Lorraine Ford

Dear CornflowerCicada,

“But what is “information” and what is “processing”?”

Good question. Also your question about symbols. The latter I think is what has been called the “symbol grounding problem”.

I think the term “information” in our usage is a symbol that means “knowledge”. Within a pure information processing paradigm, “processing” then could mean to hand over “knowledge” (for example how to further behave as a particle after an interaction). “Processing” in general would then mean for two particles to somewhat hand over the needed knowledge about the laws of physics.

That interpretation totally antropomorphises what humans mean by knowledge and information and handing the latter over to another person. Nonetheless, in an information theoretic sense one could view such a process at the bottom of physics as having the goal of ensuring that the physical world works consistently according to the laws of physics, instead of inconsistently. But one therefore had to assume a certain kind of goal-like behaviour at the bottom of physics. Moreover one had to assume that this goal was set up by a goal-oriented being that knows the difference between consistent and inconsistent and at least knows the laws of physics (if not facilitated them). Dead matter cannot make these distinctions by definition.

With all the above I do not intend to see particles as capable of discriminating between consistent and inconsistent. I merely want to stress how difficult it is to use the words information and knowledge for the bottom of what we know about physics today.

A linguist may tell you that the word information means “bringing something into a certain form”. If I would use “noitamrofni”, that wouldn't be the correct form, since it is the reversed form of the term “information”. But there are many other forms of symbolising the term “information” since there are and could be a plethora of different symbols that have attached the meaning “information”.

To know that they have attached that meaning, you somewhat had to be informed that this is the case, and what does inform you of that case other than other symbols you are already informed about that they mean something specific. So “meaning” also comes into the quest about what is information.

In my opinion the terms “information”, “meaning”, “consistent” etc. are able to be meaningful because the existence of consciousness must be considered as a meaningful, but yet unexplained phenomenon in its own right in a world that also has meaning independent of human beings. Independent because a physical world without human beings would surely operate as consistent as it does now and this in my opinion is already a meaningful distinction from inconsistency in and by itself. So I conclude that there must be something meaningful that has informed the physical world in the first place to operate consistently. That in my opinion is the true source for “meaning” being at all existent in this world: there is information about the true source for “meaning in the world, by means of logical thinking, by means of observing nature, by means of observing one's own desire for meaning (even atheists have that desire, they strive for the meaning of existence to be meaningless and try to convince others).

Back to computers: for the case of a computer, the latter is only possible because human beings exist, understand what symbols mean, invented new symbols (zeros and ones), figured out how matter works to build the hardware and then wrote the inherent meaning of the software into some matter.

So I totally agree with you when you say

“It is time to come to grips with the issue of symbols, especially in order to understand the true nature of computers/ Ais.”

The paradigm of pure information processing has to aknowledge that the mere existence of computers in this world is already a signature for the existence of meaning in this world. But not in the sense that the world is purely information processing in nature, which in my opinion is not the meaning one can logically give to the “meaning in this world” since the term “information” has its problems, as I intended to show with the above lines of reasonings. One has also to factor in the fact that human beings can extract meaning from what they find in the external world and that they can conclude that “meaning” must mean more than just subjective definitions, otherwise computers wouldn't be possible.

In constrast to the information processing interpretation of the world I would say that what we found out about nature and about ourselves up to now strongly suggests that there must be a layer of reality that is made out of what you call “aspects that are not in themselves symbols”: these aspects do not refer to something else but are truths in their own right qua the power of their mere existence. Even the belief in something is a truth in its own right, since that belief exists. Independent of whether or not that belief meets reality, the mere fact that beliefs exist already meets objective reality. And the fact that meaning exists also does already meet objective reality, as can be seen by the consistent behaviour of a physical world that is independent from the presence of human beings but nonetheless acts consistently instead of inconsistently.

That all of this can be conceptualised is by what we call knowledge and by the fact that consciousness exists. So the existence of consciousness is already a proof that there exists objective meaning, objective information in the world that cannot be squeezed into some information processing symbols. Alfred Tarski already pointed this out by his undefinability theorem that roughly says

“The theorem applies more generally to any sufficiently strong formal system, showing that truth in the standard model of the system cannot be defined within the system.”

And in the Gödelian sense one cannot make truth more reachable by adding more and more axioms to a certain standard model, since for reaching objective truth there had to be added infinitely many such axioms.

So for the truths I sor far mentioned above to be recognized as truths by human beings and to be regonized as being fundamentally different from pure information processing algorithms, it already necessitates that there must be “aspects of the world that are not in themselves symbols”. Therefore I conclude that one of these aspects is objective meaning in conjunction with objective information, both being able to exist in the world because they inherently and immanently are already the signature of a certain goal that was “implemented” together with the existence of the world.

This view of mine is in constrast to the point of view where the universe is seen as a purely information processing entity, but when asked what's the information content it computes the answer is “nothing” (or likewise “everything”). Both answers contradict the objectivity assumption, the assumption of there being an external world that is consistent and independent of beliefs, and therefore these answers already contradict the standard model itself (means the pure information processing paradigm). Thus, that paradigm in my opinion is not consistent with our notion of truth, and therefore not consistent with a consistent logics.

      Stefan Weckbach

      “… symbols. The latter I think is what has been called the “symbol grounding problem””.

      Re symbols:
      This is not a philosophical problem of “Chinese rooms” and “symbol grounding”, much discussed by philosophers like David Chalmers. The fact is that symbols don’t exist, except in the human imagination.

      Symbols don’t exist because written and spoken words (i.e. word symbols) can’t be measured or weighed. You could weigh and measure the paper that words were written on, but that would be weighing and measuring paper, not written words. You could measure sound waves, but that would be measuring sound waves, not spoken words.

      Similarly, binary digit symbols don’t exist except in the human imagination. The technical article “Logic Signal Voltage Levels” (https://www.allaboutcircuits.com/textbook/digital/chpt-3/logic-signal-voltage-levels ) explains the connection between voltage and “binary digits”/ “logic states” in computers. If you read the article, you will notice that “binary digits”/ “logic states” are an idea that human beings have imposed on voltages in computers. Binary digits don’t exist because they can’t be measured or weighed: you could measure voltage, but you can’t measure binary digits.

      Symbols don’t exist in the real physical world “out there” because they can’t be weighed and measured. All symbols - written and spoken words, number symbols and other mathematical symbols, binary digits - only exist in the human imagination. And it is not only single binary digits that only exist in the human imagination: groupings of binary digits (that are supposed to represent the abovementioned written and spoken word symbols, number symbols and other mathematical symbols) also only exist in the human imagination.

      “for the case of a computer, the latter is only possible because human beings exist, understand what symbols mean, invented new symbols (zeros and ones), figured out how matter works to build the hardware and then wrote the inherent meaning of the software into some matter.”

      Yes, but what symbols “mean” is irrelevant, because symbols only exist from the point of view of the human imagination anyway.

      This view of mine is in constrast to the point of view where the universe is seen as a purely information processing entity, … Both answers contradict the objectivity assumption, the assumption of there being an external world that is consistent and independent of beliefs, and therefore these answers already contradict the standard model itself (means the pure information processing paradigm). Thus, that paradigm in my opinion is not consistent with our notion of truth, and therefore not consistent with a consistent logics.

      Seemingly the human imagination is a slightly different thing to the measurable world “out there”.

          Lorraine Ford

          Dear CornflowerCicada,

          “Symbols don’t exist in the real physical world “out there” because they can’t be weighed and measured.”

          Agreed. But what is the ontological status of symbols. They can't be measured and weighed. Are they non-physical things in a world about many people think that it is exclusively only made up from matter, down to the last “bit”? What do you think?

          Well, maybe I should put the question like this:

          Is the human imagination a thing produced solely by (deterministic) matter and its behaviour, or is it something else. We know that human imagination exists, but it also cannot be measured and weighted, like symbols (when I say “symbols” I mean the meanings attached to these symbols, not necessarily the symbols themselves).

              Stefan Weckbach
              Dear AquamarineTapir,

              “what is the ontological status of symbols”

              Symbols are special arrangements of matter, but the arrangements are invisible to the laws of nature.

              In the case of written word symbols, ink is arranged on paper, but this arrangement is invisible to the laws of nature. A person’s eyes interact with light waves, and the person analyses the information gained to identify the symbols. Also, people have created special setups including computer programs to identify written symbols.

              Similarly, in the case of spoken word symbols, sound waves are arranged in the gaseous air, but this arrangement is invisible to the laws of nature. A person’s ears interact with sound waves, and the person analyses the information gained to identify the symbols. Also, people have created special setups including computer programs to identify spoken symbols.

              The case of binary digit symbols in computers is slightly different. In the context of the whole circuits/ transistors/ voltages/ computer program setup, voltage is used to represent the binary digit concept. Usually the higher part of the selected voltage range is used to represent the binary digit one, but the lower part of the selected voltage range can also be used to represent the binary digit one. A person who knows what the pre-selected voltage range was, and what the particular voltage currently is, and whether or not the higher part of the selected voltage range is used to represent the binary digit one, could work out what individual binary digit symbol corresponded to this particular voltage; but this special arrangement is invisible to the laws of nature, which only “see” voltage. Similarly, people have devised various different special arrangements of these binary digits that are used in computers to represent words, letters, numbers and other symbols, but these special arrangements are also invisible to the laws of nature, which only “see” voltage, and not arrangements of voltages. Also, in the context of the circuits/ transistors/ voltages/ computer program setup, transistors are used to represent logical operations between the binary digits; once again, the laws of nature only “see” voltage and the material that the transistors are made out of; the laws of nature are not doing logical operations.

              So symbols are a human artefact, having no special ontological existence But living things do have a special ontological existence because they are routinely physically arranging matter; and routinely identifying arrangements of matter using collation and logical analysis which are aspects of the mind that can’t be derived from the deterministic laws of nature, which are merely relationships between categories. I think this is the answer to your question:

              “Is the human imagination a thing produced solely by (deterministic) matter and its behaviour, or is it something else”

                  Lorraine Ford

                  Dear CornflowerCicada,

                  thank you for your decisive answer, I am now able to much better see what you see and I agree.

                  P.S. I already rated your essay after I first commented on your page – in case that the issue of ratings in this contest should be important to you.

                  Best wishes
                  AquamarineTapir

                      Stefan Weckbach

                      I think this comment of mine, made on the essay page of CornflowerCicada, should also appear here.

                      Stefan Weckbach Dear CornflowerCicada,

                      I want to thank you so much for our exchange of thoughts. I just read your essay again and I highly recommend it for everybody to read and contemplate it. This is good and solid work you have done and worth much more attention than it has received so far in my opinion.

                      Best wishes
                      AquamarineTapir

                            Stefan Weckbach
                            Dear AquamarineTapir,

                            Thanks very much for your kind words about my essay, and I like your essay very much too. I also want to thank you, because our exchange has helped me clarify my thoughts. And I am very glad to converse with you because we seem to think about the world in very similar ways. (I also rated your essay when I first commented on your essay page.)

                            Best wishes,
                            CornflowerCicada

                              Stefan Weckbach Greetings, Aquamarine Tapir. As someone who has studied social and physical sciences at different times, as well as having worked in progressive politics, I appreciate a look at expanding science in the two basic ways (as I see your point) discussed in your essay. First, yes indeed, science needs to pull in types of people that traditionally have been underrepresented in Western science activities. I am also pleased to see your call for expanding opportunities for hierarchically disadvantaged contributors (those not working in academia or relevant professions), such as myself. Yes, let's see more blind refereeing, such as is being done right here!

                              Also, would you (and anyone reading this) please take a look at my essay too, which attempts to disprove AI reductionism about minds. I use both a philosophical argument about existential knowledge (a sort of update of Descartes famous experiment) plus inferences from quantum mechanics. Thanks, and rem: this is the last day to rate essays!

                                  Neil Bates

                                  Dear PersimmonCatshark,

                                  thank you for your comments on my essay. I already read your essay some days ago and commented on it on your page.

                                  Best wishes
                                  AquamarineTapir

                                    7 days later

                                    Stefan Weckbach

                                    Dear Aquamarine Tapir,

                                    here are (finally) some more comments to your inspiring thoughts.
                                    The point you are raising differing between logical consistency and empirical support of a theory/model is quite interesting. Most cases of model-testing usually deal with proofs that the model at hand is logically inconsistent. Then, it's easy to refute the model. Yet, if it is logically consistent, the latter part is usually so much harder and that is something often fiercely debated. So I agree with you that any further proof or counterexample on an empirical basis also requires that we have assumed a certain ontology and relation to the (epistemical) model to be tested. There may not be a unique relation, the ontology may not even exist, etc.. It seems to be the heart of the discussion how to interpret quantum mechanics, for example.

                                    Concerning the notion of infinity, George Ellis once said that "Mathematical infinities do not exist in Nature" and I think there is a fundamental truth in that, if the Universe had a beginning (there are also other models that may work, but then, still, we always need to specify some boundary/initial conditions to understand and describe such cosmologies). The concepts of infinity that Cantor found are highly useful in the realm of theories and of mathematical models, but, anything that we can observe in Nature has some boundary/finiteness, maybe even the Universe itself. It's just that our models become easier to handle when making this extrapolation of infinities (like infinite accuracy or precision, or infinite volume or time). Yet, as you wrote, there is no ultimate way to find out whether these infinities are ontologically existing and in what sense. Thus, for a theory/model to describe our world around us, I think, we should not use a description including such potentially incorrect infinities and rather account for our limitations in our models. The latter become more truthful then and we explicitly introduce relationships between our point of interest and its environment/external influences -- based on my experiences, these extrapolations/interpolations are the key points where non-uniqueness in our descriptions of reality arises and I can't help but think that uniqueness is a kind of holy grail in science, even if Nature does not necessarily provide it based on the data it gives us.
                                    Maybe it is daring, but, obviously, our science over the history of humankind has not required an infinite understanding to find good approximations to explain phenomena in Nature. Hence, why should this be different with consciousness? As you wrote, our knowledge is provisionary, but we know the limits in which certain theories hold, so we may hope to discover the same in studies of consciousness.
                                    At the same time, there is no necessary clash with any existence of an intelligent designer or the contents of the Bible -- the concept of time is already interesting in the first paragraph that the world was created in seven days and you could ask: in which reference frame or does that imply a fundamental observer exist?! But isn't that anything else than questioning a certain, assumed ontology again...

                                    I will also have a look at the other discussion thread you sent and will comment soon.
                                    As I very much like our discussions here, I have something for you to remember this great essay contest, now that it is in its final step: https://ibb.co/mhf8hbN That's how aquamarine tapirs look like according to AI.

                                    Cheers,
                                    Beige Bandicoot.

                                        Jenny Wagner

                                        Dear Beige Bandicoot,

                                        thanks so much for the nice picture of the aquamarine tapir (me! :-), I will take that picture for my colour-animal-account (yours looks quite nice, too!)!.

                                        One of the reasons for why many scientists (in my opinion) have abandoned the idea / the hypothesis for a Creator God is that the physical world seems to be so different from any conceivable God-like realm. The physical seems to rule with an iron fist, and therefore, many people infer, there is no place even for the idea of a Creator.

                                        An example: I think it had been the Scholastiks that developed the seemingly contradiction between an omnipotent God and physical reality. They asked whether or not God is able to fabricate a stone that is that heavy that God himself is not able to lift that stone.

                                        At first glance it seems convincing that this is a real contradiction, not only a logical one, but also somewhat a physical one, since it suggests that God is bound to his physical creation. Surely, God, in my opinion is not omnipotent, since he / she surely cannot annihilate himself (I simply assume this without further proof).

                                        So let's also assume that God isn't able to fabricate a stone that is too heavy for him to lift. From this follows that God is “merely” able to fabricate stones that he himself is able to lift.

                                        The first sentence above is about an impossibility. The second sentence above is about a possibility.

                                        Let's now imagine the possibility for God fabricating a stone that has infinitely many atoms, each of them infinitely heavy. One could even imagine a stone that is made out of a non-denumerable infinity of atoms whereby each of the atoms is infinitely heavy – as long as God is able to lift that stone. And voila – what had been a severe contradiction in the minds of the Scholastiks is now possible: God can make any conceivable stone, as long as he can lift it.

                                        This example shows me how nonsensical it is trying to pull down the idea of a Creator to the layer of human physical understandings.

                                        I like to tell you another line of reasoning that may be equally nonsensical than the first one. Imagine that you have a list of all the things that are physically impossible. Let's say this list is long, but not infinitely long, it is finitely long.

                                        Now you are able to decide what things are possible in principle and what things are not. You simply had to look up the list and see whether or not the thing that you examine is listed as impossible. If it is not listed as impossible – well, then it is at least possible. So far, so good.

                                        But now remember that there is a difference between a possible thing and a necessary thing. Necessary things must happen necessarily. Possible things are possible to happen, but mustn't happen. But now we have a problem: if certain possible things NEVER happen, they are in a certain sense IMPOSSIBLE, aren't they? Therefore, they had to be on the list of all impossible things!

                                        It seems that with this result we have deduced that possible and necessary things are one and the same – if something is “possible”, in reality it must be necessary to happen! This then would strengthen (prove?) the worldview of Many Worlds.

                                        But can this be? Can a simple thought experiment with a simple finitely long list somewhat prove the Many Worlds interpretation of QM be correct? That would mean that logics somewhat could dictate how fundamental physics should behave!

                                        I think there are at least two errors in the above line of reasoning. Firstly we have no such list. Secondly logics tells me – on the basis of the two given examples – that what is possible to exist, what is impossible to exist and what is ultimately necessary to exist are things that are at least beyond human reasoning. I would go a step further and say that all three modalities may not be ultimately fixed, so there is plenty of “wiggle room”. For this to be true and at the same time not be drifting into paraconsistent logics, in my opinion it needs a Creator whose abilities are beyond human understanding of causality and human logical systems. That is what I refer to when I say that logics is able to “transcend” itself: one needs a reference point where it is able to transcend into.

                                        You are right, the ontological question is at the heart of how to interpret QM. The latest effort to circumvent non-locality that I have read about is by Tim Palmer and Sabine Hossenfelder. They suggest that the state space of all quantum mechanically possible experiments is such that not only the probabilities come out according to the Born rule, but also such that certain states that are implicit in all the Bell inequalities aren't existent in that huge state space.

                                        What the authors in my opinion have done is nothing other than to define a list of allowed states for the purpose of explaining violations of Bell-like inequalities without having to introduce space-time like nonlocalities. Although I cannot exclude the existence of such a state-space, I like the approach for two reasons: firstly it demonstrates how thin the line between possible and impossible is – judged by human beings. Secondly it is obvious (at least to me) that this approach (called “supermeasure”) is entirely motivated by the intention to avoid non-locality in physics.

                                        Similar hypothesis' have been facilitated with infinities involved by taking the mathematical fact of self-referencing formulas as physical facts, saying that the bottom layer of reality is infinitely fractal in nature. I whole heartedly would say that George Ellis is right what he says about infinities in nature.

                                        I also agree that unity is indeed a holy grail, I think it is directly experienced by human beings via their 5 senses that seem to be very well “integrated” into consciousness such that we experience the world around us as a unity. I therefore think that consciousness and its unity is a separate level of reality, at least when the brain works how it should (see brain-split patients etc. where that does not quite work out). For me, it is no wonder why physicists strive for unity, since I think that is what is the case anyways. Monotheistic religions have figured this out and Christianity (and the bible) is built on the assumption that nature (creation) is not equal with God. Abraham, before he went to the promised land, worshiped a moon goddess, thus worshiped nature, the creation instead of the Creator.

                                        The problem with the hypothesis of a Creator is not that this hypothesis is stupid right from the start, but that it has the “baggage” of tension between what individuals dreams for their own lifes and what God gave as commandments for each individual – to enhance the whole, not only the individual. Surely, there are other problems like the quest of evil in the world etc. But from a logical point of view I would say that nothing can speak against such a Creator, since we not even know on a logical basis what things are fundamentally impossible to exist, what things are fundamentally possible to exist and what things are fundamentally necessary to exist. About the latter I would say that for reaching at all a grip on what is fundamental in reality, human logics demands that itself is a clever invention of something that is necessarily more intelligent than human beings.

                                        I know, many people will disagree with that. But on what basis should the human brain be ever able to discover something like a “theory of everything”, other than on the basis of wishful thinking, means the wish that the universe should be such that it is totally congruent to human logics and human mathematics? And if true, wouldn't that be the most anthropocentric idea in the whole history of mankind – the fundamental layer of reality is such that it perfectly fits the intellectual capacities of a randomly evolved “ape” that at some point in time “realized” that he is neither at the center of the universe, nor at the center of the solar system nor at any center at all. Nonetheless scientists strongly believe that this “ape” should at least be at the center of intelligence in the universe such that it is able to “find out” that its intellectual capacities are perferctly congruent with fundamental reality... Well, these lines of thoughts are not convincing to me, since they obviously are born out of wishful thinking that an impersonal, solely material and rigogorously deterministic physical reality should deliver to us what we so whole-heartedly wish for.

                                        It may well be that we really cannot unite QM with GR. Not because reality is not a unity, but because the big picture isn't solely made up only from physical things. It may well be that physical reality is not there for the purpose that humans understand how “it works”, but for an entirely different purpose. To cut a long story short, many scientists in my opinion seem to think that reality is there for the purpose of entirely understanding it by humans. I see that as an equally anthropocentric idea as may be considered the idea of a Creator, so in this respect both ideas are at par.

                                        Best wishes
                                        Aquamarine Tapir

                                          Dear Beige Bandicoot,

                                          in my previous post, I left out certain aspects of what you wrote. I like to add my thoughts on these aspects here.

                                          Concerning consciousness, in my opinion there is this huge gap between death physical material that in parts can be measured and conscious Qualia. Measured always means a quantitative evaluation on a certain scale. It is all about the question “how much X is involved?”.

                                          Qualia on the other hand expresses qualities. If you would get blind tomorrow, a huge part of these qualities would vanish: you can't anymore navigate easily in the world, things will get much more stressful. We know from blind people that they not even “see” a black screen, they seem to see “nothing”. Nonetheless, in comparison to a dead stone, the latter not even “sees nothing” or can describe what it is to be blind.

                                          So even the total lack of vision, the latter being something that could theoretically be measured for example by inventing a quantitative scale for the impression of the colour purple, is a qualitative aspect of consciousness. It cannot be desribed other by some insufficient human words or some quantitative scale. But nowhere within that scale and its measurement algorithm we ever will find what it is like to see the colour purple, the quality of the experience – or in other words, experience itself. The world of mathematics has only “experience” insofar as it is projected by human beings into that mathematics. I think many mathematicians confuse this aspect: you can only talk about qualia-like “qualities” in mathematics because there is the experience of what it is like to do mathematics and this is solely due to the existence of Qualia.

                                          I conclude from this that approximating scientifically what Qualia is “made of” will run into the same conundrum, the experience of what it is like to have certain qualia must implicitely be put into the ontology of the theory that aims to explain it in the first place and we end up with a kind of tautology, packaged into what we then later call a “theory of Qualia”. That such a theory must be very strange in order to grasp what Qualia is “made of” then could be demonstrated if one explains that theory to the totally blind person.

                                          Of course, the blind person will not see colours during us explaining colours to that person. What that person presumably will “experience” (thus, hear) is a lot of quantitative desriptions about the human brain, thus explanations for why that person is not able to see colours. Since that person was formerly able to see colours (if not blind from birth), there has to be a change in the person's brain. But even figuring out that cange, in my opinion, is not at all sufficient to capture what it is like to have visual qualia – or what it is like to NOT have visual qualia. It once more will only be about the correlates of consciousness in the human brain (what in itself is a worthwile project to undertake).

                                          “... any further proof or counterexample on an empirical basis also requires that we have assumed a certain ontology and relation to the (epistemical) model to be tested.”

                                          Yes, that is true and that's a huge problem, since one can always invent further “explanations” to even counteract any counterexamples. The question then becomes how independent these explanations are from beliefs. In the case of the “supermeasure” hypothesis to explain away non-locality, I would say that this hypothesis is obviously motivated by the wish to make QM locally-realistic. That is not bad in itself, but is at odds with statistical independence and attributes to human-made quantum experiments a special status, or formulated alternatively it attributes to all quantum measurements in nature the feature that the results should be exclusively due to locally-realistic interactions. In my opinion, the latter, although it at first sight seems to be reasonable to assume that ontology, nonetheless is motivated solely by human wishes, not by evidence. So it is a matter of taste whether or not one believes in a state-space that is of the kind the “supermeasure” hypothesis proposes it. And “taste” is clearly totally dependent on the existence of human beings and their preferences! Moreover, how could we ever explain that something like “taste” exists in the universe, be it on the basis of fundamental non-locality or on the basis of a locally-realistic picture of the world? Once more, here the cat bites into its own tail and the problem of Qualia again shines through. Once more, it seems to be a matter of taste to see the factual existence of Qualia as a “problem” or to see it as a “solution” (in the sense that it points to something generically meaningful in the universe).

                                          Yes, you are right, these “musings” are nothing else than questioning once again an assumed ontology (the one that says that there cannot be any final, teological reasons for the existence of the universe and all the rest) and trying to replace it by another one. Asking for a deeper reason for the existence of “taste”, “preferences”, “beliefs” and assumptions in a world that is assumed to be almost fundamentally made out of merely dead stuff is at the one hand a heresy – but on the other hand that is what science is doing all the time (asking questions). So I think there is something wrong with attributing to the existence of dead stuff the sticker “existence without further reason”. That, self-evidently, is once more “just” another ontological assumption, but in my opinion one that is in congruence with the existence of “taste”, “preferences”, “beliefs” and “final reasons” (the latter meant in the sense of Aristotle's fourth cause).

                                          In my opinion one cannot argue away the existence of these qualia-like things. “Final reasons” are already implicit in every attempt to find a “theory of everything”. These final reasons will not be implicit in the theory itself, but these final reasons are surely already implicit within the scientists' agenda (belief) to at all search for such a theory, since it is his wish to finally find all the reasons that could act as final evidence for a universe that has no such final reasons to exist! Moreover, it is believed that this universe should be such that it allows human beings to find that final evidence!

                                          For me, that kind of agenda is somewhat a contradiction in terms, showing that we are far away from any evidence to finally explaining how and why the world is what it is. We not even can map the landscape of all impossible, all possible and all necessary things, and in my opinion for good reasons, since these three modalities may not be that interdependent on each other as we may think they are: from an assumed bird's eye view they even may be logically independent from each other in the sense that God has the freedom of not having fixed many of them eternally.

                                          Well, that's it for now, again a really long comment.

                                          Best wishes and looking forward to your comments on what I also already wrote in the course of this contest. Hope that it could make some sense to you and the reader in general.

                                          Aquamarine Tapir

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