Dear Cristi,

Thanks a lot for writing this very interesting essay -- I enjoyed it very much. I have some questions and comments. First the questions:

1) You say that all definitions in a dictionary are circular, and that physics is all about syntax. But there's a sense in which the liar paradox ('I am a liar') can be seen as the emergence of semantics from syntax, since by manipulating purely syntactical rules, the system ends up saying something about itself, namely that it has limitations. (This point is made by Hofstadter in "Gödel, Escher, Bach"; I also mention it in my essay). I think that this emergence of semantics is something rather weak compared to the point you are making (since it only talks about limitations and does not explore all possible meanings), but I was wondering what your thoughts on this point are.

2) You talk about "the collection of all true statements about the physical the world". But I worry about whether this is well-defined. If you define a set in the standard way (namely: for any property, there exists the set of elements that have that property), you can construct Rusell's paradox, which leads to inconsistencies. You mention this after Principle 2, as if it were a limitation of what we can know, but I think it is also a limitation of what can be properly defined mathematically.

3) You say that language is only about relations. I wonder what is your stand on the problem of universals in philosophy. (That is, how do we recognize an apple if all apples are particulars of the concept of an apple. The concept is the universal, which we never experience.) I am trying to understand whether your standpoint is equivalent to saying that there are no universals.

Now the comments:

1) I liked your idea that meaning is subjective and private (and I also mention this in my essay), but I don't find it scary, I guess I find it kind of beautiful... I see it as the power of words -- as what a poem can do to you.

2) You mention that the coarse graining of a deterministic system can be nondeterministic. In an essay for this year's contest, Flavio del Santo makes a similar point, in particular with regard to classical mechanics.

Thanks again for your very interesting input.

Sincerely,

Gemma

    Dear Gemma,

    Thank you for reading and making interesting comments.

    1) While dictionary is circular, this doesn't mean it doesn't say anything, just that it says only about the relations. Self-references are unavoidable in some cases, and they show something about the system, but not about anything else. I agree with you that Hofstadter makes excellent points in "Gödel, Escher, Bach", and in "I'm a strange loop" takes this kind of self-reference as an explanation of consciousness. I understand this still in the relational, i.e. "easy problems", and to me real semantics has to do with the "hard problem". In my longer essay The negative way to sentience I spend more time with such questions, but the main point is that what I mean by semantics is not something that we infer about a dictonary, because this kind of inference comes from identification meaning based on the very way we give meaning to the world. So we project it, it is not determined by the dictionary.

    2) Model theory deals with just this kind of things, and it works. The point being that a structure that exists doesn't have inconsistent facts. If you add on top of the sentences expressing facts other sentences, that introduce additional constraints, like in the case of Russell's paradox, then you'll get paradoxes. But such sentences are expressions of facts of the world. So I am not worried about this. If the world is inconsistent, then the principle of explosion guarantees that everything and their opposites is true and false at the same time, and we will have nothing to talk about, not even relations, because there would be no information.

    3) I think this is precisely the case. I doubt there is an universal of an apple, we just experience various instances of apples, train our neural networks, so that it starts to "recoginze" apples. But not because there is some universal of an apple preencoded in the network, or to which we have acces in a Platonic world. It is interesting that in many cases of autism, this mechanism doesn't seem to work so easily, they have problems with "generalization", and when they overcome it, it is because of much more training than it takes to neurotypicals.

    Now to the comments.

    1) I share your view, to me is something marvelous. I don't think that everybody does, since I've seem some strange reactions to this idea :)

    2) My point is quite as old as statistical mechanics, I understand that Flavio takes it one step further.

    Thanks, for your excellent comments and questions! I'm looking forward to read your essay!

    Cheers,

    Cristi

    Dear Cristi,

    Exciting to see your essay. I actually looked forward to it.

    You write:

    "What appears macroscopically to be a state, can be in many different ways at the microscopic level, since the macro state is a lower resolution version of the micro state. This allowed Boltzmann to understand entropy as the amount of information that is ignored when using a lower level resolution instead of the full resolution description."

    And

    "The hard problem is sometimes formulated as the task to explain the fact that "there is something like to be you" (Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 2003)."

    Now, my question (or insight) is this, given that at the one-on-one scale of physical information we are each our own unique definition of mind (the physical analogue Gödel's self-referencing state) wouldn't it be only practical to also model every mind as own maximal (or minimal) entropy?

    In which sense a mind is own Gödelian undecidable (entropy) or, put conversely, own Landauer limit.

    Combining the two scales will mean that every mind is own de facto Heisenberg Cut or natural unit (and hence natural limit) of physical information. This simply is what we should mean by the quantum gravity scale.

    In short, I am proposing thus that every mind should be modelled as own unique definition of the "nothing" -- own quantum vacuum.

    In electromagnetism this will be equivalent to modelling every mind as in any observable dispersion or spectral line of cosmic light own unit/constant refractive index or "free space".

    In the Gaussian unit of electromagnetism this may be equivalent to saying that every mind is own authentic "Planck charge" (hitherto the fine-structure constant or Coulomb force constant).

    In modern cosmology this may be equivalent to saying that every mind is own unique holographic event horizon or vacuum of QCD.

    In summary, my question to you is: shouldn't we be looking seriously at the possibility that every mind is own unique quantum gravity scale, and indeed vice versa?

    This will be in the sense presently that a mind is at once own natural unit and own natural limit of physical information. And what to call the unit mind? The "nothing" -- the quantum vacuum or holographic event horizon.

    In your relational perspective the given mind might be by definition then the Markov property. So it is as good as the norm/normal from which we are describing any system of waves.

    Likewise, all mathematics start by assuming a number basis (an imaginary unit) namely a set of all sets. Whether expressly stated or not, it is source of the consistencies for it is the bases of all apparent scale.

    Chidi Idika

    (forum topic: 3531)

    I hope you'll find the time to see how I have struggled with such huge burden of proof (Forum topic: 3531).

      Dear Chidi,

      You made some interesting proposals, thank you for reading my essay and for the comments. In my essay I don't try to figure out consciousness, just to argue that there is a hard problem and that it worth seeing if there is something fundamental about it, which I call "sentience". Even if this basis is beyond the relational description that can be explored scientifically, it makes some predictions that I believe are testable. On the other hand, you are interested in describing the mind, which I think is complementary to what I was doing. For this, you makes some creative and bold proposals, which are interesting. I don't know enough what they mean or imply to judge, but maybe I can understand more after I visit your forum.

      Cheers,

      Cristi

      Dear Christi,

      I liked many ideas expressed in your essay, in particular that we are somehow caught in our private worlds. While this is necessary for us to be free, you don't show why this situation does not degenerate to solipsism. The reason may be that you think 'logically', i.e. affirmatively.

      Further, isn't sentience a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer? Can a reflection be foundational?

      Heinz

        Dear Heinz,

        Thank you very much for reading and commenting.

        > you don't show why this situation [that we are somehow caught in our private worlds] does not degenerate to solipsism.

        Well, we are somehow caught in our private worlds, but I didn't intend to address solipsism. I didn't consider it necessary, because I don't propose that only the subjective exists. I don't reject for example the fact that we can know something about the "objective" world, I just explain that what we can know about it are just relations, not the relata. In particular scientific knowledge is of this kind. And since this is independently verifiable, as I explained in the essay and more in my longer essay, clearly I didn't propose that only subjectivity exists. But if you think that I missed something and there is a danger of solipsism in my essay, you are welcome to explain.

        On the other hand, on a funnier note, I think it doesn't hurt to reexamine the possibility of solipsism once in a while, rather than taking by default the position that it is absurd. We spend a lot of our time asleep and dreaming. It's a good point to ask ourselves once in a while if the people with whom we interact are independent sentient beings, or just figments of our minds. This may be useful in a nightmare for example, because it can allow us to wake up or to take control of the dream. Or even just to have a lucid dream, for fun, self-exploration, or preparation for a future event by "simulating" it in the dream. Taking the default position that solipsism can't be true makes us more prone to take seriously whatever bad characters we meet in our dreams, and suffer in that illusion instead of enjoying it by taking control. Other things that help this consist in looking for inconsistencies. The habit of observing inconsistencies helps us get lucid in our dreams.

        Another point from the comparison with the dreams is the following. Suppose we have an argument against solipsism. If we apply it to a dream, it should not work, because, well, the other people in the dream are not real. But for an argument to work in some instance and not work in another one, there should be a difference between the two situation. If the dream is self-consistent like the reality is, what difference would be? So, my claim is that the only difference you can notice by passive observation is one of consistency (you can also actively make experiments in the dream, e.g. trying to do things that are impossible in reality, which in general break the self-consistency of the dream). This means that no refutation of solipsism can do better than checking the consistency. Or, in my essay, I didn't reject the consistency of the world, I even took it as a principle. Being trapped in our minds doesn't lead by itself to solipsism any more than being trapped in the house.

        > Further, isn't sentience a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer? Can a reflection be foundational?

        Well, what I understand by "sentience" in my essay is "what makes experience possible", or "the irreducible part of consciousness". I tried to explain it more in my longer essay, where I "defined" it like

        Nondefinition 1. In the following, I will call sentience the ingredient that makes experience possible. Whatever this ingredient may be, I'll not try to define it.

        So I don't understand by sentience "a high level (reflective) idea over the immediate experiences of an observer". If you categorize it as "reflection", of course it can't be foundational. But I don't do this. It's a category mistake to identify what I mean by "sentience" with what others, who use it as a "reflective idea", mean. I had to use a word, some use "consciousness", but this indeed is in large part reflective. Rather than inventing a new word, I repurposed "sentience", and explained what I mean by it.

        Thanks again.

        Cheers,

        Cristi

        Dear Cristi,

        Your essay is well argued and interesting. However while I completely agree with your Principle 1, I do only agree with principles 2 and 3 with some qualifications, that might not correspond the picture your wording suggests.

        Let me try to qualify. The problem lies in the "physical world". Physical world suggests the the existence of one unique reality to which some dynamical mathematical model P is isomorphic. It is easy to mistake this physical world with the "nature of things" which principle 1 denies is accessible. This is what I call in my essay simplistic realism.

        In my essay I probe another possibility as a consequence of principle 1: The objectively knowable relations are the invariants of some symmetry group, where the objects themselves are defined only as relational entites (as irreducible representation of the symmetry group) relative to some reference frame. Also the dynamical laws are constrained by the symmetry and maybe uniquely defined. The symmetry also defines, what a closed (sub) system is.

        But - and this is the bold thesis of my essay I want to probe - the realization of the symmetry depends on the environment, which might change with time and allow the realizations of different symmetries, hence laws and objects, hence mathematical model P, which describe the physical world.

        Having the possibility, of having different models P and its physical realizations at different times, changes everything. Some of it is discussed in my essay.

        I hope this made you curious about my essay. Happy to discuss some features of it with you.

        Luca

          Dear Luca,

          Thank you for the comments and particularly for challenging and putting at test the statements in my essay. You wrote:

          > However while I completely agree with your Principle 1, I do only agree with principles 2 and 3 with some qualifications, that might not correspond the picture your wording suggests.

          I don't think principles 2 and 3 apply only "with some qualifications". Here is why. Suppose you have a model where the laws change in time, as I understand to be the one you propose. Also suppose that at each time the state of the world is represented by a different mathematical structure. But this is still a dynamical system like the ones in my essay. Simply, you still have a state, even if it corresponds to a different mathematical structure, and you still have a rule that shows how one state connects to the next one, even if this rule changes in time. And you don't contradict Principle 2 The collection of all true propositions about our physical world admits a mathematical model. Here's why. The collection of all propositions true about the world also include time specific propositions. All propositions about facts of the world valid at a time t have to be consistent, and admit a mathematical model, because this is a result from logic, it's not a postulate I want to impose (so you can't break it). There is also a larger mathematical model, corresponding to all true propositions, for all times, collected together. They can be for example of the form "At the time t things were such and such". To this collection of propositions corresponds a larger mathematical structure, valid for the entire history, and which includes as substructures those valid for each particular time. So Principle 3 The physical world is isomorphic to a dynamical system P is not contradicted.

          From your comment I understand that the symmetries at some time give the objectively knowable relations, hence a mathematical structure realizing those relations. And that symmetries can change. You say that this is due to the environment, so I take it that your system is not isolated, it's open. A question may be, what if you take the whole system? Will it's laws still change? But anyhow, let's focus on the possibility that you take it as open, or that even if you take the total system, its symmetries change for some reason. But when you say that the symmetries determine the objectively knowable relations, I understand from this that there is a procedure X which, given the symmetries, gives the relations, like a function relations=X(symmetries). So at least X is not changing, just its argument. Now, when you say symmetries, in general they correspond to transformations of some space (not necessarily the "physical space", it can be a space of other parameters). For example, the system may have rotational symmetry SO(3) at some time, and this be broken in a future time, so that the symmetry reduces to rotations around an axis. But this is just like in usual physics. You can have a large group of symmetries, and a particular state may not be invariant to the full group, but only to a subgroup. So, from changing symmetries I don't think it follows a change in the laws. But, as I explained, even if the law changes in the most crazy ways, there will still be a dynamical system P and Principles 1-3 will still hold. You wrote "I hope this made you curious about my essay". Yes, I am looking forward to read your essay.

          Cheers,

          Cristi

          Dear Cristi,

          So, I agree it is a hard problem to explain consciousness from a starting point of unconscious physical objects. But do you think it might be possible to do the reverse: so, to start with consciousness and explain everything else? After all, when we come into this world, we only seem to have conscious perceptions to work with as a starting point for making any theory.

          It is also interesting what you say about relations. So, is there anything that relates conventional physics and consciousness? I think it would be fair to say that quantity, direction and change are a part of conventional physics and they are also things that can be directly experienced, i.e. they are also part of consciousness.

          So, if you can build a 'Theory of Everything' using just the concepts of quantity, direction and change, then you have built a conventional theory of physics out of directly experienced things, i.e. out of consciousness, and then the hard problem of consciousness disappears. (If you are interested, my essay tries to do exactly that: explain everything using quantity, direction and change).

          All the best,

          David

            Dear Cristi,

            thanks for taking the time to reply. Let me clarify from my side. What I have in mind is crazier. First of all concerning the environment. I primarily think of closed or closable systems. This is needed in order to have well defined realizations of symmetries, which define the concepts, within which the model is formalized. If that is possible, we can also start to describe open system, but only then. In order to be able to realize separable closed systems, the interactions must be not to strong and the environment must be kind enough. For instance for the Poincaré symmetry to be realized (an so having the standard model as physical model), space must be almost empty

            and gravitational forces not to strong.

            Now imagine at a time 0 a model P0 is realized, such that principle 2 and 3 hold approximately within P0. And at a later time another P1 is realized, such that the two principles hold. However let us imagine that P1 is the richer system in the sense, that P0 is contained in P1. Than there are things that can happen in P1 (there are propositions in P1), that cannot be described in P0 just because of the lack of language. There are propositions in P1 that cannot be decided in P0 (principle 2) does not hold. Also there is no dynamical evolution from P0 to P1, because in P1 there are concepts/quantities that are new and did not in exist in P1. Reversely events of the past (P0) can be explained or even retrodicted from within P1.

            On a fundamental cosmological level I imagine some crystallization process, that brings more and more complex structures to light.

            But one may also think that in empty space Poincaré symmetry (with particles of the standard model) is realized and speculate that near black holes on the event horizon symmetries of a 2 dimensional space are realized. And in between? Well this is the million dollar question. But it is thinkable that no unified separable symmetry might be realizable.

            Hope this makes sense for you.

            Luca

            Dear David,

            Thank you for the comments! You ask an interesting question: do you think it might be possible to do the reverse: so, to start with consciousness and explain everything else? I agree that we only seem to have conscious perceptions to work with as a starting point for making any theory. And indeed, whatever we learn about the world, and whatever theories we make to explain it, this is based on consciousness. But if someone would ask a stronger question, that we can explain everything about the world just from consciousness, in the absence of any perceptions of the external world, this would likely not be enough. But from perceptions and consciousness, we can do a lot of things, and we know the results obtained so far are obtained like this.

            You make another interesting point here I think it would be fair to say that quantity, direction and change are a part of conventional physics and they are also things that can be directly experienced, i.e. they are also part of consciousness. I guess it's about what Kant calls "a priori" cognition, which exists before the experience, and we map to the "a posteriori" cognition that follows from experience associated to perceptions. This is an interesting idea. It may be difficult to prove in practice, but I think it worth being investigated seriously. Thanks for suggesting me your essay for more details.

            Cheers,

            Cristi

            Dear Luca,

            Thank you for the additional details. Your explanations about the Poincaré symmetry requiring that "space must be almost empty and gravitational forces not to strong" make sense to me. Then you say "Now imagine at a time 0 a model P0 is realized, such that principle 2 and 3 hold approximately within P0." I don't understand what it means for principle 2 to hold only approximately. You mean that P0 is not logically consistent? Because if "the collection of all true propositions about our physical world that apply at the time t0" is logically consistent, then it admits a mathematical model. Also, what you mean by P0, is the same what I call "P" but valid at the time t0? Because what I call "P" is a dynamical system, so principle 3 holds. Another thing you say makes me interested. You said "Reversely events of the past (P0) can be explained or even retrodicted from within P1" I tried to see what you mean by this. I checked your essay, and now I know what you mean, although I don't think it is as crazy as you said :). Nevertheless, as I explained, even if the theory changes in time, it can't break principles 1-3 unless it is not self-consistent. I like what you said, "on a fundamental cosmological level I imagine some crystallization process, that brings more and more complex structures to light", and I agree with this. Thanks again for the comments and good luck in the contest!

            Cheers,

            Cristi

            Hi Cristi,

            thank you for this essay on the hard problem of consciousness! I too have come through the philosophy of mind to wonder on the fundamentality of consciousness and its relation to physicalism and thus fundamental physics. This is a hard topic to broach given the many orthogonal viewpoints available. Here's my perhaps somewhat oblique take on your take.

            "Principle 1 Science deals with relations only, and not with the nature of things."

            For me, this principle would require a specific definition of 'relations', where for example it is specifically empirical scientists who deal with the calculable relations between observable things. And observation here would require said scientists to be at least conscious, and preferably sentient, while observing those things and then contemplating their relation to other things. Otherwise, how can we empirically say that unobserved things have mathematically calculable relations with other unobserved things? Even dark matter and dark energy, being unobservable by definition, are posited to explain observable and thus calculable phenomena. Likewise, entangled quantum states are unobservable by definition but their wave functions calculate potential observables to a fine degree of precision.

            Observation, conscious sentience, and calculation would seem to me to all play a part in scientific relational thinking, at least phenomenologically speaking.

            And then, what is the 'nature' of these relational things beyond their givenness in the scientist's empirical experience of the things that they observe and analyse? If these things can even be said to have an 'innate nature' beyond their relational character, would it then be an 'experiential nature'? And this because I have no idea of how a non-conscious non-experiential science might be practiced!

            Might Principle 1 then be rewritten as 'science deals with the calculable relations of experiential things'?

            "Problem 1 If relations can't fully explain consciousness, then what's the missing ingredient?"

            So for me again, what's missing is a definitional distinction between a calculable 'relation' and its relation to observers being conscious of things, where even consciousness isn't just a property attached to things (as in various panpsychisms) but is itself (as you point out) a dynamic relational process of being conscious of--or sentient of--or aware of--things given in empirical/phenomenal experience. But then I'm just a Husserlian pan-experientialist when it comes down to it! And as someone mentioned up thread, Strawson is a strong exponent of this view.

            Best regards,

            Malcolm Riddoch

            Je suis, nous sommes Wigner!

              Dear Cristi,

              many thanks for your precious comment in my blog. Let me clarify here about the approximate models. I think we agree that the objective knowable part of nature is the relation of things and not the things themselves. That is why (as you write) mathematics is so effective for physics. So even the things from which we only know their relations are manifestation or realizations of exactly these relations. So the realized physical structure is in a way isomorphic to the model. (For me to a certain extent even identical, if we identify the mathematical structure with operations that can be physically realized, like counting, or moving a thing by a specific distance.)

              But these operations to be exact depend on that objects or systems within the whole can be separated from the rest. This separability is always only an approximation. I am actually not so sure if I am contradicting myself or whether the non-separability shall or must be modelled by a random field causing the loss of phase information like in the objective collapse theories. Such as external influences might only be detectable as such because the laws within the system have been fixed. The expected behaviour of the separable system can be observed as disturbed.

              This is not the point, I want to make. The point is, that in specific configurations specific relation emerge or manifest described by the model. Within this manifestation rulers and measurement apparatuses can be build. Objects themselves manifest with contingent properties, that can be measured and predicted within the dynamical model during a period of time t0.

              If the objects now for instance come to near to each other, the approximate separability must be given up. New kinds of relations begin to manifest and new separable objects and systems within the new configuration manifest with new dynamical laws and contingent properties. This new system is in itself again a well defined mathematical structure/dynamical model P1 which describes itself approximately well.

              Do you understand, why I think, both cannot be necessarily unified into one dynamical model? For this we should have access to the nature of things themselves. Which we do not. Even not the things themselves.

              Thanks for the conversation.

              Luca

              Dear Luca,

              I know what you mean, but not because you translated it to me in terms of things I mentioned in my essay, that translation is too approximate. In principles 2-3 I don't talk about our models of the world. I talk about the mathematical structures that are models, in the sense of Model Theory, of the collections of propositions true about the world, regardless of what we think about them. Here's another, final, attempt to explain what I said: 1) there are facts of the world, that are true, even if we don't know them precisely or at all. 2) It is not necessary that these facts hold for all times to be true, it is enough to have factual statements about facts of the world at given times specified in the proposition. For example "At date and time t is raining in Rome". This will remain true even if at the time t2=/=t is not raining in Rome. Because that proposition is not universal, it refers specifically to a time and place and a state. You can have such statements for each time in which it makes sense to talk about Rome. The collection of all these states doesn't need to follow any rule, and there is nothing in the environment that is ignored, but, once taken into account, would make these propositions change their validity. This example is a particular fact. There may also be universal facts, like "momentum is always conserved", which may be true or false, even if we don't know it or we can't verify in all instances. 3) The collection of the propositions expressing these universal and particular facts is logically consistent. 4) From 3, according to Model Theory, there is a mathematical structure in which these are true. Period. No room to smuggle in this some presumed approximation, there's nothing approximate here. What I said has nothing to do with the models we cook up as we try to understand the world. Nothing to do with the evolution of our understanding of the world. Also, if I say "the collection of all true propositions about our physical world", there's no environment that I could've left out, no separation I left out, because I referred to the totality of the facts of the world, not of a subsystem, not about the opinion of some people who live at a certain time and not another. Talking about separation in this case is like me saying "all", and you talking about "the things I didn't include in 'all'". So I don't see a connection between what you said I said, and what I really said. I understand your points, and your generous attempt to try to explain them to me in terms of what I wrote in my essay, but I don't think what you think I said is what I said. Fortunately I read your essay, where you explain them in your terms, so I understand, but you don't understand what I said, and this is why you think you found some exceptions to principles 2-3. There's no such exception. You think there is because you have an approximate understanding of what I said.

              > Thanks for the conversation.

              Thanks for the conversation.

              Cristi

              Hi Malcolm,

              Thank you for reading my essay and for the interesting comments you made. I hope my longer essay sections 6-7 explain more the possible relations between sentience and physical facts, and how these possibilities can be tested empirically. I like the title of your essay, "Je suis, nous sommes Wigner!", and I'm looking forward to read it!

              Cheers,

              Cristi

              Hi Cristi,

              Thank you for a really interesting essay! The debate around consciousness is one I try to avoid, but you wrote a very useful and well argued piece on it. I wholeheartedly agree that the relations and not the things themselves are important, otherwise we are just stamp collecting. Your caption you write 'we select some data and ignore the rest of it' reminds me of a quote I heard about learning; something like 'you need to forget data to learn, otherwise its just memory'. You talked about open/closed Turing machines, but I was wondering if you though that the thermodynamics of a machine in a physical world are an essential component to sentience?

              Your arguments regarding the thermodynamics of Turing machines and the brain considerably overlap with my essay ``noisy machines'' and you might find it an interesting read. While I don't delve into conscious, many of my arguments would carry across to the limitations of the brain if it were assumed to be a Turing machine.

              Overall, really enjoyed the essay!

              Thanks again,

              Michael

                Hi Michael,

                Thank you for reading, and for the very interesting comments.

                > "I was wondering if you though that the thermodynamics of a machine in a physical world are an essential component to sentience?"

                It is essential for the brain to work, so for consciousness too, at least for the "easy problems" of consciousness. You said it well "noisy machines", I look forward to read more about this.

                Cheers,

                Cristi

                Dear Stoica. Great work in your essay on consciousness... I think we are surely headed to the core of it all though gradually.i Learnt something on sentience,Thanks.i too have something on consciousness in my simple essay here-https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3525.Hope you kindly take your time to review. meanwhile, Wish you all the best in the essay contest.

                  Dear Michael,

                  Thank you for reading and for the comments. And for the link to your essay. I wish you the best too!

                  Cheers,

                  Cristi