Dear Cristi,
Thank you indeed for re-opening the discussion, I thought you had closed it. And I must say, I liked the intensity and forthrightness of your later response as truly heart warming. I am sure, you must be socially and professionally successful for keeping such fierceness within, and presenting only the kind of response you offered me first. I have not learned this trick.
I respond only to one point you mentioned that includes several contentious issues between us. Let me apologize upfront for this being long, yet non-comprehensive, I do trust in your acute abilities to discern and see things beyond what is presented. For detail, please refer to Fundamentals of Natural Representation . I would request you to be kind first to give a serious consideration, then to be exceedingly critical.
>> You make a profound observation, "science deals with relations only, not with the nature of things", and yet you let that slip out of hand.
> Well, thank you, but you could point out where I let it slip out of hand. Or perhaps it just went in a direction you disagree with?
Most of us have not seen yet that the relations are all that we can observe, not the underlying reality, which may not be deterministic. Every observation is relative to some configuration of instrument, every deduction is relative to a reference, every description is an expression of relations, and every information is constructed of relations only. It troubles most that how can one create a definition or a description of an object in terms that are not in themselves absolute; that is, a description is not complete without a firm basis. But the absolute basis does not exist. Even the definition of an electron is based on constancy of certain relative causal state descriptions, (rest mass 0.511 MeV, 1 negative electronic charge, and one half spin) that remain preserved under transformations; the accountable constancy of causal states gives it an identity.
Fundamental primitive (elemental semantics) of all descriptions is the causal power of physical systems, so let me define the limits of natural causation first. Natural universe, as observed from within, undergoes change. Changes exhibit certain uniformity and regularity (constancy), such that an observable state S of a physical system P bears dependence on certain other states {S_i} within limits, where {S_i} may include relative static or dynamic values (rates of change). That is, if {S_i} were not to form a part of contextual reality within the limits, the state S of P could not have an existential reality either. Therefore, if a state C bore a dependence on B, and B on A, then it is possible to define an order on the sequence of dependence. A mutual dependence indicates conjugate state variables evolving together. It is ascertainable then that A is a precursor to B, while A and B are to C. It is noteworthy that A is not said to cause B, but rather B depends on A; B may depend on other factors in conjunction or disjunction. This relation of `precursor to the consequence' is referred to here as `natural causation'. It is referred to as `natural' to imply the independence of this relation from any model or interpretation, to mean what really exists, an ontological connotation.
From the first principles of constancy of causal relation in the nature of change, if an interaction among physical systems results in an observable state S of a physical system P, then S of P must remain congruent with, or correlate with the information of the causal context effecting the change. Otherwise, measurements do not have an interpretation relating to the cause. Let me be forthright and ask, can we deny this? One must take a moment to either except or deny this for this is critical. If not, then we have an ontological basis to existential reality of information of causal correlation, independent of an interpreter.
Causal context includes precursor state descriptions of interacting systems. For example, mass of a physical system Q denotes its causal power in an interaction, which constitutes Q's function or the basis of its relation with other systems. If a system P interacts with Q and gains a state S due to this causal function of Q, then S of P is said to correlate with this information; `mass' is mere label for the causal power of Q. Causal power of Q (mass) forms a semantic primitive from which higher level structured semantics can be constructed. This is how semantics gets grounded in physical function. The information of causal correlation of state S is referred to here as semantic value represented by the state S; this statement connects the term `semantics' to the physical function while also defining `representation'. That is, the term semantics is used only to refer to what value (relation) an information expresses.
For the same reasons of natural causal dependence, S of P also must correlate with what the observed precursor states of interacting systems correlate with. This is a second order correlation which inductively takes into account all causal descriptions responsible for S of P. Can we deny this either? It is the second order correlation that allows construction of all structured and abstract semantics as shown in the cited publication above.
A few more definitions:
Object: An object has a specification in terms of functional relations with other objects, or in terms of a structural relation among its components, it is always expressed in relative terms; therefore, an object description or definition is equivalent to a semantic value. Structural and functional relations suffice to construct specification.
State: A description of causal quality associable to a physical entity having an observable consequence defines an element of state.
Relation: A relation among objects is an expression (description) of constancy that holds over the objects even when objects undergo change or transformation. The term `constancy of relation' refers to this description. Therefore, a relation functions as a constraint over objects related.
Interaction: An interaction is defined by the `observable transitions in the states of physical entities' that are accountably interdependent on the description of causal powers (qualities) of the states.
From the perspective of a transition to an observable resultant state S of a physical system P, an interaction is equivalent to a specific transition from a priori configuration of precursor states of accountable interacting systems to the state S of P. An interaction is describable as a disjunction of specific conjunctions (configuration) of precursor state descriptions of respective interacting systems that result in the observable state S of P. That is, information processing occurs at each interaction by this expression. Furthermore, this expression forms a constructor of all expressible semantics. Please refer to the cited publication above.
Abstract and abstraction: The term `abstract' as an adjective is used as a qualifier to refer to a definite class of objects or instances, or to a relation that describes the class. `Abstraction' refers to the process of forming a class, or the emergence of a class from its instances. Therfore, a reference to an enumerable set of instances, or to a range of values is a reference to a class descriptor, an abstract entity, which is describable as disjunction of discrete values, or overlapping range of values.
As promised earlier, a proposed definition of consciousness is as follows:
Consciousness is a phenomenon of representation of structured information that specifies objects and their inter-relations, where one of the objects refers to the very system of representation at a level of abstraction that includes the system as an observer, and effector of change. The generic term object includes all that is referable. Every term used in this definition has already been related to causal function, thereby avoiding any intermediate hidden miracles. This definition is stated to be minimal, which only requires a representation of an observing self relating with other objects to control action. A stronger definition is one where a step higher abstraction of structured self is required that includes specific references to self as an observer of observing and controlling self.
Though I had not planned to enlist what you let slip out of hand, even though you captured the most critical element about the role of relations in science, but since you asked, let me state.
1. The most fundamental causal qualities (states) that give rise to all observable changes can have only relative description. That is, observations are limited to relations, and we can never have direct access to physical reality of causal states.
2. All information is only expressions of explicit or implicit relations. This recognition takes the discussion away from Shannon's measure of information to the semantics of information, and to semantic processing.
3. The reality of information is associated with the observable states of physical systems as given by causal relation among precursor states, not with the system itself. Whereas, among several other considerations of information in physics today, one is the information content of a physical system is a description of its own (model) state such that a measurement in specific context conforms to it. If it were to be so, then no matter what information processing occurs via physical interaction, information can never be anything but a state description, never the kind what a brain represents and processes. That is how we have created an artificial barrier. That is why universe appears to compute its own evolution. Funny thing is, even in the domain of computing, artificial semantic values (information) are associated with (assigned to) the states of registers rather than to the registers themselves. In the natural context, the relation of causal dependence forms the ontological reality of information.
4. If information processing occurs at logic gates in computing devices, so it must take place at all interactions in natural context; all that one requires is to found a generic expression of relation that holds true at each interaction. The constructor expression stated above serves this purpose. Now, all that is required is processing in modular hierarchy to construct higher level semantics as neurons do. No coding or decoding is required, a neural state correlates with specifics of information intrinsically, and given by disjunction of conjunctions of semantics represented by pre-synaptic neurons. This is only mechanism suggested so far on how information processing occurs in neural system. Neurons representing contextual elements in coarse coding method share synchrony, which can then be used to activate other neurons in hierarchy. A preliminary simulation is presented in the cited work.
5. Since, information cannot be separated from observable states, the only knowable reality is information, even though not directly measurable, everything else is interpretation. And, as defined above consciousness is constructed of specific information, that includes a semantic description of self as an observer, as an actor, as a controller, and so on, along with its relation to all other represented objects, even the phenomena of consciousness has a basis in relation, and information. Please note that objects are created by relations, they have no absolute correspondence to external reality.
First para from my essay: If we look around, we observe objects and their inter-relations embedded in 4.pi steradian (sr) space; consider relations as objects too. We particularly note that all of the observable descriptions are constructed of information. For instance, the paper or the computer right in front, is constructed of shape, size, color, texture, brightness, distance from us, material it is made of, and its placement relative to the table which in turn has a description made up of similar information, and so on. Next we notice is the ontological realism of all this information. Here, we are not concerned with whether or not the computer and the table exist, not even with the consciousness that relates this information to the observing self, merely with the descriptive information. Are we in a position to deny the existential reality of this information? Observe carefully! One may draw an immediate inference that all elements of consciousness, including the self and its relation with other objects, are constructed of information based on natural causation.
Sir, you read my essay, but did not offer any comments, for you may have determined the futility of such an exercise. Sometimes, one observes the strength of an argument, when one tries to critique it. Of course, I am at loss to understand why. Yet, it may make sense to visit the above cited work, which does not deal with consciousness, only with physics of information, where every inference is drawn from established experiments in physics.
We have a choice to make, either we observe every detail in our consciousness as information, representation of which can be shown to arise from second order causal correlation alone, or we continue to consider that as mystical. Indeed, the hardness of the hard problem arises when we consider the feel as ontologically fundamental, rather than the feel being a representable semantics of feel related to representable self; naturally, the feel is as real and as concrete as the self. One often asks how can a represented information feel like any thing, but they forget to see that the self is also the represented semantics in the same domain of reality with causal power of control. Hardness also arises when we refuse to see and evaluate consciousness as emerging from ontological reality of information. It is the correlation of physical state with causal information that connects the physically observable state with the non-measurable information bridging the gap between material universe to consciousness.
We have no problems now accepting that the sense of pain in a phantom limb is an attribution of pain to a non-existent limb, or even the dreams do not need a reality to be present, just the semantic representation of objects constructed merely via relations, but we have tremendous problem in accepting that the sense of consciousness is yet another representable semantics attributable to semantics of self as a sensor, an observer, and an actor. If the object descriptions were not based on relations, requiring presence of absolute objects (absolute feels in absolute limbs), one cannot have phantom limb and dream experiences.
Rajiv
