Greetings folks, I see that I have come late to this discussion, but I might have a little something to contribute. I happen to have made a semi-thorough review of the philosophic literature on this topic. This is in connection with an upcoming paper. Here are some comments taken from that paper: First, theorists who have pointedly focused on the first-cause/infinite-regress issue have an almost unanimous consensus in favor of the latter (Brown 1966; Grünbaum 1989; Reichenbach 2010; Smith 2008). Thus one of the more prominent theorists associated with this issue, the philosopher Adolf Grunbaum (1989) writes: [Quote]There is nothing at all in the concept of causality as such which warrants the claim that all causal chains must ultimately originate in the finite past from a cause that is itself uncaused. Causality as such is wholly compatible logically with physical causal chains which extend infinitely into the past [Endquote]. The law of causality, in fact, only requires that each condition and each change in a condition is the result of preceding conditions. The supposed requirement for a first cause is illusory. Indeed, any supposed first cause would be, by definition, an uncaused condition. This would be the violation of causality. Nor does quantum uncertainty imply some violation of causality. More likely, this applies to gaps in our knowledge; as every student of the subject quickly learns, this is a science that is still incompletely developed at a fundamental level. Free will would imply a violation of causality, but both philosophers and scientists now have an emerging consensus opposed to this notion (Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1985; Wegner 2004; OConnor 2011; Strawson 1986; Pereboom 2001; Smilansky 2002). Likewise, a sometimes-supposed state of primordial or alternative nothingness seems to some to require a first cause. However, this can be named, but is otherwise impossible to conceptualize, imagine or even discuss in an intelligible way. It appears to be an idea completely devoid of merit (Heath 1967). The source of the supposed requirement for a first cause is apparently our everyday experiences with conceptually circumscribed causal sequences (e.g., the appearance of organic molecules as marking the beginnings of life). In fact, each such first event is preceded by additional causal conditions (with the possible exception of conditions at the moment t = 0). Most importantly, it is possible to prove in a simple way the feasibility of an infinite causal regress. Consider, for example, a hypothetical proliferation of universes as in the fecund universes hypothesis of Lee Smolin. This might be physically impossible for some unknown reason, but it is entirely consistent with causal principles. To a descendant observer infinitely remote, we would represent an infinite past. For that observer, there would have been no beginning to the Universe. (I thought references might help a little here.)
Brown, Patterson. 1966. Infinite Causal Regression. The Philosophical Review 75 (4): 510-525.
Grünbaum, Adolf. 1989. The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology. Philosophy of Science 56 (3): 373-394.
Heath, P.L. 1967. Nothing. Ed. Paul Edwards. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan and Free Press.
Libet, Benjamin. 1985. Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (04): 529-539. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00044903.
Libet, Benjamin, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright, and Dennis K. Pearl. 1983. Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (readiness-Potential) the Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act. Brain 106 (3) (September 1): 623-642. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623.
OConnor, Timothy. 2011. Free Will. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/freewill/.
Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reichenbach, Bruce. 2010. Cosmological Argument. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/cosmological-argument/.
Smilansky, Saul. 2002. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
Smith, Quentin. 2008. A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe. Philpapers. http://philpapers.org/rec/SMIACA-2.
Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wegner, Daniel M. 2004. Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (05): 649-659. doi:10.1017/S0140525X04000159.