Dear Robert! Excellent in-depth analysis in your essay. But why not have the depth of the ontology? Modern physics and mathematics - science not ontologically grounded. Today dominate the operational theory without the necessary ontological foundation.

Correctly, you have to look deep first structure. Bourbaki is a good title "mother" or "generative". Now, as for the physics and mathematics necessary first structure-mother. The concept of "causality" - a category of relationship (Immanuel Kant) ... What are the most fundamental relationship that is unconditional?

There is a fine principle of "coincidence of opposites." Also there is another good old principle of the triunity, who was not Isaac Newton.

In my absolute generating structure to form the basis of dialectical triad only absolute (unconditional) state of matter. This structure, which Umberto Eco calls "missing." "The truth must be drawn ..." (A.Zenkin) ... and ontologically grounded .... There is no other way to truth... My rating-9. Sincerely, Vladimir

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Robert,

Congratulations, your excellent essay is in the top 35 essays of this contest. I wish you good luck in the final evaluation too.

As a final conclusion of your essay, please summarize in a few sentences, which of our 'Basic Physical Assumptions' are wrong in your opinion?

Anonymous

    My essay argues against the prevalent assumption that any proposal for a physical theory should separately specify kinematics and dynamics, that is, a space of physically possible states and a law describing how these evolve in time.

    5 days later

    Dear Robert

    a deep and intriguing essay. The core about causal sets sounds right: I believe there are many indications that gravity is really described by conformal degrees of freedom, and I learned the other day that all of the Standard Model interactions except one term are conformally invariant. Causal set theory is surely a good way to explore. But one somehow has to introduce a scale too at some point.

    Your arguments about not separating kinematics and dynamics are intriguing. Of course in a sense that is what Einstein discovered about gravity.

    Best wishes

    George Ellis

      Hello Robert,

      I have not read it yet, but your essay is on my reading list for today. However, your key point is one I have already given a lot of thought to. The notion that kinematic states and dynamic evolution are separable seems to carry over from the subject-object distinction in English and other European languages.

      It is a peculiar left-brain dominated preoccupation, which necessitates measures like Korzybski's "the word is not the thing." In Chinese, by contrast; one cannot describe a thing apart from its process, and even the individual strokes in a character tell the story of how that pictogram evolved.

      But causal structure is a subject I've been interested in for some time. The challenges posed by the recent Fermi and Integral probe results have called many promising theories like CDT into question, because of problems with achieving Lorentz invariance. And I had some interesting discussions about this matter with Gerard 't Hooft during FFP10, and with some loop quantum gravity folks during FFP11.

      So it might be interesting to read what you have to say about this.

      All the Best,

      Jonathan

      Hey Rob, nice thingy, but one thing confuses me a bit. As you well know since to told me this, causal discovery is an ill-posed problem and to even have a non-trivial causal structure a joint probability should be degenerate. So how can a causal structure underpin everything? This almost sounds a bit like the causal set paradigm, which you clearly refute in your introduction.

        It's the cornerstone to concurrency theory:

        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation

        The right mathematical context in which it lives is coalgebra. Next year in Barbados: coalgebra quantum foundations. Both of you are of course invited!

        Dear Robert,

        I think you are right about the "relativity" of kinematics-dynamics. Originally, I wrote a completely different essay for this contest, in which I explained that the universality of the physical laws (its independence of position and time), as well as the principle of relativity, should not be considered as assumptions, because they can be ensured by extending the configuration space and modifying accordingly the evolution laws. This was based on something I wrote in an older unpublished article, in which I discuss the theories of physics from the perspective of sheaf theory. At the end, I decided to write a completely different essay, about singularities in general relativity, where I have more concrete and published results (Did God Divide by Zero?).

        I find brilliant the idea of playing with the kinematics and dynamics to yield an equivalent theory, but which is local. You may be interested in Maxim Raykin's recent Analytical Quantum Dynamics in Infinite Phase Space, who finds a more elegant dynamics for de Brogile-Bohm theory. I would also humbly suggest my own view on QM, in which I try to interpret the quantum weirdness by using only the unitary evolution of the wavefunction, constrained by global consistency conditions (which are intrinsic).

        Best wishes,

        Cristi Stoica

        • [deleted]

        MAX PLANK:

        An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by gradually winning over and converting its opponents; it rarely happens that Saul becomes Paul. What does happen is that its opponents gradually die out and that the growing generation is familiarized with the idea from the beginning.

        Dear George,

        I agree that Einstein's theory of relativity provides further evidence for the conventionality of the distinction between kinematics and dynamics. Concerning the question of introducing scale, you should have a look at Sean Gryb's comment (posted above). Sean is working on shape dynamics, which posits global scale invariance. He points out that the information left in the metric after one does away with the conformal factor is entirely about the causal structure. As I mentioned to Sean in my response to his post (and also in my response to Daniel Alves), the motivation for considering scale to be unphysical is very similar to the motivation for considering the distinction between kinematics and dynamics to be unphysical. I'm certainly sympathetic to the project of formulating our physical theories relationally, as one does in shape dynamics.

        Best,

        Rob

        Hi Bob,

        It's certainly true that causal discovery algorithms, if applied to finite sets of data, are really just heuristics for identifying likely causal structures. One kind of causal discovery algorithm actually returns a probability distribution over causal structures as its output. In that way, even if one's probabilistic data does not, strictly speaking, exhibit any conditional independences among the observed variables, if it is close to exhibiting such independence the algorithm will identify the most likely causal structure to be one that predicts such independences in the limit of infinitely large statistics. I don't see any problem with positing causal structure to be primitive while granting that we can never be 100% certain of the precise causal structure underlying finite data. Isn't it just like other idealizations in physics? The notion of an inertial observer might be critical to making sense of the special theory of relativity even if, strictly speaking, no observer is every truly inertial.

        Best,

        Rob

        7 days later
        • [deleted]

        ...causality 20 % 40 % 60 % - well half truth or half half falsehood....

        Dear Robert,

        I thought you might be interested in the following idea I posted on George Ellis's thread. Since you also are interested in "nonmanifold models that emphasize the role of causality," I thought I'd copy the idea here.

        **********

        After initially struggling with the idea, I've been thinking a bit about how your [George's] top-down causation idea might look from the perspective of nonmanifold models of fundamental spacetime structure that emphasize the role of causality. It seems that top-down causation might provide an interesting new perspective on such models. For definiteness and simplicity, I use Rafael Sorkin's causal sets approach as an example.

        Causal sets, as currently conceived, are by definition purely bottom-up at the classical level. Causality is modeled as an irreflexive, acyclic, interval-finite binary relation on a set, whose elements are explicitly identified as "events." Since causal structure alone is not sufficient to recover a metric, each element is assigned one fundamental volume unit. Sorkin abbreviates this with the phrase, "order plus number equals geometry." This is a special case of what I call the causal metric hypothesis.

        In the context of classical spacetime, top-down causation might be summarized by the statement, "causal relationships among subsets of spacetime are not completely reducible to causal relations among their constituent events." In this context, the abstract causal structure exists at the level of the power set of classical spacetime, i.e., the set whose elements are subsets of spacetime. Discrete models very similar to causal sets could be employed, with the exception that the elements would correspond not to events, but to families of events. Two-way relationships would also come into play.

        Initially this idea bothered me because of locality issues, but such a model need not violate conventional classical locality, provided that appropriate constraints involving high-level and low-level relations are satisfied.

        This idea is interesting to me for the following reasons.

        1. The arguments for top-down causation presented by you [George] and others are rather convincing, and one would like to incorporate such considerations into approaches to "fundamental theories," particularly those emphasizing causality.

        2. One of the principal difficulties for "pure causal theories" is their parsimony; it is not clear that they contain enough structure to recover established physics. Top-down causation employed as I described (i.e. power-set relations) provides "extra structure" without "extra hypotheses" in the sense that one is still working with the same (or similar) abstract mathematical objects. It is the interpretation of the "elements" and "relations" that becomes more general. In particular, the causal metric hypothesis still applies, although not in the form "order plus number equals geometry."

        3. There is considerable precedent, at least in mathematics, for this type of generalization. For example, Grothendieck's approach to algebraic geometry involves "higher-dimensional points" corresponding to subvarieties of algebraic varieties, and the explicit consideration of these points gives the scheme structure, which has considerable advantages. In particular, the scheme structure is consistent with the variety structure but brings to light "hidden information." This may be viewed as an analogy to the manner in which higher-level causal structure is consistent with lower-level structure (e.g. does not violate locality), but includes important information that might be essential in recovering established physics.

        4. As far as I know, this approach has not yet been explicitly developed.

        I'd appreciate any thoughts you might have on this.

        **********

        I'd appreciate your thoughts on this too! Take care,

        Ben

        • [deleted]

        Dear Robert Spekkens,

        Your essay argues against the prevalent assumption that there are two separate basics of physics, a space of physically possible states and laws describing how these evolve in time.

        Doesn't the expression "in time" guess that the future is predetermined and just unseen? Doesn't "a space of physically possible states" also guess that the world is built like a combination of discrete elements? Maybe these assumptions are good or at least clever guesses. I prefer to not assume more than what seems to be indispensable: reality and causality.

        I see any causal structure real only in the past if the world cannot be seen from outside as a closed system although most of our theories do so. Is my caveat acceptable? I designed five figures in order to illustrate it and its implications.

        Eckard

        2 months later

        Dr. Spekkens,

        Congratulations on having your beautifully written essay winning the contest. I missed reading it before and have just done so. Your conclusion that kinematics and dynamics should be considered as one causal entity sounds to me very natural in both senses of the word.

        I know you have waded in your scholarly way through the whole layers of various quantum theories and applied your intuition and methodical analysis to reach this conclusion. Also working intuitively but lacking your erudition, I invented my own theory (of a universal lattice of nodes interacting locally, linearly and causally with their neighbors), which I think a priori has the above characteristics without consciously seeking them out (see attached figure). I would be grateful if you or your students can check it out half-cooked as it is, but it is the best I could do. Here is my Beautiful Universe Theory and here is my fqxi essay Fix Physics! on which it was based.

        Finally I wonder if you agree with me that Eric Reiter's essay deserved a prize ? Perhaps the good people at Perimeter can check out his research and replicate his experiments if need be .

        with warm regards

        Vladimir TamariAttachment #1: bu_figure_5.jpg

        sorry I meant the fqxi essay is based on the 2005 theory not the other way round!

        • [deleted]

        Robert

        As this paper won, I read it.

        You have correctly identified a false distinction in the depiction of physical existence, but not actually, I think, explained why this is so. That is because physical existence can only occur in one physically existent state at a time. In terms of what exists at any time, it is not physical substance that matters so much as the physically existent state thereof. Physical existence is existential sequence, ie one state at a time. There is no change within it. Change concerns difference between physically existent states, not of them. So there is no 'time' in physical existence, it is a spatial phenomenon which alters over time.

        Any concept which incorporates something occurring over time, ie more than one physically existent state, is therefore addressing physical change, ie the sequence, and not the existent state as such. That is cause and effect. And the important point about cause and effect, once sequence is understood, is that only certain specific existent states could be responsible for any given outcome (ie existent effect). They must be from amongst other previous states which, when existent, were adjacent both spatially, and sequentially, to that which occurred next (ie effect). Because physical influence cannot 'jump' physical circumstance. Cause and effect can only be considered in terms of direct physical interaction, otherwise it becomes 'the butterfly flaps its wings' syndrome.

        In other words, notions such as oscillation, reaction, feedback, etc, are ontologically incorrect, unless they are expressed properly in terms of a sequence of occurrences. At most there is just a repetition of a previously physically existent state as the sequence progresses, but this is still different because it occurred separately. Although even that is likely to be superficial, ie due to the level of conceptualisation (but possibly correct at that level). Physically, it is probably impossible that a configuration of any given physically existent state, in its entirety, will re-occur.

        All this stems from the fundamentally flawed way in which we conceptualise physical existence. We see it as 'things', but these are abstract concepts based on a conceptualisation of reality at a higher level than what actually occurs. So, we fail to differentiate the physical sequence down to its physically existential level. That is, most circumstances which we address as a state of existence, are not so. In fact they comprise several states. This results in the reification of time, and the type of false differentiation which you have identified.

        Paul

        • [deleted]

        I usually wait for the announcement and read the winning paper.

        Can't wait to enjoy this one.

        Congrats.

        X Bubbler

        • [deleted]

        Robert Spekkens,

        I recently made a comment on the viXra blog about bisimilation and its relevancy to your causal structure in the sense that it allows the incorporation of bi-directional causation! I made the comment before I read these comments here and as soon as I saw this comment I thought I would direct your attention to a good paper on bisimilation: http://www.cs.unibo.it/~sangio/DOC_public/history_bis_coind.pdf. This paper examines the history of bisimilarity in the context of computer science, Modal Logic, and set theory.

        Dear anonymous,

        Thanks for the reference! It's clear that bisimulation is relevant to what I want to do. I'll definitely have a look at the paper.