Hi Jochen,

Thanks for your reply. However I still don't get where your Finiteness and Extensibility principles enter your prove of the impossibility of Assumption 1.

Do you think your principles are connected to the impossibility of copying the whole information in quantum systems? So in your chair example, I was thinking, the information of weight, form, size etc. actually already exhausts all the properties, that make a chair a chair. What it makes classical is, that this information is available abundantly/redundantly, whereas this is not the case for quantum objects.

The reason for the the necessity of such epistemic restriction remains unclear. And might be not further justifiable than by the empirical evidence.

However the justification of why such epistemic consideration should have an effect on the ontology, cannot be in my opinion, by the way we (only can) view the world. This makes the whole picture a bit to anthropocentric. Don't you think? The objective quantum mechanical phenomena like super conduction, stability of atoms, etc. cannot be because of epistemic limits in the knowability the underlying world.

In my essay I probe the possibility, that the underlying objective 'reality' is emergent from relations between emergent objects themselves. Something like this could justify an epistemic impact on the underlying structure. I'll be curious on your comments on my essay.

Luca

Dear Jochen,

Yes probably you are correct, Godel theorem may not be applicable to Cosmology.

I hope you will have CRITICAL examination of my essay... "A properly deciding, Computing and Predicting new theory's Philosophy"..... ASAP

Best Regards

=snp

Hi Jochen,

Thank you for your response. "Your notions regarding---if I interpret you correctly---an inherent thermal 'noise' making the acquiring of perfect information about a system impossible remind me of Nelsonian stochastic mechanics. Is there a connection?"

Your interpretation is not quite right at a subtle but fundamental level. The idea of thermal noise and stochastic mechanics implicitly assumes random fluctuations of precise coordinates, but precise coordinates are definable only with respect to an assumed ambient temperature of absolute zero. Perfect information for a system contextually defined at a positive ambient temperature is complete. There is no randomness in the actual contextual state. Randomness only comes in during irreversible transition from a metastable state to a more stable (higher entropy) state. As long as a state exists, there is no randomness and the state evolves deterministically.

Harrison

Dear Luca,

if I understand you correctly, I think you've gotten something a little mixed up---Finiteness and Extensibility are the starting points for the reconstruction of quantum mechanics in many recent attempts to justify the formalism from first principles (the way the invariance of the speed of light and the relativity principle are for special relativity). However, that just invites the question---but why are we limited in the amount of information we can obtain about a physical system?

That's the question I'm trying to answer---in other words, Finiteness and Extensibility are the output of my approach, they're what I'm arguing must hold, due to the application of Lawvere's theorem to the notion of measurement. That these principles hold is then equivalent to Assumption 1 being false---there isn't a function f(n,k) such that it yields a value for every state and measurement. There are some measurements on certain states such that it doesn't yield a value (Finiteness, although not quite---you need the argument from the Foundations paper based on Chaitin's theorem for that), and for these, we will learn new information upon measurement (Extensibility).

This doesn't really impinge on the objectivity of quantum phenomena, by the way. My proposal of a relative realism---which I don't really develop in the essay, admittedly---assigns values only to those measurements where f(n,k) yields a value, but that's a perfectly objective statement: in a given state, only those properties where the measurement outcomes can be predicted with certainty actually have definite values.

You can, of course, also interpret this as a subjectivist stance---i. e. claim that there's some real values out there, but our descriptions can't include them. But that's an additional interpretational commitment, nothing that's forced on us by my argument.

Cheers

Jochen

Hi Jochen,

Thanks for the really interesting essay! Your introduction to the effects of Finitness and Extensibility was very intuitive and how they may be used to understand Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. I think there could be a very close connection between the amount of energy required to extract information perfect information about the system---I'm thinking squeezed states---and the finitness principle. A perfectly localised measurement requires an infinite amount of energy over an infinitesimally short period of time.

I guess my question is, do you suppose that the epistemic horizon is a physical horizon? However, we might be wading into that age old debate of ontological vs epistemic interpretations of quantum physics!

In any case, it was a terrific essay and I rated it highly! I hope you get a chance to take a look at mine. We certainly have overlap in our ideas, although I fall down on the opposite side of you conclusions if you argue it a thermodynamic angle.

All the best!

Michael

    Hi Jochen,

    Yes. I really got it mixed up. That is why I could not find the principles in the prove.

    Thanks for the clarification and also for reading and commenting on my essay.

    Good luck on the competition with your great essay and you certainly get the price for the best title.

    Luca

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    • Post #110

    Dear Jochen,

    I am curious about entanglement. What do you think of this assumption of mine:

    When we break one rod, no matter how far we move them, we will later easily find that those two parts are the same rod. A possible analogy with electrons is: No matter how much the electrons are the same, they differ minimally in mass, say only for 10 ^ -60 part of the mass, but so that every two separated electrons form wholes with identical masses.

    Regards,

    Branko

      Dear Jochen,

      I really enjoyed reading your essay.

      I particularly like one of your conclusions: "The epistemic horizons the pure mathematician and the experimental physicist find delimiting their perspectives are not separated, but instead, derive from a common thread". I reach similar conclusions in my own essay (https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3523).

      One thing that I'm still thinking about after reading it, is whether finiteness and extensibility aren't really incompatible. You argue that they are not, based on the collapse of the wavefunction. However, even if the collapse erases old information, current information still takes space. Therefore, if one invokes finiteness, there is a limit to extensibility. Within the information-theoretic framework I presented in my essay, this follows naturally regardless of the 'overwriting' of obsolete information.

      Maybe I'm missing something, so I should probably take a look at your other publications on the topic. Anyways, congratulations for your excellent essay.

      All the best,

      Rafael

        Dear Jochen,

        Very enjoyable. I think it might be my favourite so far. Ingenious in many ways.

        I especially liked the linking between superposition and the liar paradox situations on p. 4. In the other direction, that is a very nice way to understand such self-referential statements: "This sentence is false" is indeed in a kind of superposition.

        I agree with the conclusion concerning the "common thread behind mathematical undecidability and physical unknowability", which is not the usual one mentioned (and frowned upon).

        I also like the epistemic horizon concept very much. I note also that this allows you to connect in a more natural way uncertainty and Godel's theorem - also often frowned upon as one of the many Godel-based overreaches. However, of course, in viewing QM in these terms you are seemingly committing yourself to an epistemic view of quantum uncertainty. Is that correct?

        Also, Wheeler's idea to use the undecidable propositions was not a quantum principle itself, but something deeper: it was to be the stuff of his pre-geometry explaining "why the quantum?" as well as "why spacetime" and "why existence?". He didn't stay with this idea very long... [I mention this because Wheeler uses the same term "quantum principle" in a different sense, so it might be worth disambiguating your constructive sense from his.]

        Good luck!

        Best

        Dean

          Dear Michael,

          thanks for your comment! I'm glad you found my intuitive approach to deriving the Heisenberg uncertainty relation approachable. It can be made more rigorous---for a start in that direction, I refer to the Found. Phys.-paper---but I think this is a virtue of this particular approach: it makes an otherwise 'mysterious' phenomenon somewhat more easily palatable, by connecting it with statements that have a readily appreciable intuitive import.

          Thinking about the energy needed to extract the information is an interesting direction. In some sense, there ought to be a relation there---thinking about this in terms of energy and time, rather than momentum and position. But I don't have a clear intuition there yet.

          You're right to note that this sort of picture sort of straddles the epistemic/ontic divide. In a way, I'm not so sure it's good to think of these as rigidly distinct---certainly, in some sense at least, what we know about something is not something removed, off in some Cartesian realm of 'thinking stuff', from the physical world: the stuff in our brains is ultimately physical, itself. Hence, what we can know, and how we know it, is in the end also a question of what there is, i. e. what sort of stuff supports our knowledge. There's too much of the old 'detached observer' still lingering in this picture.

          Regardless, if you're so inclined, I think it's perfectly well possible to interpret my proposal in epistemic as well as ontic ways. This is, to my way of thinking, an issue that only further argument will be able to settle. So, perhaps it's a topic for another contest!

          Cheers, and thanks again for your kind words

          Jochen

          Dear Branko,

          thanks for your comment. I think that your proposal for entanglement would run into trouble with established quantum mechanics, however: for one, quantum particles must be exactly identical---otherwise, quantum statistics would come out wrong, which would lead to easily detectable disagreement with experiment.

          But the more important part is that your proposal is essentially a local hidden variable theory---particles have additional properties, not obvious to ordinary measurements, that are responsible for their correlations. But this is just the sort of thing Bell's theorem shows not to be possible---the argument in my essay tells you why: there would then be a probability distribution (whether we know it, or not) for the hidden variables to take on specific values; but this, alone, is enough for all Bell inequalities to be perfectly obeyed. Hence, violation of Bell inequalities tells you that such a picture won't work.

          Does this make sense to you?

          Cheers

          Jochen

          Dear Rafael,

          thanks for having a look at my essay. I will try to find some time to read yours.

          As for finiteness and extensibility, perhaps it helps to consider Spekkens' toy model, which demonstrates many of the features of quantum mechanics. The basic idea there is the 'knowledge balance principle': "the number of questions about the physical state of a system that are answered must always be equal to the number that are unanswered in a state of maximal knowledge."

          In other words, if your have one bit of information about the state of the system, you must also lack one bit of information that could be gained by additional measurement. But if you perform that measurement, then you'd have two bits of knowledge, and no further knowledge could be obtained; hence, to make things come out right with the knowledge balance principle, the state of the system must change so that the previous knowledge no longer applies.

          It's similar with my model. You can think of this as trying to localize a system further within its state space: some amount of knowledge will allow you to perform this localization to a certain degree of precision. If only 'finiteness' were true, then well, that might just be it: you've localized the system as well as it's possible to localize it.

          But 'extensibility' implies that you can obtain additional information. For instance, if the system (in state space) is localized to some degree along one axis, you can try to increase its localization along that axis by making a more highly fine-grained measurement; but to cope with the finiteness-requirement, its localization must consequently decrease along another axis. You can visualize this like squeezing a bubble, or a squishy ball: the volume (the total localization/total information you have) stays the same (equal to a power of Planck's constant), but the shape will deform, yielding information gain in one property, compensated by loss along another.

          Does this make matters more clear?

          Cheers,

          Jochen

          Dear Dean,

          thanks for your very kind words! I'm happy you got some enjoyment out of my essay.

          As for the epistemic vs. ontic question, I'm kinda torn about that. I'm not sure the issue is best framed in these terms---after all, what we know, and can know, depends always on what there is---items of knowledge are, in whatever oblique a way, elements of reality, and even at least supervenient on physical matters of fact, provided one tends towards a materialist metaphysics. So what we call 'epistemic' in that sense is really just a particular way of looking at what's there.

          In the other direction, we have of course no unvarnished access to what's out there in the world---whether it's behind the veils of Maya or lurking in Kantian noumena, we (re-)construct the world by means of the phenomena, which are all we can directly access. So what we can know depends on what there is; and what we consider there to be depends on how it is present to us. I'm not sure, then, there's really a hard-and-fast dividing line to be drawn---it may, perhaps, be rather a matter of method: we study the world in an epistemic or ontological way.

          So maybe it should not come as too much of a surprise that nobody has yet managed to unscramble the quantum omelette---and perhaps, it's a mistake to try, because the world itself is a mixture of the objective and the subjective. So quantum theory, in my view, can tell us something about what is---for whatever that is, it's something that admits a quantum description at least in some sense---and about what we can know---what information we can hope to obtain about the world.

          Hence, I'm not sure if whether the wave function is out there in the world, or in our heads, ultimately makes much of a difference; what's in our heads is in the world, too, after all.

          I appreciate the disambiguation regarding Wheeler's 'quantum principle'---but I'd like a bit of elaboration (or perhaps, a pointer to the relevant literature). I don't really know about the connection Wheeler drew between undecidability and space-time (vaguely, in the back of my head, it seems I remember something about building space-time out of a logical calculus, or something along those lines), so I'd love to understand this better!

          Cheers

          Jochen

          Dear Jochen Szangolies!

          Thank you for such an original essay! We agree with almost all of your arguments and assessments. We respect F. William Lawvere very much and refer to it in our essay. Thank you for the serious text. We rated the essay at ten points.

          Truly yours,

          Pavel Poluian and Dmitry Lichargin,

          Siberian Federal University.

            Dear Pavel and Dmitry,

            thanks for the kind comment! I have taken a look at your essay, and have left a few comments of my own.

            I'm glad you've found something of interest in my arguments!

            Cheers

            Jochen

            Dear Jochen,

            I truly enjoyed reading your essay with its very original path backed by rigorous arguments.

            I found it beautiful that you related the undecidability of those values to Bell's results.聽 聽 And that ultimately there there may be deep relationship between mathematical undecidability and physical unknowability聽 Falls out elegantly if one takes the "reconstructing" program.聽聽

            I also saw that you highlighted the existence of a joint probability distribution regarding the CHSH inequalities.聽 This statement also reminds me of the crucial conditions behind the entropic Bell inequalities.聽聽I would be very curious to know how you will advance your program.聽 In particular whether this will have implications to nonlocalities across time (Leggett-Garg inequality and its entropic versions).聽聽

            Thank you for the wonderful essay and I wish you the best for the contest.聽 I have give you a well deserved top vote!

            Cheers,

            Del聽

              Dear Jochen,

              Thanks for the thoughtful response to my assumption (speculation). Uncertain answers are common in this competition.

              Does this make sense to me?

              Yes, that makes sense. Although I don't have an opinion on that because I don't have enough input, so I wouldn't speculate further. What I have an opinion on, I expressed mathematically with formulas that give 100 times better results than the CODATA recommended values.

              Regarding your essay, let me make a comparison with Gordian knot. No observers, no dimensions, no shapes - no problem. No Gordian knot, no problem. R=10 exp( i * pi ).

              Regards,

              Branko

              Dear Jochen,

              I have enjoyed reading your deep essay. Thank you for the insights.

              From my side, I tend to agree with Einstein that qm is incomplete. But it turns out that to make it complete one has to also modify relativity and spacetime-structure. I explain this in my recent paper

              Nature does not play dice at thePlanck scale

              I will value your critique of these ideas.

              Many thanks,

              Tejinder

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                • Post #122

                Hi Jochen,

                My May 6 response to your question -- "Your notions regarding---if I interpret you correctly---an inherent thermal 'noise' making the acquiring of perfect information about a system impossible remind me of Nelsonian stochastic mechanics. Is there a connection?" -- was at best misleading.

                Thermal randomness applies to random fluctuations in energy levels, as defined by Boltzmann's partition function at a given temperature. In my dissipative dynamics conceptual model, thermal randomness is contextually defined at the system's positive ambient temperature(*). The randomness of ground-state energy is "irreducible," meaning its statistical description is complete and reflects perfect information. There are no hidden variables. So--I do not see any connection with Nelson's stochastic mechanics. Further discussion can be found in my Medium essay, Reinventing Time.

                Harrison

                (*) Conventional interpretations (conceptual models) define thermal randomness either at absolute zero (deterministic mechanics) or at the system temperature (thermodynamics) in order to avoid contextuality.

                Dear Del,

                thank you for your kind words! I'm glad you liked my offering.

                You're also pretty much on point with how I plan to advance my 'program'---a study of Kochen-Specker and Leggett-Garg inequalities will be on my agenda sometime soon. I think the precise conditions for co-measurability of observable need to be thrown into sharper relief---fellow contestant Hippolyte Dourdent, in his essay, has pointed out an analogy between non-simultaneously measurable observables and 'chains' of mutually co-referential, incoherent sets of propositions. I am curious whether I can understand this sort of thing from the perspective of Lawvere's theorem/diagonal arguments.

                I've also been thinking about the Frauchiger-Renner 'extended Wigner's friend' in this connection. Let's see whether anything will come out of this!

                Cheers, and thanks again for your kind comment,

                Jochen