Tom,
"it preserves free will against the mystical conspiracy of superdeterminism; i.e., individual free will is hidden in plain sight, covariant with the free will of nature. That is, randomly covariant, such that nature on every scale participates in every event bifurcation -- which is exactly what we observe to happen on the classical scale, by a sensitive dependence on initial condition which characterizes deterministic chaos."
"So nature's free will is precisely equal to observer free will; i.e., classical randomness free of domain and range dependence, and without the assumption of a singular fixed cause("absolute being"), consonant with Joy's earlier work regarding relative becoming, which is also full of insight on breaking down the local-global distinction without sacrificing the free will hypothesis which necessitates "the experimental metaphysics of time.""
" On the other hand, if classical randomness (coin-toss probability) is a property of both the physical space and the measure space -- the world is deterministic; as Joy's framework shows, nonlinear random input to the continuous measurement results in a smooth function. This could only hold if the randomness of the metaphysically real physical space were equal to the randomness of the real physical measure space."
" Nature's choice is the hidden variable -- and because it is equally random with the observer's choice, the continuous sinusoidal function is smooth with probability 1. "Relative becoming" is a deterministic schema, as is chaos theory."
When I posit something similar, that time is the effect of change, turning future probabilities into past certainties and that while the process may be deterministic, the input is random, so the output cannot be fully determined prior to the event, you hold rather tightly to the spacetime model, which is deterministic, since past and future are not differentiated and there is no preferred direction, yet here you argue for a model that is much more realistic.
"In neither case can probabilism apply."
I would argue that the future, or at least the near future, is probabilistic, rather than random, since the range of potential outcomes become further constrained the nearer an event becomes. Input can be random, but momentum and inertia limit the effect truly random input can have. Its 'space' is being limited, thus the approaching events become more probable and less random.
Jonathan,
"If the energy bath is hot enough, this forbids the formation of the familiar particle families. My main question at this point is whether it is the effusiveness and incompressibility of energy, in the matter free regime, that 'pushes things out' into the 3-d realm, or is it the linking up of sub-units which creates a quenching effect on the available energy which does the trick."
Why not extend this dichotomy of energy and structure to the processing of the entire universe? Energy does expand outward, until it becomes subsumed into structure and then compresses until such time it heats up and breaks the structure down, radiating back out. Think on just how much it creates and defines life processes, as new energy is constantly growing up and out, while old structure is holding onto form and pressing it down and inward. Then onto convective processes that form geological and stellar currents, than galactic structures, pulling in form and radiating away energy. Could it be that in the intergalactic deep, even light cools enough that it 'crusts' and becomes a gas? Such as at 2.7k?
Try linking it up with complexity theory, with 'energy' as chaos and 'structure' as order. Then this complex reality is that dynamic of energy/chaos/randomness, pushing out, while structure/order/deterministicness, ie. probability, is compressing inward. Then time is the effect of this relationship, with the past as what is ordered/determined, while the future is the energy constantly pushing out this ordered form in all its weak spots, such that the new arises, either by motivating the old, or squeezing through the cracks, as either evolution, or revolution.
Regards,
John M