Dear Edwin,

Thank you for your comments, let me just give a few clarifications on your summary of my ideas.

1. My framework is based on a combination of free logic and modal logic, however, I am looking into ways of simplifying it so that possibly only one kind of extension of classical logic is needed.

2. Your comparison between the states in 2-D Hilbert Space and the "self-licking ice cone" is funny, but I think it understates the fact that it is already capable of modeling classically highly unexpected behaviors, and yes, I am thinking of the sequential SG experiments with B-fields aligned along different axes. I know that you deny that the actual experiment is modeled by it, but this does not take anything away from the fact that, as a model, it makes non-trivial non-classical predictions and serves as an excellent way for understanding higher-dimensional Hilbert Spaces.

3. I think Matt Leifer's claim about the quantum state was not about wondering whether it is a superposition state or not, but about wondering about its ontological status.

4. The theorem that connects my ideas to the path integral was the center-piece of the essay. In my opinion, there are nowadays so many reformulations of quantum mechanics that it has become a veritable cottage industry, and the problem which, as far as I know, most if not all seem to have in common is that they don't make it any clearer what is "really" going on. I like to think that my model does. Although I don't know anything about your automatic physics, if it is based on automata, then the first question I would have is what objects in the real world these automata correspond to. Without this information, it would seem like it is just another "black box" reformulation.

Thank you again for taking the time to write your comments.

Best wishes,

Armin

  • [deleted]

Dear Jon,

Thank you for your comments and for your questions. I will try to answer them as best as I can. Keep in mind that I have not yet completely worked out everything, but I like to think that I am close.

"Do you think in your model where you consider a quantum 2-D object which has the potential to become a 3-D object (instead of a 3-D object with one dimension consisting of every possible value) you could still account for interference patterns as seen in the double slit experiment?"

The mathematical model alone cannot do this because it doesn't explain 1) where the phase factor comes from and 2) How the double slit potential is to be modeled.

However, if you combine the mathematical model with the physical model I presented at my talk in Vaxjo, then I believe it is in principle possible because the physical model supplies basis from which one can get both: The phase factor comes out of a postulated mechanism that compares the passage of time in areatime to the passage of time in spacetime, and the potential corresponds to where you set your point of origin in the abstract plane formed out of the two proper times. I say "in principle" because I have not yet performed the calculation, as I have been still focused on much more basic issues in my framework.

"Have you seen Stephen Wolfram's work where he talks about enumerating different axiom systems and showing what theorems are provable under each?"

No, I was unaware of Wolfram's work in this area. I just read the linked talk and found it very interesting. Essentially, it appears he has taken this idea of exploiting the freedom of choosing axioms several steps further. I think that this work has the potential to be very useful in mathematics, but because the space of possible axioms is infinite, you will still need something like imagination to pick out the most useful ones. Reading his talk made me wonder whether it will ever be able to simulate imagination in machines. I think that would be both a profoundly exhilarating and terrifying prospect. HAL had imagination.

"There's a lot of overlap in what theorems are provable in each consistent axiom system, but there are still some differences. How do you think this relates to your view that the "freedom to choose one's axioms coupled with the requirement of consistency should naturally lead us to expect mathematics to be unreasonably effective in modeling reality, but that this unreasonable effectiveness only exists, as it were, as an actualizability until human imagination transforms (parts of) mathematics into an actually effective model of reality."?"

Remember, we are talking about modeling nature, that is, we are talking about something within the realm of physics. As a physicist, I really don't care that much which axiom system to use as long as it serves as a foundation that gives me the desired model of the world that has the qualities that I desire: Above all, predictions that match real world observations, but also conceptual clarity, relative simplicity of the calculations, and some elegance wouldn't hurt either. Most physics models are several layers separated from the axiomatic foundation of mathematics. In that sense, I would say my work is atypical. But that is the direct result of trying to incorporate a new distinction into mathematics which beyond the level of logic, and possibly some poorly explored models of set theory simply didn't exist. I must admit that until about 1.5 years ago, when I first started the effort of learning about these formal systems, I was not all that interested in mathematics for its own sake.

"You talk of ZFC (and your ZFCD)... Do you think the axiom of choice is reasonable axiom in a system that contains real numbers which are uncomputable?"

Well, I can live with non-constructive proofs, and I can live with the Banach-Tarski paradox. I think my pragmatic physicist side is showing its side when I admit that I prefer a more powerful formal system over a less powerful one, even if, as a side effect, it proves to be sometimes "too powerful" because it allows you to derive highly non-intuitive results. The cap on this is of course provided by consistency. I don't want a system that is so "powerful" that you can prove literally anything at all. Incidentally, I am certain that once the formal system I am working out is complete, there will be highly counterintuitive implications lurking in the background, waiting to be discovered.

"How could one actually choose one of these uncomputable reals, if they cannot be specified in a finite way."

Actually, Wolfram's work to which you pointed me might be a possible way to do it. If Wolfram's system could be used to enumerate many different very similar but not identical set theoretic models based on the enumerated axiom system, perhaps it might be possible to devise an algorithm which chooses the model in which you can approximate the number to the desired level of precision. The analogy that pops into my mind is that of traditional musicians and filmmakers, who use notes and individual frames, respectively, as a their basic building blocks, whereas "mash-up artists" use entire blocks of these as their basic building blocks.

"Maybe this is where your thoughts on "imagination" comes in? "

Most definitely, I believe devising any sort of algorithm from scratch for a particular purpose requires at least a modicum of imagination.

"Also, is ZFCD trying to be a meta-mathematical theory that tries to explore the ramifications of an incomplete system being consistently extended, from a general perspective?"

I don't think so. ZFCD is a set-theoretical model, and all the relevant propositions pertaining to incomplete systems are made within it, where I assume by "incomplete system" you mean objects such as incomplete pairs etc. However, ZFCD may well have metamathematical (as well as metaphysical) implications, because the lintroduction of the formal distinction between actuality and potentiality into established mathematics is (at least in my totally biased opinion) a very important and largely unexplored area.

"Is what you describe as "pro-actually" a form of determinism, where what you define as "actualizably" a more probabilistic view of the future?"

Well, you have the right idea, but I wouldn't put it quite that way. I would say, as a conjecture, a world is deterministic iff in this world every actualizability at every moment is a proactuality. Actualizability is the more general concept which captures the ontological distinction; pro-actuality is a more specific concept which applies it to the context where the actualizability could most easily be confused for actuality. For instance, someone thinking that measuring some property of one of an entangled pair of particles causes the other to "have" the corresponding property at that moment reflects, in my opinion, such confusion.

"How would you view the question of whether a 10,000 digit number was prime or not from this perspective?"

As you asked it, without any further qualification, I would interpret the question to ask about an actuality because numbers, without further qualification, are abstractions of objects in the inner domain. If you had asked me "suppose this number was in the outer domain", then my answer would be that you are asking about a proactuality, because numbers in the outer domain are abstractions of objects in the outer domain, and no elements of the outer domain are "actual".

"Is this related to the idea that something may be considered probabilistic until a proper fully-predictive theory is found?"

No, I meant to simply point out that what distinguishes probability from non-probabilistic measures is this aspect of "coming into existence" that the others lack. As you know, Kolmogorov's axioms are not sufficient to capture the concept of probability. There is no way you can conceptually frame a unit length or a unit mass as a measure of "coming into existence". But that is not the fault of probability theory, because it just works with the sets that it is given by the set theoretical model. That is why I think that the outer domain is an important addition to set theory: It is exactly the home of the probability measure. The claim that "something may be considered probabilistic until a proper fully-predictive theory is found" strikes me as far too metaphysical for mathematics.

Is it related to the mathematical fact that we don't know if we are up against a true and unprovable statement or if we just haven't done enough searching to find a proof?

This is a great question. Although the "coming into existence" could refer merely to one's certainty of belief, I am at this point only treating probability in an objectivist manner. And from an objectivist point of view, it seems to me that it is already a matter of fact whether a statement is true but unprovable, or whether it can be proved in finite time. And that means that if the proof exists, it is already determined to be a pro-actuality (ignoring facts of reality that the computers could catch fire, or that in a few billions years our planet will be destroyed etc.), and if it doesn't exist, then it is already a matter of fact that it doesn't.

"Is something that is undecidable, probabilistic from this point of view?"

I assume you are referring to undecidability within the context of propositions. I suspect there is more than one way of relating this sort of undecidability to my framework, and for this reason I am not quite sure. However, I think if one really set out to relate undecidability to probability in it, then it would be possible to do, but that would lead to a very unfamiliar conception of probability. On the other hand, there is much that is not well understood about probability. Who knows if we have really exhausted all the possible meanings it could have?

"Are you familiar with Gregory Chaitin's omega constant?"

I was not familiar with it, and even after reading the wikipedia article, I do not have a good intuition for it.

"I think you might have some interest in some of the questions I posed at the end of my essay. Somehow many of them seem very relevant to your work. Please consider taking a crack at answering one of them."

OK, you asked:"If quantum mechanics is a world where things can be both "yes" and "no" at the same time, should experimental results be analyzed with Zen Koans instead of logical inferences?"

I would say that it is not the case that "quantum mechanics is a world where things can be both yes and no at the same time" but rather that within the domain of objects described by quantum mechanics, there are simply no things with actual properties describable in terms of "yes" and "no" until they are "measured". Zen Koans, I think, while often bringing home illuminating insights, do not seem very efficient (or even workable) as deductive systems to me (but then, I know very little about them).

I like the question in particular because it demonstrates how the confusion between actuality and actualizability can create a much more pervasive confusion in our worldview. If I had a fair coin in my hand, not yet flipped, and you asked me "is the outcome the flip heads?" and I suffered from the same confusion with respect to actuality and actualizability, of course I would say "Yes and no". Since we know what is really going on, does that not seem silly?

Thank you again for your questions.

Best,

Armin

Dear Armin,

It appears we are leaving substance and now chasing shadows. The simple question I asked has been left unanswered or answered with other questions. If I may repeat:

Given a light source, e.g. a pulsar say 10^3 light seconds away, and sending out pulses once every 60 seconds, such that the moment a pulse is detected, another is already emitted and on on its way and would be detected also after 60 seconds. So we have regular detections every 60 seconds. Now if, on detecting a pulse, the observer moves towards the next incoming pulse, can he reduce the detection time to 59 seconds? Again, if on detection, the observer moves away from the already incoming and in-flight photon, can he delay the detection time to 61 seconds? Or does the detection time always remain 60 seconds no matter whatever manouevre or motion the observer makes. In the Einstein quote above, the motion of the observer will not have any effect on optical phenomena.

Regards,

Akinbo

As an aside, check out the Sagnac experiment if you have not encountered it before and compare with the M-M experiment. Also check the latest experimental finding concerning light speed in vacuum (as posted by Pentcho today on the Faster than Light blog)

This is getting curiouser and curiouser.

"I thought from my essay it would have been obvious that I am pursuing the interpretation according to which there is no particle before the measurement event"

Sounds like, the Moon is not there when nobody is looking.

Regards,

Akinbo

Dear Akinbo,

"This is getting curiouser and curiouser."

Did you read section 6? If you did, you might want to take another look. If there is something that is not clear, I' be happy to answer any questions.

"Sounds like, the Moon is not there when nobody is looking."

Can we agree that the moon may be a tad different from an elementary particle, or, for that matter, a molecule? Specifically, you can associate space-time vectors with any location in or on the moon. So, I would not worry about whether the moon is still there when nobody is looking.

Best,

Armin

Dear Akinbo,

"It appears we are leaving substance and now chasing shadows."

I don't know what you are referring to. Looking back at the last 7 posts, all I see is that I asked two simple "Yes" or "No" questions, which my "opponent wriggles and wreathes" to avoid giving a straight answer to;)

What is so difficult about answering my question whether you accept the non-commutativity relations of QM (or, equivalently, the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle)?

"Given a light source, e.g. a pulsar say 10^3 light seconds away, and sending out pulses once every 60 seconds, such that the moment a pulse is detected, another is already emitted and on on its way and would be detected also after 60 seconds. So we have regular detections every 60 seconds. Now if, on detecting a pulse, the observer moves towards the next incoming pulse, can he reduce the detection time to 59 seconds? Again, if on detection, the observer moves away from the already incoming and in-flight photon, can he delay the detection time to 61 seconds? Or does the detection time always remain 60 seconds no matter whatever manouevre or motion the observer makes. In the Einstein quote above, the motion of the observer will not have any effect on optical phenomena."

Yes, I promise I will answer this, but could you please humor me, and give me a simple yes or no answer to mine?

Thanks,

Armin

Armin,

Let me humor you with a NO answer.

References (not the best I can lay hands on now, there is a recent experiment I can't readily locate now)...

Violation of Heisenberg's Measurement-Disturbance Relationship by Weak Measurements

Experimental realization of Popper's Experiment: Violation of the Uncertainty Principle?

Particle Measurement Sidesteps the Uncertainty Principle

Scientists Now Uncertain About Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle

In summary, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is a useful conjecture not a law or principle. I have rubbed your back. Now rub mine :)

Regards,

Akinbo

4 days later

Hi Armin -

A very interesting and clearly written essay. I recognized your "default specification axiom" from your 2013 FQXi paper, and I agree that a crucial step toward making quantum theory make sense is to learn how to imagine a world in which possibility plays a fundamental role.

I was struck by your statement that "the state of early 21st century mathematics is such that everything represented by mathematics is represented as an actuality." My knowledge of math is too rudimentary for me to know if that's true, or to judge how well your new logic remedies the situation. But it's clear that our philosophical tradition has always treated the given actuality of things as basic, while possibility has been understood mainly as a kind of defective actuality, as what might actually exist but in fact doesn't.

I've been thinking about this while reading Ruth Kastner's book on the Transactional Interpretation of QM, subtitled "The Reality of Possibility". Your treatment of the Born rule in terms of time-symmetry reminded me of her theory, which describes a sub-spacetime realm of possible interaction underlying the actually observed events of our world. Though I think her interpretation is excellent as far as it goes, it still conceives possibility only as what's potentially actualizable. I think this misses something essential about the way possibility works in QM, and it may be that this same limitation applies to the approach you have in progress.

The key for me is that possibilities don't "just exist" in the world; it takes very special kinds of situations to make things possible. I wasn't clear exactly what role "context" plays in your logic, but since you treat it as a "sample space" for measurement, I gather you have in mind the "entire measurement arrangement" that has to be taken into account in writing the wave-function for a system. Kastner's approach, like many others, just takes it for granted that such situations exist, i.e. that it's physically possible to make observations. The focus of my current essay, and also my 2013 FQXi essay, is on what's required in the mathematical structure of physics to do this - to create situations where specific outcomes are physically meaningful, which then contribute to setting up new contexts where new outcomes become possible. The argument is that a number of essentially different kinds of structure are needed for this, as reflected in the remarkably diverse set of physical parameters we need to describe our world. describe our world.

I hope your project meets with great success... it's not so common that imagination is combined with such clear thinking.

Thanks - Conrad

    Dear Mr. Shirazi,

    I have no wish to be disrespectful to you or to your essay, but I think abstract mathematics and abstract physics have nothing to do with how the real Universe is occurring for the following real reason:

    Do let me know what you think about this: This is my single unified theorem of how the real Universe is occurring: Newton was wrong about abstract gravity; Einstein was wrong about abstract space/time, and Hawking was wrong about the explosive capability of abstract NOTHING. Proof exists that every real astronomer looking through a real telescope has failed to notice that each of the real galaxies he has observed is unique as to its structure and its perceived distance from all other real galaxies. Each real star is unique as to its structure and its perceived distance apart from all other real stars. Every real scientist who has peered at real snowflakes through a real microscope has concluded that each real snowflake is unique as to its structure. Real structure is unique, once. Unique, once does not consist of abstract amounts of abstract quanta. Based on one's normal observation, one must conclude that all of the stars, all of the planets, all of the asteroids, all of the comets, all of the meteors, all of the specks of astral dust and all real objects have only one real thing in common. Each real object has a real material surface that seems to be attached to a material sub-surface. All surfaces, no matter the apparent degree of separation, must travel at the same constant speed. No matter in which direction one looks, one will only ever see a plethora of real surfaces and those surfaces must all be traveling at the same constant speed or else it would be physically impossible for one to observe them instantly and simultaneously. Real surfaces are easy to spot because they are well lighted. Real light does not travel far from its source as can be confirmed by looking at the real stars, or a real lightning bolt. Reflected light needs to adhere to a surface in order for it to be observed, which means that real light cannot have a surface of its own. Real light must be the only stationary substance in the real Universe. The stars remain in place due to astral radiation. The planets orbit because of atmospheric accumulation. There is no space.

    Warm regards,

    Joe Fisher

    Dear Conrad,

    Thank you very much for your feedback on my essay. Allow me to comment on some of the things you wrote:

    "I recognized your "default specification axiom" from your 2013 FQXi paper, and I agree that a crucial step toward making quantum theory make sense is to learn how to imagine a world in which possibility plays a fundamental role."

    Yes, but note that when I wrote my 2013 paper, I still had only an understanding at a conceptual level about how the default specification principle applies to quantum mechanics. It took me to focus for the last 1.5 years on the foundations of mathematics before I could begin to grasp how to incorporate it at a formal level, and that project is not yet complete (the technical paper is still awaiting completion).

    "I was struck by your statement that "the state of early 21st century mathematics is such that everything represented by mathematics is represented as an actuality.""

    Indeed, isn't that surprising? I have consulted with a few mathematicians on this, and, as far as I know, there are only two areas of mathematics which come close to being, but are not quite, exceptions to that claim.

    The first area is what appears to me to be a very poorly developed field called "modal set theory" (of which ZFCD would be considered a new example). To my best knowledge, the motivation for introducing the modality of "possibility" into set theory has so far been always to help address the problem of completed infinities in set theory. There are mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics who would rather expel this notion out of the current foundations of mathematics, and an appealing way of doing it is to introduce this modality specifically so that it applies to infinite sets (or, presumably, any set which is "too large" for the more standard set theories), thereby keeping the metaphysical status of all such sets in mathematics as uncompleted entities. As you now know, I think that this sort of modality has a much more important and extensive role to play in mathematics, which is at this time largely unexplored.

    The reason I feel that previous formulations of modal set theory do not constitute an exception to my claim is that, although I did not expressly say this, my claim was meant to apply to finite objects represented by mathematics. The whole issue of infinities in physics, in particular, is a subject that I would bracket off as an area onto itself, subject to its own considerations.

    The second area is probability theory. But even there, the glaring problem (in my view) is that Kolmogorov's axioms applied to standard ZFC set theory are not sufficient to distinguish the concept underlying the probability measure from that of non-probabilistic measures. For example, from a purely mathematical perspective, there is no difference between probability and, say, a unit length, or a unit mass. Of course, conceptually, they are worlds apart. As I mentioned elsewhere in this column, I think the problem is not with Kolmogorov's axioms per se, but with the fact that the set theory to which they apply fails to make such a distinction. So, even though probability theory comes close, it is by itself not sufficient to form an exception to my claim. I believe that one of the consequences of my work is that it leads to better understanding of the fundamental concept of probability at a formal level, quite independently of its implications for quantum mechanics.

    "But it's clear that our philosophical tradition has always treated the given actuality of things as basic, while possibility has been understood mainly as a kind of defective actuality, as what might actually exist but in fact doesn't."

    I completely agree. That there is a difference between actualizability/potentiality/possibility (or whatever else you want to call it) and actuality has been recognized at least since Aristotle. Indeed, even the founders of quantum mechanics understood it, and the development of quantum mechanics fostered at least some efforts to formalize this distinction at least within that context. See for example page 124 and following below, from Heisenberg's "Physics and Philosophy", where he mentions this very distinction and in particular the efforts of von Weizsaecker to formalize it as an extension of classical logic within the context of quantum mechanics:

    http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Heisenberg,Werner/Heisenberg,%20Werner%20-%20Physics%20and%20philosophy.pdf

    Nevertheless, as far as I can tell, nobody has seriously attempted to move this distinction *in its full generality* (i.e. so that it applies to any objects, not just those that obey the rules of quantum mechanics or are infinite in nature; also, of course it is always possible that somebody has already done this work and it is collecting dust in some obscure journal somewhere, but I am not aware of such an instance) from the level of philosophical verbiage to that of a formal precise distinction in the foundations of mathematics. I believe that for future generations it will be very difficult to understand how this could have been overlooked for so long, and suspect that the reason for that is that this is one of those extremely rare situations where something is "sitting right in front of your nose", yet you don't see it until it is pointed out by somebody.

    "I think this [presumably, the fact that potentiality in a given context is just taken for granted instead of arising from some more fundamental specifications that separate out possible potentialities from impossible ones] misses something essential about the way possibility works in QM, and it may be that this same limitation applies to the approach you have in progress."

    At first, I did not understand what you meant. After I had a quick look at your paper, I think I am beginning to grasp what you are referring to. If I understood you correctly, I think you have made a very astute observation in the sense that you have put your finger on a problem in the metaphysics of modern fundamental physics that could be easily mistaken for a problem in the metaphysics of quantum theory, but is actually a separate from it, and may not have been sufficiently appreciated as such.

    To answer this, I invite you to take a look at the appendix of my 2012 FQXi entry (pages 10 and 11):

    http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1431

    I present therein a schema for a "metatheory of nature" which I believe will eventually replace the currently fashionable notion of a TOE. The schema provides the bare conceptual "skeleton" on which I intend to hang the different mathematical structures that are found in fundamental physics. For example, I have some concrete ideas about how to derive The SU(2)XU(1) symmetry of electroweak interactions from the fact that the theory occupies the (2,3) box. I have some vaguer notions on how to go about deriving the SU(3) symmetry of strong interactions from the fact that in this schema, QCD occupies the (1,3) box. So, I think that you are right to point out that the interdependence of some very specific mathematical structures in fundamental physics that describe different levels of possible potentialities is a problem to be explained, but I think that I have already taken it into consideration.

    I hope that this will also give an indication of the vastness of the project that I am undertaking. When compared to my 2012 entry, my current entry is much more specific in the sense that it fills in many conceptual details of the assertions I made therein. However, it is actually itself a "Big picture Paper" to be supplemented by a paper that provides all the mathematical details. I am very much proceeding from an extremely broad and general picture to one in which all the details are filled in as I go. The upside of this approach is that I know exactly what I need to do next, i.e. I am not "groping in the dark". The downside is that, until I have a reached a certain level of specificity, it will be very difficult for others to see the "Global Big picture" that I see. Another downside (arguably) is that each additional layer of specificity requires me to learn new things that are not always so easy to assimilate quickly, in order that I can put it all together at that level.

    I started this project several years ago while actually on track in a completely different career direction, and have until recently supported myself while working as a midnight pharmacist. I left my job in January because I wanted to devote myself completely to this, and I like to think that I am close to the stage where others might be able to appreciate the merits the approach. My savings will give me until some time next year to test this hypothesis, although bringing major stages of this project to completion may well take much longer.

    Thank you again for your comments, I will leave some after I had a chance to also read the two older entries to which your paper refers, so that I can obtain a "big picture" of what you are working on.

    Best,

    Armin

    Dear Joe,

    First, a quick correction, my last name is Nikkhah Shirazi, but I understand that it is easy to think the first part is my middle name.

    Second, thank you for sharing your views.

    Best,

    Armin

      Armin -

      I appreciate your clarification on "modal" mathematics and probability theory. I believe you're exactly right that someday "it will be very difficult to understand how this could have been overlooked for so long..." - though I'm not sure that such situations are so extremely rare, at least in philosophy. It seems to me that at bottom, the whole history of our intellectual tradition is about learning how to pay attention to aspects of existence that we all grow up taking for granted. At any rate, my own work is entirely a struggle to make certain things explicit that we all know very well - for example, that physical things are observable. And there's nothing we take more for granted than the possibility of things.

      I happened to see your 2012 essay a few days ago, and I wondered how I could have missed it when it first appeared. It looks very interesting, and the title itself should have grabbed my attention, since I've always been suspicious of "unification" as the key to fundamental physics. And, your Metatheory diagram is a little like one I put up on my wall decades ago, and keep coming back to, despite my feelings of inadequacy in the face of such a task. So I'll respond at more length once I've had a chance to read that essay carefully.

      Thanks - Conrad

      Dear Armin,

      Thank you for not reporting my comment to FQXi.org as being inappropriate and have the Moderator classify it as Obnoxious Spam.

      Gratefully,

      Joe Fisher

      Thanks for such a detailed response! Still thinking about stuff... More to come soon...

      Dear Armin

      Congratulations on your new research, even though I must admit I got lost after the word "modal" - as an artist and inventor my thinking is very pragmatic and mechanical. I rejoined you when "conservation of angular momentum" came up because that is of the essence in my Beautiful Universe BU theory wherein - as I have explained in my essay - physics and mathematics become one at this very basic level of nodes echanging angular momentum causally and locally with adjacent nodes, as in an abacus. I also empathized with your words "pseudo-nonlocality" because in BU angular momentum is transmitted node to ether node as in a slippery gear train and nothing is lost or hidden. Did you read Klingman's essay debunking Bell's theorem in this contest? You lost me in your next section about the path integral because you take quantum probability as a given, which I think is only a mathematical analogy.

      Time to listen to music- I hope you are still composing!

      Best wishes and appreciation

      Vladimir

        Dear Akinbo,

        Thank you for your patience, I had some other issues to take care of before I could continue our debate, and I knew this post was going to be a long one.

        I will get to your question towards the end of this post, but I would like to first address the issues surrounding the questions I asked of you.

        First, let me at least give a sketch of an intuitive qualitative justification for my claim that the non-commutativity relations are equivalent to the uncertainty relation, and that rejecting them amounts to rejecting all of QM.

        The way I think of this is that the commutator of the operators is a measure of the independence of each other of the states that result when two different operators act on a particular quantum state, in the following sense: if the resultant states are completely independent, then they can be separately specified to arbitrary precision in terms of either observable, which is mathematically signified by the fact that the resultant states are eigenstates that both operators have in common. If they are not completely independent, then acting on the particular quantum state with one operator gives a resultant state that can no longer be specified to arbitrary precision in terms of the other observable. In that case, the order of operation matters: If you have two operators, A and B, and the resultant states when they act on a particular quantum state S are not completely independent, then acting on S with A and then B gives a different resultant state than acting on S with B and then A. Thus the difference between the two coupled operations, which is just the commutator, will be non-zero.

        On the other hand, lack of "arbitrary precision" in the specification of a state just means there is some uncertainty in the specification of a state, so that if the resultant states of the operation of two operators on S are not completely independent, then there will be a statistical spread of the product of the observed measurement outcomes associated with the two operators. Mathematically, this is signified by the fact that the product of the standard deviation of the outcomes associated with operations is greater than zero. The statement that it is equal to or greater than hbar/2 is just the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

        Why does rejecting these amount to rejecting quantum mechanics in its entirety? Because the entire mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics, and in particular the mathematical identification of quantum states as rays in Hilbert space is essentially built to accommodate the consequences of these relations: The fact that any pure quantum state at all that is definite in some measurement basis can be expressed as a superposition of more than one state in some other measurement basis reflects mathematically the uncertainty, the limit in precision in being able to express the same state in terms of different observables. If all operators in quantum mechanics commuted with each other, then the whole formalism would all be completely unnecessary and could be discarded; we could just get by with a description in terms of classical physics, where we can specify the same state in terms of, say, position or in terms of momentum to arbitrary precision.

        Now, let me address my reason for asking you the two questions:

        1. Do you believe that the introductory textbook definition of a wavelength is exact?

        2. Do you accept the non-commutativity relations?

        You said "I smell a 'dialectic' bait meant to entrap me" and I confirm that you smelled correctly. I normally do not try to trap people, but your original comment "It gives me a kind of pleasure when my "opponents", wriggle and wreathe trying to explain a question in a convoluted kind of way because of a belief that they must not let go a dogma they are holding on to." made it fair game for me to give you a reality check.

        The trap was that answering each question with yes, which is by far the reasonable answer in each case, leads to a contradiction. To see why, consider first how we go about measuring wavelength in an idealized sense: We measure the distance between two points, which is to say, we measure two positions in space and subtract them from each other, and then assign to each a point on one of two successive waveforms such that if the two waveforms were superimposed, the two points would be right on top of each other, and then say that the distance between the two points in space is equal to the distance between the two points on the waveform.

        Notice that if this idealization were exact, we could arbitrarily re-express any distance between two points in space in terms of a wave length and vice versa, which implies that you could re-express position measurements in terms of wavelength measurements and vice versa, which implies that you can express either measurement in terms of the other to arbitrary precision, or in short, that position measurements and wavelength measurements are completely independent of each other

        However, if you accept the non-commutation relations, of which the non-commutativity of position measurements and momentum measurements is the best known example, then you will run into the following problem: The commutator of x and p (where to keep things simple I am using 1D) is

        [math][x,p]= i\hbar[/math]

        But the DeBroglie relation says

        [math] p=h/\lambda=h\lambda^{-1}[/math]

        where

        [math]\lambda[/math]

        is the wavelength associated with any object described by QM. Dividing

        [math]h=2\pi\hbar[/math]

        out of both sides of the first equation gives

        [math][x,\lambda^{-1}]=i/2\pi[/math]

        which means that position measurements and wavelength measurements are not completely independent, in contradiction to the implication of our first answer. The factor of 2pi signifies that a given measured position could correspond to a a point anywhere within that waveform.

        Now, for most purposes this does not matter, and in most contexts, we can, in fact, arbitrarily interchange distance measurements in space with wavelength measurements without getting into any kind of trouble. That is why you find this definition without any further qualification in freshman physics textbooks.

        But remember, we were talking about a specific situation where this distinction does matter, namely whether for light particles wavelength times frequency is the same as distance traveled in space per unit time. It turns out that the relationship is very subtle and my argument is not as strong as I would like it to be because there is a compensating uncertainty between Energy and time that hides the distinction. In particular, for photons, because

        [math]E=pc[/math]

        if we divide the expressions for the two uncertainty principles by each other, we get

        [math]\frac{\sigma_x \sigma_p}{\sigma_t \sigma_E}=\frac{\sigma_x \sigma_{\lambda^{-1}}}{\sigma_t \sigma_f}=1[/math]

        where the sigmas are the standard deviations associated with each set of measurement outcomes. If you wanted to mount an attack on my view that photons do not travel in space you might be better advised to use this as an argument against it than to accuse me of dogmatism.

        I think it is true that most physicists today, along with "Roemer, Galileo, Newton, Maxwell" would disagree with my view, but there are two simple explanations for that: First, I think it is fair to say that most physicists do not spend a lot of time thinking about the ontological status of photons, and second, they have not had the opportunity to seriously examine the arguments that led me to my position. Of course, just saying "photons do not travel in space" and nothing more sounds crazy, but I believe that seriously examining the arguments that I have gathered so far would make that position far more plausible.

        I admit that the arguments are not yet conclusive, but the collection of different hints from two seemingly independent theories (SR and QM) pointing to the same idea is strongly suggestive. The non-conclusiveness of my arguments leaves me open to the charge of having a prejudice towards the position I hold, and that is true, but I think this is no different from the ordinary prejudices towards speculative ideas that any scientist holds as he or she is pursuing research into that idea. You need a modicum of inductive commitment to certain tentative ideas in order to be motivated to gather evidence for or against it. At this stage, this has little to do with dogma. Dogma comes in when 1) one regards non-conlusive evidence as conclusive and/or 2) one ignores contradictory evidence.

        In fact, let us see what dogma looks like in a concrete example. You successfully avoided my trap by answering yes to the first question and no to the second. But you did so at a steep cost, namely by massively damaging your credibility, as I will now show.

        I cannot tell whether you really meant your "no" answer to my second question or not, so I will consider both cases.

        Let me first suppose that in fact you accept the canonical commutation relations, but answered "no" to my second question only because you sensed that I was trying to trap you. I think it is instructive to relate to you my own past experience of finding myself in your situation: It has happened to me more than once that, in discussing some math/physics matter I could sense that there was a trap was a trap waiting for me, but that I willingly stepped in it just so I could find out how the opponent would "pull it off" to be able to, say, find a contradiction in my argument that I could not see. In short, getting closer to the "truth" was more important to me than winning the argument.

        In contrast, if I suppose that you answered "no" to my question but in fact believe the opposite, then I have no choice but to conclude that not losing an argument is more important to you than getting closer to the truth. If we considered our discussion a debate, then that would in an of itself not be a big problem, after all the point of engaging in a debate is usually to win. But this is not how you frame your discussions with others, you always frame them as "Dialectics". A dialectic is not a debate, the point of engaging in a dialectic is not to win an argument but to get closer to "the truth".

        So if I assume that you did not really mean your answer, that you answered contrary to what you really believe in order to avoid losing an argument, then I am also forced to conclude that your talk of a "dialectic" with me was not sincere.I could then not escape the conclusion that the real point of your "dialectic" with me is just to convince me of your beliefs. But the desire of convincing others of one's own beliefs while pretending otherwise presupposes that one is utterly convinced, unshakable of one's own beliefs. For some beliefs, this is still perfectly alright because there is evidence supporting the belief that can be considered, for all practical purposes, to be conclusive.

        But our "dialectic" is about the edge of our knowledge (and beyond) pertaining to fundamental aspects of reality, is it not? If it is, then it is an arena in which our beliefs, whatever they are, are not supported by conclusive evidence. If they were, then the arena in which they play out would not be be considered the "edge of our knowledge". But if it is the case that you hold beliefs of which you are utterly convinced, as though they were supported by conclusive evidence, when in fact, they are not (by virtue of the subject matter), then you have just satisfied the first criterion of dogmatism I gave above: one regards non-conclusive evidence as if it were conclusive.

        So let me instead suppose that your "No" answer to my question was sincere, you really reject the canonical commutation relations, and, therefore, in fact, all of quantum mechanics. Here it is useful to compare what evidence you base your beliefs on vs. the belief that we should accept quantum mechanics as a fundamental description of nature.

        You helpfully provided some reference articles as evidence for rejecting the non-commutation relations or, equivalently, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and I did look at them. Here is what I found:

        Violation of Heisenberg's Measurement-Disturbance Relationship by Weak Measurements

        Let me quote from the introduction of the article:

        `Heisenberg wrote, ''At the instant of time when

        the position is determined, that is, at the instant when the

        photon is scattered by the electron, the electron undergoes

        a discontinuous change in momentum. This change is the

        greater the smaller the wavelength of the light employed,

        i.e., the more exact the determination of the position'' [1].

        Here, Heisenberg was following Einstein's example and

        attempting to base a new physical theory only on observable

        quantities, that is, on the results of measurements. The

        modern version of the uncertainty principle proved in our

        textbooks today, however, deals not with the precision of a

        measurement and the disturbance it introduces, but with

        the intrinsic uncertainty any quantum state must possess,

        regardless of what measurement (if any) is performed

        [2-4]. These two readings of the uncertainty principle are

        typically taught side-by-side, although only the modern

        one is given rigorous proof. It has been shown that the

        original formulation is not only less general than the

        modern one--it is in fact mathematically incorrect [5].'

        In other words, this article, which you marshaled as evidence for rejecting the uncertainty principle (as commonly understood) in fact supports it. What it does is to give an argument for the incorrectness of Heisenberg's older and less general original version of his uncertainty principle. While it may be the case that, as the paragraph claims, the older version is still being taught in textbooks today (In fact, none of the textbooks that I have used mention it), I would say that among quantum physicists, the more general version is exclusively the one which is used.

        Experimental realization of Popper's Experiment: Violation of the Uncertainty Principle?

        This paper realizes a thought experiment first proposed by Karl Popper to take advantage of entanglement to test the limits of the uncertainty principle. I was not familiar with Popper's thought experiment, and found the paper very interesting. However, the authors recognize that, though the experiment confirms Popper's prediction, it does not support his interpretation of it due to the fact that those aspects of the entangled pair the experimented tested were not directly applicable to the HUP for a single particle.

        In fact, in the conclusion they state:

        "Our experimental result is

        emphatically NOT a violation of the uncertainty principle which governs

        the behavior of an individual quantum."[Their Capitalization]

        So, this article, which you advanced as a refutation of the HUP in fact denies doing exactly that.

        Particle Measurement Sidesteps the Uncertainty Principle

        This interesting article discusses a new technique, called compressive sensing, which, as I understand it, provides less information in a measurement of a particle's position than usual, so that its complementary property can be measured with greater precision. The concluding paragraph begins with:

        The physicists stress that they have not broken any laws of physics. "We do not violate the uncertainty principle," Howland says. "We just use it in a clever way."

        So the technique described in the article does not refute the HUP, it exploits it in a novel way. Once again, an article you gave as support for your beliefs in fact supports the opposite of your beliefs (If I take your answer to my second question to correctly reflect your beliefs)

        Scientists Now Uncertain About Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle

        This low-quality article discusses the same paper as above, "Violation of Heisenberg's Measurement-Disturbance Relationship by Weak Measurements" but does so in a highly misleading way. I already mentioned what the result of that paper is, but somehow (probably due to the author's misunderstanding) he interprets their result as refuting "one prong" of the uncertainty principle.

        I will grant you that this article makes a claim of the refutation of the HUP, but this claim is the opposite of what the authors of the experiment themselves say of their result (see the above paragraph), so in choosing whom to believe I would rather go with the scientists who did the experiment than the journalist who reports on their work.

        So, to summarize, if I take your "no" answer to reflect a genuine rejection of the canonical communication relations and thereby, all of quantum mechanics, then, at least going by the evidence you have provided me, your belief is based on essentially no evidence. There are of course beliefs that are held in the absence of any evidence, they are usually identified as "faith". What takes your purported belief in the present situation far beyond faith is the fact that the majority of technological innovations over the last several generations provide a massive body, a mountain of evidence that contradicts your belief. By choosing to ignore it, you satisfy the second criterion for dogmatism in a way that could hardly be satisfied any more strongly:one ignores contradictory evidence.

        So no matter whether I suppose that your "no" answer was genuine or not, I am forced to conclude that whatever dogmatic beliefs I may hold, yours are manifold greater. By evading my trap, you won the battle but lost the war.

        Let me now finally get to your question. I repeat it below:

        "Given a light source, e.g. a pulsar say 10^3 light seconds away, and sending out pulses once every 60 seconds, such that the moment a pulse is detected, another is already emitted and on on its way and would be detected also after 60 seconds. So we have detections every 60 seconds. Now if, on detecting a pulse, the observer moves towards the next incoming pulse, can he reduce the detection time to 59 seconds? Again, if on detection, the observer moves away from the already incoming and in-flight photon, can he delay the detection time to 61 seconds?"

        There are two factors to consider here: one is the fact that if the observer moves relative to the source, then successive waves crests travel different distances before they reach the observer (notice that here I am adopting the standard language of waves traveling in space in order to avoid the much more cumbersome language I would have to use if I wanted to express my beliefs about the existence of photons in spacetime. What licenses me to do this is the fact that the ontological status of photons is irrelevant to the present question). The other is the fact that if the observer moves relative to the source, then he will observe the emission events at the source to occur spaced out more due to the time dilation effect.

        The first factor implies that the inverse relation between frequency of emission and emission period must be corrected by a factor derived from the relative speed. The corrected relation if the relative speed is such that the source and observer are moving towards each other is

        [math]f=\frac{c}{(c-v)T}[/math]

        where f is the frequency, T is the period, v is the relative speed. The second factor implies that we must substitute T_0, the period in the rest frame by

        [math]T=\gamma T_0=\frac{T_0}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}}[/math]

        where gamma is the Lorentz factor. Substituting this into the first equation gives

        [math]f=\frac{c}{(c-v)\gamma T_0}=\frac{c\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}}{(c-v) T_0}=\frac{\sqrt{c^2-v^2}}{(c-v)T_0}=\frac{\sqrt{(c-v)(c+v)}}{(c-v)T_0}=\sqrt{\frac{(c+v)}{(c-v)}}\frac{1}{T_0}[/math]

        but since in the frame of the source the inverse relationship between frequency and period still holds, we can substitute

        [math]f_0=\frac{1}{T_0}[/math]

        into the last equation to get

        [math]f=\sqrt{\frac{(c+v)}{(c-v)}}f_0[/math]

        If the source and observer are moving away relative to each other, the above relation becomes

        [math]f=\sqrt{\frac{(c-v)}{(c+v)}}f_0[/math]

        The reason I went through the derivation is because I suspect that you want to point out what you perceive as another "illogicality" of SR, and having the derivation handy will make it easier to pinpoint if what you wish to argue is based on a misunderstanding of some aspect of the situation.

        Ok, now to your question. What you call the "Detection time" is in fact the inverse of the frequency of detections in the frame of of the observer (i.e. f), but remember the inverse of the frequency is NOT the period associated with the emission event in the frame of the moving observer because each successive wave travels a shorter distance to get to the observer than the previous one. So plugging in 1/59 for f and 1/60 for f_0 into the second last equation and using Wolfram Alpha, I get the answer that yes, it is possible if the relative speed is on the order of 5*10^6 km/s toward each other. Similarly, if I plug in 1/61 for f and 1/60 for f_0 into the last equation, then using WA again I get a solution if the relative speed is on the order of 4.9*10^6 away from each other.

        I am not sure where you are going with this example, but my suspicion, based on the fact that you used the word "detection time" instead of frequency is that you wish to mount an objection based on the assumption that in the observer's frame the inverse association between frequency and period holds. But as I pointed out above and in the derivation, this assumption is false.

        Already, this got to be a very long post, so I'll cut it off here.

        Best,

        Armin

        Dear Vladimir,

        Thank you for your comments. It is too bad that you got lost after the word "modal", if anything I would have expected that as an artist you might actually appreciate it because there is a neat analogy to color and painting:

        Working within classical logic is like being able to paint only using black and white as available colors. But because the only limit on finding interpretations for modalities is one's imagination, working within modal logic is like painting using many more different colors. The fact that modalities capture subtle nuances in meaning is like having access to a rich palette of colors to paint subtle nuances that you see in your mind's eye.

        "I also empathized with your words "pseudo-nonlocality" because in BU angular momentum is transmitted node to ether node as in a slippery gear train and nothing is lost or hidden"

        Well, the "pseudo" in pseudo-nonlocality in my theory comes out of something that most opponents of non-locality would probably not find palatable, namely a radical non-realism according to which there is "nothing" (i.e. no spacetime object) in between quantum measurements. This ensures that there are no "beables" in Bell's sense (The absence of a "beable" is what marks the ontological significance of the incomplete spacetime vector), and so there is nothing that could receive a non-local influence. In my view, Bell's arguments for non-locality are in and of themselves correct, but they simply fail to apply because they require "beables" in order to do so.

        "Did you read Klingman's essay debunking Bell's theorem in this contest?"

        Yes, I read his essay and found that he did no such thing. What he did is to point out the possibility that a particular experiment (the SG experiment) that could be used to test (really, I should say check its applicability to) Bell's theorem might not be appropriately modeled by Bell's theorem. While I doubt that he is correct I don't think it is impossible, but even if he is right then this has nothing to do with the correctness of Bell's theorem, because the theorem stands independently of any experiment.

        Bell's theorem is a mathematical theorem, and trying to debunk it is like trying to debunk the theorem that the product of the number 1 and the number -1 is something other than -1. The only way this could be done is by changing some axioms in the foundations of mathematics, but that would have the highly unwelcome side effect that a whole host of other intuitive commonsense results would become mathematically invalid.

        Also, I am a bit disturbed by how quickly you were willing to jump on his "debunking" claim, presumably because it agrees with your metaphysical preferences. Let me just mention that the mark of good science is applying one's skepticism to new claims equally and without regard to whether they agree with one's philosophical predilections or not. Few people may achieve perfection in this regard, but it is a goal that should be aspired to.

        "You lost me in your next section about the path integral because you take quantum probability as a given, which I think is only a mathematical analogy."

        It's too bad that I lost you in section 6 because that is the heart of my paper. It shows directly, by means of a theorem, the connection between the novel objects definable under an expanded foundation for mathematics and quantum mechanics.

        Also, it is not the case that I took probability as a given. Rather, I showed (although omitting a lot of details) that the concept of probability is one of the thing that arises from the the application of axiom D, and then applied the example at the end of section 3, which pertains to an incomplete space vector, in section 6 to an incomplete spacetime vector, thereby setting the stage for deriving the Feynman path integral.

        "Time to listen to music- I hope you are still composing!"

        Well, thank you, yes as a matter of fact I still am. Last year I composed nearly 25 new pieces, so that my total is now up to almost 140. This year, I have not taken the time to compose because I am trying to focus filling in all the details of my theory.

        Thank you again for your comments, I will read your essay shortly and leave some comments.

        All the best,

        Armin

        Dear Armin,

        I must first thank you for the great length and effort you have taken to elaborate further on your viewpoint. I cannot dismiss all what you have said with a wave of the hand but if you will pardon my say so, I see a brilliant mind toiling honestly and laboriously on a road to which he was led by the misplaced confidence in and mis-directions from others. I believe you are seeking after the truth and not just being dogmatic, because if you were dogmatic you would not have uncovered that gem of a paradox, which I have been marketing to some in this community in some of my comments (with due acknowledgement to you of course).

        On uncovering this paradox, you have sought to fit it into the picture of reality painted by SR. As you do not wish to let go of some of those parts of SR which you cherish over Galilean relativity/ transformation, you have therefore been compelled to re-invent a new type of reality compatible with both your paradox and those parts of SR you desire to retain.

        Having discovered this paradox, two options arose must have confronted you. One is to discard the claimed truthfulness of the Lorentz transformation, and the second option is to accept and retain the correctness of the Lorentz equation but add some twist to the prevailing view of reality in order that the photon can exist.

        This confidence in the Lorentz transformation equation is understandable, since it was by accepting it as a fact in the first place that made you discover the photon existence paradox.

        I promised to make this the last question so as not to distract from the focus of your essay. In saying, "I get the answer that yes, it is possible if the relative speed is on the order of 5*10^6 km/s toward each other. Similarly, if I plug in 1/61 for f and 1/60 for f_0 into the last equation, then using WA again I get a solution if the relative speed is on the order of 4.9*10^6 away from each other.", I get the impression that we reach some form of agreement that 'detection times', 'observed frequency', 'observed period' or 'observed light arrival times' can be influenced by the relative velocity. This if you crosscheck is against the principle of Lorentz invariance, according to which the velocity of the observer towards or away from the source has no effect on these observed parameters. See also the Einstein quote posted earlier.

        Thanks for the dialectic opportunity. I am sure you know how this beloved Lorentz factor came about. It was used for the purpose of explaining the null finding of earlier or later light arrival times despite earth motion in the direction of and away from incoming light during the Michelson-Morley experiment. From this factor path lengths could contract to prevent otherwise expected later light arrival times from occurring, and time could dilate to prevent otherwise expected earlier light arrival times. For example:

        L' = L в€љ(1-v2/c2)

        Now what is the v in the equation? If it is relative velocity between source and receiver/observer, then in the Michelson-Morley interferometer since this is zero, then no length contraction or time dilation mechanism should occur or be applicable to explain the null findings.

        On the other hand, if v is the observer's velocity in space towards the incoming light travelling at speed, c, then there is a dilemma of which velocities of the earthly observer in space to apply. v could simultaneously have three different velocities as it moves in space towards the light. In the M-M experiment, the v considered was the orbital velocity 30km/s about the sun. However, today, we now know that the sun as well as the Milky Way are moving with the result that in the Lorentz factor, the magnitude of v for a moving earth in space can be 30km/s, 225km/s (solar system motion in space) or 370km/s (earth motion relative to CMB). So which v applies in the Lorentz factor during the M-M experiment?

        What is the - sign in the Lorentz factor? If it applies to the direction of the observer relative to the incoming light, then it means we can also have length dilation for a + sign and time contraction for a + sign apart from the contradiction that the observer's frame of motion then becomes capable of influencing whether it is contraction or dilation that happens. Anyway, enough of this for now. We can reconvene later.

        I shouldn't end without a word on the non-commutation relations of quantum mechanics which appear fundamental to your work in QM. My own major area of disagreement is the fundamental QM postulate that the photon is indivisible, even though I don't fully agree with the non-commutation relations, I agree they can be useful.

        Regards,

        Akinbo