very recent, I mean within the last 100 years (I'm a historian of physics: this is recent for historians)! Riemannian geometry was not devised as a physical theory (though Riemann was aware of physical aspects). True, it was then applied in GR (which was not ahead of experiment, but based on anomalous extant data: Mercury perihelion). This seems like a case in my favour. Not sure what the black hole case is supposed to be proving here. But again, you admit that there are physical/experimental limits imposed by the scales of the new physics. That is precisely my point. If you still want to continue doing physics in the same way, then the recourse to more mathematical explorations seems inevitable.

On the quaternions/octonions as a counterexample to applicability. Certainly not true. Both find plenty of applications in physics (whether they are 'widely applicable' or not seems to be irrelevant). Two nice books are:

http://www.amazon.com/Division-Algebras-Quaternions-Mathematics-Applications/dp/0792328906/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1253180087&sr=8-1

and

http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Octonion-Non-Associative-Algebras-Mathematical/dp/0521017920/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1253180087&sr=8-3

Also, my point was meant to be more general: even if there happen now to be structures that happen not to be applied to physics; it is hard to believe that one could not find some representational link between them and some aspect of the world - but this is, of course, impossible to prove: it's a plausibility argument.

Thank you again. These were thoughtful, intelligent questions.

Cheers,

Dean

  • [deleted]

"The question appears impossible to answer. Any factor introduced to explain why there is something will itself be part of the something to be explained, so it (or anything utilizing it) could not explain all of the something - it could not explain why there is *anything* at all." [Phil. Exp. p. 115]

Very interesting arguments about this issue here!

The problem is indeed circularity/tautology.

If one assumes that we have something rather than nothing because "something" can be, one simply states that "something rather than nothing is possible because it is possible".

If one assumes that something rather than nothing is necessary, one simply states that "something rather than nothing is necessary because it is necessary" (without answering *why* it is necessary).

That something rather than nothing is possible, is evident.

That something rather than nothing is necessary, is only "evident" if one assumes that boolean logics is the one-and-only everlasting truth, eternal and the source of all relations that can be built.

If one assumes that the question about something rather than nothing has no rational answer via logics (human intelligence/mind), the necessity-argument vanishes, but the possibility-argument survives.

If one assumes via logics that logics is limited in the sense that mutually exclusive polarities aren't really mutually exclusive at a deeper level, then both arguments could count, necessity as well as possibility. The melting of these polarities could be done by realizing via logics that each side of the polarities *defines* its counterpart in an entanglement-like fashion. This seems to be logic for me. Now one can conclude out of this line of reasoning that there must be a deeper level that isn't concerned with definitions, its realm is an *undefined* area on which one can project definitions. For me, it seems that such an area could best fit with - vaguely spoken - an area of imagination-like abilities including intentions and emotions. But even this argument has its circularity-problem, because it presupposes the one thing it wants to explain, namely existence of consciousness (to be able to evidently state at all that there is rather something than nothing and "something" is at least possible).

With observers which would live forever and some properties of "observing something" would be an in-built-feature of all particles/matter/fields, the whole problem wouldn't be existent. There would be only transformations from possibilities to actualities (and maybe backwards). There would be only creativity by transforming a problem into its solution. If in this case the problem of "something rather than nothing" doesn't really exist, therefore another "thing" must exist "a priori", namely consciousness and its transformatory power. But this could only be possible if consciousness itself would be self-evident to itself and would realize that itself has created the polarities of something and nothing. So consciousness at its core level must be something that goes deeply beyond "something" and "nothing". It would deal *mainly* with values, not with quantitative proportions like maths.

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An axiomatic system sufficiently complex to be useful must contain questions it cannot answer. So? Economics is an empirical disaster as is string theory and its 10^(50,000) acceptable vacua. Both are punctilious interpolations that are revealed to be frauds when extrapolated. The first class of failure requires a contrived construct to fail. The second class of failure merely requires a look. That is an important difference.

Existence might be an automaton whose evolution is contingent upon universal simple rules acting on increasingly complex structures. The bulk is self-evident. Increasing locality is increasingly perverse. Both scales are self-consistent and co-consistent. So?

A gold dubloon is accidently dropped near the center of a long unlit block. A professional manager will amortize the loss. A quality engineer will search at the corners, under four bright streetlights. A decent scientist will get a flashlight and a metal detector, walk into the darkness, find the gold dubloon, and then be discharged for cause - insubordination. Know the fear and do it anyway.

You don't have anything unless you risk a contingent unique testable prediction. Libraries bursting with scientific socialism tomes are ample warning that theorists boast promiscuity while empiricists pay child support.

Uncle Al,

The whole point of this essay competition is to go beyond "unique testable predictions". There's nothing wrong with some good old-fashioned speculation to get the mind going. If I were to write something with a "unique testable prediction" it would really be probing the ultimate foundations of physics now would it?

In any case, the idea of a unique testable prediction" is a slippery notion: Popper's views have been widely discredited amongst philosophers of science for quite some time now, largely thanks to Lakatos' analyses, and the Duhem-Quine hypothesis. You also need to have an account of experiment in order to give sense to the idea of a "unique testable prediction" - not as easy as you might think. Whatever you might think of the sociologists of science, there have been some very good studies that highlight the many contingencies in experiments.

Give me any so-called "unique testable prediction" from the history of science and I will show you an alternative that can also make that prediction. Moreover, if scientists were really to restrict themselves to "unique testable predictions" we would have a very impoverished science to show for it.

Also: perhaps you might phrase your points in plain English rather than quirky metaphors next time, and then we might be able to have a coherent argument.

Cheers,

Dean

  • [deleted]

Dear Dean Rickles

I do not really appreciate your lauding my comments and then squeezing around them like a cat around a hot pot of milk.

Your answer is not addressing the issues properly and I will only point out again your main flaw and for the last time:"I didn't split into possible, necessary, existent. Existence was descried as something that can be possible or necessary. When I say existence is necessary I always mean *some kind of existing 'thing'*. We are rather constrained by language here. Of course Wittgenstein and the ordinary language brigade focused squarely on how concepts are used in practice. I thought we'd gotten beyond that straightjacketed form of philosophizing?"

The "straightjacket" is plainly to stick to meaningful terminology. What you are saying is, actually your essay is not about existence, but about some kind of "Rickles-existence". In that case however, you need to make that clear right from the beginning. You disregard what existence, possible, necessary etc actually means, claim that you cannot get into what you are actually writing about on only 10 pages, and then instead spend the valuable space on three or four times at length expounding one of the most silly, empty and misleading statements, namely that math is "unreasonably effective".

I recommend those who address the modality terminology and who want to improve it in the light of for example quantum theory. However, one needs to first understand the issues one desires to improve.

S

Sascha,

I showed you a great deal of respect in my response. I can both appreciate some comments and then proceed to criticise them. There's no inconsistency here. Knowledge advances by criticism. Consider: "Dear Mr Bohr. I don't appreciate the way you laud my comments on local realism and then squeeze them around them like a cat around a hot pot of milk (whatever the hell that means!)" Yours A. Einstein. Though neither you nor I are a Bohr or an Einstein, the point is this is clearly a ridiculous attitude.

The definitions of possibility and necessity I gave are the standard ones from modal logic. I didn't need the existence operator. I don't know what superior source you have. Enlighten me. You say: "The "straightjacket" is plainly to stick to meaningful terminology." I am using the standard, meaningful terminology in this case. My ambivalence over the definition of existence concerns the fact that the word "thing" is too heavily loaded. I don't quite want to say existence implies existence of some thing, but it'll have to do. The question 'why something rather than nothing?' does mean 'why existence?', but that will always be interpreted as the existence of a thing of some kind. I tried to remain as general as possible about what that 'thing' might be.

Finally. If the claim that mathematics' being "unreasonably effective" is silly and empty, then I'm perfectly content to be silly and empty with Wigner.

D

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Dear Dean Rickles,

I was not complaining about your lauding me but about your use of such strategy to circumvent addressing the issue. I prefer people just get to the point - it is shorter and does not hide the core in PC niceties.

My source, since you are so dependent on big names like Einstein Bohr and Wigner, is I. Kant (for example) and his work on categories, particularly that of modality, which is traditionally split into possibility, existence, and necessity.

Wigner's statement is not only empty and silly but misleading (read: detrimental to research progress), but you may remain hiding behind Wigner, because the views of founding fathers do matter a great deal in religion, and if you are with Wigner, then of course you may do so, because Wigner is of course Wigner and I am no Wigner.

S

Sascha.

I'll ignore your deliberate attempts to wind me up this time and focus on what you insist on saying is my main flaw.

You say: "... I. Kant (for example) and his work on categories, particularly that of modality, which is traditionally split into possibility, existence, and necessity."

Yes, I know that. Why should I follow this Kantian approach? If you knew anything about Kant, you'd realise that my definitions of necessity and possibility are in any case perfectly consistent with his (his universality almost exactly matches the definition of necessity). What, in any case, does this have to do with the topics in my essay? I'm interested in ontology; beyond the categories. The best connection I can make is via a transcendental argument: it's necessary condition for us having any experience is that there be something that exists. We can know that a priori, so it must be a necessary truth that something exists. But this is just the anthropic-type argument that I mentioned. It doesn't genuinely resolve the problem. Add to this the internal problems with Kant's theory as described by Quine and Kripke.

Next: "Wigner's statement is not only empty and silly but misleading (read: detrimental to research progress), but you may remain hiding behind Wigner, because the views of founding fathers do matter a great deal in religion, and if you are with Wigner, then of course you may do so, because Wigner is of course Wigner and I am no Wigner." So what is your actual argument here? I gave you a reasoned response to the unreasonable effectiveness issue involving a case study.

Dean

  • [deleted]

Dear Dean,

May I ask you for the clarification of your *main point*?

"If it is necessary then we need a necessary structure to ground this fact. Mathematical structures are of this kind. If reality is mathematical then it must exist. Reality is mathematical (as evidenced by the effectiveness of mathematics in the sciences). . . . Mathematical structures are timeless. . . . In other words, the universe is mathematical because there is existence, and the only reason for there to be existence is that there are mathematical truths."

Aren't mathematical structures *created* by us? As far as I understand the situation, they are not handed to us by any God. In fact, the most basic mathematical structure, the natural numbers, is an encapsulation, or representation, of a sequence of identical consecutive events (Peano axioms). One can argue that without such connection with temporal events, the concept of number, and hence of the mathematical structure, could not have appeared in the first place. So, to produce numbers--the very foundations of our mathematical journey--the least *our* universe must have are the sequences of events. Thus, our experience suggests that to have any 'mathematical structures' (in our current understanding of the term) the universe must have temporal sequences of events. Hence, I do not see how, *relying on the mathematical structures*, we can argue beyond this *minimal requirement on one of the possible universes*.

Dear Lev,

You said: "Aren't mathematical structures *created* by us? As far as I understand the situation, they are not handed to us by any God."

I certainly never said they were handed to us by a God! Then I'd have to explain that!

Representations of mathematical structures *are* constructed by us. Of course I agree with that. What they represent was not. The structures were around before the first sentient being capable of representing them emerged.

You then say: " One can argue that without such connection with temporal events, the concept of number, and hence of the mathematical structure, could not have appeared in the first place." There are plenty of possibilities whereby the concept of natural numbers could have emerged. Are you saying that temporal succession is a necessary condition for the emergence of this concept? That doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying. And even if it were true that the 'concept' of the natural numbers emerged this way, that does not mitigate against the structure having a reality independently of this. If the sequence of events is there then we have something instantiating the structure. Unless you mean the sequences recorded in memory. But that case: (1) you have a very idealist view that seems harder to stomach than mathematical realism; or (2) you face the problem that memory, records, and psychology are hardly unproblematic themselves.

I don't know what you have in mind by the claim: "Hence, I do not see how, *relying on the mathematical structures*, we can argue beyond this *minimal requirement on one of the possible universes*". You'll have to spell that out a bit more for me.

Best,

Dean

  • [deleted]

Hi Dean-

You are stating the interesting issue of existence and suggest that there are two ways to go about answering the questions that you bring up:

But now what if we are puzzled about existence itself? Why is there anything at all? This is really the ultimate question: why is there something when, presumably, there might not have been? There are two ways to go about answering this kind of question:

1. Show that existence is in fact necessary, so that there couldn't possibly have been nothing-in other words, we deny that there might have been nothing, so that the presumption above is seen to be mistaken.

2. We somehow give a 'bootstrap' explanation showing how consistency alone brings reality into being, perhaps via some kind of (non-vicious) explanatory loop.

The questions are answered in the context of Quantum Field Mechanics (QFM), which is described in my essay "Ultimate Possibilities of Physics". QFM originates from A.P. Kirilyuk. I have extended QFM in some areas and provided it with tutorial style explanations on my website.

The issue of existence issues boils down to the existence of two pre-space pre-time physically motivated fields (aka protofields) and their mutual attraction. This configuration is mathematically described as a state equation, also called existence equation.

Refering to your item 1: Existence is a necessary (unavoidable) consequence of the mutually attractive protofield interaction.

Refering to your item 2: Bootstrapping occurs, again, a consequence of attractive protofield interaction, which causes uncessing pulsations, rotation, and random motion of the interacting protofields.

In the essay, protofield attraction is postulated, but its physical need is motivated as follows. Without interaction, any perturbation in a protofield will 'spread out' and thus be unstable. Protofield attraction could potentially ensure that protofield perturbations are 'self-stabilizing'. As shown by the mathematical analysis of the state equation (existence equation), under the assumption of protofield attraction, protofield stabilized pulsating entities can indeed occur and be identified with particles.

Sincerely,

Ben Baten

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1. "Representations of mathematical structures *are* constructed by us. Of course I agree with that. What they represent was not. The structures were around before the first sentient being capable of representing them emerged."

Dean, I don't know what exactly you mean by the last statement. I can accept such existence for some (informational) structure, but this structure can be *radically* different from any of the *currently* known mathematical structures. The latter can be, as was suggested by von Neumann (see the end of his quote on page 2 of my essay), "a *secondary* [formal] language, built on [top of] the *primary* [formal] language". (In fact, in my essay such a possible formalism is discussed.)

2. "There are plenty of possibilities whereby the concept of natural numbers could have emerged. Are you saying that temporal succession is a necessary condition for the emergence of this concept? That doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying."

I don't see at all why it "doesn't sound like a good thing to be saying".

3. "If the sequence of events is there then we have something instantiating the structure."

I agree that there should be some structure instantiating streams of events (and this I discuss in my essay), but, as I mentioned above, the important question, of course, is *which* structure is instantiating them.

Dean, the reason I raised the question in the first place has to do with the following point. Based on the above, we can claim only that *in our universe* there is at least one 'preexisting' formal structure. It is not quite obvious why this situation is also valid for *all* other (possible) universes.

  • [deleted]

Another short remark to the issue of existence/non-existence:

If one assumes that something rather than nothing is possible, one assumes at the same time that nothing rather than something could also be possible - but actually isn't, because of the evidence that we have for something rather than nothing as an obvious fact. So the question wether there could be nothing instead of something seems to be not very puzzling for me. Because the case of a totally non-existence in the future (maybe by the vanishing of the universe into "non-existence" in some far away future) or even in the past (by arising of "something" out of nothing), one cannot erase the very fact of the possibility of our present existence.

But that does not prove the necessity of existence - or does it? I think it does, because a "possibility" inhabits choices. The possibility of a totally non-existence inhabits the choice of being actual or not, as we see with our actual existence. Therefore, something that inhabits choices cannot be "nothing" at all.

It seems to me, that assuming a totally non-existence to be possible is to deny a subtle detail in the argumentative chain, namely the fact of the existence of our universe and ourselves.

Therefore, the question for me is not, if it is possible that nothing exists, but moreover, where do choices come from - insofar as they cannot come from nothing at all. If they nonetheless could, then everything could come out of nothing and our choices and deductions could be only random exercises, because even contradictions of any kind could come out of nothing and even such contradictions, which could camouflage themselves as consistent lines of reasoning. Therefore, if we believe in rationalism, the necessity of something existent seems obvious for me and Dean Rickles rule of non-contradiction is as necessary as existence seems to be for me.

p.s. In my own essay in the current contest i argue, that not only the rule of non-contradiction is necessary, but also consciousness for the explanation *where* this rule originates from.

  • [deleted]

Your essay contains important questions but I don't see the responses and real results. What are the limits of physics 'explanatory power? Can physics explain existence itself? These questions do not have responses in your essay. 'Reality is mathematical. Therefore, there is existence.'

It explains nothing. If reality is mathematical then please transform a formula into a material body. Or try to transform a body into a formula. Therefore your approach to EXISTENCE is erroneous. You cannot explain the EXISTENCE using simple logical discussions like 'the only way one can explain existence is to demonstrate that non-existence is a logical impossibility'. The answer for EXISTENCE lies in a deep physics. 'Why is there being?' The answer for this fundamental question lies in the region of nature of space-time: all bodies EXIST IN SPACE. All bodies EXIST IN TIME. To find a sense of EXISTENCE you must explain why a body occupies space and why a body exists in time. The discussions about 'Reality is mathematical' do nothing here.

'why does something exist (rather than nothing)? Please see in my essay the explanation of nothing.

http://www.fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Leshan_Leshan.pdf

It is a hole in space-time without extension and duration properties. It is the primal void, it is the fundament of universe and 'being'. Thus a hole in space-time is an example of the non-existence. To explain the existence, please explain first the non-existence (a hole in space-time). After that you can explain why a body have extension and duration properties and it will be the explanation of existence (why is there being?). You cannot explain EXISTENCE without explanation of extension and duration properties. The explanation of EXISTENCE means explanations of extension and duration: why a body exists in space and time?

All discussions about EXISTENCE using mathematical reasons are senseless. Bodies exist in space and time but not in imaginary mathematics.