nmann,
Yes, I had seen the commentaries on Bell's theorem, and I admire your willingness to engage on this issue. I have avoided it until now because the disputes tend to become heated, and time is severely limited.
My first response to the challenges (maybe not the best) is to write out and post as explicit and clear a derivation of the CHSH version of Bell's inequality as I can, and ask for a clear explanation of what is wrong with it. A legitimate counterexample should provide sufficient insight that such an explanation should be easy. I had started to do that here, but then noticed that Joy Christian had posted a comment to an earlier thread that you had started above. So it will be posted there. It is a bit long-winded, and pedantic, but there does not seem to be any way around it.
Concerning the motivation for my thesis, I find Bell's analysis and the experiments that have confirmed the quantum predictions to be decisive. The analyses of Leggett and Gisin, and the work of the Zeilinger and Gisin groups has done a great deal to deepen and extend our understanding of the implications of quantum theory. But Bell's analysis clearly rules out local causality, and for me, that is the crucial point.
I do disagree with the Zeilinger group's characterization of "realism". Gisin has pointed out on a number of occasions that realism does not entail determinism. The fact that a system in a z-spin eigenstate does not have a well defined x-angular momentum does not mean that the system is not real. The fact that a particle in an entangled state might not, by itself, possess any well-defined properties does not mean that entangled states are ill-defined (just nonlocal). A sphere has a well-defined diameter; a cube does not. That does not lead us to question the reality of the cube.
Unfortunately, Tresser appears to make exactly this mistake. The following quotation is taken from the abstract of one of his recent papers. Perhaps, I am misunderstanding it, but it appears to contain a flat-out logical contradiction.
"We prove versions of the Bell and the GHZ Theorems that do not assume Locality but only the Effect After Cause Principle (EACP) according to which for any Lorentz observer the value of an observable cannot change because of an event that happens after the observable is measured. We show that the EACP is strictly weaker than Locality. As a consequence of our results, Locality cannot be considered as the common cause of the contradictions obtained in all versions of Bell's Theory. ... This work indicates that it is Weak Realism, not Locality, that needs to be negated to avoid contradictions in microscopic physics."
If EACP is strictly weaker than Locality, then it is implied by Locality. If
EACP is false, the Locality is ruled out a fortiori. Tossing out other basic assumptions will not save locality. It has been many, many years since I taught logic, but I don't think that the rules have changed that much.
I have not had a chance to look at the Gisin group's moving reference frame experiment. Suarez' claim that the quantum correlations should be viewed as originating outside spacetime seems to be generally in sync with some of the statements of Gisin regarding the difficulty (impossibility?) of embedding nonlocal quantum effects in relativistic spacetime. I would have phrased it differently, but I hold a similar view. I think that a logical account of nonlocal effects has to assume some sequencing even beyond what is provided by the universal time suggested by Gisin, and I think that Suarez might have been making a similar point.
In the process of writing this I noticed that you had posted a nice, simple derivation of Bell's inequality below. The one that I am posting above is different enough that I think it is still worth doing.
Ed